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of us, the laws, but by men; but if you depart so shamefully, returning injustice and injury, having transgressed your own agreements and covenants with us, and having worked evil against those whom you least ought—yourself and your friends and your fatherland and us—we will be angry with you while you live, and there our brothers, the laws in Hades, will not receive you kindly, knowing that you attempted to destroy us, for your part.”

13.10.1 10. THAT ONE MUST NOT FLEE DEATH FOR THE SAKE OF TRUTH; FROM THE APOLOGY OF SOCRATES

“Perhaps, then, someone might say: ‘Well, are you not ashamed, Socrates, to have pursued such a practice, from which you are now in danger of dying?’ But to this person I would make a just reply, that you do not speak well, O man, if you think that a man who is of any small benefit ought to take into account the danger of living or dying, but should consider this alone when he acts, whether he is doing just or unjust things 13.10.2 and the deeds of a good or a bad man. For by your argument, the demigods who died at Troy would be worthless, both the others and the son of Thetis, who so despised danger, in comparison with enduring something shameful, that, when his mother, being a goddess, said to him as he was eager to kill Hector, something like this, I believe: ‘O child, if you avenge the murder of your companion Patroclus and kill Hector, you yourself will die; for straightway,’ she says, ‘after Hector your doom is ready.’ And he, hearing this, made light of death and danger, but feared much more to live as a coward and not to avenge his friends, ‘Straightway,’ he says, ‘may I die,’ after inflicting punishment on the wrongdoer, ‘so that I do not remain here, an object of ridicule beside the curved ships, a burden on the earth.’ 13.10.3 Do you think he took any thought of death and danger? For this is how it is, O men of Athens, in truth: wherever a man stations himself, believing it to be best, or is stationed by a commander, there he must, as it seems to me, remain and face danger, taking no account 13.10.4 of either death or anything else before what is shameful. I, then, would have done a terrible thing, O men of Athens, if when the commanders whom you chose to command me stationed me, both in Potidaea and in Amphipolis and at Delium and somewhere else where they stationed me, I remained like anyone else and risked death, but when the god stations me, as I thought and supposed, that I must live philosophizing and examining myself and others, then, fearing death or any other thing whatsoever, I should desert my 13.10.5 post. That would indeed be a terrible thing, and truly then someone might justly bring me into court, on the grounds that I do not believe gods exist, disobeying the oracle and fearing death and thinking myself wise when I am not. For to fear death, gentlemen, is nothing other than to seem to be wise when one is not; for it is to seem to know what one does not know. For no one knows death, not even if it happens to be the greatest of all goods for man, but they fear it as if they knew well that it is the greatest of evils. And yet how is this not that shameful ignorance, of thinking one knows what one does not know? 13.10.6 But I, gentlemen, in this and here perhaps differ from the many; and if I should claim to be wiser than anyone in any way, it would be in this, that not knowing sufficiently about the things in Hades, I also think that I do not know. But to do wrong and to disobey one's better, both god and man, I know that this is evil and shameful. Before the evils, then, which I know are evils, I will never fear or flee from things which I do not know if they may even 13.10.7 happen to be good. So not even if you were now to acquit me, disbelieving Anytus, who said that either I ought not to have come here in the first place, or since

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ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων, ἀλλ' ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων· ἐὰν δὲ ἐξέλθῃς οὕτως αἰσχρῶς ἀνταδικήσας τε καὶ ἀντικακουργήσας, τὰς σαυτοῦ ὁμολογίας τε καὶ συνθήκας τὰς πρὸς ἡμᾶς παραβὰς καὶ κακὰ ἐργασάμενος τούτους οὓς ἥκιστα ἔδει, σαυτόν τε καὶ τοὺς φίλους καὶ πατρίδα καὶ ἡμᾶς, ἡμεῖς τέ σοι χαλεπανοῦμεν ζῶντι καὶ ἐκεῖ οἱ ἡμέτεροι ἀδελφοί, οἱ ἐν Ἅιδου νόμοι, οὐκ εὐμενῶς σε ὑποδέξονται, εἰδότες ὅτι καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐπεχείρησας ἀπολέσαι τὸ σὸν μέρος.»

13.10.1 ιʹ. ΟΤΙ ΜΗ ∆ΕΟΙ ΦΕΥΓΕΙΝ ΤΟΝ ΥΠΕΡ ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑΣ ΘΑΝΑΤΟΝ· ΑΠΟ ΤΗΣ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑΣ

