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the name of father of its natural relational meaning. But what is constructed by means of this no longer has a 2.1.498 doubtful absurdity, at least for those who have sense. For just as it is absurd to consider a stone to be God, or anything else of those things that have come into being through creation, so it will be acknowledged that one ought not to testify to the divinity of the only-begotten God either, since one and the same meaning according to energy testifies to both titles for God, according to the argument of Eunomius, by which he is named both father and creator. 2.1.499 But let us hold to the matters at hand. For slandering our argument, which says that knowledge about God is gathered for us through different conceptions, he says 20that he is no longer constructed by us as simple, as partaking of the concepts signified by each appellation and through participation in them completing for himself the perfection of his being20. These things I write in my own words, shortening his long-winded chatter. 2.1.500 But against this vain and, I think, feeble superfluity of words, I believe that none of those who think well would make a refutation, apart from an accusation of foolishness. For if there were anything of such a sort in what was said by us, it would be altogether necessary for us either to retract the things badly said, or to lead the ambiguity of thought to a blameless interpretation. But since nothing of the sort has been said by us, nor does the consequence of what has been said push the thought to such a necessity, why is it necessary, by dwelling on what is acknowledged, to 2.1.501 weary those who read with the extension of the argument? For who is so without sense, that upon hearing that the pious conceptions about God are gathered by us through many concepts, he would think the divine is composite from different things, or gathers its perfection to itself from participation in certain things? Suppose someone has discovered geometry, and let this same person be supposed to be the discoverer of astronomy and again of medicine and grammar and geometry and certain other such practices; since the many and various names of the practices are contemplated in connection with the one soul, 2.1.502 will the soul for this reason be considered composite? And yet there is the greatest difference between what is signified by medicine and the science of astronomy, and grammar has no commonality with geometry according to what is signified, nor, again, do seamanship and agriculture; but surely it is possible for the concept of each of these to be gathered in one soul, and not for this reason does the soul become highly composite, nor are all the names of the practices mixed together into one 2.1.503 meaning. If, therefore, the human mind, through so many names said about it, is in no way harmed with respect to its simplicity, how could anyone suppose God, if he were called by the names wise and just and good and eternal and all things befitting God—unless one meaning were thought for all the names—either to become multipartite or to gather to himself the perfection of his nature from participation in these? 2.1.504 But let us examine his more vehement accusation against us, which is as follows. 20But if it is necessary20, he says, 20to proceed to the more abrupt argument, he does not even keep the substance itself unmixed and pure from worse and contrary things20. So then, such is the accusation, but what is the proof of the charges? Let us see his vehement and rhetorical attack against us. 20If according to the unending20, he says, 20of his life he is only incorruptible, and according to having no beginning he is only unbegotten, in that respect in which he is not incorruptible, he will be corruptible, and in that respect in which he is not 2.1.505 unbegotten, he will be begotten20. And taking up the same point again, he says: 20He will be, therefore, according to having no beginning, at once unbegotten and corruptible, and according to being unending, at once incorruptible and begotten20. This then is his 20more abrupt argument20, which he threatened to bring forth against us as a refutation of our saying that the substance of God is mixed with contrary and with worse things. But I consider it manifest to those who have a sound criterion of truth in themselves, that no

