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discussed, but in effect he said that the substance of happiness lay in pleasures. For by always making speeches about pleasure, he led those who approached him to suspect that he was saying the end is to live 14.18.32 pleasantly. His hearer, along with others, was also his daughter Arete; who, having borne a child, named him Aristippus, who, having been led by her into philosophical discourses, was called mother-taught; who also clearly defined the end to be living pleasantly, positing pleasure as that which is in motion. For he said there are three states concerning our constitution: one, in which we feel pain, similar to a storm at sea; another, in which we feel pleasure, likened to a gentle wave, for pleasure is a gentle motion, compared to a fair wind; and the third is an intermediate state, in which we feel neither pain nor pleasure, being like a calm. And indeed he said that we have perception of these feelings alone. Against whom these things have been said in reply: 14.19.1 19. AGAINST THE PHILOSOPHERS ACCORDING TO ARISTIPPUS WHO SAY THAT ONLY

THE FEELINGS ARE COMPREHENSIBLE BUT THE REST INCOMPREHENSIBLE

“Next would be those who say that only the feelings are comprehensible; this was said by some of those from Cyrene. These men thought it right, as if oppressed by some stupor, to know nothing at all, unless someone standing by were to strike and prick them; for when being burned, they said, or being cut, they knew that they were experiencing something; but whether the 14.19.2 thing burning them was fire or the thing cutting them iron, they could not say. One might immediately ask those who say these things if they themselves at least know this, that they are experiencing and perceiving something. For if they do not know, they would not be able to say that they know only the feeling; but if they do know, then the feelings would not be the only comprehensible things. For 14.19.3 “I am being burned” was a statement and not a feeling. But indeed it is necessary that these three things coexist: the feeling itself, that which causes it, and that which experiences it. He, therefore, who perceives the feeling would certainly also perceive the one experiencing it. For he will not indeed know that, as it happens, he is being warmed, but be ignorant of whether it is himself or his neighbor; and now or last year, and in Athens or in Egypt, and living or dead, and moreover being a man 14.19.4 or a stone. Therefore he will also know by what he is being affected; for they also know one another and roads and cities and food; and again, craftsmen know their own tools, and doctors and sailors take note of future events, and of wild beasts the 14.19.5 dogs find the tracks. Moreover, he who experiences something necessarily perceives it either as his own feeling or as another's. From where, then, will he be able to say that this is pleasure, and this pain, or that by tasting or seeing or hearing he experiences something, and that he tastes with the tongue, sees with the eyes, and hears with the ears? Or how do they know that they must choose this, but flee from that? But if none of these things moved them, they would have no impulse or desire; and so they would not even be living creatures. For they are ridiculous, whenever they say that these things have happened to them, but they do not know how or in what way. For thus they would not be able to say whether they are human by nature or if they are alive, 14.19.6 nor therefore if they are saying something and making a statement. So, what argument could there be against such people? One might indeed wonder, if they are ignorant of whether they are on the earth or in the heavens; but it is much more wonderful if they do not know, and this while claiming to be philosophers, whether four is more than three and how many one and two are. For these men cannot even say how many fingers they have on their hands, nor whether each 14.19.7 of them is one or more. So that they would not even know their own name, nor their fatherland, nor Aristippus. Therefore, neither whom they love or hate, nor what they desire; nor, if they were to laugh or to weep, will they be able to say that the one was

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διελέξατο, δυνάμει δὲ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔλεγεν ἐν ἡδοναῖς κεῖσθαι. αἰεὶ γὰρ λόγους περὶ ἡδονῆς ποιούμενος εἰς ὑποψίαν ἦγε τοὺς προσιόντας αὐτῷ τοῦ λέγειν τέλος εἶναι τὸ ἡδέως 14.18.32 ζῆν. τούτου γέγονεν ἀκουστὴς σὺν ἄλλοις καὶ ἡ θυγάτηρ αὐτοῦ Ἀρήτη· ἥτις γεννήσασα παῖδα ὠνόμασεν Ἀρίστιππον, ὃς ὑπαχθεὶς ὑπ' αὐτῆς εἰς λόγους φιλοσοφίας μητροδίδακτος ἐκλήθη· ὃς καὶ σαφῶς ὡρίσατο τέλος εἶναι τὸ ἡδέως ζῆν, ἡδονὴν ἐντάττων τὴν κατὰ κίνησιν. τρεῖς γὰρ ἔφη καταστάσεις εἶναι περὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν σύγκρασιν· μίαν μὲν καθ' ἣν ἀλγοῦμεν, ἐοικυῖαν τῷ κατὰ θάλασσαν χειμῶνι· ἑτέραν δὲ καθ' ἣν ἡδόμεθα, τῷ λείῳ κύματι ἀφομοιουμένην, εἶναι γὰρ λείαν κίνησιν τὴν ἡδονήν, οὐρίῳ παραβαλλομένην ἀνέμῳ· τὴν δὲ τρίτην μέσην εἶναι κατάστασιν, καθ' ἣν οὔτε ἀλγοῦμεν οὔτε ἡδόμεθα, γαλήνῃ παραπλησίαν οὖσαν. τούτων δὴ καὶ ἔφασκε τῶν παθῶν μόνων ἡμᾶς τὴν αἴσθησιν ἔχειν. πρὸς οὓς ἀντιλέλεκται ταῦτα· 14.19.1 ιθʹ. ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΥΣ ΚΑΤ' ΑΡΙΣΤΙΠΠΟΝ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΟΥΣ ΜΟΝΑ ΛΕΓΟΝΤΑΣ

ΤΑ ΠΑΘΗ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΚΑΤΑΛΗΠΤΑ ΤΑ ∆Ε ΛΟΙΠΑ ΑΚΑΤΑΛΗΠΤΑ