«Ἴσως ἂν οὖν εἴποι τις· εἶτ' οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοιοῦτον ἐπιτήδευμα ἐπιτηδεύσας, ἐξ οὗ κινδυνεύεις νυνὶ ἀποθανεῖν; ἐγὼ δὲ τούτῳ δίκαιον ἂν λόγον ἀντείποιμι, ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, εἰ οἴει δεῖν κίνδυνον ὑπολογίζεσθαι τοῦ ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι ἄνδρα ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελός ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνο μόνον σκοπεῖν, ὅταν πράττῃ, πότερον δίκαια ἢ ἄδικα πράτ13.10.2 τει καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἔργα ἢ κακοῦ. φαῦλοι γὰρ ἂν τῷ γε σῷ λόγῳ εἶεν τῶν ἡμιθέων ὅσοι ἐν Τροίᾳ τετελευτήκασιν, οἵ τε ἄλλοι καὶ ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος υἱός, ὃς τοσοῦτον τοῦ κινδύνου κατεφρόνησε παρὰ τὸ αἰσχρόν τι ὑπομεῖναι ὥστε, ἐπειδὴ εἶπεν ἡ μήτηρ αὐτῷ προθυμουμένῳ Ἕκτορα ἀποκτεῖναι, θεὸς οὖσα, οὑτωσί πως, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι· ὦ παῖ, εἰ τιμωρήσεις Πατρόκλῳ τῷ ἑταίρῳ τὸν φόνον καὶ Ἕκτορα ἀποκτενεῖς, αὐτὸς ἀποθανῇ· αὐτίκα γάρ τοι φησί μεθ' Ἕκτορα πότμος ἑτοῖμος. ὁ δὲ τοῦτο ἀκούσας τοῦ μὲν θανάτου καὶ τοῦ κινδύνου ὠλιγώρησεν, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον δείσας τὸ ζῆν κακὸς ὢν καὶ τοῖς φίλοις μὴ τιμωρεῖν, «αὐτίκα», φησί, «τεθναίην» δίκην ἐπιθεὶς τῷ ἀδικοῦντι, ἵνα μὴ ἐνθάδε μένω καταγέλαστος παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν, ἄχθος ἀρούρης. 13.10.3 μὴ αὐτὸν οἴει φροντίσαι θανάτου καὶ κινδύνου; οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ· οὗ ἄν τις αὑτὸν τάξῃ ἡγησάμενος βέλτιστον εἶναι ἢ ὑπ' ἄρχοντος ταχθῇ, ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, μένοντα κινδυνεύειν, μηδὲν 13.10.4 ὑπολογιζόμενον μήτε θάνατον μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ. ἐγὼ οὖν δεινὰ ἂν εἴην εἰργασμένος, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ ὅτε μέν με οἱ ἄρχοντες ἔταττον, οὓς ὑμεῖς εἵλεσθε ἄρχειν μου, καὶ ἐν Ποτιδαίᾳ καὶ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει καὶ ἐπὶ ∆ηλίῳ καὶ ἄλλοθί που οὗ ἐκεῖνοι ἔταττον, ἔμενον ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλος τις καὶ ἐκινδύνευον ἀποθανεῖν, τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος, ὡς ἐγὼ ᾠήθην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον, φιλοσοφοῦντά με δεῖν ζῆν καὶ ἐξετάζοντα ἐμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθεὶς θάνατον ἢ ἄλλ' ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα λίποιμι τὴν τά13.10.5 ξιν. δεινὸν μεντἂν εἴη καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τότ' ἄν με δικαίως εἰσάγοι τις εἰς δικαστήριον, ὅτι οὐ νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι ἀπειθῶν τῇ μαντείᾳ καὶ δεδιὼς θάνατον καὶ οἰόμενος σοφὸς εἶναι οὐκ ὤν. τὸ γάρ τοι θάνατον δεδιέναι, ὦ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ δοκεῖν σοφὸν εἶναι μὴ ὄντα· δοκεῖν γὰρ εἰδέναι ἐστὶν ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν. οἶδε μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς τὸν θάνατον οὐδ' εἰ τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων μέγιστον ὂν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, δεδίασι δὲ ὡς εὖ εἰδότες ὅτι μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστι. καίτοι πῶς οὐκ ἀμαθία ἐστὶν αὕτη ἡ ἐπονείδιστος, ἡ τοῦ οἴεσθαι 13.10.6 εἰδέναι ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν; ἐγὼ δ', ὦ ἄνδρες, τούτῳ καὶ ἐνταῦθα διαφέρω τῶν πολλῶν ἴσως ἀνθρώπων· καὶ εἰ δή τῳ σοφώτερός του φαίην εἶναι, τούτῳ ἄν, ὅτι οὐκ εἰδὼς ἱκανῶς περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου οὕτω καὶ οἴομαι οὐκ εἰδέναι· τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀπειθεῖν τῷ βελτίονι, καὶ θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν ἐστιν οἶδα. πρὸ οὖν τῶν κακῶν ὧν οἶδα ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, ἃ μὴ οἶδα εἰ 13.10.7 καὶ ἀγαθὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει, οὐδέποτε φοβήσομαι οὐδὲ φεύξομαι· ὥστε οὐδ' εἴ με νῦν ὑμεῖς ἀφίετε, Ἀνύτῳ ἀπιστήσαντες, ὃς ἔφη ἢ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐ δεῖν ἐμὲ δεῦρο εἰσελθεῖν ἢ ἐπειδὴ