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if we should wish to pay attention to them. And yet Timon, in his *Python*, narrates, spinning out a long story, how he met Pyrrho walking towards Pytho past the shrine of Amphiaraus, and what they said to each other. So then, would not someone reasonably stand beside him as he was writing these things and say: Why, you rogue, do you trouble yourself writing these things and narrating what you do not know? For why is it any more the case that you met him and spoke with him than that you did not meet him and did not speak with him? 14.18.15 And did that wonderful Pyrrho himself know why he was walking to see the Pythian games? Or was he wandering along the road like a madman, and when he began to accuse men and their ignorance, shall we say that he spoke the truth or not, and that Timon was affected by something and assented to his words, or that he paid no attention? For if he was not persuaded, how did he become a philosopher instead of a dancer and continue to admire Pyrrho? But if he assented to what was said, he would be a strange person, philosophizing himself but preventing us. 14.18.16 And one might simply wonder what is the point for them of Timon’s *Silloi* and the blasphemies against all men, and the long elementary treatises of Aenesidemus, and all that crowd of arguments. For if they have written these things thinking to make us better, and for this reason think it necessary to refute everyone, so that we may cease from talking nonsense, they clearly wish us to know and suppose the truth, that things are such as Pyrrho claims. So if we were persuaded by them, we would become better from being worse, having judged what is more 14.18.17 advantageous and having accepted those who speak better. How then could things be equally indifferent and unable to be judged? And how could we become non-assenting and without opinions? But if there is no benefit from their arguments, why do they bother us? Or why does Timon say: “No other mortal indeed would contend with Pyrrho”? For one would no more admire Pyrrho than that Coroebus or that Mele 14.18.18 tides, who indeed are thought to have excelled in foolishness. However, one must also consider these things: For what kind of citizen or judge or counselor or friend or, to speak simply, human being would such a person be? Or what evil would he not dare to do, who thinks nothing is truly evil or shameful or just or unjust? For one could not even say that such people fear the laws and punishments; for how could they, 14.18.19 being passionless and undisturbed, as they themselves say? And Timon indeed says these things about Pyrrho: “But such was the man I saw, unassuming and untamed by all those things, spoken and unspoken, by which you mortals are subdued, you fickle tribes of men, weighed down this way and that by passions and opinion and foolish legislation.” 14.18.20 However, whenever they say this wise thing, that one must live following nature and customs, but assent to nothing, they are utterly foolish. For if to nothing else, one must at least assent to this very thing and suppose it to be so. But why must one follow nature and customs any more 14.18.21 than not follow them, seeing that we know nothing and have nothing by which we shall judge? For that is also utterly stupid, when they say that just as cathartic drugs expel themselves along with the waste products, in the same way the argument that claims all things are unclear destroys itself along with the others. For if it refutes itself, those who use it would be talking nonsense. It is better, then, for them to keep 14.18.22 quiet and not even open their mouths. But indeed the cathartic drug and their argument have nothing in common. For the drug is expelled and does not remain in the body, but the argument must exist in the soul, being the same and always believed; for this alone would be what makes them 14.18.23 non-assenting. But that it is not possible for a human being to be without opinions, one might also learn in this way: for it is impossible for one who perceives not to perceive. And to perceive was to know something. But that also

