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to demonstrate, that of these things that appear and are in sight, nothing truly is, he proves it by means of the things that appear themselves; for he says: 'For if there is earth and water and air and fire and iron and gold, and the living and the dead, and black and white, and all the other things that men say truly are, and we see and hear correctly, then being itself should also be of such a kind as it first seemed to us to be, and not change nor become different, but each thing should be like what it is. But now we say that we see and hear and understand correctly; but it seems to us that the hot also becomes cold and the cold hot, and the hard soft and the soft hard.' 14.17.8 When he says these and many other such things, one might very reasonably ask: 'Therefore, when a thing is hot and then becomes cold, did you not know this by perceiving it?' And likewise concerning the others. For as I said, he would be found to be doing nothing else but refuting and disproving the senses because he most of all trusts 14.17.9 them. But indeed, such arguments have already given sufficient account of themselves; for they have faded away, as if they had never been spoken at all. Now, however, we confidently say that those philosophize correctly who employ both the senses and reason for the knowledge of things.' 14.17.10 Such then were the followers of Xenophanes, who is said to have been a contemporary of the followers of Pythagoras and Anaxagoras. And Parmenides was a student of Xenophanes; of him, Melissus; of whom, Zeno; of whom, Leucippus; of whom, Democritus; of whom, Protagoras and Nessas; of Nessas, Metrodorus; of whom, Diogenes; of whom, Anaxarchus. And Pyrrho became an associate of Anaxarchus, from whom the school of those called Sceptics was established; and it is possible to learn from the aforementioned writing how those who held the opposite opinion refuted these men, who themselves defined nothing at all to be comprehensible either by sense or by reason, but suspended judgment on all things, in a passage that runs something like this:

14.18.1 18. AGAINST THE SCEPTICS ACCORDING TO PYRRHO, ALSO CALLED EPOCHISTS, WHO DECLARED THAT NOTHING IS COMPREHENSIBLE

“It is necessary before all else to consider our own knowledge; for if indeed we are by nature incapable of knowing anything, there is no longer any need to investigate other matters. 14.18.2 Now, there were some among the ancients who uttered this saying, whom Aristotle has contradicted. Pyrrho of Elis was also influential in saying such things; but he himself left nothing in writing, though his pupil Timon says that he who is to be happy must look to these three things: first, what sort of things are by nature; second, in what manner we ought to be disposed 14.18.3 towards them; and finally, what will be the result for those who are so disposed. Now, as to things, he says that he [Pyrrho] declares them to be equally indifferent and unstable and indeterminable, and for this reason neither our senses nor our opinions are true or false. Therefore, for this reason, one must not trust them, but be without opinions and without inclination and without wavering, saying about each single thing that it no more 14.18.4 is than is not, or both is and is not, or neither is nor is not. And for those so disposed, Timon says the result will be, first, speechlessness, and then, imperturbability, but Aenesidemus says pleasure. 14.18.5 These then are the main points of what is said; but let us consider if they speak correctly. Since, therefore, they say that all things are equally indifferent and for this reason they bid us to assent to nothing nor to hold opinions, one might reasonably, I think, ask them whether those who think they differ are mistaken or not? For in any case, if they are mistaken, they would not be judging correctly. So it is necessary to say to them

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ἐπιδεικνύναι, διότι τῶν φαινομένων καὶ ἐν ὄψει τούτων οὐδὲν εἴη τῷ ὄντι, διὰ τῶν φαινομένων ἀποδείκνυσιν αὐτῶν· φησὶ γοῦν· «Εἰ γάρ ἐστι γῆ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀὴρ καὶ πῦρ καὶ σίδηρος καὶ χρυσὸς καὶ τὸ μὲν ζῶν, τὸ δὲ τεθνηκὸς καὶ μέλαν καὶ λευκὸν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα, ὅσα φασὶν εἶναι ἄνθρωποι ἀληθῶς, καὶ ἡμεῖς ὀρθῶς ὁρῶμεν καὶ ἀκούομεν, εἶναι ἐχρῆν καὶ τὸ ὂν τοιοῦτον, οἷον πρῶτον ἔδοξεν ἡμῖν εἶναι, καὶ μὴ μεταπίπτειν μηδὲ γίνε σθαι ἕτερον, ἀλλ' εἶναι ὅμοιον, οἷόν πέρ ἐστιν, ἕκαστον. νῦν δέ φαμεν ὀρθῶς ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ συνιέναι· δοκεῖ δὲ ἡμῖν τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν γίνεσθαι καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν θερμὸν καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν μαλακὸν καὶ τὸ μαλακὸν σκληρόν.» 14.17.8 ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα λέγοντος αὐτοῦ καὶ μάλα εἰκότως ἐπύθετό τις ἄν· Ἆρ' οὖν ὅτι θερμόν ἐστι κἄπειτα τοῦτο γίνεται ψυχρόν, οὐκ αἰσθόμενος ἔγνως; ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ὅπερ γὰρ ἔφην, εὑρεθείη ἂν οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἀναιρῶν καὶ ἐλέγχων διὰ τὸ μάλιστα πιστεύειν 14.17.9 αὐταῖς. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οἱ μὲν τοιοῦτοι λόγοι σχεδὸν ἱκανὰς ἤδη δεδώκασιν εὐθύνας· ἐξίτηλοί γέ τοι γεγόνασιν, ὡς εἰ μηδὲ ἐλέχθησαν τὸ παράπαν. ἤδη μέντοι θαρροῦντες λέγομεν ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφεῖν τοὺς καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὸν λόγον ἐπὶ τὴν γνῶσιν τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων παραλαμβάνοντας.» 14.17.10 Τοιοίδε μὲν οὖν οἱ ἀμφὶ τὸν Ξενοφάνην, ὃς δὴ λέγεται συνακμάσαι τοῖς ἀμφὶ Πυθαγόραν καὶ Ἀναξαγόραν. Ξενοφάνους δὲ ἀκουστὴς γέγονε Παρμενίδης· τούτου Μέλισσος, οὗ Ζήνων, οὗ Λεύκιππος, οὗ ∆ημόκριτος, οὗ Πρωταγόρας καὶ Νεσσᾶς· τοῦ δὲ Νεσσᾶ Μητρόδωρος, οὗ ∆ιογένης, οὗ Ἀνάξαρχος. Ἀναξάρχου δὲ γνώριμος γέγονε Πύρρων, ἀφ' οὗ ἡ τῶν Σκεπτικῶν ἐπικληθέντων διατριβὴ συνέστη· οὓς καὶ αὐτοὺς μηδὲν εἶναι τὸ παράπαν μήτ' ἐν αἰσθήσει μήτ' ἐν λόγῳ καταληπτὸν ὁριζομένους, ἐπέχοντας δὲ ἐν πᾶσιν ὅπως ἀπήλεγχον οἱ ἀντιδοξάζοντες μαθεῖν πάρεστιν ἀπὸ τοῦ δηλωθέντος συγγράμματος ὧδέ πη πρὸς λέξιν ἔχοντος·

