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the natural lord. So much for these things. But let us proceed to another matter.
13.16.1 10. THAT PLATO DID NOT IN ALL RESPECTS HOLD RIGHT OPINIONS CONCERNING THE SOUL Although, like the Hebrews, he supposed the soul to be immortal and said it was like God, he no longer followed them when he said that its substance is at one time composite, as if bringing in some part from the indivisible and ever-constant cause and a part from the divisible nature associated with bodies. 13.16.2 For he says in these very words in the *Timaeus*: 'And soul, being prior and elder to body both in birth and in virtue, he established as mistress and ruler of the ruled, out of these things and in this manner: From the indivisible substance that is ever constant, and from the divisible substance that comes to be in bodies, he mixed a third form of substance in the middle of them both, partaking of the nature of the Same and of the nature of the Other, and in this way he constituted it in the middle of the indivisible part of them and the divisible part related to bodies. And having taken these three existing things, he mixed them all into a single form, fitting together by force the nature of the Other, which was difficult to mix, into the Same.' 13.16.3 Hence, it is reasonable that for him the passible part is also connected in the account of its substance. But while at one time he has conceived of the soul's substance in this way, at another time he attributes to it a different, worse absurdity, saying that that divine and heavenly, that incorporeal and rational soul, like to God and by its greatness of virtue soaring beyond the vaults of heaven, from somewhere above, from the super-cosmic realms, descends into donkeys and wolves and ants and bees, and exhorting us to believe this account 13.16.4 without any proof. For in *On the Soul* he says the following: 'And so far they wander, until by the desire of the corporeal which accompanies them they are again imprisoned in a body. And they are imprisoned, as is likely, in natures of such a kind as the practices they happen to have cultivated 13.16.5 in life. What kind of natures do you mean, Socrates? For example, those who have practiced gluttony and insolence and drunkenness, and have not been on their guard, are likely to pass into the race of donkeys and wild beasts. Or do you not think so? 13.16.6 What you say is very likely indeed. But those who have preferred injustice and tyranny and robbery will pass into the race of wolves and hawks and kites. Or where else can we say such souls go? Unquestionably, said Cebes, into such races. Then, he said, is it not clear as to the others, where each would go according to the resemblances 13.16.7 of its own practice? Clear indeed, he said. How could it not be? Therefore, the happiest, he said, of these, and those who go to the best place, are those who have practiced the popular and social virtue which they call temperance and justice, which is acquired by habit and practice, without philosophy and reason? In what way are these the happiest? Because it is likely that these will pass again into a social and gentle race, such as bees, or wasps, or ants, or even back again into the human race.' 13.16.8 And in the *Phaedrus* also, listen to what sort of things he relates: 'For to that same place from whence each soul has come, it does not arrive for ten thousand years; for it does not grow wings before that much time has passed, except for the soul of one who has philosophized without deceit, or who has loved boys with philosophy. These, in the third period of a thousand years, if they have chosen this life three times in a row, thus grow wings and depart in the three-thousandth year. But the other souls, when they have finished their first life, receive judgment; and when they have been judged, some go to the places of judgment beneath the earth and pay the penalty, while others, lightened by justice, are carried to a certain place in heaven and live in a manner worthy of the life they lived in human form. And in the thousandth year, both kinds of souls come to the drawing of lots and the choice of a second life, and each chooses whatever it wishes
