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that there are some who hold false opinions about realities; they themselves, therefore, would be the ones speaking the truths; and so there would be something true and false. But if we, the many, do not err in thinking that realities differ, what have they learned that they rebuke 14.18.6 us? For they themselves would be erring in claiming they do not differ. And indeed, if we were to grant them that all things are equally indifferent, it is clear that they themselves would not differ from the many. What then would be their wisdom? And why does Timon 14.18.7 revile all others, but hymn Pyrrho alone? Further, if all things are equally indifferent and for this reason one must hold no opinion, then these things too would not differ; I mean, to differ or not to differ, and to hold an opinion or not to hold an opinion. For why are such things so any more than they are not so? Or, as Timon says, why yes and why no, and why the "why" itself? It is clear then that inquiry is destroyed; so let them stop troubling us. Since now, at any rate, they are madly far from any art, at once exhorting us not to hold opinions, and at the same time commanding us to do this very thing and saying that one should make no assertion about anything, and then making assertions; and they demand that one assent to nothing, yet they command us to obey them; then, saying 14.18.8 they know nothing, they refute everyone as if they knew well. But it is necessary for those who say that all things are uncertain to do one of two things: either to be silent or to make some assertion and speak. If, then, they were to keep quiet, it is clear that there would be no argument at all with such people; but if they were to make assertions, they would entirely and in every way say either that something is or that it is not, just as they now in fact say that all things are unknowable and conventional to all, 14.18.9 but nothing is knowable. Therefore, the one claiming this either makes the matter clear and it is possible to understand it when said, or it is not possible. But if it does not make it clear, there would be absolutely no argument at all with such a person. But if it should signify, it would certainly speak of either infinite or finite things; and if infinite, not even so would there be an argument with him, for there is no knowledge of the infinite; but if the things being made clear are finite, or even one of any kind, the one saying this defines something and judges. How then could all things be unknowable and unjudgeable? And if he should say the same thing also is not, first, the same thing will be both true and false, and second, he will say something and not say something and, by using reason, will destroy reason, and further, while confessing to be lying he will say that one must believe him. 14.18.10 It is worth inquiring from where, having learned it, they say all things are uncertain. For they must first know what the certain is; for only then