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Therefore, regarding what has been said, no one could object that one who has learned a certain art for operating toward the better would be able to use the same art also for things that are not fitting, so we say that the power of conception was implanted by God in human nature for a good purpose, but when some misuse this inventive power, it often becomes a servant and collaborator of unprofitable 2.1.190 inventions. Therefore, it is not because conception is able to plausibly fashion false and nonexistent things, that for this reason it is unable to investigate things that truly are and genuinely exist, but its aptitude for the one becomes, for the discerning, a testimony of its power for the other. For the fact that the mind, when it sets out to devise some astonishment or delight for its audience, does not lack the conception for what it is attempting, but can give form to things with many hands or many heads or breathing fire or coiled with the writhings of serpents, or can exaggerate symmetry to a greater size or mutilate the measures of nature for the sake of the ridiculous, or can narrate how men and trees and birds come into being as springs through a transformation, by which those who take pleasure in such things can find some entertainment, I say this is the clearest proof that it would be able to comprehend also the higher objects of study through its inventive 2.1.191 power. For our mind has not been implanted by the Giver as perfect for the fashioning of non-existent things, but for the discovery of soul-profiting things has been allotted no power for providing what is beneficial; but just as the impulsive and volitional power of our soul was constructed in nature primarily for the desire of things noble and good, but someone might use such a movement also for things that are not fitting, and no one would say that its having an inclination at times toward base things is a proof that the will inclines toward nothing good, so also the movement of conception toward vain and useless things is not an accusation of its inability for what is useful, but becomes a proof that it is not inactive toward things that are both soul-profiting and necessary. For as it discovered there what leads to pleasure or astonishment, so also here it will not fail in its approaches to the truth. 2.1.192 One of the things being investigated was whether the first cause, which is God, exists without beginning or has its being dependent on some beginning. And having comprehended with our mind that what is conceived from another cannot be first, we devised a name expressive of such a supposition and we say that which exists without a super-eminent cause exists without beginning, that is, unbegotten. And that which so exists we have named unbegotten and without beginning, indicating through the name not what it is, but what it is not. 2.1.193 But that the concept may become as clear as possible, I will try to present it through a more vivid example. Let it be granted that the inquiry is about a certain tree, whether it is planted or has come into being spontaneously. If, then, it were from planting, we would certainly call the tree planted, but if spontaneously, unplanted. Such a name is not at variance with the truth; for the tree will certainly be one way or the other, and it does not indicate the particular nature of the plant. For we learned that it is self-grown through the term 'unplanted', but whether what is indicated is a plane-tree or a vine or some other such plant, 2.1.194 we have not been taught through such a designation. If, then, the example has been understood, it would be time to transfer the argument to the matter of which it is an example. We comprehended that the first cause has its being from no super-eminent cause. Therefore, bringing this concept into the form of a name, we called God, who exists unbegottenly, 'unbegotten'. That, then, he is not through generation, we have declared from the meaning of the name, but what the substance which exists unbegottenly is in its own nature, we have been guided in no way to perceive 2.1.195 from this appellation. For it was not likely that the conception of our reasonings should be strong enough to raise us above the measures of nature and set us upon what is incomprehensible and, of which it is not possible

