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will fight each other according to the previous weaving; for the meaning of truth is one thing, and that of justice 2.1.521 another. So that Eunomius might consequently say about these things too that truth is not present with justice, and that justice is lacking from truth, and that it follows that when one considers that which is alien to injustice in God, one declares the divine to be at the same time just and false, but if we consider its alienation from falsehood, we construct 2.1.522 the divine as true and at the same time unjust. Thus the invisible, thus the unfigured. For it will be possible, through * wisdom similar in manner to what has been previously set forth, to say that neither is the invisible in the unfigured, nor the unfigured in the invisible, but he will entwine figure with the invisible, and by conversion will construct the unfigured as visible, saying the same things about these as he technically argued about the imperishable and the unbegun, that when we consider the uncompounded nature of the divine life, we confess it to be unfigured, but not also invisible, and when we consider that it is not possible to see God with bodily eyes, having conceded to him the invisible, we will not agree that he is without 2.1.523 figure. But if these things seem ridiculous and senseless to all alike, much more will a man of sense condemn the absurdity of those things, from which the argument, starting out, consequently advanced the absurdity to these things. But he takes hold of the teacher's statement, as one that improperly beholds the imperishable in the unceasing and conceives the unceasing in the imperishable. Therefore let us too make a joke of something similar to the cleverness of Eunomius. For let us examine what sort of opinion he has concerning these 2.1.524 names. He will either say that the unceasing is something other in meaning than the imperishable, or he will join the two as one. But if he should say both are one, he will agree with our argument; but if he should say that the meaning of the imperishable is one thing and that of the unceasing another, it is entirely necessary in the case of things that are alien to one another that one is not the same as the other in its 2.1.525 power. Therefore if the concept of the imperishable is one and that of the unceasing again another, and each of these is what the other is not, he will grant neither that the imperishable is unceasing nor that the unceasing is imperishable, but the unceasing will be perishable, and the imperishable will be subject to an end. But I beg those who read this not to turn against 2.1.526 us the condemnation for what is ridiculous. For we have of necessity played these games against the jester, in order that through similar child's play we might unravel the puerile weaving of his sophism. But if it should not seem burdensome and troublesome to the readers, it would not be inopportune to set forth again the words of Eunomius verbatim. 