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powers, Love and Strife, of which the one is unitive, and the other divisive. And he says thus: “First hear the four roots of all things: Shining Zeus and life-bringing Hera, and Aidoneus and Nestis, who with her tears moistens the mortal fount.” For by Zeus he means heat and the aether, by life-bringing Hera, the air; by Aidoneus, the earth. And by Nestis and the mortal fount, as it were, seed and water.” 14.14.7 So great was the disagreement of the first natural philosophers, and such was their opinion about the first principles, postulating in their first principles no god, no maker, no creator, nor any cause of the universe, nor indeed gods nor incorporeal powers, no intelligent natures, no rational substances, nor anything at all beyond the senses. 14.14.8 Anaxagoras alone, then, is remembered as the first of the Greeks in his discourses on first principles to declare Mind to be the cause of all things. At least they say that he, especially among those before him, marveled at natural philosophy; for its sake he allowed his own land to become sheep-pasture, and he was the first of the Greeks to articulate the theory of first principles. For not only did he declare concerning the substance of all things, 14.14.9 as those before him did, but also concerning the cause that moves it. “For in the beginning,” he says, “all things were mixed up together, but Mind came in and brought them from disorder into order.” And it is a wonder how he, the first among the Greeks to theologize in this way, seeming to the Athenians to be an atheist, because he did not deify the sun, but the sun's maker, came very near to being stoned to death. 14.14.10 And it is said that not even he kept his doctrine sound. For while he set Mind over all things, he no longer presented his natural philosophy concerning existing things according to mind and reason. Hear, then, what Socrates in Plato's *On the Soul* alleges against the man in these words:

14.15.1 15. CONCERNING THE OPINION OF ANAXAGORAS “But having once heard someone reading from a book of Anaxagoras, as he said, and saying that it is Mind that orders and is the cause of all things, I was delighted with this cause, and it seemed to me in a way to be right that Mind is the cause of all things, and I considered that if this is so, then Mind in ordering 14.15.2 all things orders them and places each one in whatever way is best. If then someone wished to find the cause of each thing, how it comes to be or is destroyed or exists, he must find out this about it, how it is best for it to be or to suffer or do anything else. From this argument, then, it is fitting for a person to consider nothing else, both about himself and about other things, than what is most excellent and best. And it is necessary that this same person also know what is worse; 14.15.3 for the knowledge of them is the same. Reflecting on these things, I thought I had gladly found in Anaxagoras a teacher of the cause of existing things after my own mind, and that he would tell me first whether the earth is flat or round, and when he had told me, he would go on to explain the cause and the necessity, saying what was better and that it was better for it to be so; and if he should say it is in the center, he would go on to explain how it was better for it to be in the center; and if he should show me these things, I was prepared to long no more for any other kind 14.15.4 of cause. And indeed I was likewise prepared to inquire in the same way about the sun and moon and the other stars, about their relative speeds and their turnings and their other affections, in what way it is ever better for each to do and to suffer what it suffers. For I would never have thought that he, saying that they were ordered by Mind, would bring to bear any other cause for them than that it is best for them to be 14.15.5 as they are. Therefore, in assigning the

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δυνάμεις, Φιλίαν τε καὶ Νεῖκος, ὧν ἡ μέν ἐστιν ἑνωτική, τὸ δὲ διαιρετικόν. φησὶ δὲ οὕτως· τέσσαρα τῶν πάντων ῥιζώματα πρῶτον ἄκουε· Ζεὺς ἀργὴς Ἥρη τε φερέσβιος ἠδ' Ἀϊδωνεὺς Νῆστίς θ', ἣ δακρύοις τέγγει κρούνωμα βρότειον. ∆ία μὲν γὰρ λέγει τὴν ζέσιν καὶ τὸν αἰθέρα, Ἥραν δὲ φερέσβιον τὸν ἀέρα· τὴν γῆν τὸν Ἀϊδωνέα. Νῆστιν δὲ καὶ κρούνωμα βρότειον οἱονεὶ τὸ σπέρμα καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ.» 14.14.7 Τοσαύτη μὲν ἡ τῶν πρώτων φυσικῶν φιλοσόφων διαφωνία, τοιαύτη δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ ἡ περὶ ἀρχῶν δόξα, οὐ θεόν, οὐ ποιητήν, οὐ δημιουργὸν οὐδέ τι τῶν ὅλων αἴτιον οὐδὲ μὴν θεοὺς οὐδ' ἀσωμάτους δυνάμεις, οὐ νοερὰς φύσεις, οὐ λογικὰς οὐσίας οὐδ' ὅλως τι τῶν ἐκτὸς αἰσθήσεως ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς 14.14.8 ὑποθεμένων. μόνος δ' οὖν πρῶτος Ἑλλήνων Ἀναξαγόρας μνημονεύεται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ἀρχῶν λόγοις Νοῦν τὸν πάντων αἴτιον ἀποφήνασθαι. φασὶ γοῦν ὡς ἄρα οὗτος μάλιστα παρὰ τοὺς πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἐθαύμασε φυσιολογίαν· μηλόβοτόν γε τοι τὴν ἑαυτοῦ χώραν δι' αὐτὴν εἴασε τόν τε περὶ ἀρχῶν λόγον πρῶτος Ἑλλήνων διήρθρωσεν. οὐ γὰρ μόνον περὶ τῆς πάντων οὐσίας ἀπεφή14.14.9 νατο, ὡς οἱ πρὸ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τοῦ κινοῦντος αὐτὴν αἰτίου. «Ἦν γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ» φησίν «ὁμοῦ τὰ πράγματα πεφυρμένα, Νοῦς δὲ εἰσελθὼν αὐτὰ ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας εἰς τάξιν ἤγαγε.» θαυμάσαι δ' ἔστιν ὡς οὗτος πρῶτος παρ' Ἕλλησι τοῦτον θεολογήσας τὸν τρόπον, δόξας Ἀθηναίοις ἄθεος εἶναι, ὅτι μὴ τὸν ἥλιον ἐθεολόγει, τὸν δὲ ἡλίου ποιητήν, μικροῦ δεῖν καταλευσθεὶς 14.14.10 ἔθανε. λέγεται δὲ μηδὲ οὗτος σῶον φυλάξαι τὸ δόγμα. ἐπιστῆσαι μὲν γὰρ Νοῦν τοῖς πᾶσιν, οὐκέτι δὲ κατὰ νοῦν καὶ λογισμὸν τὴν περὶ τῶν ὄντων ἀποδοῦναι φυσιολογίαν. ἐπάκουσον δ' οὖν οἷα ὁ Σωκράτης ἐν τῷ Πλάτωνος Περὶ ψυχῆς αἰτιᾶται τὸν ἄνδρα ἐν τούτοις·