could they say that things are not of such a kind. For one must first know the affirmation, then the negation. But if they are ignorant of what kind the certain is, 14.18.11 they would not know what the uncertain is either. Indeed, whenever Aenesidemus in his *Outlines* goes through the nine modes—for by so many has he attempted to show that things are uncertain—should we say he speaks of them knowingly or ignorantly? For he says that animals differ, and we ourselves, and cities, and ways of life, and customs, and laws; and he says our senses are weak and that there are many external things that corrupt knowledge: distances and magnitudes and motions; and further, the fact that the young and the old, the waking and the sleeping, the healthy and the sick are not disposed in the same way; 14.18.12 and that we perceive nothing simple and pure; for all things are confused and spoken of in relation to something. These things indeed, I say, and such things, one would gladly ask him as he states them so cleverly, whether he says them knowing well that things are this way, or being ignorant; for if he did not know, how could we believe him? but if he knew, he was an utter fool, at once declaring all things uncertain, 14.18.13 and at the same time saying he knew so many things. And indeed, whenever they go through such things, they say nothing but a kind of induction, showing what sort of things the phenomena and particulars are; and such a thing both is and is called a proof. If then they assent to it, it is clear that they hold an opinion; but if they do not believe, neither would 14.18.14 we

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εἶναί τινας τοὺς τὰ ψευδῆ περὶ τῶν ὄντων δοξάζοντας· αὐτοὶ τοίνυν εἶεν ἂν οἱ τἀληθῆ λέγοντες· οὕτω δὲ εἴη ἂν ἀληθές τι καὶ ψεῦδος. εἰ δ' οὐχ ἁμαρτάνομεν οἱ πολλοὶ τὰ ὄντα διαφέρειν οἰόμενοι, τί μαθόντες ἐπιπλήττουσιν 14.18.6 ἡμῖν; αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἁμαρτάνοιεν ἂν ἀξιοῦντες μὴ διαφέρειν αὐτά. καὶ μὴν εἰ καὶ δῴημεν αὐτοῖς ἐπ' ἴσης ἀδιάφορα πάντα εἶναι, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν διαφέροιεν οὐδ' αὐτοὶ τῶν πολλῶν. τίς οὖν εἴη αὐτῶν ἂν ἡ σοφία; καὶ διὰ τί Τίμων τοῖς μὲν 14.18.7 ἄλλοις λοιδορεῖται πᾶσι, Πύρρωνα δ' ὑμνεῖ μόνον; ἔτι γε μὴν εἰ ἐπ' ἴσης ἐστὶν ἀδιάφορα πάντα καὶ διὰ τοῦτο χρὴ μηδὲν δοξάζειν, οὐκ ἂν οὐδὲ ταῦτα διαφέροι· λέγω δὲ τὸ διαφέρειν ἢ μὴ διαφέρειν, καὶ τὸ δοξάζειν ἢ μὴ δοξάζειν. τί γὰρ μᾶλλον τοιαῦτα ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν; ἤ, ὥς φησι Τίμων, διὰ τί ναὶ καὶ διὰ τί οὒ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ διὰ τί διὰ τί; φανερὸν οὖν ὡς ἀναιρεῖται τὸ ζητεῖν· ὥστε παυσάσθωσαν ἐνοχλοῦντες. ἐπεὶ νῦν γε μεμήνασι πόρρω τέχνης ἅμα μὲν ἡμῖν διακελευόμενοι μὴ δοξάζειν, ἅμα δὲ κελεύοντες αὐτὸ τοῦτο ποιεῖν καὶ λέγοντες, ὡς περὶ οὐδενὸς ἀποφαίνεσθαι δέοι, κἄπειτα ἀποφαινόμενοι· καὶ ἀξιοῦσι μὲν μηδενὶ συγκατατίθεσθαι, πείθεσθαι δ' αὐτοῖς κελεύουσιν· εἶτα λέγοντες 14.18.8 μηδὲν εἰδέναι πάντας ἐλέγχουσιν ὡς εὖ εἰδότες. ἀνάγκη δὲ τοὺς