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supply this argument very strongly. Therefore, my dear Theodorus, we must rather consider from the beginning, just as they themselves suggest. 14.4.4 By all means, then. For indeed, Socrates, concerning these doctrines of Heraclitus or, as you say, of Homer and still more ancient thinkers, with the men of Ephesus themselves, those who claim to be experts, it is no more possible to converse than with those who are gadfly-stung. For they are literally swept along according to their writings, but as for pausing on an argument and a question and quietly answering and asking in turn, they care less for it than for nothing at all; or rather, the term 'not even nothing' is an understatement for the lack of even a little quietness in these men. but if you ask one of them a question, they draw out enigmatic little phrases from their quiver, as it were, and shoot them at you, and if you try to get an explanation of what he has said, you will be hit by another, newly re-named, and you will never accomplish anything with any of them, nor they with each other, but they are very careful to allow nothing stable to exist, either in argument or in their own souls, thinking, as it seems to me, that this very thing is static. And they wage war against this mightily and, as far as they can, cast it out from everywhere. 14.4.5 Perhaps, Theodorus, you have seen the men when they are fighting, but you have not been with them when they are at peace; for they are not your companions. But, I think, they explain such things at leisure to their disciples, whom they wish to make like themselves. What disciples, my good sir? Among such men one does not become the disciple of another, but they spring up spontaneously, wherever each of them happens to get his inspiration, and each one thinks the other knows nothing. From these men, then, as I was about to say, you could never get an explanation, either with their will or against it; but we must take them up ourselves and investigate them as if they were a problem. 14.4.6 And what you say is reasonable. And have we not taken over the problem from the ancients, who concealed it from the many in poetry, that the genesis of all things, Oceanus and Tethys, is a stream, and nothing is stable, and from the later thinkers, as being wiser, who show it openly, so that even the cobblers might hear and learn their wisdom and cease from foolishly believing that some things are at rest and others are in motion among the things that exist, and, having learned that all things are in motion, might honor them? But I nearly forgot, Theodorus, that others in turn have declared the opposite to these, such as: "unmoved is the name for the all," and all the other things that Melissus and Parmenides, opposing all these, maintain, that all things are 14.4.7 and it stands still in itself, having no place in which to move. What shall we do, then, my friend, with all these? For, advancing little by little, we have unwittingly fallen into the middle of both sides, and if we do not somehow defend ourselves and escape, we shall pay the penalty just like those in the wrestling schools who play the game on the line, when they are caught by both sides and are pulled in opposite directions." 14.4.8 These things are in the *Theaetetus*. And moving on next to the *Sophist*, he again says the following about the natural philosophers who came before him: "Parmenides seems to me to have conversed with us in an easy-going way, and everyone who has ever set out to determine how many and what kind of things exist. Each one seems to me to be telling us a story, as if we were children. One says that there are three beings, and that some of them are sometimes at war with one another in some way, and at other times, becoming friends, they bring about marriages and births and nourishment for their offspring; another, speaking of two, moist and dry, or hot and cold, joins them in marriage and gives them away. And our Eleatic tribe, beginning from Xenophanes and even earlier, narrates in its myths that what are called 'all things' are one. But then certain Ionian and Sicilian Muses perceived that it is safer to combine both and to say that Being is both many and one, and is held together by enmity and friendship. For 'in differing it is always being brought together,' say the more severe of the Muses; while the more gentle ones that things are always thus