14.15.1 ιεʹ. ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΑΝΑΞΑΓΟΡΟΥ ∆ΟΞΗΣ «Ἀλλ' ἀκούσας ποτὲ ἐκ βιβλίου τινός, ὡς ἔφη, Ἀναξαγόρου ἀναγινώσκοντος καὶ λέγοντος, ὡς ἄρα Νοῦς ἐστιν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος, ταύτῃ δὴ τῇ αἰτίᾳ ἥσθην τε καὶ ἔδοξέ μοι τρόπον τινὰ εὖ ἔχειν τὸν Νοῦν εἶναι πάντων αἴτιον, καὶ ἡγησάμην, εἰ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, τόν γε Νοῦν κοσμοῦντα 14.15.2 πάντα κοσμεῖν καὶ ἕκαστον τιθέντα ὅπη ἂν βέλτιστα ἔχῃ. εἰ οὖν τις βούλοιτο τὴν αἰτίαν εὑρεῖν περὶ ἑκάστου, ὅπη ἢ γίγνεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἔστι, τοῦτο δεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ εὑρεῖν, ὅπη βέλτιστον αὐτόν ἐστιν ἢ εἶναι ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν. ἐκ δὴ τοῦ λόγου τούτου οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπεῖν προσήκειν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον. ἀναγκαῖον δὴ εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον εἰδέναι· τὴν αὐτὴν 14.15.3 γὰρ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην περὶ αὐτῶν. ταῦτα δὴ λογιζόμενος ἄσμενος εὑρηκέναι ᾤμην διδάσκαλον τῆς αἰτίας περὶ τῶν ὄντων κατὰ νοῦν ἐμαυτῷ, τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν, καί μοι φράσειν πρῶτον μὲν πότερον ἡ γῆ πλατεῖά ἐστιν ἢ στρογγύλη, ἐπειδὴ δὲ φράσειεν, ἐπεκδιηγήσεσθαι τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην, λέγοντα τὸ ἄμεινον καὶ ὅτι αὐτὴν ἄμεινον ἦν τοιαύτην εἶναι· καὶ εἰ ἐν μέσῳ φαίη εἶναι αὐτήν, ἐπεκδιηγήσεσθαι ὡς ἄμεινον ἦν αὐτὴν ἐν μέσῳ εἶναι· καὶ εἴ μοι ταῦτα ἀποφαίνοι, παρεσκευάσμην ὡς οὐκέτι ποθεσόμενος αἰτίας ἄλλο 14.15.4 εἶδος. καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἡλίου οὕτως παρεσκευάσμην ὡσαύτως πευσόμενος καὶ σελήνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρων τάχους τε πέρι πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ τροπῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παθημάτων, πῇ ποτε ταῦτ' ἄμεινόν ἐστιν ἕκαστον καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἃ πάσχει. οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε αὐτὸν ᾤμην, φάσκοντά γε ὑπὸ Νοῦ κεκο σμῆσθαι, ἄλλην τινὰ αὐτοῖς αἰτίαν ἐπενεγκεῖν ἢ ὅτι βέλτιστον αὐτὰ οὕτως 14.15.5 ἔχειν ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἔχει. ἑκάστου οὖν ἀποδιδόντα τὴν