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becoming of good things. And he says that temptations are twofold, the ones voluntary, the others involuntary; and the voluntary ones are fathers of bodily pleasure according to sense; and progenitors of grief according to the soul. For sin alone, when committed, grieves the soul. But the involuntary ones, which are shown in labors contrary to the will, are fathers of pleasure according to the soul, and progenitors of bodily pain according to sense.

6. The voluntary temptation, he says, brings about grief according to the soul; but clearly creates pleasure according to sense; while the involuntary one, the pleasure of the soul; and brings about the grief of the flesh.

7. The Lord, he says, teaches us to pray away voluntary temptations; as they are productive of pleasure for the flesh, but of pain for the soul; but the great James advises us to rejoice in involuntary temptations; as they take away the pleasure of the flesh, and the pain of the soul.

8. (601) Whom he calls perfect. 9. Whom he calls whole. 10. One who has had experience of the flesh's grief and pleasure might be called tested, as of ease

and of difficulty in matters concerning the flesh having been tried. But perfect is he who has wrestled down the pleasure of the flesh and its pain by the power of reason. And whole is he who has preserved the dispositions related to practice and contemplation immutably through intense focus on the divine.

11. Of all grief arising in the soul, he says, the pleasure of the flesh precedes. 12. That without the soul's impassioned relation to sense, among humans

there is no sin at all. 13. That he spiritually gladdens the soul, he says, who with voluntary things the flesh

subdues with labors. 14. That the genesis of virtue, he says, is the soul's voluntary toward the flesh

alienation. 15. He calls the intellectual power of the soul inventive; which, being separated from the according to

relation of sense, leaves the flesh destitute of providence toward pleasure, according to the relation in the will. Nor does it endure to comfort the pain of the flesh, on account of the will's complete engagement with divine matters in its relation.

16. The soul's putting away of things according to nature, he says, is naturally the beginning of pain according to sense. For when the soul is laboring over goods according to nature, the power that discovers ways of pleasure according to sense does not exist.

17. To sense are subject the objects of sense; and to the mind, the objects of the mind. There is, at any rate, a great difference between intelligible and sensible things.

18. The mind, he says, as long as it considers sense a power kindred to it by nature, being entangled with the surfaces of sensible things, devises the pleasures of the flesh, not being able to pass beyond the nature of visible things, being constrained by its impassioned relation to sense.

19. Fr. He who transfers the laws of beings to his own law by way of imitation, considering the movement of those deprived of reason to be virtuous. But he who changes his own [law] to the laws of others by way of imitation, is impassioned; carrying forth the power of reason towards irrationality.

20. That when reason prevails in us, he says, of necessity the flesh, having been enslaved to it for virtue, is tormented.

21. The flesh is of the soul, but the soul is not of the flesh. For the lesser, he says, is of the greater; but the greater is not of the lesser. Therefore, since the law of sin was implanted in the flesh through the transgression, which is pleasure according to sense, on account of which through labors

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ἀγαθῶν γινομένην. ∆ιττούς δέ λέγει καί τούς πειρασμούς, τούς μέν ἑκουσίους, τούς δέ ἀκουσίους· καί τούς μέν ἑκουσίους, τῆς μέν κατ᾿ αἴσθησιν σωματικῆς ἡδονῆς εἶναι πατέρας· τῆς δέ κατά ψυχήν λύπης εἶναι γεννήτορας. Μόνη γάρ πραχθεῖσα λυπεῖ τήν ψυχήν ἁμαρτία. Τούς δέ ἀκουσίους, οἵτινες ἐν τοῖς παρά γνώμην δείκνυνται πόνοις, τῆς μέν κατά ψυχἠν ἡδονῆς εἶναι πατέρας, τῆς δέ κατ᾿ αἴσθησιν σωματικῆς ὀδύνης εἶναι γεννήτορας.

στ΄. Ὁ μέν κατά γνώμην πειρασμός, φησι, τήν μέν κατά ψυχήν λύπην συνίστησι· τήν δέ κατ᾿ αἴσθησιν δημιουργεῖ σαφῶς ἡδονήν· ὁ δέ παρά γνώμην, τήν μέν τῆς ψυχῆς ἡδονήν· τήν δέ τῆς σαρκός λύπην ὑφίστησι.

ζ΄. Ὁ μέν Κύριος, φησί, τούς ἑκουσίους ἀπεύχεσθαι ἡμᾶς διδάσκει πειρασμούς· ὡς σαρκός μέν ἡδονῆς, ψυχῆς δέ ποιητικούς ὀδύνης· ὁ δέ μέγας Ἰάκωβος, ἐπί τοῖς ἀκουσίοις ἡμῖν παραινεῖ χαίρειν πειρασμοῖς· ὡς σαρκός μέν ἡδονήν, ψυχῆς δέ ὀδύνην ἀφαιρουμένους.

