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to depart to live in all happiness apart from evils, but the one who lived unjustly and godlessly to go to the prison of retribution and justice, which they call Tartarus; But those who have committed the ultimate injustices and through such injustices have become incurable, from these the examples are made; and these themselves are no longer benefited, being incurable, but others are benefited who see them suffering for all time the greatest and most painful and most terrible sufferings on account of their sins, literally hung up as examples there in Hades in the prison, as spectacles and admonitions for those of the just who are always arriving.” 13.16.17 How could these things be consistent with the arguments about the exchange of bodies, which they say the soul chooses when it transmigrates? For how could the same soul undergo punishments and imprisonments and so great a penalty for all time after its departure from here, and again, as if relaxed and free from bonds, choose whatever lives it might wish? But if it is going to choose again the things that are according to pleasure, where then is the prison of retribution and justice? And one might at leisure take up countless other points of the argument, 13.16.18 on which it is not the time to prolong the thought. And so the first slip of Plato’s opinion on these matters has somehow been shown in this way; but the other part of the doctrine's contrivance, through which he defined that one part of the soul is divine and rational, while some other part of it happens to be irrational and subject to passion, has also been condemned by his own acquaintances, as can be learned from arguments such as these:

13.17.1 17. THAT THE NATURE OF THE SOUL IS NOT COMPOSED OF IMPASSIBLE AND PASSIBLE SUBSTANCE

“Concerning the soul according to Plato, which he says was composed by God from impassible and passible substance, just as one of the intermediate colors is from white and black, we have this to say, that it is necessary in time, when a separation of them occurs, for it to be destroyed, just like the composition of the intermediate color, as each of the things from which it was composed is naturally separated in time to its own properties. If this is so, 13.17.2 we shall prove the soul to be perishable, and not immortal. For if it is agreed that nothing among the things in nature exists without its opposite and that the things in the cosmos have been ordered by God from the nature of opposites, he having created in them friendship and community—for example, dry with wet, hot with cold, heavy with light, white with black, sweet with bitter, hard with soft, and for all such things another single community of all, and for the impassible substance with the passible—and things that have been blended and mixed naturally admit of separation from one another in time, and the soul is assumed to have been made from impassible and passible substance, it is necessary that, just like the intermediate color, so also this should be destroyed in time by nature, as the opposites in its composition hasten toward their own nature. 13.17.3 For do we not see that even what is by nature heavy, even if by us or by some external natural lightness added to it it is borne upwards, is likewise forced downwards to its own nature, and likewise also what is by nature light, being borne downwards by similar external causes, is likewise forced upwards? For things brought together into the same state from two things opposite to each other cannot always be in the same state, unless some third substance of existing things is always present in them. 13.17.4 But the soul is not some third thing compounded from two things opposite to each other, but is simple and by its own nature impassible and incorporeal; 13.17.5 whence Plato and those with him said it was immortal. But since it is the common account of all that man has come to be from soul and body, and the passions that arise in us without the body, both voluntarily and involuntarily, are said to be of the soul, those

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ἀπιόντα οἰκεῖν ἐν πάσῃ εὐδαιμονίᾳ ἐκτὸς κακῶν, τὸν δὲ ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέως εἰς τὸ τῆς τίσεώς τε καὶ δίκης δεσμωτήριον, ὃ δὴ Τάρταρον καλοῦσιν, ἰέναι· οἳ δ' ἂν τὰ ἔσχατα ἀδικήσωσι καὶ διὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀδικήματα ἀνίατοι γένωνται, ἐκ τούτων τὰ παραδείγματα γίγνεται· καὶ οὗτοι αὐτοὶ μὲν οὐκέτι ὀνίνανται, ἅτε ἀνίατοι ὄντες, ἄλλοι δὲ ὀνίνανται οἱ τούτους ὁρῶντες διὰ τὰς ἁμαρτίας τὰς μεγίστας καὶ ὀδυνηρότατα καὶ φοβερώτατα πάθη πάσχοντας τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον, ἀτεχνῶς παραδείγματα ἀνηρτημένους ἐκεῖ ἐν Ἅιδου ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ, τοῖς ἀεὶ τῶν δικῶν ἀφικνουμένοις θεάματα καὶ νουθετήματα.» 13.16.17 Ταῦτα πῶς ἂν δύναιτο συνᾴδειν τοῖς περὶ ἀμοιβῆς σωμάτων, ἃ τὴν ψυχὴν μετιοῦσαν αἱρεῖσθαι φάσκουσι, λόγοις; πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἡ αὐτὴ τιμωρίας καὶ δεσμωτήρια καὶ τοσαύτην δίκην εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον μετὰ τὴν ἐνθένδε τελευτὴν ὑφέξει καὶ πάλιν οἵα τις ἀνειμένη καὶ δεσμῶν ἐλευθέρα βίους ἕλοιτ' ἂν οὓς ἂν ἐθέλοι; εἰ δὲ τὰ καθ' ἡδονὴν μέλλοι πάλιν αἱρεῖσθαι, καὶ ποῦ τὸ τῆς τίσεώς τε καὶ δίκης δεσμωτήριον; μυρία δ' ἂν καὶ ἄλλα τις ἐπὶ 13.16.18 σχολῆς ἐπιλάβοιτ' ἂν τοῦ λόγου, ὧν οὐ καιρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν μηκύνειν. καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὀλίσθημα τῆς τοῦ Πλάτωνος περὶ τῶνδε δόξης ταύτη πη πέφανται· τὸ δ' ἕτερον τῆς τοῦ δόγματος διασκευῆς, δι' οὗ τὸ μέν τι θεῖον καὶ λογικὸν εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς, τὸ δέ τι μέρος αὐτῆς ἄλογον καὶ παθητικὸν τυγχάνειν ὡρίσατο, καὶ πρὸς τῶν αὐτοῦ γνωρίμων κατέγνωσται, ὡς μαθεῖν ἔνεστιν ἀπὸ τῶν τοιῶνδε λόγων·