«Ἑξῆς δ' ἂν εἶεν οἱ λέγοντες μόνα τὰ πάθη καταληπτά· τοῦτο δ' εἶπον ἔνιοι τῶν ἐκ τῆς Κυρήνης. οὗτοι δ' ἠξίουν, ὥσπερ ὑπὸ κάρου πιεζόμενοί τινος, οὐδὲν εἰδέναι τὸ παράπαν, εἰ μή τις παραστὰς αὐτοὺς παίοι καὶ κεντῴη· καιόμενοι γὰρ ἔλεγον ἢ τεμνόμενοι γνωρίζειν ὅτι πάσχοιέν τι· πότερον δὲ τὸ 14.19.2 καῖον εἴη πῦρ ἢ τὸ τέμνον σίδηρος, οὐκ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν. τοὺς δὴ ταῦτα λέγοντας εὐθὺς ἔροιτό τις ἄν, εἰ δὴ τοῦτο γοῦν ἴσασιν αὐτοί, διότι πάσχουσί τι καὶ αἰσθάνονται. μὴ εἰδότες μὲν γὰρ οὐδ' εἰπεῖν δυνηθεῖεν ἂν ὅτι μόνον ἴσασι τὸ πάθος· εἰ δ' αὖ γνωρίζουσιν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη μόνα τὰ πάθη καταληπτά. τὸ γὰρ 14.19.3 «ἐγὼ καίομαι» λόγος ἦν καὶ οὐ πάθος. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀνάγκη γε τρία ταῦτα συνυφίστασθαι, τό τε πάθος αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον. ὁ τοίνυν ἀντιλαμβανόμενος τοῦ πάθους πάντως αἰσθάνοιτ' ἂν καὶ τοῦ πάσχοντος. οὐ γὰρ δὴ διότι μέν, εἰ τύχοι, θερμαίνεται γνωριεῖ, πότερον δ' αὐτὸς ἢ ὁ γείτων, ἀγνοήσει· καὶ νῦν ἢ πέρυσι καὶ Ἀθήνησιν ἢ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ καὶ ζῶν ἢ τεθνεώς, ἔτι δὲ ἄνθρωπος 14.19.4 ὢν ἢ λίθος. οὐκοῦν εἴσεται καὶ ὑφ' ὅτου πάσχοι· καὶ γὰρ ἀλλήλους γνωρίζουσι καὶ ὁδοὺς καὶ πόλεις καὶ τὴν τροφήν· οἵ τ' αὖ τεχνῖται τὰ ἐργαλεῖα τὰ αὑτῶν οἴδασι καὶ οἱ ἰατροὶ καὶ ναυτικοὶ σημειοῦνται τὰ μέλλοντα καὶ τῶν θηρίων οἱ 14.19.5 κύνες εὑρίσκουσι τοὺς στίβους. ἔτι γε μὴν ὁ πάσχων τι πάσχων πάντως ἢ ὡς οἰκείου τινὸς ἢ ὡς ἀλλοτρίου πάθους ἀντιλαμβάνεται. πόθεν οὖν ἕξει λέγειν ὅτι τοῦτο μέν ἐστιν ἡδονή, τοῦτο δὲ πόνος, ἢ ὅτι γευόμενος ἢ ὁρῶν ἢ ἀκούων πάσχοι τι, καὶ τῇ μὲν γλώσσῃ γευόμενος, τοῖς δ' ὄμμασιν ὁρῶν, τοῖς δ' ὠσὶν ἀκούων; ἢ πῶς ἴσασιν ὅτι τοδὶ μὲν αἱρεῖσθαι χρή, τοδὶ δὲ φεύγειν; εἰ δὲ μηδὲν τούτων κινοῖεν, οὐχ ἕξουσιν ὁρμὴν οὐδ' ὄρεξιν· οὕτω δ' οὐδ' ἂν ζῷα εἶεν. γελοῖοι γάρ εἰσιν, ὁπότε λέγοιεν ὅτι ταῦτα μὲν αὐτοῖς συμβέβηκεν, οὐ μὴν ἴσασί γε πῶς καὶ τίνα τρόπον. οὕτω γὰρ οὐδ' εἰ ἄνθρωποι πεφύκασιν οὐδ' εἰ ζῶσιν, 14.19.6 ἔχοιεν ἂν εἰπεῖν· οὐκοῦν οὐδ' εἰ λέγουσί τι καὶ ἀποφαίνονται. πρὸς δὴ τοὺς τοιούτους τίς ἂν εἴη λόγος; θαυμάσαι μέντοι τις ἄν, εἰ ἀγνοοῦσι πότερον ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς εἰσιν ἢ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ· πολλῷ δὲ θαυμασιώτερον εἰ οὐκ οἴδασι, καὶ ταῦτα φάσκοντες φιλοσοφεῖν, ἆρά γε τὰ τέτταρα πλείονά ἐστιν ἢ τὰ τρία καὶ τὸ ἓν καὶ τὰ δύο πόσα ἐστίν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁπόσους ἔχουσιν ἐπὶ τῶν χειρῶν δακτύλους οὗτοί γε δύνανται εἰπεῖν οὐδὲ πότερον ἕκαστος 14.19.7 αὐτῶν εἷς ἐστιν ἢ πλείους. ὥστε οὐδὲ τοὔνομα τὸ ἴδιον εἰδεῖεν ἂν οὐδὲ τὴν πατρίδα καὶ τὸν Ἀρίστιππον. οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ τίνας φιλοῦσιν ἢ μισοῦσιν οὐδὲ τίνων ἐπιθυμοῦσιν· οὐδ', εἰ γελάσαιεν ἢ δακρύσαιεν, ἕξουσιν εἰπεῖν ὅτι τὸ μὲν εἴη