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having established in this part the incomparability of the Son to the Father, since the things considered concerning the grain were sufficient for the Son also to indicate the variation in relation to the Father 2.1.367 in a more humble way. But he discusses 20the incorruptibility of the Father20 as 20not being his from an activity inherent in him20. But whether life which is truly so is some activity activating itself, and if it is the same in meaning both to live always and never to be dissolved into corruption, I do not yet add to the argument, 2.1.368 but I will reserve it for its proper places. That, however, <the> concept of incorruptibility is one, understood in the same way for both the Father and the Son, and that in no way does the incorruptibility of the Father differ from the incorruptibility of the Son, no variation in incorruptibility being found either in any remission and intensification or in any other manner of difference—this I say it is opportune to say both now and always, so that his argument may have no place through this, testifying by the concept of incorruptibility to the Father's lack of communion with the Son. 2.1.369 For as incorruptibility is apprehended concerning the Father, so also it is not doubted to exist in the Only-begotten. For that which is insusceptible to corruption, which is and is called incorruptibility, has an equal, or rather the same, meaning of whomever it may be said. What then has he learned that he testifies only to the unbegotten God that his incorruptibility is not from activity, as if showing through this the variation of the Father 2.1.370 from the Only-begotten? For if he supposes his own 2.1.370 created god to be corruptible, he well demonstrates by the difference of the corruptible from the incorruptible the variation according to nature; but if each is likewise insusceptible to corruption and neither the more nor the less is apprehended in the incorruptibility according to nature, how does he show the incomparability of the Father to the only-begotten Son? Or what does he mean by testifying that the incorruptibility of the Father is not from activity? 2.1.371 But he reveals his purpose in the argument that follows. 20Not from activities,20 he says, 20is he incorruptible and unbegotten as he is Father and Creator.20 I ask the hearer to pay special attention to this. How does he think the meaning of these two names is the same, I mean of creation and of fatherhood? For he defines each of these equally to be an activity, clearly declaring in his argument that he is incorruptible not by activity, but is named Father 2.1.372 and Creator from activities. If, therefore, it is the same for him to be called Father and Creator, because activity is for him the cause of both names, it is absolutely necessary that the results of the activities also be of the same kind as one another, by virtue of their being likewise from activity. But to what limit of