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to bestow the higher names on the unworthy, not imparting the worth appearing in the meaning of the names, and again to insult the great things by nature with unworthy utterances, with nature not being changed along with the lowliness of the expressions? 2.1.336 But perhaps we do an injustice to this unintelligible arrangement of his words by subjecting it to such accusations. For these things are altogether foreign to all thought, I do not mean only to right thought that leads to piety, but are found by those who know how to examine them accurately 2.1.337 to have no share at all in any reasoning. Since, therefore, in the likeness of sea-lungs, the visible thing seems to have a certain bulk, but the bulk is a phlegm, disgusting to see, and more disgusting to take in hand, for this reason, judging silence most fitting in the face of vanities, I will pass over what has been said in silence. For by what law are actuality and analogy and relation governed, and who is it that legislates for God the laws and modes of analogy and relation, it would be better to remain unexamined than through eagerness about these things both to cause nausea to the hearers and to lead the discourse away from more serious matters. 2.1.338 But I am afraid that all the things set before us from the treatise of Eunomius may equally be some kind of phlegm and sea-lungs; so that of necessity our discourse must end with what has been said, finding no material from what has been written for elaboration. For as some smoke or mist deepens and muddies the air in which it takes its consistency, and hinders sight from its natural activity, but is not so condensed in itself that one who wishes could grasp it and hold it in his palms and offer resistance to one who strikes it, so too, one who said something of this sort about this solemn treatise would not miss the true 2.1.339 likeness. Much nonsense has been crafted in a pompous and turgid style, and to one whose soul is not very discerning it seems, like a mist to one who looks from afar, to have some substance and appearance; but if someone should get close to it and touch upon what is said with an examining mind, the thoughts flow away like smoke from his grasp and are scattered into non-being and do not receive the refuting argument with any solidity or 2.1.340 resistance. What then should be done, is a difficult question; for the choice is easily misrepresented in either direction by those fond of accusations, whether, having leaped over the empty talk as if it were some ravine, we direct our discourse to what is steep and accessible, engaging through refutation with those things that seem to have some force against the truth, or whether we extend our battle against vanities to all the nonsense; for in this way our effort will be burdensome to the indolent and unprofitable, being prolonged through many thousands of words for no 2.1.341 useful purpose. But if we should take up only those things that seem to have some force against the truth, we will provide a pretext for accusation to our opponents as if we had yielded on some points that do not admit of refutation. Since, therefore, two courses are set before us, that of going through everything in our discourse and that of touching only upon the more necessary points, the one being burdensome to the hearers, the other suspect to slanderers, I say that it is good to turn to some middle way and thus escape, as far as possible, 2.1.342 blame from either side. What then is the method? By shortening as much as possible all the great 2.1.342 trash he has labored over in his vanity, we will run through his thoughts summarily in a few words, so as neither to delve needlessly into nonsensical things nor to overlook any of what has been said as unexamined. 2.1.343 His entire argument, then, is occupied with this endeavor, contentiously trying to show that the divine speaks in a human manner and that the creator of things himself applies the utterances that signify things to the things that exist. And for this reason, fighting against the one who said that such names belong to the rational nature which we have received from God, he says that he both misses the truth and does not hold to his own hypothesis, and having brought this charge 2.1.344 against him

