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perception of contraries; and perfect, as one who unyieldingly fights against pleasure and pain according to sense through self-control and endurance (596); and whole, as one who preserves unharmed, in the stability of sameness according to reason, the states which are warring against the dispositions that are contrary to one another according to sense; I mean action and contemplation, joined to one another, and neither separated from the other; but action, revealing the knowledge of contemplation through its ways; and contemplation, no less than reason, being the virtue armored by action.

Therefore, since the logos has shown that both pain and pleasure are twofold; and that the one consists according to the soul, the other according to sense; come let us also consider their causes more summarily. Now, the mode of pain according to the soul is twofold. The one consisting in one's own transgressions, the other in those of others. And the cause of such pain is clearly established as the pleasure according to sense of the one who is pained, or of those for whom he is pained. For according to the precise account, there is almost no sin at all among men that does not have as the beginning of its own genesis the soul's irrational relationship with sense for the sake of pleasure. But the cause of pleasure according to the soul is manifestly the pain according to sense of the one who is pleased and rejoices in his own or others' virtues; for according to the precise account there is almost no virtue at all among men that does not have as the beginning of its own genesis the soul's reasoned aversion from sense.

And when the soul has acquired an aversion from sense for the sake of virtue, sense will necessarily be in pains; not having the power, which is joined to it according to the soul's volitional relationship, for devising pleasures; but on the contrary, manfully beating back through self-control the insurrection of its own natural pleasures; and remaining completely relentless through endurance toward the introduction of unnatural and involuntary pains; and not departing from the god-befitting worth and glory according to virtue on account of unsubstantial pleasure. And not falling from the height of the virtues toward the perception of pains, out of regard for the flesh on account of painful sensation. And the cause of pain according to sense is established as the soul's complete lack of occupation with the things that are according to nature. The unnatural activity of the soul manifestly establishes pleasure according to sense, being able to have no other beginning of its constitution than the soul's renunciation of the things according to nature.

For intellect and sense have their natural activity opposed to one another, on account of the extreme difference and otherness of their underlying subjects. For the one has as its subjects intelligible and incorporeal substances, which it is its nature to apprehend essentially; but the other, sensible and corporeal natures, which it too apprehends naturally.

Since, therefore, it is not possible for the intellect to pass over to the kindred (597) intelligibles, without the contemplation of the sensibles set forth in between; and since it is completely impossible for this [contemplation] to be born [ Fr.γενέσθαι] without sense, which is composite with it, but is by nature kindred to the sensibles; reasonably, if indeed, upon encountering them, it becomes entangled in the surfaces of visible things, thinking the composite sense to be a natural activity; it has fallen away from the intelligible things that are according to nature, and has seized, with both hands, as it is said, the bodies that are contrary to nature; by which, being active contrary to reason, on account of the sense that has conquered it; it becomes the begetter of pain according to the soul, which is tortured by the frequent scourgings of conscience; and it manifestly becomes the maker of pleasure according to sense, being fattened by the devices of the ways that minister to the flesh. But if, at the same time as it encounters visible things, it cuts through the surface toward sense and beholds the spiritual principles of beings, pure of the shapes upon them, it has worked out the pleasure of the soul; to no one

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αἴσθησιν ἐναντίων· τέλειος δέ, ὡς τῇ κατ᾿ αἴσθησιν ἡδονῇ τε καί λύπῃ, δι᾿ ἐγκρατείας καί ὑπομονῆς (596) ἀνενδότως μαχόμενος· ὁλόκληρος δέ, ὡς τάς μαχομένας ταῖς κατ᾿ αἴσθησιν ἀλλήλαις ἀντικειμέναις διαθέσεσιν ἕξεις ἐν τῇ σταθηρότητι τῆς κατά τόν λόγον ταυτότητος ἀλωβήτους διαφυλάττων· φημί δέ τήν πρᾶξιν καί τήν θεωρίαν ἀλλήλαις συνεχομένας, καί μηδεμίαν τῆς ἑτέρας διεζευγμένην· ἀλλά τήν μέν πρᾶξιν, τῆς θεωρίας τήν γνῶσιν διά τῶν τρόπων προφαίνουσαν· τήν δέ θεωρίαν, οὐχ ἧττον τοῦ λόγου τήν ἀρετήν τεθωρακισμένην τῆς πράξεως.

Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδή τήν τε λύπην καί τήν ἡδονήν διττήν οὖσαν ἀπέδειξεν ὁ λόγος· καί τήν μέν, κατά ψυχήν, τήν δέ, κατ᾿ αἴσθησιν συνισταμένην· φέρε καί τάς τούτων συνοπτικώτερον θεωρήσωμεν αἰτίας. Τῆς μέν οὖν κατά ψυχήν λύπης διττός ὁ τρόπος. Ὁ μέν, ἐπί τοῖς οἰκείοις, ὁ δέ, ἐπί τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις πλημμελήμασι συνιστάμενος. Αἰτία δέ τῆς τοιαύτης λύπης ἡ κατ᾿ αἴσθησιν τοῦ λυπουμένου σαφῶς, ἤ τῶν δι᾿ οὕς λυπεῖται, καθέστηκεν ἡδονή. Κατά γάρ τόν ἀκριβῆ λόγον, οὐκ ἔστι παντελῶς ἁμαρτία σχεδόν ἐν ἀνθρώποις, μή τήν ψυχῆς πρός αἴσθησιν ἡδονῆς ἕνεκεν ἀλόγιστον σχέσιν ἀρχήν τοῖς οἰκείας γενέσεως ἔχουσαν. Τῆς δέ κατά ψυχήν ἡδονῆς αἰτία προδήλως ἐστίν, ἡ κατ᾿ αἴσθησιν τοῦ ἐπί ταῖς οἰκείαις ἤ ταῖς ἀλλοτρίαις ἀρεταῖς ἡδομένου τε καί χαίροντος λύπη· κατά γάρ τόν ἀκριβῆ λόγον οὐκ ἔστι παντελῶς ἀρετή σχεδόν ἐν ἀνθρώποις, μή τήν ψυχῆς πρός αἴσθησιν λελογισμένην ἀποδιάθεσιν ἀρχήν τῆς οἰκείας γενέσεως ἔχουσα.

