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the one laughable, the other painful. It is clear, then, that they do not even understand what we are now saying. Therefore, such men would differ in no way from gnats or flies; and yet even those creatures recognize what is according to nature and contrary to nature.” 14.19.8 Now, against those who are so disposed, though it is possible to say a myriad of things, these are sufficient. It follows to examine together with these also those who have trodden the opposite path and have determined that one must trust in all things the senses of the body, 14.19.9 among whom were Metrodorus of Chios and Protagoras of Abdera. Now, they said that Metrodorus had been a student of Democritus, and that he declared the principles to be the full and the void; of which the one is being, and the other non-being. At any rate, in writing *On Nature* he used such an introduction: “None of us knows anything, not even this very thing, whether we know or we do not know.” This introduction gave bad starting-points to Pyrrho who came after him. And proceeding, he says that “all things 14.19.10 are what one thinks them to be.” As for Protagoras, the story goes that he was called an atheist. At any rate, he too, writing *On the Gods*, used the following introduction: “Now concerning the gods, I do not know either that they are or what they are like in form; for there are many things that prevent me from knowing each of these things.” The Athenians, having punished him with exile, burned his books publicly in the middle of the agora. Since, then, these men said that one must trust only in the senses, let us examine the objections against them:

14.20.1 20. AGAINST THOSE AROUND METRODORUS AND PROTAGORAS WHO SAY THAT ONE MUST TRUST IN THE SENSES ALONE

“There have been some who claim that one must trust in sense-perception and appearances alone. Some, however, say that Homer also hints at such a thing by declaring Oceanus to be the origin of all things, as if things were in a state of flux. Among those whom we know, Metrodorus of Chios also seems to say this same thing, 14.20.2 but Protagoras of Abdera said it outright. For he said that “man is the measure of all things, of things that are, that they are, and of things that are not, that they are not;” for however things appear to each person, such 14.20.3 they are. But concerning other things, we are unable to assert anything. Against these one might say what Plato also says in the *Theaetetus*: first, why on earth, if things are indeed so, did they claim that man is the measure of truth, and not a pig or a baboon? Then, how did they say they themselves were wise, if indeed every person is the measure of truth for himself? Or how do they refute others, if indeed for each person what appears is true, and we are ignorant of something, though we often perceive it, just as when we hear barbarians 14.20.4 speaking? Moreover, he who has seen something and then remembers it, knows it, but no longer perceives it. And if one were to close one eye, but see with the other, it is clear that he would both know and not know the same thing 14.20.5. In addition to this, if what appears to each person is also true, but to us what is said by them does not appear to be true, then 14.20.6 that man is not the measure of all things would be true. And surely craftsmen differ from the unskilled and the experienced from the inexperienced, and for this reason a pilot, a physician, and a general 14.20.7 foresee what will be better. And in general these men do away with the more and the less, and the necessary and the possible, and the according to nature and the contrary to nature. In this way the same thing would be both being and not being; for nothing prevents the same thing from appearing to be to some, and not to be to others. And the same thing would be a man and a piece of wood; for at times 14.20.8 the same thing appears to this one to be a man, and to that one a piece of wood. And every statement would be true, and for this reason also false. And those who deliberate and judge would be able to do nothing. And the most terrible thing,

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γελοῖον, τὸ δὲ λυπηρόν. δῆλον οὖν ὡς οὐδὲ τί νυνὶ λέγομεν ἡμεῖς, συνιᾶσιν. οὐδὲν οὖν οἵ γε τοιοῦτοι διαφέροιεν ἂν ἐμπίδων ἢ μυιῶν· καίτοι κἀκεῖνα γνωρίζει τὰ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ παρὰ φύσιν.» 14.19.8 Πρὸς δὴ τοὺς οὕτω διακειμένους εἰ καὶ μυρία λέγειν ἔνεστιν, ἀλλ' ἀρκεῖ γε καὶ ταῦτα. ἕπεται τούτοις συνεξετάσαι καὶ τοὺς τὴν ἐναντίαν βαδίσαντας καὶ πάντα χρῆναι πιστεύειν ταῖς τοῦ σώματος αἰσθήσεσιν ὁρισαμένους, 14.19.9 ὧν εἶναι Μητρόδωρον τὸν Χῖον καὶ Πρωταγόραν τὸν Ἀβδηρίτην. τὸν μὲν οὖν Μητρόδωρον ∆ημοκρίτου ἔφασαν ἀκηκοέναι, ἀρχὰς δὲ ἀποφήνασθαι τὸ πλῆρες καὶ τὸ κενόν· ὧν τὸ μὲν ὄν, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὂν εἶναι. γράφων γέ τοι περὶ φύσεως εἰσβολῇ ἐχρήσατο τοιαύτῃ· «Οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν οὐδὲν οἶδεν, οὐδ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο, πότερον οἴδαμεν ἢ οὐκ οἴδαμεν.» ἥτις εἰσβολὴ κακὰς ἔδωκεν ἀφορμὰς τῷ μετὰ ταῦτα γενομένῳ Πύρρωνι. προβὰς δέ φησιν ὅτι «πάντα 14.19.10 ἐστίν, ὃ ἄν τις νοήσῃ.» τὸν δὲ Πρωταγόραν λόγος ἔχει κεκλῆσθαι ἄθεον. γράφων γέ τοι καὶ αὐτὸς περὶ θεῶν εἰσβολῇ τοιᾷδε ἐχρήσατο· «Περὶ μὲν οὖν θεῶν οὐκ οἶδα οὔθ' ὡς εἰσὶν οὔθ' ὁποῖοί τινες ἰδέαν· πολλὰ γάρ ἐστι τὰ κωλύοντά με ἕκαστον τούτων εἰδέναι.» τοῦτον Ἀθηναῖοι φυγῇ ζημιώσαντες τὰς βίβλους αὐτοῦ δημοσίᾳ ἐν μέσῃ τῇ ἀγορᾷ κατέκαυσαν. ἐπεὶ οὖν οἵδε μόναις δεῖν ἔφασαν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι πιστεύειν, τὰς πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀντιρρήσεις θεασώμεθα·