blasphemy this leads by its consequence, is clear to everyone who knows how to look to the consequence. But what I think about these things, I wish to add to the joint examination of the arguments. It is not possible for an activity productive of some thing to exist by itself, without something receiving the motion of the activity, for example we say the bronzesmith is active, and that the matter set before him is acted upon 2.1.373 by the art. Therefore these things necessarily have a certain relation to each other, the active and the passive power, of which if one were separated in thought, the remaining one could not exist by itself. For if there were not that which is acted upon, that which acts would not exist. What then is established from this? If an activity that accomplishes some thing does not subsist by itself, without that which is acted upon underlying it, and the Father, as these men say, is nothing other than activity, then through these arguments the only-begotten Son is shown to be passive, being formed by the motion of the activity that gives him subsistence. 2.1.374 For as we say that the Creator of the universe, taking under himself some passive and pliant matter, made his own creative substance active, in the case of sensible things skillfully imposing the varied and multiform qualities to the underlying subject for the production of each of the things that come into being, but in the case of intelligible things, in another way

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κατασκευάσας ἐν τῷ μέρει τούτῳ τὸ πρὸς τὸν πατέρα τοῦ υἱοῦ ἀπαράθετον, ὡς ἱκανῶν ὄντων τῶν περὶ τὸν κόκκον θεωρηθέντων καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ τὴν πρὸς τὸν πατέρα 2.1.367 κατὰ τὸ ταπεινότερον παραλλαγὴν συνενδείξασθαι. ἀλλὰ 20περὶ τῆς ἀφθαρσίας τοῦ πατρὸς20 διαλέγεται ὡς 20οὐκ ἐξ ἐνεργείας προσούσης αὐτῷ20. ἐγὼ δὲ εἰ μὲν ἐνέργειά τίς ἐστιν ἡ ὄντως ζωὴ ἑαυτὴν ἐνεργοῦσα καὶ εἰ ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ σημαινομένῳ τό τε ἀεὶ ζῆν καὶ τὸ μηδέ ποτε εἰς φθορὰν διαλύεσθαι οὔπω τῷ λόγῳ προστίθημι, 2.1.368 ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἰδίοις ταμιεύσομαι τόποις. ὅτι μέντοι μία <ἡ> τῆς ἀφθαρσίας ἐστὶ διάνοια ὡσαύτως ἐπί τε τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ νοουμένη καὶ κατ' οὐδὲν τὸ τοῦ πατρὸς ἄφθαρτον τῆς ἀφθαρσίας τοῦ υἱοῦ παραλλάσσει, οὔτε ὑφέσει τινὶ καὶ ἐπιτάσει οὔτε τινὶ ἄλλῳ διαφορᾶς τρόπῳ τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἀφθαρσίαν παραλλαγῆς εὑρισκομένης, τοῦτο καὶ νῦν φημι εὔκαιρον εἶναι καὶ ἀεὶ λέγειν, ὡς ἂν μηδεμίαν ἔχοι διὰ τούτου χώραν ὁ λόγος αὐτῷ τῇ κατὰ τὴν ἀφθαρσίαν ἐννοίᾳ τῷ πατρὶ προσμαρτυρῶν τὸ πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν ἀκοινώνητον. 