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Such, then, are the divisions and blasphemies of the natural philosophers concerning God, of whom the account establishes as first those around Pythagoras and Anaxagoras, Plato and Socrates, who set mind and God over the world. These indeed are shown to be mere children in time, 14.16.12 at which times the latest events of the Hebrew archaeology are recorded. Therefore the knowledge of the God of all was not most ancient among all the Greeks, nor among those who long ago introduced the polytheistic superstition among both Phoenicians and Egyptians, which Anaxagoras was the first of the Greeks, along with his followers, to bring forth. And yet the polytheistic superstition prevailed among all nations; but, as it seems, it did not contain true theology, but that which the Egyptians 14.16.13 and Phoenicians were testified to be the very first to establish. And this theology was not about gods at all, nor any divine powers, but about men long since lying among the dead, as the word of truth long ago demonstrated. Come then, let us take up the argument again. Since of the natural philosophers, some based everything on the senses, while others in turn opposed them, such as those around Xenophanes of Colophon and Parmenides of Elea, who indeed denied the senses, saying that nothing among things of sense is comprehensible, wherefore one must trust only in reason, let us consider the arguments made against them.

14.17.1 17. AGAINST THOSE AROUND XENOPHANES AND PARMENIDES WHO DENY THE SENSES; FROM THE EIGHTH BOOK OF *ON PHILOSOPHY*

OF ARISTOCLES "But others arose, uttering the contrary voice to these men. For they think one must reject the senses and appearances, and trust only in reason. For such things were said formerly by Xenophanes and Parmenides and Zeno and Melissus, and later by the followers of Stilpo and the Megarians. Wherefore these men claimed that being is one and that the other is not, and that nothing is generated 14.17.2 nor perishes nor is moved at all. Therefore, we shall learn more of the argument against them by philosophizing, but for now this much must be said: For we might say that our reason is the most divine thing; but yet there is need also of sensation, just as indeed of the body. And it is clear that sensation is by nature truthful; for it is not possible for one who perceives not to be affected by something; and being affected, he would know the affection 14.17.3; sensation, therefore, is also a kind of knowledge. But if to perceive is to be affected by something, and everything that is affected is affected by something, then the agent and the patient must certainly be different. So, in the first place, there would be what is called the 'other,' such as color and sound; and then being will not be one; and moreover, it will not be motionless; 14.17.4 for sensation is motion. And in this way everyone wishes to have his senses in a natural state, since, I think, he trusts the healthy ones more than the diseased. Reasonably, therefore, a powerful love for them has been ingrained in us. Certainly no one, unless he were mad, would ever choose to lose one sense so that all 14.17.5 other good things might be his. Those who slander them, being persuaded that they have them in vain, ought to have said what Pandarus says in Homer about his own bow, "straightway then may a stranger cut the head from me, if I do not put this bow in the bright fire, breaking it with my hands, for it attends me as a thing of wind," and after this to destroy all their own senses; for thus 14.17.6 would one believe them as they teach by deed that they have no need of them. But as it is, this is most absurd; for though they declare them useless in 14.17.7 word, in their deeds they continue to use them most of all. For Melissus, wishing

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Τοιαῦται μὲν δὴ τῶν φυσικῶν φιλοσόφων καὶ αἱ περὶ θεοῦ διαστάσεις τε καὶ δυσφημίαι, ὧν πρώτους ὁ λόγος συνίστησι τοὺς ἀμφὶ τὸν Πυθαγόραν τε καὶ Ἀναξαγόραν Πλάτωνά τε καὶ Σωκράτη νοῦν καὶ θεὸν ἐπιστῆσαι τῷ κόσμῳ. οὗτοι δὴ κομιδῇ παῖδες τοῖς χρόνοις ἀποδείκνυνται γενόμενοι, 14.16.12 καθ' οὓς χρόνους τὰ ὕστατα ἱστορεῖται τῆς Ἑβραίων ἀρχαιολογίας. οὐκ ἦν ἄρα παλαιοτάτη παρὰ πᾶσιν Ἕλλησι καὶ τοῖς πρόπαλαι τὴν πολύθεον δεισιδαιμονίαν παρά τε Φοίνιξι καὶ Αἰγυπτίοις εἰσηγησαμένοις ἡ τοῦ τῶν ὅλων θεοῦ γνῶσις, ἣν πρῶτος Ἑλλήνων Ἀναξαγόρας καὶ οἱ ἀμφ' αὐτὸν ἐξήνεγκαν. καὶ μὴν τὰ τῆς πολυθέου δεισιδαιμονίας πάντων ἐθνῶν ἐκράτει· ἀλλ' ἦν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐ τὴν ἀληθῆ περιέχοντα θεολογίαν, ἀλλ' ἣν Αἰγύπτιοι 14.16.13 καὶ Φοίνικες πρῶτοι πάντων συστήσασθαι ἐμαρτυρήθησαν. αὕτη δὲ ἦν θεοὺς μὲν οὐδαμῶς οὐδέ τινας θείας δυνάμεις, ἄνδρας δὲ ἤδη πάλαι ἐν νεκροῖς κειμένους θεολογοῦσα, ὡς ὁ τῆς ἀληθείας πάλαι ἀπέδειξε λόγος. φέρ' οὖν πάλιν ἀναλάβωμεν τὸν λόγον. ἐπειδὴ τῶν φυσικῶν φιλοσόφων οἱ μὲν πάντα κατέβαλλον ἐπὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις, οἱ δ' αὖ πάλιν τούτοις ἀνθεῖλκον, ὡς οἱ περὶ Ξενοφάνη τὸν Κολοφώνιον καὶ Παρμενίδην τὸν Ἐλεάτην, οἳ δὴ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἀνῄρουν, μηδὲν εἶναι φάσκοντες καταληπτὸν τῶν ἐν αἰσθήσει, διὸ μόνῳ δεῖν πιστεύειν τῷ λόγῳ, τὰ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀντειρημένα διασκεψώμεθα.