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τοίνυν ἐπὶ τῶν εἰρημένων οὐκ ἄν τις ἀντείποι τὸν πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον ἐνεργεῖν μεμαθηκότα τέχνην τινὰ δύνασθαι ἂν τῇ αὐτῇ καὶ πρὸς τὰ μὴ δέοντα χρήσασθαι, οὕτως φαμὲν καὶ τῆς ἐπινοίας τὴν δύναμιν ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ μὲν ἐντεθεῖσθαι παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει, κατακεχρημένων δέ τινων τῇ ἐφευρετικῇ δυνάμει διάκονον πολλάκις καὶ συνεργὸν γίνεσθαι τῶν ἀνωφελῶν 2.1.190 εὑρημάτων. οὐκοῦν οὐκ ἐπειδὴ δύναται τὰ ψευδῆ καὶ ἀνύπαρκτα πιθανῶς ἡ ἐπίνοια διαπλάσσειν, διὰ τοῦτο τὰ ὄντως ὄντα καὶ ἀληθῶς ὑφεστῶτα διερευνᾶσθαι οὐ δύναται, ἀλλ' ἡ πρὸς τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐπιτηδειότης μαρτυρία τοῖς εὐγνώ μοσι τῆς πρὸς ἐκεῖνο δυνάμεως γίνεται. τὸ γὰρ προθέ μενον κατάπληξιν τοῖς ὁρῶσιν ἢ θυμηδίαν τινὰ μηχανή σασθαι τῆς πρὸς τὸ σπουδαζόμενον ἐπινοίας μὴ ἀπορῆσαι, ἀλλ' ἢ πολύχειράς τινας ἢ πολυκεφάλους ἢ πῦρ πνέοντας ἢ δρακόντων ὁλκοῖς συνεσπειραμένους εἰδοποιῆσαι ἢ πρὸς τὸ μεῖζον ἐξᾶραι τὴν συμμετρίαν ἢ διακολοβῶσαι πρὸς τὸ γελοῖον τὰ μέτρα τῆς φύσεως ἢ πηγὰς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ δένδρα καὶ ὄρνεα γενέσθαι διὰ μεταβολῆς διηγήσασθαι, δι' ὧν ἔστι ψυχαγωγίαν τινὰ τοὺς διὰ τῶν τοιούτων ἡδο μένους εὑρεῖν, ἐναργεστάτην ἀπόδειξιν εἶναί φημι τοῦ καὶ τὰ κρείττω τῶν μαθημάτων δύνασθαι ἂν διὰ τῆς εὑρετικῆς 2.1.191 δυνάμεως κατανοῆσαι. οὐ γὰρ πρὸς μὲν τὴν τῶν ἀνυπάρ κτων διάπλασιν ἐντελὴς ἡμῖν ὁ νοῦς παρὰ τοῦ δεδωκότος ἐμπέφυκε, πρὸς δὲ τὴν τῶν ψυχωφελῶν εὕρεσιν οὐδεμίαν δύναμιν ποριστικὴν τῶν λυσιτελούντων κεκλήρωται· ἀλλὰ καθάπερ ἡ ὁρμητικὴ καὶ προαιρετικὴ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν δύναμις κατὰ μὲν τὸ προηγούμενον πρὸς τὴν τῶν καλῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἔφεσιν ἐγκατεσκευάσθη τῇ φύσει, χρήσαιτο δ' ἄν τις καὶ πρὸς τὰ μὴ δέοντα τῇ τοιαύτῃ κινήσει, καὶ οὐκ ἄν τις εἴποι τοῦ πρὸς μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν τὴν προαίρεσιν ῥέπειν τεκμήριον εἶναι τὸ πρὸς τὰ φαῦλά ποτε τὴν ῥοπὴν ἔχειν, οὕτως καὶ ἡ περὶ τὰ μάταιά τε καὶ ἀνόνητα τῆς ἐπινοίας κίνησις οὐ κατηγορία τῆς πρὸς τὸ χρήσιμον ἀδυνα μίας ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἀπόδειξις γίνεται τοῦ καὶ πρὸς τὰ ψυχω φελῆ τε καὶ ἀναγκαῖα μὴ ἄπρακτος εἶναι. ὡς γὰρ ἐξεῦρεν ἐκεῖ τὸ πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἢ κατάπληξιν, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα τῶν πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐφόδων οὐχ ἁμαρτήσεται. 2.1.192 Ἓν δὲ τῶν ζητουμένων ἦν, εἰ τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον, ὅ ἐστιν ὁ θεός, ἀνάρχως ἔστιν ἤ τινος ἀρχῆς ἐξημμένον ἔχει τὸ εἶναι. καταλαβόντες δὲ τῇ διανοίᾳ μὴ δύνασθαι πρῶτον εἶναι τὸ ἐξ ἑτέρου νοούμενον ἐπενοήσαμεν ὄνομα τῆς τοιαύ της ἐμφαντικὸν ὑπολήψεως καί φαμεν τὸν ἄνευ αἰτίας ὑπερ κειμένης ὄντα ἀνάρχως εἴτουν ἀγεννήτως εἶναι. τὸν δὲ οὕτως ὄντα ἀγέννητον καὶ ἄναρχον ὠνομάσαμεν, οὐ τί ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ τί οὐκ ἔστι διὰ τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐνδεικνύμενοι. 2.1.193 ὡς δ' ἂν μάλιστα καταφανὲς τὸ νόημα γένοιτο, δι' ὑπο δείγματος ἐναργεστέρου παραστῆσαι πειράσομαι. δεδόσθω περὶ δένδρου τινὸς εἶναι τὴν ζήτησιν εἴτε φυτευτόν ἐστιν ἢ αὐτομάτως γενόμενον. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐκ φυτείας εἴη, φυτευτὸν πάντως προσεροῦμεν τὸ δένδρον, εἰ δὲ αὐτομάτως, ἀφύτευτον. τὸ δὴ τοιοῦτον ὄνομα καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας οὐ διασφάλλεται· πάντως γὰρ ἢ οὕτως ἢ ἑτέρως ἔσται τὸ δένδρον, καὶ τοῦ φυτοῦ τὴν ἰδιάζουσαν οὐκ ἐνδείκνυται φύσιν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοφυῶς εἶναι διὰ τοῦ ἀφυτεύτου ἐμάθομεν, εἰ δὲ πλάτανος ἢ ἄμπελος ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων φυτῶν ἐστι τὸ δηλούμενον, 2.1.194 διὰ τῆς τοιαύτης ὀνομασίας οὐκ ἐδιδάχθημεν. εἰ δὴ νενόηται τὸ ὑπόδειγμα, καιρὸς ἂν εἴη μεταβιβάσαι τὸν λόγον ἐπὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα οὗ τὸ ὑπόδειγμα. τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον ἐξ οὐδεμιᾶς ὑπερκειμένης αἰτίας ἔχειν τὸ εἶναι κατελαβόμεθα. τὸν οὖν ἀγεννήτως ὄντα θεὸν εἰς ὀνόματος τύπον τὴν ἔννοιαν ταύτην παράγοντες ἀγέννητον ὠνομάσαμεν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐ διὰ γενέσεώς ἐστιν, ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐμφάσεως ἐδηλώσαμεν, αὐτὴ δὲ ἡ οὐσία ἡ ἀγεννήτως οὖσα τίς κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν φύσιν ἐστίν, οὐδὲν ἐκ τῆς ἐπωνυμίας ταύτης πρὸς τὸ κατι 2.1.195 δεῖν ὡδηγήθημεν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦν εἰκὸς μέχρι τοσούτου τὴν τῶν λογισμῶν ἐπίνοιαν ἰσχύειν, ὥστε ὑπεραίρειν ἡμᾶς τῶν μέτρων τῆς φύσεως καὶ τοῖς ἀλήπτοις ἐπιβιβάζειν καί, ὧν οὐκ ἔστιν