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χορηγοῦσι τούτου τοῦ λόγου μάλα ἐρρωμένως. Τῷ τοι, ὦ φίλε Θεόδωρε, μᾶλλον σκεπτέον καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὥσπερ αὐτοὶ ὑποτείνονται. 14.4.4 Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. καὶ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, περὶ τούτων τῶν Ἡρακλειτείων ἢ ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις Ὁμηρείων τε καὶ ἔτι παλαιοτέρων, αὐτοῖς μὲν τοῖς περὶ τὴν Ἔφεσον, ὅσοι ποιοῦνται ἔμπειροι, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οἷόν τε διαλεχθῆναι ἢ τοῖς οἰστρῶσιν. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ κατὰ τὰ συγγράμματα φέρονται, τὸ δὲ ἐπιμεῖναι ἐπὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἐρωτήματι καὶ ἡσυχίως ἐν μέρει ἀποκρίνασθαί τε καὶ ἐρέσθαι, ἧττον αὐτοῖς μέλει ἢ τὸ μηδέν· μᾶλλον δὲ ὑπερβάλλει τὸ οὐδ' οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸ σμικρὸν ἐνεῖναι τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἡσυχίας. ἀλλ' ἄν τινα ἔρῃ, ὥσπερ ἐκ φαρέτρας ῥηματίσκια αἰνιγματώδη ἀνασπῶντες ἀποτοξεύουσι, καὶ ἂν τούτου ζητῇς λόγον λαβεῖν, τί εἴρηκεν, ἑτέρῳ πεπλήξῃ καινῶς μετωνομασμένῳ, περανεῖς δὲ οὐδέποτε οὐδὲν πρὸς οὐδένα αὐτῶν οὐδέ γε ἐκεῖνοι αὐτοὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἀλλ' εὖ πάνυ φυλάττουσι τὸ μηδὲν βέβαιον ἐᾶν εἶναι μήτ' ἐν λόγῳ μήτ' ἐν ταῖς αὑτῶν ψυχαῖς, ἡγούμενοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, αὐτὸ στάσιμον εἶναι. τούτῳ δὲ πάνυ πολεμοῦσι καὶ καθ' ὅσον δύνανται πανταχόθεν ἐκβάλλουσιν. 14.4.5 Ἴσως, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τοὺς ἄνδρας μαχομένους ἑώρακας, εἰρηνεύουσι δὲ οὐ συγγέγονας· οὐ γάρ σοι ἑταῖροί εἰσιν. ἀλλ', οἶμαι, τὰ τοιαῦτα τοῖς μαθηταῖς ἐπὶ σχολῆς φράζουσιν, οὓς ἂν βούλωνται ὁμοίους αὑτοῖς ποιῆσαι. Ποίοις μαθηταῖς, ὦ δαιμόνιε; οὐδὲ γίγνεται τῶν τοιούτων ἕτερος ἑτέρου μαθητής, ἀλλ' αὐτόματοι ἀναφύονται, ὁπόθεν ἂν τύχῃ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἐνθουσιάσας, καὶ τὸν ἕτερον ὁ ἕτερος οὐδὲν ἡγεῖται εἰδέναι. παρὰ μὲν οὖν τούτων, ὅπερ ᾖα ἐρῶν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε λάβοις λόγον οὔτε ἑκόντων οὔτε ἀκόντων· αὐτοὺς 14.4.6 δὲ δεῖ παραλαβόντας ὥσπερ πρόβλημα ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι. Καὶ μετρίως γε λέγεις. τὸ δὲ δὴ πρόβλημα ἄλλο τι παρειλήφαμεν παρὰ μὲν τῶν ἀρχαίων μετὰ ποιήσεως ἐπικρυπτομένων τοὺς πολλούς, ὡς ἡ γένεσις τῶν πάντων Ὠκεανός τε καὶ Τηθὺς ῥεῦμα τυγχάνει καὶ οὐδὲν ἕστηκε, παρὰ δὲ τῶν ὑστέρων, ἅτε σοφωτέρων, ἀναφανδὸν ἀποδεικνυμένων, ἵνα καὶ οἱ σκυτοτόμοι αὐτῶν τὴν σοφίαν μάθωσιν ἀκούσαντες καὶ παύσωνται ἠλιθίως οἰόμενοι τὰ μὲν ἑστάναι, τὰ δὲ κινεῖσθαι τῶν ὄντων, μαθόντες δὲ ὅτι πάντα κινεῖται τιμῶσιν αὐτούς; ὀλίγου δὲ ἐπελαθόμην, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὅτι ἄλλοι αὖ τἀναντία τούτοις ἀπεφήναντο, οἷον· «ἀκίνητον τελέθει τῷ παντὶ ὄνομ' εἶναι,» καὶ ἄλλα ὅσα Μέλισσοί τε καὶ Παρμενίδαι ἐναντιούμενοι πᾶσι τούτοις διισχυρίζονται, ὥς τε πάντα 14.4.7 ἐστὶ καὶ ἕστηκεν αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ, οὐκ ἔχον χώραν ἐν ᾗ κινεῖται. τούτοις οὖν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, πᾶσι τί χρησόμεθα; κατὰ σμικρὸν γὰρ προϊόντες λελήθαμεν ἀμφοτέρων εἰς τὸ μέσον πεπτωκότες, καὶ ἐὰν μή πη ἀμυνόμενοι διαφύγωμεν, δίκην δώσομεν ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς παλαίστραις διὰ γραμμῆς παίζοντες, ὅταν ὑπ' ἀμφοτέρων ληφθέντες ἕλκωνται εἰς τἀναντία.» 14.4.8 Ταῦτα μὲν ἐν Θεαιτήτῳ. μεταβὰς δὲ ἑξῆς ἐπὶ τὸν Σοφιστὴν αὖθις περὶ τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ γενομένων φυσικῶν φιλοσόφων τοιάδε φησίν· «Εὐκόλως μοι δοκεῖ Παρμενίδης ἡμῖν διειλέχθαι καὶ πᾶς ὅστις ἡμῖν πώποτε ἐπὶ κρίσιν ὥρμησε τοῦ τὰ ὄντα διορίσασθαι πόσα τε καὶ ποῖά ἐστι. Μῦθόν τινα ἕκαστος φαίνεταί μοι διηγεῖσθαι, παισὶν ὡς οὖσιν ἡμῖν. ὁ μὲν ὡς τρία τὰ ὄντα, πολεμεῖ δὲ ἀλλήλοις ἐνίοτε αὐτῶν ἄττα πη, τοτὲ δὲ καὶ φίλα γιγνόμενα γάμους τε καὶ τόκους καὶ τροφὰς τῶν ἐγγόνων παρέχεται· δύο δὲ ἕτερος εἰπών, ὑγρὸν καὶ ξηρὸν ἢ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν, συνοικίζει τε αὐτὰ καὶ ἐκδίδωσι. τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν Ἐλεατικὸν ἔθνος ἅπαν, ἀπὸ Ξενοφάνους τε καὶ ἔτι πρόσθεν ἀρξάμενον, ὡς ἑνὸς ὄντος τῶν πάντων καλουμένων οὕτω διεξέρχεται τοῖς μύθοις. Ἰάδες δέ τινες καὶ Σικελικαί τινες ὕστερον Μοῦσαι ξυνενόησαν ὅτι συμπλέκειν ἀσφαλέστερον ἀμφότερα καὶ λέγειν ὡς τὸ ὂν πολλά τε καὶ ἕν ἐστιν, ἔχθρᾳ δὲ καὶ φιλίᾳ συνέχεται. διαφερόμενον γὰρ ἀεὶ ξυμφέρεται, φασὶν αἱ συντονώτεραι τῶν Μουσῶν· αἱ δὲ μαλακώτεραι τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν