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And another. 13.15.1 15. THAT PLATO DID NOT ENTIRELY CORRECTLY PURSUE THE ARGUMENT CONCERNING INTELLIGIBLE

SUBSTANCES. The Hebrews say that the intermediate nature of rational beings is created, but not uncreated. And dividing this conceptually into intellectual substances, they name them spirits and powers and ministers of God, both angels and archangels; and from their fall and deviation they introduce the race of demons and 13.15.2 every form of the contrary and wicked activity. Therefore they do not permit them to be considered gods, as they do not possess the beautiful and the good as inseparable from their nature, but have received their being not from themselves but from the cause of all things, and possess well-being and virtue and immortality itself neither in the same way as the God over all, nor as He through whom all things were constituted. 13.15.3 But Plato, while he, like the Hebrews, posits the rational natures as incorporeal and intelligible substances, falls away from consistency, first by asserting them to be uncreated, just like every soul, and then by saying they were constituted from an emanation of the first cause. For he is unwilling to grant that they have come into being out of non-being. 13.15.4 For this reason he also supposes that there is a race of several gods, positing in his argument certain emanations and projections of the first and second cause, and that they are good by nature and in no way able to depart from 13.15.5 their proper virtue, from which he also opines them to be gods. But he considers the tribe of demons to be different from these, being susceptible to baseness and wickedness and of a turn to the worse; of whom some are and are called good, and others base. But having supposed these things in this manner, contrary to the beliefs of the Hebrews, he does not explain from where it is likely to say that the 13.15.6 demons came into existence. For no one in his right mind would say from the matter of bodies; for this is irrational; but rational beings could never be born from the irrational, and demons are rational. But if these are from the emanation of the superior beings, then how are they not also gods, on an equal footing with their progenitors? And how, if the source is good, are the things from it not also similar? Whence did the offshoot of evil in the secondary beings spring forth, when the root 13.15.7 comes from above from good things and through good things? And how could the bitter come from the sweet? But if indeed the race of wicked demons is more grievous than all darkness and all bitterness, how could it be said to be from an emanation of the superior nature? But if it was from this, it would not have been turned from its proper state; and if it has been altered, it was not impassible by nature in the beginning; and if it was not such, how could 13.15.8 they be gods, if indeed they are able to partake of a base lot? But if they are neither from the emanation of the superior beings nor again from the matter of bodies, it is time either to call them uncreated and, in addition to the uncreated matter of bodies, to set a third host of uncreated rational beings in opposition to God, and no longer to grant that God is the maker and fashioner of all things, or, while acknowledging this, to also acknowledge, in agreement with the doctrines of the Hebrews, that he makes things 13.15.9 that are not. But what do these teach concerning these things? They say that the intermediate nature of rational beings came to exist neither from the matter of bodies, nor from an emanation of the uncreated substance which is always in the same state and in the same way, but that, not existing before, it came into being by the active 13.15.10 power of the cause of all things; and for this reason they are not gods nor are they properly deemed worthy of this appellation, because their nature is not equal to their maker, nor do they possess the good as inseparably as God, and sometimes they might even admit the contrary to the beautiful, through neglect of the pursuit of what is better, which each one has brought upon himself, through his own impulse and judgment

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καὶ ἄλλο. 13.15.1 ιεʹ. ΟΤΙ ΜΗ ΚΑΘΟΛΟΥ Ο ΠΛΑΤΩΝ ΟΡΘΩΣ ΤΟΝ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΝΟΗΤΩΝ

ΟΥΣΙΩΝ ΕΦΩ∆ΕΥΣΕ ΛΟΓΟΝ Ἑβραῖοι τὴν μέσην τῶν λογικῶν φύσιν γενητήν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀγένητον εἶναί φασι. ταύτην δὲ εἰς νοερὰς οὐσίας διαιροῦντες τῷ λόγῳ πνεύματα καὶ δυνάμεις καὶ θεοῦ λειτουργοὺς ἀγγέλους τε καὶ ἀρχαγγέλους ἐπονομάζουσιν· ἐκ δὲ τῆς τούτων ἀποπτώσεως καὶ παρατροπῆς τὸ δαιμόνων γένος καὶ 13.15.2 πᾶν τὸ τῆς ἐναντίας καὶ μοχθηρᾶς ἐνεργείας εἶδος εἰσάγουσι. διόπερ οὐδὲ θεοὺς ἐπιτρέπουσιν ἡγεῖσθαι τοὺς μὴ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἀχώριστον τῆς φύσεως ἐπαγομένους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶναι οὐ παρ' ἑαυτῶν, παρὰ δὲ τοῦ πάντων αἰτίου ἐπενηνεγμένους τό τε εὖ εἶναι καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν αὐτό τε τὸ ἀθάνατον οὔτε τῷ ἐπὶ πάντων θεῷ ὁμοίως οὔτε τῷ δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα συνέστη 13.15.3 ἐπιφερομένους. ὁ δέ γε Πλάτων ἀσωμάτους μὲν καὶ νοητὰς οὐσίας τὰς λογικὰς φύσεις ὁμοίως Ἑβραίοις ὑφίστησι, διαπίπτει δὲ τῆς ἀκολουθίας, πρῶτον μὲν ἀγενήτους εἶναι φάσκων αὐτάς, ὥσπερ καὶ πᾶσαν ψυχήν, ἔπειτα ἐξ ἀπορροίας τῆς τοῦ πρώτου αἰτίου συστῆναι λέγων. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος 13.15.4 αὐτὰς γεγονέναι διδόναι βούλεται. διὸ καὶ πλειόνων θεῶν ὑποτίθεται εἶναι γένος, ἀπορροίας τινὰς καὶ προβολὰς τοῦ πρώτου καὶ τοῦ δευτέρου αἰτίου τῷ λόγῳ ὑφιστάμενος, εἶναί τε ἀγαθὰς τὴν φύσιν οὐδαμῶς τε οἵας τε τῆς 13.15.5 οἰκείας ἐκστῆναι ἀρετῆς, ἔνθεν αὐτοὺς καὶ θεοὺς εἶναι δοξάζει. τούτων δὲ ἕτερον εἶναι τὸ δαιμόνων φῦλον ἡγεῖται, φαυλότητος ὂν καὶ μοχθηρίας καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον τροπῆς δεκτικόν· ὧν τοὺς μὲν ἀγαθούς, τοὺς δὲ φαύ λους εἶναί τε καὶ ὀνομάζεσθαι. ταῦτα δὲ παρὰ τὰ Ἑβραίοις δοκοῦντα τοῦτον ὑποθέμενος τὸν τρόπον, οὐκ ἀποδίδωσιν ὁπόθεν ὑποστῆναι φάναι εἰκὸς τοὺς 13.15.6 δαίμονας. ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τῆς τῶν σωμάτων ὕλης οὐδεὶς ἂν νοῦν ἔχων εἴποι· ἄλογος γὰρ αὕτη· λογικὰ δ' οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐξ ἀλόγου τεχθείη, λογικοὶ δὲ οἱ δαίμονες. εἰ δ' ἐκ τῆς τῶν κρειττόνων ἀπορροίας οὗτοι, καὶ πῶς οὐ θεοὶ καὶ αὐτοὶ τοῖς γεγεννηκόσιν ἐξ ἴσου; πῶς δ' ἀγαθῆς οὔσης πηγῆς οὐχ ὅμοια καὶ τὰ παρ' αὐτῆς; κακίας δ' ἐν τοῖς δευτέροις ἡ βλάστη πόθεν ἐξέφυ τῆς ῥίζης 13.15.7 ἄνωθεν ἐξ ἀγαθῶν καὶ δι' ἀγαθῶν ἰούσης; πῶς δ' ἂν γένοιτο πικρὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ γλυκέος; εἰ δὲ δὴ σκότους παντὸς καὶ πικρίας πάσης χαλεπώτερον τὸ τῶν μοχθηρῶν δαιμόνων γένος, πῶς ἐξ ἀπορροίας λέγοιτ' ἂν τῆς τῶν κρειττόνων φύσεως; εἰ δὲ ἐκ τῆσδε ἦν, οὐδ' ἂν ἐτράπη τῆς οἰκείας λήξεως· εἰ δ' ἠλλοίωται, οὐδ' ἦν τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπαθὴς τὴν φύσιν· εἰ δ' οὐ τοιάδε ἦν, καὶ πῶς 13.15.8 θεοὶ εἶεν, εἰ δὴ φαύλης οἷοί τε εἰσὶ μετέχειν μοίρας; ἀλλ' εἰ μήτε τῆς τῶν κρειττόνων ἀπορροίας μηδ' αὖ τῆς τῶν σωμάτων ὕλης εἶεν, ὥρα ἢ ἀγενήτους λέγειν καὶ πρὸς τῇ ἀγενήτῳ ὕλῃ τῶν σωμάτων τρίτον στῖφος λογικῶν ἀγενήτων ἀντιπαρατάττειν τῷ θεῷ οὐκέτι τε τὸν θεὸν πάντων εἶναι ποιητὴν καὶ δημιουργὸν τῶν ὅλων ἀποδιδόναι, ἢ τοῦθ' ὁμολογοῦντας καὶ τὰ 13.15.9 μὴ ὄντα ποιεῖν αὐτὸν τοῖς Ἑβραίων συμφώνως ὁμολογεῖν λόγοις. τίνα δὲ οἵδε περὶ τῶνδε ἐκδιδάσκουσι; τὴν μέσην τῶν λογικῶν φύσιν οὔτ' ἐκ τῆς τῶν σωμάτων ὕλης οὔτ' ἐξ ἀπορροίας τῆς ἀγενήτου καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἐχούσης οὐσίας ὑποστῆναί φασι, μὴ οὖσαν δὲ πρότερον δυνάμει 13.15.10 δραστηρίῳ τοῦ πάντων αἰτίου γεγονέναι· ταύτη τε μὴ θεοὺς εἶναι μηδὲ κυρίως τῆσδε τῆς προσηγορίας ἠξιῶσθαι, ὅτι μηδὲ τὴν φύσιν ἰσοῦται τῷ πεποιηκότι μηδ' ἀχώριστον ὁμοίως τῷ θεῷ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐφέλκεται τό τε τῷ καλῷ ἐναντίον ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ δέξοιτ' ἂν ὀλιγωρίᾳ τῆς περὶ τὸ κρεῖττον σχολῆς, ἣν αὐτὸς ἕκαστος αὑτῷ κατείργασται, τῆς οἰκείας ὁρμῆς τε καὶ γνώμης