20If according to the unceasing20, he says, 20of life alone he is imperishable and according to the unbegun alone unbegotten, according to that in which he is not imperishable, he will be perishable, and according to that in which he is not unbegotten, he will be begotten20. And taking up the same thing again he says 20He will be, then, according to the unbegun, unbegotten and at the same time perishable, but according to the unceasing, imperishable and at the same time 2.1.527 begotten20. For I pass over the inopportune parenthetical remarks in the middle of the superfluous phrases, as contributing nothing further to the construction of the argument. But I think it is easy for anyone to understand that the meaning of our words, from which he himself quoted, has no fellowship with the accusation constructed by him against us. For we say that the God of all is imperishable and unbegotten, says the teacher, using these names according to different 2.1.528 conceptions. For in that he transcends, he says, the circumscription of the ages according to every interval of temporal extension, whether we consider that which is from the beginning or that which follows, we signify that which is indefinite and uncircumscribed of the eternal life according to each conception, the one by the name of imperishability, the other by that of unbegottenness. But this man says that we say that the unbegun is an essence and the unceasing is again an essence, as two parts of essences spoken of in opposition

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ἀλλήλοις κατὰ τὴν προλαβοῦσαν πλοκὴν μαχεσθήσεται· ἄλλο γὰρ τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ ἕτερον 2.1.521 τοῦ δικαίου τὸ σημαινόμενον. ὥστε εἰπεῖν ἂν ἐκ τοῦ ἀκο λούθου καὶ περὶ τούτων Εὐνόμιον τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ τὸ ἀληθὲς μὴ παρεῖναι, τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ λείπειν τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ συμ βαίνειν ὅταν τὸ τῆς ἀδικίας ἀλλότριον ἐπὶ θεοῦ τις λογί ζηται, δίκαιόν τε καὶ ψευδὲς εἶναι τὸ θεῖον κατὰ ταὐτὸν ἀποφαίνεσθαι, ἐὰν δὲ τὴν πρὸς τὸ ψεῦδος αὐτοῦ ἀλλο τρίωσιν λογιζώμεθα, ἀληθὲς ἅμα καὶ ἄδικον κατασκευάζειν 2.1.522 τὸ θεῖον. οὕτως τὸ ἀόρατον, οὕτως τὸ ἀσχημάτιστον. ἐξέσται γὰρ διὰ τῶν * κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότροπον τοῖς προ εκτεθεῖσι σοφίαν μήτε ἐν τῷ ἀσχηματίστῳ τὸ ἀόρατον εἶναι λέγειν μήτε ἐν τῷ ἀοράτῳ τὸ ἀσχημάτιστον, ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν ἀοράτῳ συμπλέξει τὸ σχῆμα, ὁρατὸν δὲ διὰ τῆς ἀναστρο φῆς κατασκευάσει τὸ ἀσχημάτιστον, τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπὶ τούτων εἰπών, ἃ περὶ τοῦ ἀφθάρτου τε καὶ ἀνάρχου ἐτεχνολόγησεν, ὅτι ὅταν τὸ ἀσύνθετον τῆς θείας ζωῆς λογιζώμεθα, ἀσχη μάτιστον μὲν αὐτὴν ὁμολογοῦμεν, οὐ μὴν καὶ ἀόρατον, καὶ ὅταν τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι σωματικοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς τὸν θεὸν ἰδεῖν ἐννοήσωμεν, τὸ ἀόρατον αὐτῷ συγχωρήσαντες τὸ ἔξω σχή 2.1.523 ματος εἶναι οὐ συνθησόμεθα. εἰ δὲ ταῦτα καταγέλαστα πᾶσιν ὁμοίως δοκεῖ καὶ ἀνόητα, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐκείνων τὴν