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is, there is need of another to judge. For whether something is one's own or another's, perception says; but whether it is to be chosen or avoided, 14.21.3 reason does. They themselves, indeed, say that they do not embrace every pleasure and shun every pain. And this has happened quite naturally. For the criteria reveal both themselves and the things being judged, but passion reveals itself alone. That it is so, they themselves testify. For although they hold that every pleasure is a good and every pain an evil, nevertheless they say one ought not always to choose the one, 14.21.4 and flee the other; for they are measured by quantity, even if not by quality. It is clear, therefore, that quantity is judged by nothing other than reason; for "it is better to endure certain pains so that we may enjoy greater pleasures" and "it is advantageous to abstain from certain pleasures, so that we may not suffer more grievous pains" 14.21.5 and all such things, it is reason that judges. On the whole, the senses and mental impressions seem to be like mirrors and images of things; but passions and pleasures and pains are turnings and alterations of ourselves. In this way, when sensing and imagining we look outward, but when feeling pleasure and pain we turn back only upon ourselves. For external things produce our sensations, and whatever quality those things have, they produce mental impressions of the same quality, but passions become of a certain quality because of us and as we ourselves 14.21.6 may be. Therefore these things seem at one time pleasant, at another unpleasant, and sometimes more so, sometimes less so. This being the case, we shall find, if we wish to examine, that those who assume both the senses 14.21.7 and the intellect as the principles of knowledge do best. Perception seems like snares and nets and other such hunting implements, but the intellect and reason are like the hounds that track and pursue. However, of these very men one should think that those philosophize better who neither use the senses at random nor employ the passions for the discernment of truth. Or it would be a terrible thing for men, by their nature, to entrust themselves to irrational pleasures and pains, having forsaken the most divine judge, the intellect.” These things are from the works of Aristocles.

14.22.1 22. FURTHERMORE AGAINST THOSE WHO DEFINE PLEASURE AS THE GOOD; FROM PLATO'S PHILEBUS

“Let us then judge each one of the three with respect to pleasure and intellect. For we must see to which of them we shall assign each one as more akin. Do you speak of beauty and truth and measure? Yes. Take truth first, Protarchus, and having taken it, look at the three—intellect, truth, and pleasure—and after taking a long time, answer for yourself, whether pleasure or intellect is more akin to truth. 14.22.2 But what need is there of time? For they differ greatly, I think. For pleasure is the most boastful of all things; and, as the saying goes, even in the pleasures of love, which seem to be the greatest; even perjury has received pardon from the gods, as if pleasures were like children possessing not even the slightest intellect; whereas intellect is either the same as truth, or of all things the most like it and the most true. 14.22.3 Therefore, will you consider moderation next in the same way, whether pleasure possesses more of prudence, or prudence of pleasure? You have proposed a question easy to consider. For I think that one could find nothing in existence by nature more immoderate than pleasure and excessive joy, and nothing ever more moderate than intellect and knowledge. 14.22.4 You have spoken well. But still, speak of the third. Has intellect partaken more of beauty for us than the kind of pleasure, so that intellect is more beautiful than pleasure, or the opposite? But as for prudence and intellect, O Socrates, has anyone ever, either waking or in a dream, ugly