Τῆς δέ ψυχῆς ὑπέρ ἀρετῆς πρός τήν αἴσθησιν ἀποδιάθεσιν κτησαμένης, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡ αἴσθησις ἐν πόνοις ἔσται· τήν τῶν ἡδέων ἐπινοητικήν συνημμένην, αὐτῇ κατά τήν γνωμικήν σχέσιν τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἔχουσα δύναμιν· τοὐναντίον δέ, τῶν μέν αὐτῆς φυσικῶν ἡδονῶν ἐπανάστασιν δι᾿ ἐγκρατείας ἀνδρικῶς ἀποῤῤαπίζουσαν· πρός δέ τήν τῶν παρά φύσιν καί ἀκουσίων πόνων ἐπαγωγήν, διά τῆς ὑπομονῆς ἀμείλικτον παντελῶς διαμένουσαν· καί τῆς κατ᾿ ἀρετήν θεοπρεποῦς ἀξίας τε καί δόξης, διά τήν ἀνυπόστατον ἡδονήν οὐκ ἐξισταμένην. Καί πρός τήν τῶν πόνων ἀντίληψιν φειδοῖ τῆς σαρκός διά τήν ὀδύνουσαν αἴσθησιν, τοῦ ὕψους τῶν ἀρετῶν οὐκ ἀποπίπτουσαν. Τῆς δέ κατ᾿ αἴσθησιν λύπης αἰτία καθέστηκεν, ἡ πρός τά κατά φύσιν τῆς ψυχῆς παντελής ἀσχολία. τήν κατ᾿ αἴσθησιν ἡδονήν ἡ παρά φύσιν ἐνέργεια τῆς ψυχῆς προδήλως ὑφίστησιν, ἄλλην ἀρχήν ἔχειν οὐ δυναμένην συστάσεως, ἤ τήν ψυχῆς τῶν κατά φύσιν ἀπόθεσιν.

Νοῦς γάρ καί αἴσθησις ἀντικειμένην ἔχουσι πρός ἄλληλα τήν κατά φύσιν ἐνέργειαν, διά τήν τῶν αὐτοῖς ὑποκειμένων ἀκροτάτην διαφοράν καί ἑτερότητα. Ὁ μέν γάρ ὑποκειμένας ἔχει τάς νοητάς καί ἀσωμάτους οὐσίας, ὧν κατ᾿ οὐσίαν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι πέφυκεν· ἡ δέ, τάς αἰσθητάς καί σωματικάς φύσεις, ὧν καί αὐτή φυσικῶς ἀντιλαμβάνεται.

Ἐπεί οὖν οὐκ ἔστι δυνατόν πρός τά συγγενῆ (597) νοητά νοῦν διαβῆναι, δίχα τῆς τῶν διά μέσου προβεβλημένων αἰσθητῶν θεωρίας· ταύτην δέ γεννᾶσθαι [ Fr.γενέσθαι] παντελῶς ἀμήχανον χωρίς τῆς αὐτῷ μέν συγκειμένης, τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς δέ κατά φύσιν συγγενοῦς αἰσθήσεως· εἰκότως εἰ μέν προσβαλών ἐνσχεθῇ ταῖς ἐπιφανείαις τῶν ὁρατῶν ἐνέργειαν εἶναι φυσικήν τήν συγκειμένην οἰόμενος αἴσθησιν· τῶν μέν κατά φύσιν ἐκπέπτωκε νοητῶν, τῶν δέ παρά φύσιν ἀμφοῖν ταῖν χεροῖν, τό δή λεγόμενον, ἐπελάβετο σωμάτων· οἷς παρά τόν λόγον ἐνεργούμενος, διά τήν αὐτόν ἐκνικήσασαν αἴσθησιν· τῆς μέν κατά ψυχήν λύπης γεννήτωρ καθίσταται, συχναῖς ταῖς κατά συνείδησιν μάστιξιν αἰκιζομένην· τῆς δέ κατ᾿ αἴσθησιν ἡδονῆς ἀριδήλως γίνεται ποιητής, ταῖς ἐπινοίαις τῶν περιποιητικῶν τῆς σαρκός τρόπων λιπαινόμενος. Εἰ δέ τήν πρός αἴσθησιν ἅμα τῇ προβολῇ τῶν ὁρωμένων διατεμών ἐπιφάνειαν, τούς πνευματικούς τῶν ὄντων καθαρούς τῶν ἐπ᾿ αὐτοῖς σχημάτων θεάσηται λόγους τήν μέν τῆς ψυχῆς ἡδονήν ματειργάσατο· μηδενί