ἀτοπίαν ὁ νοῦν ἔχων καταψηφίσεται, ὅθεν ὁρμηθεὶς ὁ λόγος ἐπὶ ταῦτα δι' ἀκολούθου τὴν ἀτοπίαν προήγαγεν. Ἀλλ' ἐπιλαμβάνεται τῆς τοῦ διδασκάλου φωνῆς, ὡς οὐ δεόντως ἐν τῷ ἀτελευτήτῳ θεωρούσης τὸ ἄφθαρτον καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀφθάρτῳ νοούσης τὸ ἀτελεύτητον. οὐκοῦν τι παρα πλήσιον τῇ ἀγχινοίᾳ τοῦ Εὐνομίου καὶ ἡμεῖς γελοιάσωμεν. ἐξετάσωμεν γὰρ τὴν τοιαύτην αὐτοῦ γνώμην περὶ τῶν ὀνο 2.1.524 μάτων τούτων, ἥτις ἐστίν. ἄλλο τι φήσει τῷ σημαινομένῳ τὸ ἀτελεύτητον εἶναι παρὰ τὸ ἄφθαρτον ἢ ἓν τὰ δύο συνθήσεται. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἓν ἀμφότερα λέγοι, τῷ ἡμετέρῳ συναγορεύσει λόγῳ· εἰ δὲ ἄλλο φήσει τοῦ ἀφθάρτου εἶναι καὶ ἕτερον τοῦ ἀτελευτήτου τὸ σημαινόμενον, ἀνάγκη πᾶσα ἐπὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίως ἐχόντων πρὸς ἄλληλα μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν 2.1.525 τῷ ἑτέρῳ τὸ ἕτερον. οὐκοῦν εἰ ἄλλη τοῦ ἀφθάρτου ἡ ἔν νοια καὶ τοῦ ἀτελευτήτου πάλιν ἑτέρα, καί ἐστι τούτων ἑκάτερον ὅπερ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἕτερον, οὔτε τὸ ἄφθαρτον ἀτε λεύτητον εἶναι δώσει οὔτε τὸ ἀτελεύτητον ἄφθαρτον, ἀλλὰ φθαρτὸν μὲν ἔσται τὸ ἀτελεύτητον, τελευτητὸν δὲ τὸ ἄφθαρτον. ἀλλὰ παραιτοῦμαι τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας μὴ καθ' 2.1.526 ἡμῶν τρέψαι τὴν ἐπὶ τῷ γελοίῳ κατάγνωσιν. ταῦτα γὰρ ἡμεῖς πρὸς τὸν γελοιαστὴν ὑπ' ἀνάγκης ἐπαίξαμεν, ἵνα διὰ τῆς ὁμοίας παιδιᾶς τὴν μειρακιώδη τοῦ σοφίσματος αὐτοῦ πλοκὴν διαλύσωμεν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ βαρύ τε καὶ ὀχληρὸν τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσι φαίνοιτο, οὐκ ἄκαιρον ἂν εἴη πάλιν ἐπὶ λέξεως ἐκθέσθαι τοῦ Εὐνομίου τὰ ῥήματα. 20εἰ κατὰ τὸ ἀτε λεύτητον20, φησί, 20τῆς ζωῆς μόνον ἐστὶν ἄφθαρτος καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἄναρχον μόνον ἀγέννητος, καθ' ὃ μή ἐστιν ἄφθαρτος, φθαρτὸς ἔσται, καὶ καθ' ὃ μή ἐστιν ἀγέννητος, γεννητὸς ἔσται20. καὶ ἐπανα λαβὼν τὸ αὐτὸ πάλιν φησὶν 20ἔσται ἄρα κατὰ μὲν τὸ ἄναρχον ἀγέννητος ὁμοῦ καὶ φθαρτός, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἀτελεύτητον ἄφθαρτος ὁμοῦ καὶ γεν 2.1.527 νητός20. τὰς γὰρ ἀκαίρους ἐν τῷ μέσῳ τῶν περιττῶν παρενθήκας ὡς οὐδὲν πλέον εἰς τὴν τοῦ λόγου κατασκευὴν συντελούσας παρίημι. ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν διάνοιαν τῶν ἡμετέρων λόγων, ἀφ' ὧν αὐτὸς οὗτος παρέθετο, παντὶ ῥᾴδιον οἶμαι κατανοῆσαι ὡς οὐδεμίαν ἔχει κοινωνίαν πρὸς τὴν κατα σκευασθεῖσαν αὐτῷ καθ' ἡμῶν κατηγορίαν. ἄφθαρτον γὰρ καὶ ἀγέννητον τὸν θεὸν τῶν ὅλων λέγομεν, φησὶν ὁ διδά σκαλος, κατὰ διαφόρους ἐπιβολὰς τοῖς ὀνόμασι τούτοις 2.1.528 χρώμενοι. τῷ γὰρ ὑπερεκπίπτειν αὐτόν, φησί, τῆς τῶν αἰώνων περιγραφῆς κατὰ πᾶν διάστημα τῆς χρονικῆς πα ρατάσεως, εἴτε τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἴτε τὸ ἐφεξῆς λογιζοίμεθα, τὸ καθ' ἑκατέραν ἔννοιαν τῆς ἀϊδίου ζωῆς ἀόριστόν τε καὶ ἀπερίγραπτον τὸ μὲν τῷ τῆς ἀφθαρσίας ὀνόματι, τὸ δὲ τῷ τῆς ἀγεννησίας διασημαίνομεν. οὑτοσὶ δέ φησι λέγειν ἡμᾶς ὅτι τὸ ἄναρχον οὐσία ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ ἀτελεύτητον οὐσία πάλιν ἐστίν, ὡς δύο τμήματα οὐσιῶν κατὰ τὸ ἐναντίον λεγόμενα