η΄. (601) Τίνα λέγει τέλειον. θ΄. Τίνα λέγει ὁλόκληρον. ι΄. Ὁ λύπης καί ἡδονῆς σαρκός πεῖραν λαβών, λέγοιτ᾿ ἄν δόκιμος, ὡς εὐχερείας

καί δυσχερείας τῶν περί σάρκα πραγμάτων πεπειραμένος. Τέλειος δέ, ὁ τήν ἡδονήν τῆς σαρκός, καί τήν ὀδύνην τῇ τοῦ λόγου δυνάμει καταπαλαίσας. Ὁλόκληρος δέ, ὁ τάς κατά τήν πρᾶξιν καί τήν θεωρίαν ἕξεις ἀτρέπτους τῇ περί τόν θεῖον συντονίᾳ διατηρήσας.

ια΄. Πάσης λύπης συνισταμένης κατά ψυχήν, ἡδονή σαρκός φησι προηγεῖται. ιβ΄. Ὅτι χωρίς τῆς κατά ψυχήν ἐμπαθοῦς πρός αἴσθησιν σχέσεως, ἐν ἀνθρώποις

οὐκ ἔστι παντελῶς ἁμαρτία. ιγ΄. Ὅτι ψυχήν πνευματικῶς εὐφραίνει, φησίν, ὁ τοῖς ἑκουσίοις τήν σάρκα

πόνοις δομάζων. ιδ΄. Ὅτι γένεσίς ἐστιν ἀρετῆς, φησίν, ἡ πρός τήν σάρκα τῆς ψυχῆς ἑκούσιος

ἀλλοτρίωσις. ιε΄. Ἐπινοητικήν λέγει τήν νοεράν τῆς ψυχῆς δύναμιν· ἥτις χωριζομένη τῆς κατ᾿

αἴσθησιν σχέσεως, ἔρημον τῆς πρός ἡδονήν τήν σάρκα καταλιμπάνει προνοίας κατά τήν ἐν γνώμῃ σχέσιν. Οὐδέ τήν ὀδύνην τῆς σαρκός ἀνεχομένης παραμυθεῖσθαι διά τήν ἐν σχέσει τῆς γνώμης ὁλικήν περί τά θεῖα σχολήν.

ιστ΄. Ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν κατά φύσιν ἀπόθεσίς φησι τῆς κατ᾿ αἴσθησιν ὀδύνης ἀρχή γίνεσθαι πέφυκε. Τῆς γάρ ψυχῆς περί τά κατά φύσιν ἀγαθά πονουμένης, οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ τῶν κατ᾿ αἴσθησιν τῆς ἡδονῆς τρόπων ἐφευρίσκουσα δύναμις.

ιζ΄. Ὑπόκειται τῇ μέν αἰσθήσει, τά αἰσθητά· τῷ δέ νῷ, τά νοητά. Πολλή γοῦν διαφορά νοητῶν ἐστι καί αἰσθητῶν.

ιη΄. Ὁ νοῦς, φησίν, ἅμα τήν αἴσθησιν οἰκείαν κατά φύσιν ἡγήσεται δύναμιν, ταῖς τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐπιπλεκόμενος ἐπιφανίαις, ἐπινοεῖ τάς τῆς σαρκός ἡδονάς, οὐ δυνάμενος τῶν ὁρατῶν διαβῆναι τήν φύσιν, τῇ πρός τήν αἴσθησιν ἐμπαθεῖ σχέσει περισχεθείς.

ιθ΄. Fr. Ὁ πρός τόν ἑαυτοῦ νόμον, τούς τῶν ὄντων κατά μίμησιν μεταφέρων νόμους, ἐνάρετον λογίζων τῶν ἐστερημένων λόγου τήν κίνησιν. Ὁ δέ τόν ἑαυτοῦ πρός τούς νόμους τῶν ἄλλων κατά μίμησιν μεταβάλλων, ἐμπαθής· πρός ἀλογίαν ἐκφέρων τοῦ λόγου τήν δύναμιν.

κ΄. Ὅτι κρατοῦντος ἐν ἡμῖν τοῦ λόγου φησίν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡ πρός ἀρετήν αὐτῶ δουλωθεῖσα βασανίζεται σάρξ.

κα΄. Ψυχῆς ἡ σάρξ, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ σαρκός ἡ ψυχή. Τοῦ γάρ κρείττονός φησι τόν ἧττον· ἀλλ᾿ οὐ τοῦ ἥττονος τό κρεῖττον. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδή τῇ σαρκί διά τήν παράβασιν ἐνεφύρη τῆς ἁμαρτίας ὁ νόμος, ὅπερ ἐστίν ἡ κατ᾿ αἴσθησιν ἡδονή, δι᾿ ἥν διά πόνων