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πατρὸς ὄνομα τῆς κατὰ φύσιν σχετικῆς σημασίας. τὸ δὲ διὰ τούτου κατασκευαζόμενον οὐκέτ' ἀμ 2.1.498 φίβολον ἔχει τὴν ἀτοπίαν τοῖς γε νοῦν ἔχουσιν. ὡς γὰρ ἄτοπόν ἐστι λίθον ἡγεῖσθαι θεὸν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν διὰ κτίσεως ὑποστάντων, οὕτως ὁμολογηθήσεται μηδὲ τῷ μονογενεῖ θεῷ δεῖν προσμαρτυρεῖν τὴν θεότητα, μιᾶς καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν σημασίας ἀμφοτέρας τῷ θεῷ τὰς κλήσεις κατὰ τὸν Εὐνομίου λόγον προσμαρτυ ρούσης, καθ' ἣν καὶ πατὴρ καὶ δημιουργὸς ὀνομάζεται. 2.1.499 Ἀλλὰ τῶν προκειμένων ἐχώμεθα. διαβάλλων γὰρ τὸν ἡμέτερον λόγον τὸν κατὰ διαφόρους ἐπιβολὰς λέγοντα τὴν περὶ θεοῦ γνῶσιν ἡμῖν συναγείρεσθαι φησὶ 20μηκέτ' αὐτὸν παρ' ἡμῶν ἁπλοῦν εἶναι κατασκευάζε σθαι ὡς μεταλαμβάνοντα τῶν νοημάτων τῶν δι' ἑκάστης προσηγορίας σημαινομένων καὶ διὰ τῆς ἐκείνων μετουσίας συμπληροῦντα ἑαυτῷ τὴν κατὰ τὸ εἶναι τελείωσιν20. ταῦτα διὰ τῆς ἐμαυτοῦ λέξεως γράφω συντέμνων αὐτοῦ τὴν μακρὰν ἀδολεσχίαν. 2.1.500 ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν ματαίαν ταύτην οἶμαι καὶ ἄτονον περιττο λογίαν οὐδὲ τὴν ἀντίρρησιν ἄν τινα τῶν εὖ φρονούντων ἔξω τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἄνοιαν κατηγορίας ποιήσασθαι. εἰ μὲν γάρ τι τοιοῦτον ἐν τοῖς παρ' ἡμῶν εἰρημένοις ἦν, ἔδει πάντως ἡμᾶς ἢ ἀνατίθεσθαι τὰ κακῶς εἰρημένα ἢ τὸ ἀμφίβολον τῆς διανοίας πρὸς τὸ ἀνεύθυνον τῆς ἑρμηνείας ἄγειν. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὔτε εἴρηται παρ' ἡμῶν τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν οὔτε ἡ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀκολουθία πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην ἀνάγκην ἐξωθεῖ τὴν διάνοιαν, τί δεῖ τοῖς ὁμολογουμένοις ἐνδιατρίβοντα ἀπο 2.1.501 κναίειν τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας τῇ παρατάσει τοῦ λόγου; τίς γὰρ οὕτως ἔξω διανοίας ἐστίν, ὡς ἀκούσας διὰ πολλῶν ἡμῖν νοημάτων τὰς εὐσεβεῖς περὶ θεοῦ ὑπολήψεις ἀθροί ζεσθαι σύνθετον ἐκ διαφόρων τὸ θεῖον οἴεσθαι ἢ ἐκ μετα λήψεώς τινων ἑαυτῷ συναγείρειν τὴν τελειότητα; εὕρατό τις καθ' ὑπόθεσιν γεωμετρίαν, ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς οὗτος ὑπει λήφθω καὶ ἀστρονομίας εὑρετὴς εἶναι ἰατρικῆς τε πάλιν καὶ γραμματικῆς καὶ γεωμετρίας καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων ἐπι τηδευμάτων τινῶν· ἆρ' ἐπειδὴ πολλὰ καὶ διάφορα τὰ ὀνό ματα τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων περὶ τὴν μίαν θεωρεῖται ψυχήν, 2.1.502 σύνθετος διὰ τοῦτο ἡ ψυχὴ νομισθήσεται; καίτοιγε πλεῖ στον διαφέρει τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἰατρικὴν σημαινόμενον τῆς ἀστρο νομικῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ ἡ γραμματικὴ πρὸς τὴν γεωμετρίαν οὐδεμίαν κατὰ τὸ σημαινόμενον τὴν κοινωνίαν ἔχει, οὐδ' αὖ πάλιν ἡ ναυτιλία καὶ ἡ γεωπονία· ἀλλὰ μὴν περὶ τὴν μίαν ψυχὴν ἑκάστου τούτων τὸν λόγον δυνατόν ἐστιν ἀθροι σθῆναι, καὶ οὐ διὰ τοῦτο πολυσύνθετος ἡ ψυχὴ γίνεται οὐδὲ πάντα τὰ ὀνόματα τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων πρὸς ἓν σημαινό 2.1.503 μενον ἀνακίρναται. εἰ τοίνυν ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς διὰ τοσού των ὀνομάτων τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν λεγομένων οὐδὲν εἰς τὴν ἁπλότητα βλάπτεται, πῶς ἄν τις οἰηθείη τὸν θεόν, εἰ σοφὸς καὶ δίκαιος καὶ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἀΐδιος καὶ πάντα τὰ θεοπρεπῆ καλοῖτο ὀνόματα, εἰ μὴ μία πᾶσι νομισθείη τοῖς ὀνόμασι σημασία, ἢ πολυμερῆ γίνεσθαι ἢ ἐκ μετουσίας τούτων τὸ τέλειον ἑαυτῷ συναγείρειν τῆς φύσεως; 2.1.504 Ἀλλ' ἐξετάσωμεν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν σφοδροτέραν καθ' ἡμῶν κατηγορίαν ἔχουσαν οὕτως. 20εἰ δὲ δεῖ20, φησίν, 20ἐπὶ τὸν ἀποτομώτερον χωρῆσαι λόγον, οὐδὲ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτὴν ἀνεπίμικτον καὶ καθαρὰν φυ λάσσει τῶν χειρόνων καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων20. ἡ μὲν οὖν κατηγορία τοσαύτη, ὁ δὲ τῶν ἐγκλημάτων ἔλεγχος τίς; ἴδωμεν τὴν σφοδρὰν αὐτοῦ καὶ ῥητορικὴν καθ' ἡμῶν ἐπιχείρησιν. 20εἰ κατὰ τὸ ἀτελεύτητον20, φησί, 20τῆς ζωῆς μόνον ἐστὶν ἄφθαρτος καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἄναρχον μόνον ἀγέννητος, καθ' ὃ μή ἐστιν ἄφθαρτος, φθαρτὸς ἔσται, καὶ καθ' ὃ μή ἐστιν 2.1.505 ἀγέννητος, γεννητὸς ἔσται20. καὶ ἐπαναλαβὼν πάλιν τὸ αὐτό φησιν· 20ἔσται ἄρα κατὰ μὲν τὸ ἄναρχον ἀγέννητος ὁμοῦ καὶ φθαρτός, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἀτε λεύτητον ἄφθαρτος ὁμοῦ καὶ γεννητός20. ὁ μὲν οὖν 20ἀποτομώτερος αὐτοῦ λόγος20 οὗτός ἐστιν, ὃν καθ' ἡμῶν προοίσειν ἠπείλησεν εἰς ἔλεγχον τοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ θεοῦ λέγειν ἡμᾶς ἐπιμεμίχθαι τοῖς ἐναντίοις τε καὶ τοῖς χείροσιν. ἐγὼ δὲ φανερὸν μὲν ἡγοῦμαι τοῖς ἐρρωμένον ἔχουσιν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας κριτήριον, ὅτι οὐδεμίαν