Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that all the powers of the soul remain in the soul separated from the body. For we read in the book De Spiritu et Anima that "the soul withdraws from the body, taking with itself sense and imagination, reason and intelligence, concupiscibility and irascibility."

Objection 2: Further, the powers of the soul are its natural properties. But properties are always in that to which they belong; and are never separated from it. Therefore the powers of the soul are in it even after death.

Objection 3: Further, the powers even of the sensitive soul are not weakened when the body becomes weak; because, as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4), "If an old man were given the eye of a young man, he would see even as well as a young man." But weakness is the road to corruption. Therefore the powers of the soul are not corrupted when the body is corrupted, but remain in the separated soul.

Objection 4: Further, memory is a power of the sensitive soul, as the Philosopher proves (De Memor. et Remin. 1). But memory remains in the separated soul; for it was said to the rich glutton whose soul was in hell: "Remember that thou didst receive good things during thy lifetime" (Lk. 16:25). Therefore memory remains in the separated soul; and consequently the other powers of the sensitive part.

Objection 5: Further, joy and sorrow are in the concupiscible part, which is a power of the sensitive soul. But it is clear that separate souls grieve or rejoice at the pains or rewards which they receive. Therefore the concupiscible power remains in the separate soul.

Objection 6: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 32) that, as the soul, when the body lies senseless, yet not quite dead, sees some things by imaginary vision; so also when by death the soul is quite separate from the body. But the imagination is a power of the sensitive part. Therefore the power of the sensitive part remains in the separate soul; and consequently all the other powers.

On the contrary, It is said (De Eccl. Dogm. xix) that "of two substances only does man consist; the soul with its reason, and the body with its senses." Therefore the body being dead, the sensitive powers do not remain.

I answer that, As we have said already (Articles 5,6,7), all the powers of the soul belong to the soul alone as their principle. But some powers belong to the soul alone as their subject; as the intelligence and the will. These powers must remain in the soul, after the destruction of the body. But other powers are subjected in the composite; as all the powers of the sensitive and nutritive parts. Now accidents cannot remain after the destruction of the subject. Wherefore, the composite being destroyed, such powers do not remain actually; but they remain virtually in the soul, as in their principle or root.

So it is false that, as some say, these powers remain in the soul even after the corruption of the body. It is much more false that, as they say also, the acts of these powers remain in the separate soul; because these powers have no act apart from the corporeal organ.

Reply to Objection 1: That book has no authority, and so what is there written can be despised with the same facility as it was said; although we may say that the soul takes with itself these powers, not actually but virtually.

Reply to Objection 2: These powers, which we say do not actually remain in the separate soul, are not the properties of the soul alone, but of the composite.

Reply to Objection 3: These powers are said not to be weakened when the body becomes weak, because the soul remains unchangeable, and is the virtual principle of these powers.

Reply to Objection 4: The recollection spoken of there is to be taken in the same way as Augustine (De Trin. x, 11; xiv, 7) places memory in the mind; not as a part of the sensitive soul.

Reply to Objection 5: In the separate soul, sorrow and joy are not in the sensitive, but in the intellectual appetite, as in the angels.

Reply to Objection 6: Augustine in that passage is speaking as inquiring, not as asserting. Wherefore he retracted some things which he had said there (Retrac. ii, 24).

Articulus 8

Argumentum 1

Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnes potentiae animae remaneant in anima a corpore separata.

Dicitur enim in libro de spiritu et anima, quod anima recedit a corpore, secum trahens sensum et imaginationem, rationem et intellectum et intelligentiam, concupiscibilitatem et irascibilitatem.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, potentiae animae sunt eius naturales proprietates.

Sed proprium semper inest, et nunquam separatur ab eo cuius est proprium. Ergo potentiae animae sunt in ea etiam post mortem.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, potentiae animae, etiam sensitivae, non debilitantur debilitato corpore, quia, ut dicitur in I de anima, si senex accipiat oculum iuvenis, videbit utique sicut et iuvenis.

Sed debilitas est via ad corruptionem. Ergo potentiae animae non corrumpuntur corrupto corpore, sed manent in anima separata.

Argumentum 4

Praeterea, memoria est potentia animae sensitivae, ut philosophus probat.

Sed memoria manet in anima separata, dicitur enim, Luc. XVI, diviti epuloni in inferno secundum animam existenti, recordare quia recepisti bona in vita tua.

Ergo memoria manet in anima separata; et per consequens aliae potentiae sensitivae partis.

Argumentum 5

Praeterea, gaudium et tristitia sunt in concupiscibili, quae est potentia sensitivae partis. Manifestum est autem animas separatas tristari et gaudere de praemiis vel poenis quas habent.

Ergo vis concupiscibilis manet in anima separata.

Argumentum 6

Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. Ad litt., quod sicut anima, cum corpus iacet sine sensu nondum penitus mortuum, videt quaedam secundum imaginariam visionem; ita cum fuerit a corpore penitus separata per mortem.

Sed imaginatio est potentia sensitivae partis. Ergo potentia sensitivae partis manet in anima separata; et per consequens omnes aliae potentiae.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod dicitur in libro de eccles. Dogmat., ex duabus tantum substantiis constat homo, anima cum ratione sua, et carne cum sensibus suis.

Ergo, defuncta carne, potentiae sensitivae non manent.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, omnes potentiae animae comparantur ad animam solam sicut ad principium. Sed quaedam potentiae comparantur ad animam solam sicut ad subiectum, ut intellectus et voluntas. Et huiusmodi potentiae necesse est quod maneant in anima, corpore destructo.

Quaedam vero potentiae sunt in coniuncto sicut in subiecto, sicut omnes potentiae sensitivae partis et nutritivae. Destructo autem subiecto, non potest accidens remanere. Unde, corrupto coniuncto, non manent huiusmodi potentiae actu; sed virtute tantum manent in anima, sicut in principio vel radice.

Et sic falsum est, quod quidam dicunt huiusmodi potentias in anima remanere etiam corpore corrupto.

Et multo falsius, quod dicunt etiam actus harum potentiarum remanere in anima separata, quia talium potentiarum nulla est actio nisi per organum corporeum.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod liber ille auctoritatem non habet.

Unde quod ibi scriptum est, eadem facilitate contemnitur, qua dicitur. Tamen potest dici quod trahit secum anima huiusmodi potentias, non actu, sed virtute.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod huiusmodi potentiae quas dicimus actu in anima separata non manere, non sunt proprietates solius animae, sed coniuncti.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod dicuntur non debilitari huiusmodi potentiae debilitato corpore, quia anima manet immutabilis, quae est virtuale principium huiusmodi potentiarum.

Ad 4

Ad quartum dicendum quod illa recordatio accipitur eo modo quo Augustinus ponit memoriam in mente; non eo modo quo ponitur pars animae sensitivae.

Ad 5

Ad quintum dicendum quod tristitia et gaudium sunt in anima separata, non secundum appetitum sensitivum, sed secundum appetitum intellectivum; sicut etiam in Angelis.

Ad 6

Ad sextum dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur ibi inquirendo, non asserendo.

Unde quaedam ibi dicta retractat.