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ἀτίμοις τὰ ὑψηλότερα τῶν ὀνομάτων χαρίζεσθαι, μὴ συμμεταδιδόντα τῆς ἐμφαι νομένης τῇ σημασίᾳ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀξίας, καὶ πάλιν τὰ μεγάλα κατὰ τὴν φύσιν καθυβρίζειν ταῖς ἀτίμοις φωναῖς, τῇ ταπεινότητι τῶν ῥημάτων οὐ συμμετατιθεμένης τῆς φύ 2.1.336 σεως; ἀλλ' ἀδικοῦμεν τάχα τὴν ἀδιανόητον αὐτοῦ ταύτην τῶν ῥημάτων συνθήκην ταῖς τοιαύταις κατηγορίαις ὑπά γοντες. ταῦτα γὰρ καθόλου πάσης ἐστὶ διανοίας ἀλλότρια, οὐ μόνον τῆς ὀρθῆς λέγω τῆς εἰς εὐσέβειαν, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὁπωσοῦν μετέχοντά τινος λογισμοῦ τοῖς ἐξετάζειν ἀκριβῶς 2.1.337 ἐπισταμένοις εὑρίσκεται. ἐπεὶ οὖν καθ' ὁμοιότητα τῶν θα λασσίων πνευμόνων ὄγκον μέν τινα τὸ φαινόμενον ἔχειν δοκεῖ, ὁ δὲ ὄγκος φλέγμα ἐστὶ βδελυκτὸν μὲν ἰδεῖν, βδε λυκτότερον δὲ εἰς χεῖρας λαβεῖν, διὰ τοῦτο πρεπωδεστάτην πρὸς τὰ μάταια τὴν σιωπὴν κρίνων παραδραμοῦμαι τὰ εἰρημένα σιγῇ. τίνι γὰρ διοικεῖται νόμῳ ἐνέργειά τε καὶ ἀναλογία καὶ σχέσις καὶ τίς ὁ νομοθετῶν τῷ θεῷ τοὺς τῆς ἀναλογίας καὶ σχέσεως νόμους καὶ τρόπους, κρεῖττον ἂν εἴη μένειν ἀνεξέταστον ἢ διὰ τῆς περὶ ταῦτα σπουδῆς ναυτίαν τε ποιεῖν τοῖς ἀκούουσι καὶ ἀπάγειν τῶν σπουδαι οτέρων τὸν λόγον. 2.1.338 Ἀλλὰ δέδοικα μὴ πάντα ἡμῖν ἐπίσης τὰ ἐκ τῆς λογο γραφίας τοῦ Εὐνομίου προκείμενα φλέγματά τινα ᾖ καὶ θαλάσσιοι πνεύμονες· ὥστε κατ' ἀνάγκην ἡμῖν τὸν λόγον τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἐναπολῆξαι, μηδεμίαν ἐκ τῶν γεγραμμένων ὕλην εἰς ἐργασίαν εὑρίσκοντα. ὡς γάρ τις καπνὸς ἢ ὀμίχλη βαθύνει μὲν καὶ ἀναθολοῖ τὸν ἀέρα, ἐν ᾧπερ ἂν τὴν σύ στασιν λάβῃ, καὶ πρὸς τὴν κατὰ φύσιν ἐνέργειαν κωλύει τὴν ὅρασιν, οὐ μὴν οὕτω καταπυκνοῦται πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ὡς καὶ δράξασθαι τὸν βουλόμενον καὶ περισχεῖν ταῖς παλάμαις καὶ ἀντιτυπῆσαι τῷ πλήττοντι, τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ περὶ τῆς σεμνῆς ταύτης λογογραφίας εἰπών τις οὐκ ἂν τῆς ἀληθοῦς 2.1.339 εἰκασίας ἁμάρτοι. πολὺς ὁ ὕθλος ἐν ὀγκώδει καὶ φλεγμαί νοντι λόγῳ πεπονημένος καὶ τῷ μὴ λίαν διορατικῷ τὴν ψυχὴν ὥσπερ ἀχλὺς τῷ πόρρωθεν βλέποντι σύστασιν ἔχειν τινὰ καὶ φαντασίαν δοκεῖ· εἰ δέ τις κατ' αὐτὸν γένοιτο καὶ τῇ ἐξεταστικῇ διανοίᾳ τῶν εἰρημένων ἐφάπτοιτο, καπνοῦ δίκην διαρρεῖ <ὑπὸ> τῆς λαβῆς τὰ νοήματα καὶ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν διασκίδναται καὶ οὐ δέχεται διά τινος στερρότητος καὶ 2.1.340 ἀντιτυπίας τὸν πλήττοντα λόγον. τί οὖν χρὴ πράττειν, ἄπορον· εὐσυκοφάντητος γὰρ πρὸς ἑκάτερον παρὰ τοῖς φιλ αιτίοις ἡ αἵρεσις, εἴτε καθάπερ τινὰ φάραγγα διαπηδή σαντες τὴν κενοφωνίαν ἐπὶ τὰ πρανῆ καὶ ἐπίδρομα τὸν λόγον εὐθύνωμεν, τοῖς δοκοῦσί τινα κατὰ τῆς ἀληθείας ἰσχὺν ἔχειν συσταθέντες διὰ τῆς ἀντιρρήσεως, εἴτε καὶ πάσῃ συμπαρατείνωμεν τῇ φλυαρίᾳ τὴν πρὸς τὰ μάταια μάχην· οὕτω μὲν γὰρ ἐπαχθὴς ἔσται τοῖς ἀφιλοπόνοις ἡ σπουδὴ καὶ ἀνόνητος ἐν πολλαῖς ἐπῶν χιλιάσιν ἐπ' οὐδενὶ 2.1.341 χρησίμῳ μηκυνομένη. εἰ δὲ τῶν δοκούντων ἔχειν τινὰ κατὰ τῆς ἀληθείας ἰσχὺν μόνων ἀντιλαβοίμεθα, κατηγορίας ἀφορ μὴν τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις παρέξομεν ὡς παρεικότες τινὰ τῶν οὐ δεχομένων ἀντίρρησιν. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν δύο προκειμένων ἡμῖν, τοῦ τε διὰ πάντων τὸν λόγον ἐλθεῖν καὶ τοῦ τοῖς ἀναγκαιοτέροις μόνοις ἐπιδραμεῖν, τὸ μὲν ἐπαχθὲς τοῖς ἀκούουσι, τὸ δὲ τοῖς διαβάλλουσιν ὕποπτον, καλῶς ἔχειν φημὶ μέσην τινὰ τραπόμενον ἐκφυγεῖν ἑκατέρωθεν ὡς οἷόν τε 2.1.342 τὸ ὑπαίτιον. τίς οὖν ἡ μέθοδος; πάντων τῶν κατὰ τὸ 2.1.342 μάταιον πεπονημένων αὐτῷ συντεμόντες ὡς οἷόν τε τὸν πολὺν συρφετὸν δι' ὀλίγων ἐπιδραμούμεθα κεφαλαιωδῶς τὰ νοήματα, ὡς μήτε τοῖς ἀνοήτοις ἐμβαθύνειν εἰκῆ μήτε τι τῶν εἰρημένων περιϊδεῖν ἀνεξέταστον. 2.1.343 Ἅπας τοίνυν ὁ λόγος αὐτῷ πρὸς ταύτην ἄσχολός ἐστι τὴν σπουδήν, δεῖξαι φιλονεικῶν ἀνθρωπικῶς τὸ θεῖον δια λεγόμενον καὶ τὰς σημαντικὰς τῶν πραγμάτων φωνὰς αὐτὸν τοῖς οὖσι τὸν τῶν πραγμάτων δημιουργὸν ἐφαρμόζοντα. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μαχόμενος πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα τῆς λογικῆς εἶναι φύσεως, ἣν θεόθεν εἰλήφαμεν, τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὀνομάτων, καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας διαμαρτάνειν φησὶ καὶ τῆς ἰδίας αὐτὸν μὴ κρατεῖν ὑποθέσεως καὶ ταύτην ἐπαγαγὼν τὴν μέμψιν 2.1.344 αὐτῷ