14.20.1 κʹ. ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΥΣ ΠΕΡΙ ΜΗΤΡΟ∆ΩΡΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΠΡΩΤΑΓΟΡΑΝ ΜΟΝΑΙΣ ∆ΕΙΝ ΠΙΣΤΕΥΕΙΝ ΤΑΙΣ ΑΙΣΘΗΣΕΣΙ ΛΕΓΟΝΤΑΣ

«Γεγόνασι δέ τινες οἱ ἀξιοῦντες τῇ αἰσθήσει καὶ ταῖς φαντασίαις μόναις δεῖν πιστεύειν. ἔνιοι μέντοι φασὶ καὶ τὸν Ὅμηρον αἰνίττεσθαι τὸ τοιοῦτο πάντων ἀποφαίνοντα τὸν Ὠκεανὸν ἀρχήν, ὡς ἐν ῥύσει τῶν πραγμάτων ὄντων· ὧν δ' ἴσμεν ἔοικε μὲν καὶ Μητρόδωρος ὁ Χῖος τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο λέγειν, 14.20.2 οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἄντικρύς γε Πρωταγόρας ὁ Ἀβδηρίτης εἶπεν. οὗτος γὰρ ἔφη «μέτρον εἶναι πάντων χρημάτων τὸν ἄνθρωπον, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δ' οὐκ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν·» ὁποῖα γὰρ ἑκάστῳ φαίνεται τὰ πράγματα, τοιαῦτα καὶ 14.20.3 εἶναι· περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων μηδὲν ἡμᾶς δύνασθαι διισχυρίσασθαι. πρὸς δὲ τούτους εἴποι τις ἂν ἃ καὶ Πλάτων ἐν Θεαιτήτῳ· πρῶτον μέν, τί δήποτε, τοιούτων γε δὴ τῶν πραγμάτων ὄντων, ἠξίωσαν εἶναι μέτρον τῆς ἀληθείας τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλ' οὐ σῦν ἢ κυνοκέφαλον; ἔπειτα δέ, πῶς ἔλεγον εἶναι σοφοὺς ἑαυτούς, εἰ δὴ πᾶς τις αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ μέτρον ἐστὶ τῆς ἀληθείας; ἢ πῶς ἐλέγχουσι τοὺς ἄλλους, εἴπερ ἑκάστῳ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀληθές ἐστιν, ἀγνοοῦμέν τέ τινα, καίτοι πολλάκις αἰσθανόμενοι, καθάπερ ἐπειδὰν τῶν βαρβάρων ἀκούω14.20.4 μεν; ὅ γε μὴν θεασάμενος ὁτιοῦν, εἶτα μεμνημένος, οἶδε μέν, αἰσθάνεται δ' οὐκέτι. καὶ εἰ θατέρῳ μὲν ὀφθαλμῷ μύσαι, θατέρῳ δ' ὁρῴη, δῆλον ὅτι ταὐτὸ 14.20.5 καὶ εἴσεται καὶ οὐκ εἴσεται. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, εἰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἑκάστῳ καὶ ἀληθές ἐστιν, ἡμῖν δὲ οὐ φαίνεται τὰ ὑπ' ἐκείνων λεγόμενα ἀληθῆ, καὶ 14.20.6 τὸ μὴ εἶναι πάντων πραγμάτων μέτρον τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀληθὲς ἂν εἴη. καὶ μὴν οἵ γε τεχνῖται τῶν ἀτέχνων διαφέρουσι καὶ οἱ ἔμπειροι τῶν ἀπείρων καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μᾶλλον προορᾷ τὸ μέλλον ἔσεσθαι κυβερνήτης καὶ ἰατρὸς καὶ στρα14.20.7 τηγός· ἁπλῶς τε ἀναιροῦσιν οὗτοί γε τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τὸ παρὰ φύσιν. οὕτω δ' ἂν εἴη ταὐτὸ καὶ ὂν καὶ οὐκ ὄν· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει ταὐτὸ τοῖς μὲν εἶναι φαίνεσθαι, τοῖς δὲ μὴ εἶναι· καὶ ταὐτὸ ἂν εἴη ἄνθρωπος καὶ ξύλον· ἔσθ' ὅτε γὰρ 14.20.8 φαίνεται ταὐτὸ τῷδε μὲν ἄνθρωπος, τῷδε δὲ ξύλον· ἅπας τε λόγος ἀληθὴς ἂν εἴη, διὰ τοῦτο δὲ καὶ ψευδής· καὶ οἱ βουλευόμενοι καὶ δικάζοντες οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιεν οὐδὲν ποιεῖν. καὶ τὸ δεινότατον,