14.18.1 ιηʹ. ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΥΣ ΚΑΤΑ ΠΥΡΡΩΝΑ ΣΚΕΠΤΙΚΟΥΣ ΗΤΟΙ ΕΦΕΚΤΙΚΟΥΣ ΕΠΙΚΛΗΘΕΝΤΑΣ ΜΗ∆ΕΝ ΚΑΤΑΛΗΠΤΟΝ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΑΠΟΦΗΝΑΜΕΝΟΥΣ

«Ἀναγκαίως δ' ἔχει πρὸ παντὸς διασκέψασθαι περὶ τῆς ἡμῶν αὐτῶν γνώσεως· εἰ γὰρ αὖ μηδὲν πεφύκαμεν γνωρίζειν, οὐδὲν ἔτι δεῖ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων 14.18.2 σκοπεῖν. ἐγένοντο μὲν οὖν καὶ τῶν πάλαι τινὲς οἱ ἀφέντες τήνδε τὴν φωνήν, οἷς ἀντείρηκεν Ἀριστοτέλης. ἴσχυσε μὲν τοιαῦτα λέγων καὶ Πύρρων ὁ Ἠλεῖος· ἀλλ' αὐτὸς μὲν οὐδὲν ἐν γραφῇ καταλέλοιπεν, ὁ δέ γε μαθητὴς αὐτοῦ Τίμων φησὶ δεῖν τὸν μέλλοντα εὐδαιμονήσειν εἰς τρία ταῦτα βλέπειν· πρῶτον μέν, ὁποῖα πέφυκε τὰ πράγματα· δεύτερον δέ, τίνα χρὴ τρόπον ἡμᾶς 14.18.3 πρὸς αὐτὰ διακεῖσθαι· τελευταῖον δέ, τί περιέσται τοῖς οὕτως ἔχουσι. τὰ μὲν οὖν πράγματά φησιν αὐτὸν ἀποφαίνειν ἐπ' ἴσης ἀδιάφορα καὶ ἀστάθμητα καὶ ἀνεπίκριτα, διὰ τοῦτο μήτε τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἡμῶν μήτε τὰς δόξας ἀληθεύειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι. διὰ τοῦτο οὖν μηδὲ πιστεύειν αὐταῖς δεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀδοξάστους καὶ ἀκλινεῖς καὶ ἀκραδάντους εἶναι, περὶ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου λέγοντας ὅτι οὐ μᾶλλον 14.18.4 ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ καὶ ἔστι καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε οὐκ ἔστιν. τοῖς μέντοι γε διακειμένοις οὕτω περιέσεσθαι Τίμων φησὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἀφασίαν, ἔπειτα δ' ἀταραξίαν, Αἰνησίδημος δ' ἡδονήν. 14.18.5 Τὰ μὲν οὖν κεφάλαια τῶν λεγομένων ἐστὶ ταῦτα· σκεψώμεθα δ' εἰ ὀρθῶς λέγουσιν. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ἐπ' ἴσης ἀδιάφορα πάντα φασὶν εἶναι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κελεύουσι μηδενὶ προστίθεσθαι μηδὲ δοξάζειν, εἰκότως ἄν, οἶμαι, πύθοιτό τις αὐτῶν, ἆρά γε διαμαρτάνουσιν οἱ διαφέρειν αὐτὰ νομίζοντες ἢ οὔ; πάντως γάρ, εἰ μὲν ἁμαρτάνουσιν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνοιεν ἄν. ὥστε ἀνάγκη λέγειν αὐτοῖς