13.17.1 ιζʹ. ΟΤΙ ΜΗ ΕΞ ΑΠΑΘΟΥΣ ΚΑΙ ΠΑΘΗΤΗΣ ΟΥΣΙΑΣ Η ΤΗΣ ΨΥΧΗΣ ΣΥΝΕΣΤΗΚΕ ΦΥΣΙΣ

«Περὶ δὲ τῆς κατὰ Πλάτωνα ψυχῆς, ἥν φησιν ἐξ ἀπαθοῦς καὶ παθητῆς οὐσίας συστῆναι ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὡς ἐκ λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος τῶν μέσων τι χρωμάτων, ἐκεῖνα ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἀνάγκη χρόνῳ διαστάσεως αὐτῶν γιγνομένης ἀφανισθῆναι αὐτήν, ὡς τὴν τοῦ μέσου χρώματος σύστασιν, ἐπὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἑκάστου ἐξ ὧν συνέστη ἐν χρόνῳ φύσει χωριζομένου. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, 13.17.2 φθαρτὴν ἀποφανοῦμεν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀθάνατον τὴν ψυχήν. εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο ὁμολογεῖται μηδὲν τῶν ἐν τῇ φύσει ὄντων ἄνευ τοῦ ἐναντίου εἶναι τά τε ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἐναντίων φύσεως ὑπὸ θεοῦ κεκοσμῆσθαι, φιλίαν αὐτοῖς καὶ κοινωνίαν ἐμποιήσαντος αὐτοῦ, οἷον τῷ ξηρῷ πρὸς τὸ ὑγρὸν καὶ τῷ θερμῷ πρὸς τὸ ψυχρὸν τῷ τε βαρεῖ πρὸς τὸ κοῦφον λευκῷ τε πρὸς τὸ μέλαν γλυκεῖ τε πρὸς πικρὸν σκληρῷ τε πρὸς μαλακὸν καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις μίαν ἄλλην πάντων κοινωνίαν τῇ τε ἀπαθεῖ οὐσίᾳ πρὸς τὴν παθητήν, τὰ δὲ κραθέντα καὶ μιχθέντα χωρισμὸν τὸν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ἐν χρόνῳ φύσει ἐπιδέχεται, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἐξ ἀπαθοῦς καὶ παθητῆς οὐσίας γεγονέναι ὑποκείσεται, ἀνάγκη ὡς τὸ μέσον χρῶμα οὕτω καὶ ταύτην ἐν χρόνῳ φύσει ἀφανισθῆναι, τῶν ἐν 13.17.3 τῇ συστάσει αὐτῆς ἐναντίων ἐπὶ τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν ἐπειγομένων. ἦ γὰρ οὐχ ὁρῶμεν καὶ τὸ φύσει βαρύ, κἂν ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἤ τινος ἔξωθεν φυσικῆς προσ γενομένης αὐτῷ κουφότητος ἄνω φέρηται, ὡς αὐτὸ ὁμοίως ἐπὶ τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν κάτω βιάζεται, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ φύσει κοῦφον, κατὰ τὰς ὁμοίας ἔξωθεν αἰτίας κάτω φερόμενον, ὡς αὐτὸ ὁμοίως ἐπὶ τὰ ἄνω βιάζεται; τὰ γὰρ ἐκ δύο τινῶν ἀλλήλοις ἐναντίων εἰς ταὐτὸν συναχθέντα ἀδύνατον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀεὶ εἶναι, μὴ τρίτου τινὸς τῆς τῶν ὄντων οὐσίας ἀεὶ ἐνόντος αὐτοῖς. 13.17.4 ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι ψυχὴ τρίτον τι πρᾶγμα ἐκ δύο ἐναντίων ἀλλήλοις σύνθετον, ἁπλοῦν δὲ καὶ τῇ αὐτῇ φύσει ἀπαθὲς καὶ ἀσώματον· ὅθεν Πλάτων 13.17.5 καὶ οἱ μετ' αὐτοῦ ἀθάνατον αὐτὴν ἔφασαν εἶναι. ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος κοινός ἐστι πάντων λόγος γεγονέναι, τὰ δ' ἐν ἡμῖν ἄνευ σώματος ἑκουσίως καὶ ἀκουσίως γιγνόμενα πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς εἶναι λέγεται, οἱ