φάσκοντας, ὡς ἄδηλα πάντα εἴη, δυοῖν θάτερον, ἢ σιωπᾶν ἢ ἀποφαίνεσθαί τι καὶ λέγειν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἡσυχίαν ἄγοιεν, δῆλον ὅτι πρός γε τοὺς τοιούτους οὐδεὶς ἂν εἴη λόγος· εἰ δ' ἀποφαίνοιντο, πάντη τε καὶ πάντως ἢ εἶναί τι φαῖεν ἂν ἢ μὴ εἶναι, καθάπερ ἀμέλει νυνί φασιν ὡς εἴη πάντα ἄγνωστα καὶ νομιστὰ πᾶσι, 14.18.9 γνωστὸν δ' οὐθέν. τοῦτο τοίνυν ὁ ἀξιῶν ἤτοι δηλοῖ τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ ἔνεστιν αὐτὸ συνεῖναι λεγόμενον, ἢ οὐκ ἔνεστιν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν οὐ δηλοῖ, καθάπαξ οὐδεὶς οὐδ' οὕτως πρὸς τὸν τοιοῦτον ἂν εἴη λόγος. εἰ δὲ σημαίνοι, πάντως ἢ ἄπειρα λέγοι ἂν ἢ πεπερασμένα· καὶ εἰ μὲν ἄπειρα, οὐδ' οὕτως ἂν εἴη λόγος πρὸς αὐτόν, ἀπείρου γὰρ γνῶσις οὐκ ἔστι· πεπερασμένων δὲ ὄντων τῶν δηλουμένων ἢ ἑνὸς ὁτουοῦν, ὁ τοῦτο λέγων ὁρίζει τι καὶ κρίνει. πῶς οὖν ἄγνωστα καὶ ἀνεπίκριτα πάντα εἴη ἄν; εἰ δὲ φαίη ταὐτὸ καὶ μὴ εἶναι, πρῶτον μὲν ἔσται ταὐτὸ καὶ ἀληθὲς καὶ ψεῦδος, ἔπειτα δ' ἐρεῖ τι καὶ οὐκ ἐρεῖ καὶ λόγῳ χρώμενος ἀναιρήσει λόγον, ἔτι δὲ ὁμολογῶν ψεύδεσθαι πιστεύειν ἑαυτῷ 14.18.10 φήσει δεῖν. ἄξιον δὲ ζητῆσαι πόθεν καὶ μαθόντες ἄδηλα πάντα φασὶν εἶναι. δεῖ γὰρ εἰδέναι πρότερον αὐτοὺς τί δή ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ δῆλον· οὕτω γοῦν ἂν ἔχοιεν λέγειν, ὡς οὐκ εἴη τὰ πράγματα τοιαῦτα. πρῶτον γὰρ εἰδέναι χρὴ τὴν κατάφασιν, εἶτα τὴν ἀπόφασιν. εἰ δὲ ἀγνοοῦσιν ὁποῖόν ἐστι τὸ δῆλον, 14.18.11 οὐκ ἂν εἰδεῖεν οὐδὲ τί τὸ ἄδηλον. ὁπόταν γε μὴν Αἰνησίδημος ἐν τῇ Ὑποτυπώσει τοὺς ἐννέα διεξίῃ τρόπους κατὰ τοσούτους γὰρ ἀποφαίνειν ἄδηλα τὰ πράγματα πεπείραται, πότερον αὐτὸν φῶμεν εἰδότα λέγειν αὐτοὺς ἢ ἀγνοοῦντα; φησὶ γὰρ ὅτι τὰ ζῷα διαφέρει καὶ ἡμεῖς αὐτοὶ καὶ αἱ πόλεις καὶ οἱ βίοι καὶ τὰ ἔθη καὶ οἱ νόμοι· καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις δέ φησιν ἡμῶν ἀσθενεῖς εἶναι καὶ πολλὰ τὰ ἔξωθεν λυμαινόμενα τὴν γνῶσιν, ἀποστήματα καὶ μεγέθη καὶ κινήσεις· ἔτι δὲ τὸ μὴ ὁμοίως διακεῖσθαι νέους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους καὶ ἐγρηγορότας καὶ κοιμωμένους καὶ ὑγιαίνοντας καὶ νοσοῦντας· οὐδενός τε 14.18.12 ἡμᾶς ἁπλοῦ καὶ ἀκραιφνοῦς ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι· πάντα γὰρ εἶναι συγκεχυμένα καὶ πρός τι λεγόμενα. ταῦτα δή, φημί, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κομψολογοῦντα αὐτὸν ἡδέως ἄν τις ἤρετο, πότερον εὖ εἰδὼς λέγοι διότι τὰ πράγματα τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον ἢ ἀγνοῶν· εἰ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ᾔδει, πῶς ἂν ἡμεῖς αὐτῷ πιστεύοιμεν; εἰ δ' ἐγίνωσκε, κομιδῇ τις ἦν ἠλίθιος ἅμα μὲν ἄδηλα πάντα ἀποφαινόμενος, 14.18.13 ἅμα δὲ τοσαῦτα λέγων εἰδέναι. καὶ μὴν ὁπότε γε τὰ τοιαῦτα διεξίοιεν, οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ ἐπαγωγήν τινα λέγουσι, δεικνύντες ὁποῖ' ἄττα εἴη τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα· τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτο καὶ ἔστι καὶ λέγεται πίστις. εἰ μὲν οὖν αὐτῇ συγκατατίθενται, δῆλον ὅτι δοξάζουσιν· εἰ δ' οὐ πιστεύουσιν, οὐδ' ἂν 14.18.14 ἡμεῖς