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it is not possible for a single nature to be split between the concept of a product and an offspring. For since each of these, when spoken of by itself, has its own distinct meaning, it is absolutely necessary that its proper and related correlative 3.2.107 pairing be conceived along with the names. For other relative terms as well do not have their affinity with what is foreign and unsuitable, but even if that to which it refers is passed over in silence, its correlative is automatically heard along with the original term; for instance, creator, slave, friend, son, and the like. For all things that are considered in reference to another, each indicates through its appellation the proper and connected relationship of what is signified, having its association with what is of a different kind unmixed. 3.2.108 For neither is the name 'creator' yoked with 'son', nor is the term 'slave' referred to 'creator', nor does 'friend' signify 'slave', nor 'son', 'master', but we recognize a clear and distinct pairing of each of these with its suitable counterpart, understanding through 'friend' another friend, through 'slave' the master, the work through the creator, and through the son, the father. So therefore, both 'offspring' and 'product' have their principal significance in relation to something. Therefore, 'the one who begot' is yoked with 'offspring', and 'the one who created' with 'creation', and it is absolutely necessary, if we are not to cause some confusion of realities through the interchange of names, to preserve for each of the relative terms what is properly co-signified. 3.2.109 Since, then, the concept of these words and what it refers to is clear, how did he who advances his doctrines through logical artifice fail to understand the proper meaning of these names as relative terms, but thinks it <necessary> to fit 'offspring' to the one who has made and 'product' to the one who has begotten, saying 20that the essence of the Son admits to itself the appellations of 'offspring' and 'product' and 'creation', while preserving an undivided relation to the one who has begotten and made and created 3.2.110?20 For one thing is not of a nature to be divided up into different relations, but the son is related to the father, and what is begotten to the one who begot, while the product has its reference to the one who made it; unless perhaps one might consider some misuse, in some indifferent custom of words, to be more authoritative than their natural meaning. 3.2.111 By what reasonings, then, and by what arguments, according to that invincible dialectic of his, having turned the opinions of the majority to the contrary, does he authoritatively declare these things: that when the God over all is both conceived of and called Creator and Father, the Son is suitably related to both appellations, being called equally a creation and an offspring 3.2.112? For since the usage and precision of language properly distinguishes such names, applying the name of 'generation' to those begotten from the essence itself, but that of 'creation' to those constituted externally to the nature of the maker, and since for this reason the divine doctrines, in the tradition of the knowledge of God, have handed down Father and Son, not Creator and work, so that there might be no corruption into blasphemy, thrusting the Son away to what is alien and foreign to such an appellation, and so that the godless doctrines which separate the Only-begotten from his essential kinship with the Father might gain no entrance, he who says that the appellation 'product' is fitting for the Son will surely say, as a consequence, that the title 'son' also applies fittingly to a 'product', so that, if the Son is a creation, then the heaven is a son, and each of the things that have come into being is properly named by the appellation 'son' 3.2.113 according to this prose-writer. For if He has the name not by sharing in the nature of the one who begot Him, but is called Son because He is created, the same reasoning will grant that a lamb and a dog and a frog and everything that subsists by the will of the maker also be named by the appellation of 'son'. But if each of these, because it is outside the nature of God, is not a son, nor God