14.17.1 ιζʹ. ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΥΣ ΠΕΡΙ ΞΕΝΟΦΑΝΗΝ ΚΑΙ ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙ∆ΗΝ ΤΑΣ ΑΙΣΘΗΣΕΙΣ ΑΝΑΙΡΟΥΝΤΑΣ· ΑΠΟ ΤΟΥ ΟΓ∆ΟΟΥ ΤΩΝ ΠΕΡΙ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑΣ

ΑΡΙΣΤΟΚΛΕΟΥΣ «Ἄλλοι δ' ἐγένοντο τούτοις τὴν ἐναντίαν φωνὴν ἀφιέντες. οἴονται γὰρ δεῖν τὰς μὲν αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰς φαντασίας καταβάλλειν, αὐτῷ δὲ μόνον τῷ λόγῳ πιστεύειν. τοιαῦτα γάρ τινα πρότερον μὲν Ξενοφάνης καὶ Παρμενίδης καὶ Ζήνων καὶ Μέλισσος ἔλεγον, ὕστερον δ' οἱ περὶ Στίλπωνα καὶ τοὺς Μεγαρικούς. ὅθεν ἠξίουν οὗτοί γε τὸ ὂν ἓν εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἕτερον μὴ εἶναι, μηδὲ γεννᾶσθαί τι μηδὲ 14.17.2 φθείρεσθαι μηδὲ κινεῖσθαι τὸ παράπαν. τὸν μὲν οὖν πλείω πρὸς τούτους λόγον εἰσόμεθα φιλοσοφοῦντες, νυνὶ μέντοι τοσοῦτο λεκτέον· εἴποιμεν γὰρ ἂν ὡς ὁ μὲν λόγος ἡμῶν εἴη τὸ θειότατον· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ δεῖ γε καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ὥσπερ γε δὴ καὶ σώματος. ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις ἀληθεύειν πέφυκε δῆλον· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε τὸν αἰσθανόμενον μὴ οὐχὶ πάσχειν τι· πάσχων δὲ τὸ πάθος ἂν 14.17.3 εἰδείη· γνῶσις οὖν τίς ἐστι καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι πάσχειν τί ἐστιν, ἅπαν δὲ τὸ πάσχον ὑπό του πάσχει, πάντως ἕτερον ἂν εἴη τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον. ὥστε πρῶτον μὲν εἴη ἂν τὸ λεγόμενον ἕτερον, οἷον τὸ χρῶμα καὶ ὁ ψόφος· ἔπειτα δὲ ἓν τὸ ὂν οὐκ ἔσται· καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀκίνητον· 14.17.4 ἡ γὰρ αἴσθησίς ἐστι κίνησις. ταύτη δὲ βούλεται πᾶς τις κατὰ φύσιν ἔχειν τὰς αἰσθήσεις, ἅτε δὴ πιστεύων, οἶμαι, ταῖς ὑγιαινούσαις μᾶλλον ἢ ταῖς νοσούσαις. εἰκότως ἄρα καὶ δεινός τις ἔρως αὐτῶν ἡμῖν ἐντέτηκεν. οὐδείς γέ τοι μὴ μεμηνὼς ἕλοιτ' ἄν ποτε μίαν αἴσθησιν ἀποβάλλειν, ὅπως αὐτῷ πάντα τὰ 14.17.5 ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ γένοιτο. τοὺς δὴ διαβάλλοντας αὐτὰς ἐχρῆν, πεπεισμένους γε διότι μάτην ἔχοιεν αὐτάς, εἰπόντας ἅπερ ὁ Πάνδαρος λέγει παρὰ τῷ Ὁμήρῳ περὶ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ τόξων, αὐτίκ' ἔπειτ' ἀπ' ἐμεῖο κάρη τάμοι ἀλλότριος φώς, εἰ μὴ ἐγὼ τάδε τόξα φαεινῷ ἐν πυρὶ θείην, χερσὶ διακλάσσας, ἀνεμώλια γάρ μοι ὀπηδεῖ, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο διαλυμήνασθαι πάσας τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἑαυτῶν· οὕτω γὰρ ἄν 14.17.6 τις ἐπίστευεν αὐτοῖς ἔργῳ διδάσκουσιν ὡς εἰς οὐδὲν αὐτῶν δέοιντο. νυνὶ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ἀτοπώτατόν ἐστιν· ἀχρήστους γὰρ ἀποφαίνοντες αὐτὰς τῷ 14.17.7 λόγῳ τοῖς ἔργοις τὰ μάλιστα χρώμενοι διατελοῦσιν αὐταῖς. ὅ γέ τοι Μέλισσος ἐθέλων