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πεφυκὼς κύριος. ταῦτα καὶ περὶ τῶνδε. μετίωμεν δὲ καὶ ἐφ' ἕτερον.
13.16.1 ιʹ. ΟΤΙ ΜΗ ΚΑΤΑ ΠΑΝΤΑ ΟΡΘΩΣ Ε∆ΟΞΑΣΕ ΠΕΡΙ ΨΥΧΗΣ Ο ΠΛΑΤΩΝ Ἑβραίοις ὁμοίως τὴν ψυχὴν ἀθάνατον ὑποθέμενος καὶ τῷ θεῷ ὁμοίαν αὐτὴν εἰπών, οὐκέτ' ἀκολούθως αὐτοῖς ποτε μὲν αὐτῆς τὴν οὐσίαν σύνθετον εἶναί φησιν, ὡς ἂν μέρος μέν τι ἐπαγομένης τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐχούσης αἰτίας καὶ μέρος τῆς περὶ τὰ σώματα μεριστῆς φύσεως. 13.16.2 λέγει δ' οὖν αὐτοῖς ῥήμασιν ἐν Τιμαίῳ· «Ὁ δὲ καὶ γενέσει καὶ ἀρετῇ προτέραν καὶ πρεσβυτέραν ψυχὴν σώματος ὡς δεσπότιν καὶ ἄρξουσαν ἀρξομένου συνεστήσατο ἐκ τῶνδε καὶ τοιῷδε τρόπῳ· τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐχούσης οὐσίας, καὶ τῆς αὖ περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνομένης μεριστῆς, τρίτον δ' ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐν μέσῳ συνεκεράσατο οὐσίας εἶδος, τῆς τε ταὐτοῦ φύσεως αὖ πέρι καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἑτέρου, καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα συνέστησεν ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ τε ἀμεροῦς αὐτῶν καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὰ σώματα μεριστοῦ. καὶ τρία λαβὼν αὐτὰ ὄντα συνεκεράσατο εἰς μίαν πάντα ἰδέαν, τὴν θατέρου φύσιν δύσμικτον· οὖσαν εἰς ταὐτὸ ξυναρμόττων βίᾳ.» 13.16.3 Ἔνθεν εἰκότως αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ παθητικὸν μέρος τῷ λόγῳ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς συνῆπται. ἀλλὰ τοτὲ μὲν ὧδε περὶ ψυχῆς οὐσίας διείληφε, τοτὲ δὲ ἄλλο τι χεῖρον περιτίθησιν αὐτῇ ἀτόπημα, τὴν θείαν ἐκείνην καὶ οὐράνιον, τὴν ἀσώματον καὶ λογικήν, τὴν θεῷ ὁμοίαν καὶ δι' ἀρετῆς μέγεθος τὰς οὐρανίους ὑπερπαίουσαν ἁψῖδας ἄνωθέν ποθεν ἐκ τῶν ὑπερκοσμίων ἐπὶ ὄνους καὶ λύκους καὶ μύρμηκας καὶ μελίττας κατιέναι φάσκων καὶ τούτῳ πιστεύειν 13.16.4 ἡμᾶς παρακαλῶν τῷ λόγῳ ἄνευ τινὸς ἀποδείξεως. λέγει δ' οὖν ἐν μὲν τῷ Περὶ ψυχῆς τάδε· «Καὶ μέχρι γε τούτου πλανῶνται, ἕως ἂν τῇ τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς τοῦ συνεπακολουθοῦντος ἐπιθυμίᾳ πάλιν ἐνδεθῶσιν εἰς σῶμα. ἐνδοῦνται δέ, ὥσπερ εἰκός, εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἤθη, ὁποῖα ἄττ' ἂν καὶ μεμελετηκυῖαι τύχωσιν 13.16.5 ἐν βίῳ. Τὰ ποῖα δὴ ταῦτα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; Οἷον τοὺς μὲν τὰς γαστριμαργίας τε καὶ ὕβρεις καὶ φιλοποσίας μεμελετηκότας καὶ μὴ διευλαβουμένους εἰς τὰ τῶν ὄνων γένη καὶ τῶν θηρίων εἰκὸς ἐνδύεσθαι· ἢ οὐκ οἴει; 13.16.6 Πάνυ μὲν οὖν εἰκὸς λέγεις. Τοὺς δέ γε ἀδικίας καὶ τυραννίδας καὶ ἁρπαγὰς προτετιμηκότας εἰς τὰ τῶν λύκων τε καὶ ἱεράκων καὶ ἰκτίνων γένη· ἢ ποῖ ἂν ἄλλοσε φαῖμεν τὰς τοιαύτας ἰέναι; Ἀμέλει, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα. Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, δῆλα δὴ καὶ τἄλλα, ᾗ ἂν ἑκάστη ἴοι κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ὁμοιό13.16.7 τητας τῆς μελέτης. ∆ῆλον δή, ἔφη· πῶς δ' οὔ; Οὐκοῦν εὐδαιμονέστατοι, ἔφη, καὶ τούτων εἰσὶ καὶ εἰς βέλτιστον τόπον ἰόντες οἱ τὴν δημοτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιτετηδευκότες, ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην, ἐξ ἔθους τε καὶ μελέτης γεγονυῖαν ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ; Πῇ δὴ οὗτοι εὐδαιμονέστατοι; Ὅτι τούτους εἰκός ἐστιν εἰς τοιοῦτον πάλιν ἀφικνεῖσθαι πολιτικὸν καὶ ἥμερον γένος, ἤπου μελιττῶν ἢ σφηκῶν ἢ μυρμήκων, ἢ καὶ εἰς αὐτό γε πάλιν τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος.» 13.16.8 Καὶ ἐν τῷ Φαίδρῳ δὲ ἐπάκουσον ὁποῖα διέξεισιν· «Εἰς μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ὅθεν ἥκει ψυχὴ ἑκάστη, οὐκ ἀφικνεῖται ἐτῶν μυρίων· οὐ γὰρ πτεροῦται πρὸ τοσούτου χρόνου, πλὴν ἡ τοῦ φιλοσοφήσαντος ἀδόλως ἢ παιδεραστήσαντος μετὰ φιλοσοφίας. αὗται δὲ τρίτῃ περιόδῳ τῇ χιλιετεῖ, ἐὰν ἕλωνται τρὶς ἐφεξῆς τὸν βίον τοῦτον, οὕτω πτερωθεῖσαι τρισχιλιοστῷ ἔτει ἀπέρχονται. αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι, ὅταν τὸν πρῶτον βίον τελευτήσωσι, κρίσεως ἔτυχον· κριθεῖσαι δὲ αἱ μὲν εἰς τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς δικαιωτήρια ἐλθοῦσαι δίκην τίνουσιν, αἱ δ' εἰς τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τινα τόπον ὑπὸ τῆς δίκης κουφισθεῖσαι διάγουσιν ἀξίως οὗ ἐν ἀνθρώπου εἴδει ἐβίωσαν βίου. τῷ δὲ χιλιοστῷ ἀμφότεραι ἀφικνούμεναι ἐπὶ κλήρωσίν τε καὶ αἵρεσιν τοῦ δευτέρου βίου αἱροῦνται ὃν ἂν θέλῃ