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ἐστὶν ἑτέρου δεῖ τοῦ κρινοῦντος. εἰ μὲν γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἢ ἀλλότριον, ἡ αἴσθησις λέγει, πότερον δ' αἱρετὸν ἢ φευκτόν, 14.21.3 ὁ λόγος. αὐτοί γέ τοί φασιν οὐ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν ἀσπάζεσθαι καὶ πάντα πόνον ἐκτρέπεσθαι. τοῦτο δὲ συμβέβηκε καὶ μάλα εἰκότως. τὰ μὲν γὰρ κριτήρια καὶ ἑαυτὰ δείκνυσι καὶ τὰ κρινόμενα, τὸ μέντοι πάθος ἑαυτὸ μόνον. ὅτι δ' οὕτως ἔχει, μαρτυροῦσιν αὐτοί. καίπερ γὰρ ἀξιοῦντες ἅπασαν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ πᾶσαν ἀλγηδόνα κακόν, ὅμως οὐκ ἀεί φασι δεῖν τὴν μὲν αἱρεῖσθαι, 14.21.4 τὴν δὲ φεύγειν· μετρεῖσθαι γὰρ αὐτὰ τῷ ποσῷ, εἰ καὶ οὐ τῷ ποιῷ. δῆλον οὖν ὡς τό γε ποσὸν οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ ὁ λόγος κρίνει· τὸ γὰρ «ἄμεινόν ἐστιν ὑπομεῖναι τούσδε τινὰς τοὺς πόνους, ὅπως ἡσθείημεν ἡδονὰς μείζους» καὶ τὸ «συμφέρει τῶνδέ τινων ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν, ἵνα μὴ ἀλγῶμεν ἀλγηδόνας χα14.21.5 λεπωτέρας» καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα λόγος ὁ κρίνων ἐστίν. τὸ δ' ὅλον, αἱ μὲν αἰσθήσεις καὶ αἱ φαντασίαι καθαπερεὶ κάτοπτρα καὶ εἰκόνες ἐοίκασι τῶν πραγμάτων εἶναι· τὰ μέντοι πάθη καὶ αἱ ἡδοναὶ καὶ οἱ πόνοι τροπαὶ καὶ ἀλλοιώσεις ἡμῶν αὐτῶν. ταύτη δὲ αἰσθανόμενοι μὲν καὶ φαντασιούμενοι πρὸς τὰ ἔξω βλέπομεν, ἡδόμενοι δὲ καὶ ἀλγοῦντες ἐπιστρέφομεν ἐπὶ μόνους ἑαυτούς. τὰς μὲν γὰρ αἰσθήσεις ἡμῶν τὰ ἔξω ποιεῖ καὶ ὁποῖα ἂν ᾖ ἐκεῖνα, τοιαύτας ἀπεργάζεται καὶ τὰς φαντασίας, τὰ δὲ πάθη ποιὰ ἄττα γίνεται δι' ἡμᾶς καὶ ὡς ἂν ἡμεῖς 14.21.6 ἔχωμεν. διὸ ταῦτα ποτὲ μὲν ἡδέα, ποτὲ δ' ἀηδῆ φαίνεται καὶ ἔσθ' ὅτε μὲν μᾶλλον, ἔσθ' ὅτε δὲ ἧττον. ὧν οὕτως ἐχόντων εὑρήσομεν, εἰ ἐθέλοιμεν σκοπεῖν, ἄριστα τὰς τῆς γνώσεως ἀρχὰς ὑποτιθεμένους ὁπόσοι καὶ τὰς αἰσθή14.21.7 σεις καὶ τὸν νοῦν παραλαμβάνουσιν. ἔοικε δ' ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις ταῖς ἄρκυσι καὶ τοῖς δικτύοις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς τοιούτοις θηράτροις, ὁ δὲ νοῦς καὶ ὁ λόγος τοῖς κυσὶ τοῖς στιβεύουσι καὶ μεταθέουσιν. αὐτῶν μέντοι τούτων ἄμεινον φιλοσοφεῖν οἴεσθαι χρὴ τοὺς μήτε ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ὡς ἔτυχε χρωμένους μήτε τὰ πάθη παραλαμβάνοντας ἐπὶ τὴν τἀληθοῦς διάγνωσιν. ἢ δεινόν γ' ἂν εἴη πεφυκότας ἀνθρώπους ἡδοναῖς καὶ πόνοις ἀλόγοις ἐπιτρέπειν ἑαυτούς, ἀφέντας τὸν θειότατον κριτὴν νοῦν.» Ταῦτα ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀριστοκλέους.

14.22.1 κβʹ. ΕΤΙ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΥΣ ΤΗΝ Η∆ΟΝΗΝ ΤΟ ΑΓΑΘΟΝ ΕΙΝΑΙ

ΟΡΙΖΟΜΕΝΟΥΣ· ΑΠΟ ΤΟΥ ΦΙΛΗΒΟΥ ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ «Καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον τοίνυν τῶν τριῶν πρὸς τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὸν νοῦν κρίνωμεν. δεῖ γὰρ ἰδεῖν ποτέρῳ μᾶλλον ξυγγενὲς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἀπονεμοῦμεν. Κάλλους καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ μετριότητος πέρι λέγεις; Ναί. πρῶτον δέ γε ἀληθείας λαβοῦ, ὦ Πρώταρχε, καὶ λαβόμενος βλέψας εἰς τρία, νοῦν καὶ ἀλήθειαν καὶ ἡδονήν, πολὺν ἐπισχὼν χρόνον ἀπόκριναι σαυτῷ, πότερον ἡδονὴ ξυγγενέστερον ἢ νοῦς ἀληθείᾳ. 14.22.2 Τί δὲ χρόνου δεῖ; πολὺ γάρ, οἶμαι, διαφέρετον. ἡδονὴ μὲν γὰρ ἁπάντων τὸ ἀλαζονέστατον· ὡς δὲ λόγος, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ταῖς περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια, αἳ δὴ μέγισται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι· καὶ τὸ ἐπιορκεῖν συγγνώμην εἴληφε παρὰ θεῶν, ὡς καθάπερ παίδων τῶν ἡδομένων νοῦν οὐδὲ τὸν ὀλίγιστον κεκτημένων· νοῦς δὲ ἤτοι ταὐτὸν καὶ ἀλήθειά ἐστιν ἢ πάντων ὁμοιότατόν τε καὶ ἀληθέστατον. 14.22.3 Οὐκοῦν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο τὴν μετριότητα ὡσαύτως σκέψῃ, πότερον ἡδονὴ φρονήσεως, ἢ φρόνησις ἡδονῆς πλείω κέκτηται; Εὔσκεπτόν γε καὶ ταύτην σκέψιν προβέβληκας. οἶμαι γὰρ ἡδονῆς μὲν καὶ περιχαρείας οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων πεφυκὸς ἀμετρότερον εὑρεῖν ἄν τινα, νοῦ δὲ καὶ ἐπιστήμης ἐμμετρότερον οὐδ' ἂν ἕν ποτε. 14.22.4 Καλῶς εἴρηκας. ὅμως δ' ἔτι λέγε τὸ τρίτον. νοῦς ἡμῖν κάλλους μετείληφε πλέον ἢ τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς γένος, ὥστε εἶναι καλλίω νοῦν ἡδονῆς, ἢ τοὐναντίον; Ἆρ' οὐ φρόνησιν μὲν καὶ νοῦν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδεὶς πώποτε οὔθ' ὕπαρ οὔτ' ὄναρ αἰσχρὸν