2.1.369 ὡς γὰρ περὶ τὸν πατέρα ἡ ἀφθαρσία καταλαμβάνεται, οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μονογενοῦς εἶναι οὐκ ἀμφιβάλλεται. τὸ γὰρ τῆς φθορᾶς ἀπαράδεκτον, ὅπερ ἀφθαρσία καὶ ἔστι καὶ λέγεται, ἴσον μᾶλλον δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει λόγον ἐφ' οὗπερ ἂν λέγηται. τί οὖν μαθὼν μόνῳ προσμαρτυρεῖ τῷ ἀγεν νήτῳ θεῷ τὸ μὴ ἐξ ἐνεργείας εἶναι τὴν ἀφθαρσίαν αὐτῷ, ὡς διὰ τούτου τὴν κατὰ τοῦ μονογενοῦς παραλλαγὴν τοῦ 2.1.370 πατρὸς δεικνύων; εἰ μὲν γὰρ φθαρτὸν ὑποτίθεται τὸν 2.1.370 κτιστὸν ἑαυτοῦ θεόν, καλῶς τῇ τοῦ φθαρτοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἄφθαρτον διαφορᾷ τὴν κατὰ φύσιν παραλλαγὴν ἀποδείκνυσιν· εἰ δὲ ἀνεπίδεκτος φθορᾶς ὡσαύτως ἑκάτερος καὶ οὔτε τὸ μᾶλλον οὔτε τὸ ἧττον ἐν τῇ κατὰ φύσιν ἀφθαρσίᾳ κατα λαμβάνεται, πῶς δείκνυσι τοῦ πατρὸς πρὸς τὸν μονογενῆ υἱὸν τὸ ἀσύγκριτον; ἢ τί βούλεται τὸ μὴ ἐξ ἐνεργείας προσμαρτυρεῖσθαι τῷ πατρὶ τὸ ἄφθαρτον; 2.1.371 Ἀλλ' ἐκκαλύπτει τὸν σκοπὸν τῷ μετὰ ταῦτα λόγῳ. 20οὐκ ἐξ ἐνεργειῶν20, φησίν, 20ἄφθαρτός ἐστιν καὶ ἀγέννητος ὡς πατήρ τε καὶ δημιουργός20. τούτῳ μοι προσέχειν μάλιστα τὸν ἀκροατὴν ἀξιῶ. πῶς ταὐτὸν οἴεται τῶν δύο τούτων ὀνομάτων τὸ σημαινόμενον, τῆς δημιουργίας λέγω καὶ τῆς πατρότητος; ἐνέργειαν γὰρ εἶναι τούτων ἑκάτερον ἐπίσης ὁρίζεται σαφῶς οὕτω διαγορεύων τῷ λόγῳ, ὅτι ἄφθαρτος μὲν οὐκ ἐνεργείᾳ ἐστί, πατὴρ δὲ 2.1.372 καὶ δημιουργὸς ἐξ ἐνεργειῶν ὀνομάζεται. εἰ τοίνυν ταὐτόν ἐστι πατέρα τε καὶ δημιουργὸν αὐτὸν λέγεσθαι, τῷ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἀμφοτέρων αὐτῷ γίνεσθαι τῶν ὀνομάτων αἰτίαν, ἀνάγκη πᾶσα καὶ τὰ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἀποτελέσματα ὁμογενῶς ἔχειν ἀλλήλοις κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἐξ ἐνεργείας ὁμοίως εἶναι. τοῦτο δὲ πρὸς ποῖον βλασφημίας πέρας διὰ τῆς ἀκολου θίας ἐκφέρεται, παντὶ δῆλόν ἐστι τῷ ἐπισταμένῳ βλέπειν πρὸς τὸ ἀκόλουθον. ἐγὼ δ' ὅσα περὶ τούτων λογίζομαι, βούλομαι προσθεῖναι τῇ συνεξετάσει τῶν λόγων. οὐκ ἔστιν ἐνέργειαν ἀπεργαστικήν τινος πράγματος αὐτὴν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς συστῆναι, μή τινος ὑποδεχομένου τῆς ἐνεργείας τὴν κίνη σιν, οἷον ἐνεργεῖν τί φαμεν τὸν χαλκεύοντα, ἐνεργεῖσθαι δὲ 2.1.373 τὴν ἐκκειμένην ὕλην τῇ τέχνῃ. οὐκοῦν ἀναγκαίως ἔχει σχέσιν τινὰ ταῦτα πρὸς ἄλληλα, ἡ ἐνεργητικὴ καὶ ἡ παθη τικὴ δύναμις, ὧν εἰ χωρισθείη τῷ λόγῳ τὸ ἕτερον, οὐκ ἂν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ συσταίη καὶ τὸ λειπόμενον. εἰ γὰρ μὴ τὸ πάσχον εἴη, τὸ ἐνεργοῦν οὐκ ἔσται. τί οὖν ἐκ τούτου κατα σκευάζεται; εἰ οὐ συνίσταται καθ' ἑαυτὴν ἡ ἐνέργεια ἡ ἀποτελεστική τινος πράγματος, μὴ ὑποκειμένου τοῦ πάσχον τος, ὁ πατὴρ δέ, καθὼς οὗτοί φασιν, οὐδὲν ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἢ ἐνέργεια, παθητὸς ἄρα διὰ τούτων ὁ μονογενὴς υἱὸς ἀπο δείκνυται πρὸς τὴν κίνησιν τῆς ὑφιστώσης αὐτὸν ἐνεργείας 2.1.374 τυπούμενος. ὡς γὰρ τὸν τοῦ παντὸς δημιουργόν φαμεν παθητικήν τινα καὶ εὔεικτον ὕλην ὑποβαλόμενον ἐνεργὸν ἑαυτοῦ τὴν δημιουργικὴν οὐσίαν ποιῆσαι, ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν αἰσθη τῶν τὰς ποικίλας τε καὶ πολυειδεῖς τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ ποι ότητας πρὸς τὴν ἑκάστου τῶν γινομένων ἀπεργασίαν τεχνι κῶς ἐπιβάλλοντα, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν νοητῶν ἕτερον τρόπον