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ἐνδέχεται μίαν τινὰ φύσιν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ποιήματος καὶ γεννήματος ἔννοιαν διασχισθῆναι. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ λεγόμενον τούτων ἑκάτερον ἰδιά ζουσαν ἔχει τὴν ἑρμηνείαν, ἀνάγκη πᾶσα οἰκείαν τε καὶ συγγενῆ τοῖς ὀνόμασι συνεπινοεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν σχετικὴν 3.2.107 συζυγίαν. καὶ γὰρ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν πρός τι λεγομένων οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἀλλότριόν τε καὶ ἀκατάλληλον ἔχει τὴν οἰκειότητα, ἀλλὰ κἂν σιωπηθῇ πρὸς ὃ λέγεται, αὐτομάτως μετὰ τοῦ πρωτοτύπου καὶ τὸ συνεζευγμένον ἀκούεται· οἷον δημιουργὸς δοῦλος φίλος υἱὸς καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. πάντα γὰρ ὅσα τῇ πρὸς ἕτερον ἀναφορᾷ θεωρεῖται, τὴν οἰκείαν ἕκαστον καὶ συνημμένην τοῦ δηλουμένου συγγένειαν διὰ τῆς προσηγορίας παρίστησιν, ἄμικτον ἔχοντα τὴν πρὸς τὸ ἑτερογενὲς κοινω 3.2.108 νίαν. οὔτε γὰρ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ τὸ ὄνομα τῷ υἱῷ συνέ ζευκται οὔτε ἡ τοῦ δούλου φωνὴ πρὸς τὸν δημιουργὸν ἀναφέρεται οὔτε ὁ φίλος τὸν δοῦλον ἐδήλωσεν οὔτε ὁ υἱὸς τὸν δεσπότην, ἀλλὰ φανερὰν καὶ διακεκριμένην τούτων ἑκάστου τὴν πρὸς τὸ κατάλληλον συζυγίαν ἐπιγινώσκομεν, νοοῦντες διὰ μὲν τοῦ φίλου ἕτερον φίλον, διὰ δὲ τοῦ δούλου τὸν κύριον, τὸ δὲ ἔργον διὰ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ καὶ διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ τὸν πατέρα. οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ τὸ γέννημα καὶ τὸ ποίημα πρός τι τὴν κυρίαν ἔμφασιν ἔχει. οὐκοῦν συνέ ζευκται τῷ μὲν γεννήματι ὁ γεννήσας, ὁ δὲ κτίσας τῷ κτίσματι, καὶ δεῖ πάντως, εἴγε μὴ μέλλομεν σύγχυσίν τινα τῶν πραγμάτων διὰ τῆς τῶν ὀνομάτων ὑπαλλαγῆς ἐμποιεῖν, σῴζειν ἑκάστῳ τῶν πρός τι λεγομένων τὸ οἰκείως συσση μαινόμενον. 3.2.109 Φανερᾶς οὖν οὔσης τῆς τῶν λέξεων τούτων ἐννοίας πρὸς ὅ τι βλέπει, πῶς ὁ διὰ τῆς λογικῆς τεχνολογίας προ άγων τὰ δόγματα τὴν οἰκείαν τῶν πρός τι διάνοιαν ἐπὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων οὐ κατενόησεν, ἀλλ' ἁρμόζειν <δεῖν> οἴεται τῷ πεποιηκότι τὸ γέννημα καὶ τῷ γεγεννηκότι τὸ ποίημα, λέγων 20τοῦ υἱοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν εἰς ἑαυτὴν δέχεσθαι τὰς τοῦ γεννήματος καὶ ποιήματος καὶ κτίσματος προσηγορίας, ἀμέριστον δὲ σῴζειν τὴν πρὸς τὸν γεγεννηκότα καὶ ποιήσαντα καὶ κτίσαντα 3.2.110 σχέσιν20; τὸ γὰρ ἓν πρᾶγμα πρὸς διαφόρους σχέσεις κατα μερισθῆναι φύσιν οὐκ ἔχει, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν υἱὸς τῷ πατρὶ προσ ωκείωται καὶ τὸ γεννηθὲν τῷ γεννήσαντι, τὸ δὲ ποίημα πρὸς τὸν πεποιηκότα τὴν ἀναφορὰν ἔχει· πλὴν εἰ μή τινα κατάχρησιν ἐν ἀδιαφόρῳ τινὶ συνηθείᾳ ῥημάτων κυριωτέραν ἡγοῖτό τις εἶναι τῆς προσφυοῦς σημασίας. 3.2.111 Τίσιν οὖν λογισμοῖς καὶ ποίαις κατασκευαῖς κατὰ τὴν ἄμαχον διαλεκτικὴν ἐκείνην εἰς τοὐναντίον τὰς δόξας τῶν πολλῶν μεταστήσας ταῦτα κατ' ἐξουσίαν διέξεισιν, ὅτι τοῦ ἐπὶ πάντων θεοῦ καὶ κτίστου καὶ πατρὸς νοουμένου τε καὶ λεγομένου ὁ υἱὸς πρὸς ἀμφοτέρας τὰς προσηγορίας ἐπιτη δείως ἔχει, καὶ κτίσμα καὶ γέννημα κατὰ τὸ ἴσον λεγό 3.2.112 μενος; τῆς γὰρ τοῦ λόγου συνηθείας τε καὶ ἀκριβείας οἰκείως διακρινούσης τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ τὸ μὲν τῆς γεννήσεως ὄνομα ἐπὶ τῶν ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς οὐσίας γεννω μένων λεγούσης, τὸ δὲ τῆς κτίσεως ἐπὶ τῶν ἔξωθεν τῆς τοῦ κατασκευάζοντος φύσεως συνισταμένων, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τῶν θείων δογμάτων ἐν τῇ παραδόσει τῆς θεογνωσίας πατέρα καὶ υἱὸν παραδεδωκότων, οὐ κτίστην καὶ ἔργον, ὡς ἂν μή τις γένοιτο παραφθορὰ πρὸς τὸ βλάσφημον, εἰς τὸ ἀλλότριόν τε καὶ ξένον τῆς τοιαύτης προσηγορίας τὸν υἱὸν ἀπωθούσης, μηδέ τινα πάροδον λάβοι τὰ ἄθεα δόγματα τὰ τῆς κατ' οὐσίαν οἰκειότητος τὸν μονογενῆ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀφο ρίζοντα, ὁ λέγων τῷ υἱῷ τὴν τοῦ ποιήματος ἁρμόζειν προσ ηγορίαν ἐρεῖ πάντως κατὰ τὸ ἀκόλουθον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ποιή ματος τὴν τοῦ υἱοῦ κλῆσιν προσφυῶς ἔχειν, ὥστε, εἰ ὁ υἱὸς κτίσμα καὶ ὁ οὐρανὸς υἱὸς καὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν γεγονότων κυρίως κατὰ τὸν λογογράφον τῇ τοῦ υἱοῦ προσ 3.2.113 ηγορίᾳ κατονομάζεται. εἰ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος οὐχὶ τῷ κοινωνεῖν τῷ γεγεννηκότι τῆς φύσεως ἔχει τὸ ὄνομα, ἀλλὰ καθὸ κτιστός ἐστι, κατὰ τοῦτο υἱὸς ὀνομάζεται, ὁ αὐτὸς δώσει λόγος καὶ ἀμνὸν καὶ κύνα καὶ βάτραχον καὶ πάντα, ὅσα θελήματι τοῦ πεποιηκότος ὑπέστη, τῇ τοῦ υἱοῦ προσηγορίᾳ κατονομάζεσθαι. εἰ δὲ τούτων ἕκαστον διὰ τὸ ἔξω τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ φύσεως εἶναι υἱὸς οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲ θεὸς