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of intensification, nor of remission, nor of the otherness in quantity or quality introducing variation, it is entirely necessary that things corresponding to the same concepts should also 2.1.490 be called by the same names. If, therefore, the one reality in the simplicity of life is apprehended in the Father and the Son, admitting no variation in the principle of simplicity, as has been said, it is entirely necessary that the name applied to the one also be fitting for the other; so that if the simplicity of the Father’s life is signified by the name of unbegottenness, this term is not 2.1.491 unfitting for the Son’s simplicity either. For just as what is rational and mortal and capable of intellect and knowledge is called man, equally in the case of Adam and of Abel, and nothing has altered the designation of the nature—neither in Abel's case having come into life through generation, nor in Adam's case without generation—so too, if the name for the simple and uncompounded life of the Father is unbegottenness, likewise in the case of the Son's life the same concept will necessarily be applied with the same term, if indeed 20it is necessary20, as Eunomius says, 20for one of two things to be true: either the thing signified is entirely different, or the signifying term is not different either20. 2.1.492 But why do we idly occupy ourselves with vain things, when we should propose Eunomius’s book itself to the more diligent for the refutation of the folly of his arguments, and without those who correct it, it shows by itself to the intelligent not only the blasphemy of the dogma, but also the feebleness of his style? For in many ways, not according to our conception but according to his own opinion, misinterpreting the name of ‘conception,’ as in a night-battle where no one distinguishes friend from foe, he does not realize that by the means through which he thinks he is fighting against us, he is stabbing his own dogma 2.1.493. For that by which he thinks he must especially alienate himself from the church of the pious is this: to construct the argument 20that God became Father at some late time, and that the name of fatherhood is more recent than the other names spoken of him. For he was called Father from the time he purposed to become a Father and 2.1.494 became one20. Since, therefore, in this argument he constructs 20that all the appellations applied to the divine nature agree with one another in what they signify, and that there is no difference among them20, and ‘Father’ is one of the applied names (for as he is called incorruptible and eternal, so also he is called Father), either he will confirm in the case of this term too the opinion he holds about the other names and will corrupt his first assumption, if the concept of fatherhood 2.1.495 should also happen to be included with all the appellations (for it is clear that if the meaning of ‘incorruptible’ and ‘Father’ were the same, as he is always incorruptible, so he will be acknowledged as always Father, since, as he says, the signification is one for all the names), or if he should be afraid to testify to God’s fatherhood from eternity, he will necessarily destroy his argument, confessing that a particular meaning exists in each of the names, and so his great nonsense about the names, bursting like a bubble, 2.1.496 is extinguished. But if he should defend himself regarding the contradiction by saying that only the appellation of Father and that of Creator were added to God subsequently, 20because from an activity20, as he himself says, 20each of the terms is applied to God20, he will delimit our great labor on the present subject, confessing those things which should have been refuted by us with much effort. For if the signification of the term Creator and of Father is one (for each is 20from an activity20), the things signified by the terms are in every way equivalent to each other; for of things whose signification is the same, their subject is not in any way 2.1.497 different. 20If, therefore, from an activity20 He is called both Father and Creator, it is entirely possible, by interchanging them convertibly, to use the names and say that God is both Creator of the Son and Father of the stone, if indeed the... is without a share of the
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ἐπιτάσεως οὔτε ὑφέσεως οὔτε τῆς κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ἢ ποιὸν ἑτερότητος τὴν παραλλαγὴν ἐμποιούσης, ἀνάγκη πᾶσα τὰ ταῖς αὐταῖς ἐννοίαις συμβαίνοντα καὶ 2.1.490 ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν προσηγοριῶν ὀνομάζεσθαι. εἰ οὖν ἓν τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἁπλότητα τῆς ζωῆς ἐν πατρὶ καὶ υἱῷ καταλαμβάνεται, οὐδεμίαν τοῦ τῆς ἁπλότητος λόγου καθὼς εἴρηται παραλλαγὴν δεχομένου, ἀνάγκη πᾶσα τὸ τῷ ἑνὶ ἐφαρμοζόμενον ὄνομα καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἕτερον προσφυῶς ἔχειν· ὥστε εἰ ἡ ἁπλότης τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς ζωῆς τῷ τῆς ἀγεννησίας ὀνόματι διασημαίνεται, μηδὲ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ υἱοῦ ἁπλότητα 2.1.491 τὴν φωνὴν ἀνοικείως ἔχειν. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ λογικὸν καὶ θνητὸν καὶ νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικὸν ἄνθρωπος ὀνομάζεται ὁμοίως ἐπί τε τοῦ Ἀδὰμ καὶ τοῦ Ἄβελ καὶ οὐδὲν τὴν τῆς φύσεως ἐπωνυμίαν ὑπήμειψεν, οὔτε ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἄβελ τὸ διὰ γεννήσεως οὔτε ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἀδὰμ τὸ ἄνευ γεννήσεως εἰς ζωὴν παρελθεῖν, οὕτως εἴπερ τὸ ἁπλοῦν καὶ ἀσύνθετον τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς ζωῆς ὄνομα τὴν ἀγεννησίαν ἔχει, ὡσαύτως καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ υἱοῦ ζωῆς ἡ αὐτὴ ἔννοια τῇ αὐτῇ φωνῇ κατ' ἀνάγκην ἐφαρμοσθήσεται, εἴπερ 20δεῖ20, καθώς φησιν ὁ Εὐνόμιος, 20δυοῖν θάτερον, ἢ καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ δηλούμενον πάντως ἕτερον ἢ μηδὲ τὸν δηλοῦντα λόγον ἕτερον20 εἶναι. 2.1.492 Ἀλλὰ τί τοῖς ματαίοις ἐμφιλοχωροῦμεν εἰκῇ, δέον αὐτὴν τοῖς φιλοπονωτέροις εἰς ἔλεγχον τῆς ἀνοίας τῶν λό γων προτείνειν τοῦ Εὐνομίου τὴν βίβλον καὶ δίχα τῶν εὐθυ νόντων αὐτόθεν οὐ μόνον τὸ τοῦ δόγματος βλάσφημον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ τῆς συνηθείας ἄτονον τοῖς συνετοῖς ἐπιδεικνύναι; πολυτρόπως γὰρ οὐκ ἐπὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἐννοίας, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ αὐτῷ δοκοῦν τὸ τῆς ἐπινοίας ὄνομα παρερμηνεύων, καθ άπερ ἐν νυκτομαχίᾳ μηδενὸς διακρίνοντος τὸ φίλιόν τε καὶ ἀλλότριον, δι' ὧν ἡμῖν προσπολεμεῖν οἴεται, τὸ ἴδιον δόγμα 2.1.493 κατακεντῶν οὐ συνίησιν. ᾧ γὰρ μάλιστα τῆς ἐκκλησίας τῶν εὐσεβούντων ἑαυτὸν ἀλλοτριοῦν οἴεται δεῖν τοῦτό ἐστι, τὸ κατασκευάζειν 20ὀψέ ποτε τὸν θεὸν γεγενῆσθαι πατέρα καὶ τὸ τῆς πατρότητος ὄνομα νεώτερον εἶναι τῶν λοιπῶν ὀνομάτων, ὅσα περὶ αὐτὸν λέγεται. ἐξ ἐκείνου γὰρ αὐτὸν κληθῆναι πα τέρα ἀφ' οὗ προέθετο γενέσθαι πατὴρ καὶ 2.1.494 ἐγένετο20. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ κατα σκευάζει 20πάσας τὰς ἐπιλεγομένας τῇ θείᾳ φύσει προσηγορίας κατὰ τὸ σημαινόμενον ἀλ λήλαις συμφέρεσθαι καὶ μηδεμίαν ἐν αὐταῖς εἶναι διαφοράν20, ἓν δὲ τῶν ἐπιλεγομένων ἐστὶν ὀνομάτων καὶ ὁ πατήρ (ὡς γὰρ ἄφθαρτός τε καὶ ἀΐδιος, οὕτω καὶ πατὴρ ὀνομάζεται), ἢ κυρώσει καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φωνῆς ταύτης τὴν περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ὀνομάτων δόξαν καὶ διαφθερεῖ τὴν πρώτην ὑπόληψιν, εἴπερ πάσαις ταῖς προσηγορίαις καὶ ἡ 2.1.495 τῆς πατρότητος ἔννοια συμπεριειλημμένη τύχοι (δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι εἰ ταὐτὸν εἴη τὸ σημαινόμενον ἀφθάρτου τε καὶ πατρός, ὡς ἀεὶ ἄφθαρτος, οὕτως ἀεὶ καὶ πατὴρ ὁμολογηθήσεται, μιᾶς, ὥς φησι, πᾶσι τοῖς ὀνόμασι τῆς σημασίας οὔσης) ἢ εἰ φοβοῖτο ἐξ ἀϊδίου προσμαρτυρεῖν τῷ θεῷ τὴν πατρότητα, λύσει κατ' ἀνάγκην τὸ ἐπιχείρημα, ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἰδιάζουσαν ἐνυπάρχειν ὁμολογῶν σημασίαν, καὶ οὕτως ὁ πολὺς αὐτῷ περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων ὕθλος πομφόλυγος δίκην 2.1.496 ἀπορραγεὶς κατασβέννυται. εἰ δὲ ἀπολογοῖτο περὶ τῆς ἐν αντιότητος ὡς μόνης τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῆς τοῦ δημιουργοῦ προσηγορίας ἐπιγεννηματικῶς τῷ θεῷ προσγενομένης, 20διὰ τὸ ἐξ ἐνεργείας20, ὡς αὐτὸς λέγει, 20ἑκατέρας ἐπι λέγεσθαι τῷ θεῷ τὰς φωνάς20, περιγράψει τὴν πολλὴν ἡμῶν περὶ τὸ προκείμενον ἀσχολίαν, ταῦτα ὁμολογῶν ἃ πολλοῖς ἔδει πόνοις παρ' ἡμῶν διελέγχεσθαι. εἰ γὰρ μία τῆς τε τοῦ δημιουργοῦ καὶ τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς φωνῆς ἡ ση μασία (20ἐξ ἐνεργείας20 γὰρ ἑκατέρα), ἰσοδυναμεῖ πάντως ἀλλήλοις καὶ τὰ διὰ τῶν φωνῶν σημαινόμενα· ὧν γὰρ τὸ σημαινόμενον τὸ αὐτό, τούτων οὐδὲ τὸ ὑποκείμενον πάντως 2.1.497 διάφορον. 20εἰ οὖν ἐξ ἐνεργείας20 καὶ πατὴρ καὶ δημιουργὸς ὀνομάζεται, ἔξεστι πάντως καὶ ὑπαλλάξαντι κατὰ τὸ ἀντι στρέφον τοῖς ὀνόμασι χρήσασθαι καὶ εἰπεῖν ὅτι καὶ δημιουρ γὸς τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ πατὴρ τοῦ λίθου ἐστὶν ὁ θεός, εἴπερ ἄμοιρόν ἐστι τὸ τοῦ