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For the same people will be virtuous and wicked, and vice and virtue the same thing. And one might have many other such things to say; but in fact there is no need of more arguments against those who do not think they have mind and reason.” 14.20.9 Then he adds in order: “Since there are still some now who say that every sensation and every appearance is true, let us say a few things about these as well. For these people seem to fear that if they should say some sensations are false, they would not have the criterion and the rule firm or trustworthy; but they do not see that they would not be long in this way in declaring all opinions also to be true; for indeed we are accustomed to judge many things by these also; and no less do they claim that some of them are true, 14.20.10 and others false. Then, upon examining, one might see that not even of the other criteria is any one always and in all circumstances unerring, such as, I mean, a balance or a lathe or any such thing; but each of them in one condition is sound, and in another defective, and used in this way it is true, but in that way it is false. And indeed if every sensation were true, there would be no need for them to differ so much. For they are different near and far, of the sick and the healthy, of craftsmen and the unskilled, and of the wise and the foolish. And indeed it would be altogether absurd to say that the sensations of madmen are true, and those of people who see or hear amiss; for it would be a silly thing to say, that the one who sees amiss either sees or 14.20.11 does not see; for one might say that he sees, but not correctly. However, when they say that sensation, being irrational, adds or subtracts nothing, they appear not to see what is in front of them; for in the case of the oar in the water, and in the case of paintings, and a myriad of other things, it is the sensation that deceives. Therefore we all find fault in such cases not with our mind, but with the appearance. For the argument refutes itself by claiming that every appearance is true; for our own appearance, by which we do not think every one is such, it will certainly declare to be false. Therefore it follows 14.20.12 for them that they say every appearance is both true and false. And in general they err by claiming that whatever sort of things appear to us, such they also are. For on the contrary, whatever sort of things they are by nature, such they appear, and we do not make them be so, but we ourselves are somehow disposed by them. Since it would also be ridiculous, if we were to imagine like painters and sculptors puppies or chimeras, to claim that these things immediately exist and for this reason they are imagined as if present and ready.” 14.20.13 That they do not speak correctly, therefore, who assert that every sensation 14.20.13 and every appearance is true, is clear from these things. But while these things are so, again the school of Epicurus, starting from the way of life of Aristippus, made everything depend on pleasure and sensation, defining that only the feelings are apprehensible and 14.20.14 that pleasure is the end of goods. And Epicurus is said by some to have been a student of no one, but to have encountered the writings of the ancients; but by some that he was a student of Xenocrates, and later also of Nausiphanes, who had become an acquaintance of Pyrrho. What then, as it happens, are the things said against him, let us see;

14.21.1 21. AGAINST THOSE OF EPICURUS' SCHOOL WHO DEFINE PLEASURE AS THE END

“Since knowledge is twofold, the one of external things, the other of things to be chosen and avoided by us, some say we have a principle and criterion for choice and avoidance in pleasure and pain; and indeed even now some such things are said by 14.21.2 the school of Epicurus; it is necessary therefore to examine this as well. I for my part am so far from saying that feeling is the principle and rule of good and evil, that to me it seems this very thing needs a criterion. For that it exists, it shows itself, but of what kind

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ἔσονται γὰρ οἱ αὐτοὶ σπουδαῖοι καὶ μοχθηροὶ καὶ ταὐτὸ κακία καὶ ἀρετή. πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτά τις ἂν ἔχοι λέγειν· ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδὲν δεῖ πλειόνων λόγων πρὸς τοὺς οὐκ οἰομένους ἔχειν νοῦν καὶ λόγον.» 14.20.9 Εἶθ' ἑξῆς ἐπιλέγει· «Ἐπεὶ δ' ἔτι νῦν εἰσί τινες οἱ πᾶσαν αἴσθησιν καὶ πᾶσαν φαντασίαν ἀληθῆ λέγοντες εἶναι, μικρὰ καὶ περὶ τούτων εἴπωμεν. ἐοίκασι γὰρ οὗτοί γε δεδοικέναι μήποτ', εἰ ψευδεῖς εἴποιεν αἰσθήσεις εἶναί τινας, οὐκ ἂν σχοῖεν τὸ κριτήριον καὶ τὸν κανόνα βέβαιον οὐδ' ἐχέγγυον· οὐχ ὁρῶσι δὲ ὡς οὐκ ἂν φθάνοιεν οὕτω γε καὶ τὰς δόξας ἁπάσας ἀληθεῖς ἀποφαίνοντες· πολλὰ γὰρ δὴ καὶ ταύταις πεφύκαμεν κρίνειν· καὶ οὐδὲν ἧττον ἀξιοῦσιν αὐτῶν τὰς μὲν ἀλη14.20.10 θεῖς εἶναι, τὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς. ἔπειτα δὲ σκοπῶν ἴδοι τις ἂν οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων κριτηρίων αἰεὶ καὶ διὰ παντὸς ἀψευδὲς οὐδέν, οἷον λέγω ζυγὸν ἢ τόρνον ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων· ἀλλ' ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ὡδὶ μὲν ἔχον ὑγιές ἐστιν, ὡδὶ δὲ μοχθηρόν, καὶ τουτονὶ μὲν χρώμενον τὸν τρόπον ἀληθεύει, τουτονὶ δὲ ψεύδεται. καὶ μὴν εἴ γε πᾶσα αἴσθησις ἀληθὴς ἦν, οὐκ ἔδει τοσοῦτο διαφέρειν αὐτάς. ἄλλαι γάρ εἰσιν ἐγγύθεν καὶ πόρρωθεν καὶ νοσούντων καὶ ἐρρωμένων καὶ τεχνιτῶν καὶ ἀτέχνων καὶ φρονίμων καὶ ἀφρόνων. τὰς δὲ δὴ τῶν μεμηνότων καὶ παντάπασιν ἄτοπον ἂν εἴη λέγειν ἀληθεῖς εἶναι καὶ τὰς τῶν παρορώντων καὶ παρακουόντων· εὔηθες γὰρ ἂν ἦν τὸ λεγόμενον, ὡς ὁ παρορῶν ἤτοι ὁρᾷ ἢ 14.20.11 οὐχ ὁρᾷ· φαίη γὰρ ἄν τις ὅτι ὁρᾷ μέν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ὀρθῶς. ὁπόταν μέντοι φῶσιν, ὡς ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις οὖσα ἄλογος οὐδὲν προστίθησιν οὐδ' ἀφαιρεῖ, φαίνονται τἀμποδὼν οὐχ ὁρῶντες· ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῦ ἐρετμοῦ τοῦ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι κἀπὶ τῶν γραφῶν καὶ μυρίων ἄλλων ἡ αἴσθησίς ἐστιν ἡ ἀπατῶσα. διὸ καὶ μεμφόμεθα πάντες ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων οὐ τὸν νοῦν ἡμῶν, ἀλλὰ τὴν φαντασίαν. ἐλέγχει γὰρ ὁ λόγος αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἀξιῶν ἅπασαν ἀληθῆ φαντασίαν εἶναι· τὴν γὰρ ἡμετέραν, δι' ἣν οὐκ οἰόμεθα πᾶσαν εἶναι τοιαύτην, ψευδῆ πάντως ἀποφανεῖ. συμβαίνει 14.20.12 τοίνυν αὐτοῖς ἅπασαν φαντασίαν ἀληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ λέγειν εἶναι. καθόλου δὲ ἁμαρτάνουσιν ἀξιοῦντες ὁποῖα ἂν ἡμῖν φαίνηται τὰ πράγματα, τοιαῦτα καὶ εἶναι. τοὐναντίον γάρ, ὁποῖα πέφυκε, τοιαῦτα φαίνεται καὶ οὐχ ἡμεῖς αὐτὰ ποιοῦμεν οὕτως ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ὑπ' ἐκείνων αὐτοὶ διατιθέμεθά πως. ἐπεὶ καὶ γελοῖον εἴη ἄν, εἰ διανοηθείημεν ἡμεῖς ὥσπερ οἱ ζωγράφοι καὶ πλάσται σκύλακας ἢ χιμαίρας, ἀξιοῦν εὐθὺς εἶναι ταῦτα καὶ διὰ τοῦτο φαντάζεσθαι καθάπερ εὐτρεπῆ παρεστῶτα.» 14.20.13 ∆ιότι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγουσιν οἱ φάσκοντες εἶναι πᾶσαν αἴσθη14.20.13 σιν καὶ πᾶσαν φαντασίαν ἀληθῆ, δῆλον ἐκ τούτων. ἀλλὰ γὰρ καὶ τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων αὖθις οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον ἐκ τῆς Ἀριστίππου διαγωγῆς ὁρμώμενοι πάντα ἡδονῆς ἐξῆπτον καὶ αἰσθήσεως, μόνα τὰ πάθη καταληπτὰ καὶ 14.20.14 τέλος ἀγαθῶν τὴν ἡδονὴν εἶναι ὁριζόμενοι. λέγεται δὲ ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ὑπὸ μέν τινων μηδενὸς ἀκηκοέναι, ἐντυχεῖν δὲ τοῖς τῶν παλαιῶν συγγράμμασιν· ὑπό τινων δ' ὅτι ἤκουσε Ξενοκράτους, ὕστερον δὲ καὶ Ναυσιφάνους τοῦ Πύρρωνος γενομένου γνωρίμου. τίνα δὴ οὖν τὰ καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀντειρημένα τυγχάνει, θεασώμεθα·

14.21.1 καʹ. ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΥΣ ΚΑΤ' ΕΠΙΚΟΥΡΟΝ Η∆ΟΝΗΝ ΤΕΛΟΣ ΟΡΙΖΟΜΕΝΟΥΣ

«Ἐπειδή ἐστι γνῶσις διττή, ἡ μὲν τῶν ἔξω πραγμάτων, ἡ δὲ τῶν ἡμῖν αἱρετῶν καὶ φευκτῶν, ἔνιοί φασι τῆς αἱρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς ἀρχὴν καὶ κριτήριον ἔχειν ἡμᾶς τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὸν πόνον· ἔτι γέ τοι καὶ νῦν τοιαῦτά τινα λέγουσιν οἱ 14.21.2 περὶ τὸν Ἑπίκουρον· ἀναγκαίως οὖν ἔχει καὶ περὶ τούτου σκέψασθαι. τοσούτου τοίνυν ἔγωγε δέω λέγειν ἀρχὴν εἶναι καὶ κανόνα τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν κακῶν τὸ πάθος, ὥστε ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ τοῦτο αὐτὸ κριτηρίου δεῖσθαι. διότι μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν, ἑαυτὸ δείκνυσιν, ὁποῖον δ'