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προσέχειν αὐτοῖς βουληθείημεν. ὅ γε μὴν Τίμων ἐν τῷ Πύθωνι διηγεῖται, μακρόν τινα κατατείνας λόγον, ὡς ἐντύχοι τῷ Πύρρωνι βαδίζοντι Πυθοῖδε παρὰ τὸ ἱερὸν τὸ τοῦ Ἀμφιαράου καὶ τίνα διαλεχθεῖεν ἀλλήλοις. ἆρ' οὖν οὐκ εὐλόγως ἄν τις αὐτῷ ταῦτα συγγράφοντι παραστὰς εἴποι· Τί, ὦ πονηρέ, ἐνοχλεῖς σεαυτῷ ταῦτα συγγράφων καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶσθα διηγούμενος; τί γὰρ μᾶλλον ἐνέτυχες ἢ οὐκ ἐνέτυχες αὐτῷ καὶ διελέχθης ἢ οὐ διελέχθης; 14.18.15 αὐτός τε ἐκεῖνος ὁ θαυμαστὸς Πύρρων ἆρά γε ᾔδει τὸ διὰ τί βαδίζοι Πύθια θεασόμενος; ἢ καθάπερ οἱ μεμηνότες ἐπλανᾶτο κατὰ τὴν ὁδόν, ἡνίκα δ' ἤρξατο κατηγορεῖν τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῆς ἀγνοίας αὐτῶν, ἆρά γε φῶμεν αὐτὸν ἀληθῆ λέγειν ἢ μὴ καὶ τὸν Τίμωνα παθεῖν τι καὶ συγκαταθέσθαι τοῖς λόγοις ἢ μὴ προσέχειν; εἰ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἐπείσθη, πῶς ἀντὶ χορευτοῦ φιλόσοφος ἐγένετο καὶ τὸν Πύρρωνα διετέλεσε θαυμάζων; εἰ δὲ συγκατέθετο τοῖς λεγομένοις, ἄτοπος ἂν εἴη τις αὐτὸς μὲν φιλοσοφῶν, ἡμᾶς δὲ κωλύων. 14.18.16 ἁπλῶς δὲ θαυμάσαι τις ἄν, οἱ Τίμωνος Σίλλοι καὶ αἱ κατὰ πάντων ἀνθρώπων βλασφημίαι καὶ αἱ μακραὶ στοιχειώσεις Αἰνησιδήμου καὶ πᾶς ὁ τοιοῦτος ὄχλος τῶν λόγων τί δήποτε βούλετ' αὐτοῖς. εἰ μὲν γὰρ οἰόμενοι κρείττους ἡμᾶς ἀπεργάσεσθαι ταῦτα γεγράφασι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντας οἴονται δεῖν ἐλέγχειν, ὅπως παυσώμεθα φλυαροῦντες, βούλονται δηλονότι τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἡμᾶς εἰδέναι καὶ ὑπολαβεῖν, ὅτι τοιαῦτα εἴη τὰ πράγματα καθάπερ ἀξιοῖ Πύρρων. ὥστε εἰ πεισθείημεν αὐτοῖς, ἐκ χειρόνων βελτίους ἂν γενοίμεθα, κρίναντες τὰ συμφο14.18.17 ρώτερα καὶ τοὺς ἄμεινον λέγοντας ἀποδεξάμενοι. πῶς οὖν ἐπ' ἴσης ἀδιάφορα τὰ πράγματα καὶ ἀνεπίκριτα δύναιτ' ἂν εἶναι; καὶ πῶς ἀσυγκατάθετοι καὶ ἀδόξαστοι γενοίμεθ' ἄν; εἰ δ' οὐδὲν ὄφελός ἐστι τῶν λόγων, τί ἡμῖν ἐνοχλοῦσιν; ἢ διὰ τί Τίμων φησίν· οὐκ ἂν δὴ Πύρρωνί γ' ἐρίσσειεν βροτὸς ἄλλος; οὐ γὰρ μᾶλλον Πύρρωνα θαυμάσαι τις ἂν ἢ τὸν Κόροιβον ἐκεῖνον ἢ τὸν Μελη14.18.18 τίδην, οἳ δὴ δοκοῦσι μωρίᾳ διενεγκεῖν. ἐνθυμεῖσθαι μέντοι χρὴ καὶ ταῦτα· ποῖος γὰρ ἂν γένοιτο πολίτης ἢ δικαστὴς ἢ σύμβουλος ἢ φίλος ἢ ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἄνθρωπος ὅ γε τοιοῦτος; ἢ τί τῶν κακῶν οὐ τολμήσειεν ἂν ὁ μηδὲν ὡς ἀληθῶς οἰόμενος εἶναι κακὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον; οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκεῖνο φαίη τις ἄν, ὅτι τοὺς νόμους δεδοίκασι καὶ τὰς τιμωρίας οἱ τοιοῦτοι· πῶς γὰρ οἵ 14.18.19 γε ἀπαθεῖς καὶ ἀτάραχοι, καθάπερ αὐτοί φασιν, ὄντες; ὅ γέ τοι Τίμων ταῦτα καὶ λέγει περὶ τοῦ Πύρρωνος· ἀλλ' οἷον τὸν ἄτυφον ἐγὼ ἴδον ἠδ' ἀδάμαστον πᾶσιν ὅσοις δαμνᾶσθε βροτῶν ἄφατοί τε φατοί τε, λαῶν ἔθνεα κοῦφα, βαρυνόμεν· ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα ἐκ παθέων δόξης τε καὶ εἰκαίης νομοθήκης. 14.18.20 ὁπόταν μέντοι φῶσι τὸ σοφὸν δὴ τοῦτο, διότι δέοι κατακολουθοῦντα τῇ φύσει ζῆν καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσι, μηδενὶ μέντοι συγκατατίθεσθαι, πάνυ τινές εἰσιν εὐήθεις. εἰ γὰρ μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ, τούτῳ γοῦν αὐτῷ δεῖ συγκαταθέσθαι καὶ ὑπολαβεῖν οὕτως ἔχειν αὐτό. τί δὲ μᾶλλον τῇ φύσει καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσι δεῖ κατακολου14.18.21 θεῖν ἢ οὐ δεῖ, μὴ εἰδότας γε δὴ μηθὲν μηδ' ἔχοντάς τι ὅτῳ κρινοῦμεν; ἐκεῖνο μὲν γὰρ καὶ παντάπασίν ἐστιν ἠλίθιον, ἐπειδὰν λέγωσιν, ὅτι καθάπερ τὰ καθαρτικὰ φάρμακα συνεκκρίνει μετὰ τῶν περιττωμάτων καὶ ἑαυτά, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ὁ πάντα ἀξιῶν εἶναι λόγος ἄδηλα μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀναιρεῖ καὶ ἑαυτόν. εἰ γὰρ αὐτὸς αὑτὸν ἐλέγχοι, ληροῖεν ἂν οἱ χρώμενοι τούτῳ. βέλτιον οὖν ἡσυ14.18.22 χίαν ἄγειν αὐτοὺς καὶ μηδὲ τὸ στόμα διαίρειν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ὅμοιον ἔχει τι τὸ καθαρτικὸν φάρμακον καὶ ὁ τούτων λόγος. τὸ μὲν γὰρ φάρμακον ἐκκρίνεται κἀν τοῖς σώμασιν οὐχ ὑπομένει, τὸν μέντοι λόγον ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὑπάρ χειν δεῖ τὸν αὐτὸν ὄντα καὶ πιστευόμενον αἰεί· μόνος γὰρ οὗτος εἴη ἂν ὁ ποιῶν 14.18.23 ἀσυγκαταθέτους. ὅτι δ' οὐχ οἷόν τε τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀδόξαστον εἶναι, καὶ ὡδὶ καταμάθοι τις ἄν· ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὸν αἰσθανόμενον μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι. τὸ δ' αἰσθάνεσθαι γνωρίζειν τι ἦν. διότι δὲ καὶ