250

to be contributed by us; and so he constructs the absurdity, positing his own ideas and entangling himself with them, and thrusting the thoughts composed by himself into absurdity. 2.1.529 he touches on none of our points. For the idea that God is incorruptible only with respect to the endlessness of life is his and not ours. Likewise, the idea that the incorruptible is not without beginning is a discovery of the same cleverness, which classifies what is not present in the definition of essence. For we do not define as essence any of those things that are not present. 2.1.530 But it is not present to God for life to end in corruption, nor for being to begin from generation; which is represented by these two names, both incorruptibility and unbegottenness. But he who has babbled his own nonsense against our doctrines, exposing himself through the 2.1.531 accusation against us, does not understand. For he who defines 20unbegottenness20 to be essence will consequently fall into the very absurdity which he brings against our doctrines. For since beginning and end are conceived as different in their extension through intervals, if someone were to grant that the privation of one of these is essence, he will posit life from half of it, subsisting only in what is without beginning, and no longer extending by its nature to what is without end, if indeed 2.1.532 unbegottenness were considered nature. But if someone were to insist that both are essence, it is entirely necessary according to the argument of Eunomius that has been presented that each of the names, according to its inherent significance, also has its being in the definition of essence, existing only to the extent that the meaning of the appellation indicates; and thus the argument of Eunomius will become strong, with neither the "without beginning" having the "without end," nor the "without end" having the "without beginning," since according to his argument each of the aforesaid is essence and the two are unmixed with each other in their concepts, and neither does the beginning have the same relation to the end, nor do the names negating these agree with each other in their meanings. 2.1.533 But so that he himself might recognize his own nonsense, the refutation will come from the things said by him. For in fighting against our views he says that God is unbegotten with respect to His endlessness and endless with respect to His unbegottenness, as if there were one significance in each of the names. If, then, He is unbegotten also with respect to His endlessness, and "endless" and "unbegotten" are the same in meaning, and he agrees that the Son is also endless, he will necessarily also agree from this sequence that the Son is unbegotten, if indeed, as he has said, the "endless" is the same as the "without beginning". 2.1.534 For just as he sees the endless in the unbegotten, so he confesses to have understood also the "without beginning" in the "without end". For he would not have made the reversal of the names on equal terms. But 20by nature and not by comparison with the ages20, he says, 20God is unbegotten20. But who is it that disputes this, that God is not by nature everything 2.1.535 that He is said to be? For we say that God is just and powerful and Father and incorruptible, neither by comparison with the ages nor by reference to anything else that exists, but we consider every pious conception to be about the subject itself, whatever it is by nature. So that if, hypothetically, neither an age nor anything else conceived within creation had been created, God would be no less what He is now believed to be, needing none of the ages in order 2.1.536 to become what He is. But 20not imported20, he says, 20nor composite nor does he have a varied life; for he himself is eternal life, immortal by virtue of life itself, incorruptible by virtue of immortality itself20. These things we have also learned concerning the Only-begotten, and there is no one who contradicts, unless perhaps someone openly fights against the words of John. For life was not brought into the Son (For "I am," He says, "the life"), nor is His life composite or varied, but He is immortal by virtue of life itself (for <in> what else could one contemplate immortality except in life?), and incorruptible by virtue of immortality itself. The

250

παρ' ἡμῶν συμβάλλεσθαι· καὶ οὕτω κατασκευάζει τὸ ἄτοπον, τὰ ἑαυτοῦ τιθεὶς καὶ τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ συμπλεκόμενος, καὶ τὰς παρ' ἑαυτοῦ συντεθείσας διανοίας ἐξωθῶν εἰς τὸ ἄτοπον 2.1.529 κατ' οὐδὲν τῶν ἡμετέρων προσάπτεται. τὸ γὰρ κατὰ τὸ ἀτελεύτητον τῆς ζωῆς μόνον τὸν θεὸν ἄφθαρτον εἶναι τού του ἐστὶ καὶ οὐχ ἡμέτερον. ὡσαύτως καὶ τὸ ἄφθαρτον ἄναρχον μὴ εἶναι τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστιν ἀγχινοίας [τὸ] εὕρημα τῆς τὸ μὴ προσὸν εἰς τὸν τῆς οὐσίας λόγον κατατασσούσης. ἡμεῖς γὰρ οὐδὲν τῶν μὴ προσόντων οὐσίαν εἶναι διοριζό 2.1.530 μεθα. οὐ πρόσεστι δὲ τῷ θεῷ οὔτε τὸ εἰς φθορὰν τὴν ζωὴν καταλῆξαι οὔτε τὸ ἀπὸ γεννήσεως τοῦ εἶναι ἄρξασθαι· ὅπερ διὰ τῶν δύο τούτων ὀνομάτων, τῆς τε ἀφθαρσίας καὶ τῆς ἀγεννησίας, παρίσταται. ὁ δὲ τὸν ἴδιον λῆρον τοῖς ἡμετέροις δόγμασιν ἐπιθρυλήσας ἑαυτὸν στηλιτεύων διὰ τῆς 2.1.531 κατηγορίας τῆς καθ' ἡμῶν οὐ συνίησιν. ὁ γὰρ οὐσίαν τὴν 20ἀγεννησίαν20 εἶναι διοριζόμενος εἰς αὐτὴν κατὰ τὸ ἀκό λουθον τὴν ἀτοπίαν ἐκβήσεται ἣν τοῖς ἡμετέροις δόγμασιν ἐπιφέρει. ἄλλο γὰρ τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ ἄλλο τοῦ τέλους κατὰ τὴν διαστηματικὴν παράτασιν νοουμένων, εἰ μὲν τὴν ἑνὸς τούτων στέρησιν οὐσίαν τις εἶναι δοίη, ἐξ ἡμισείας αὐτοῦ τὴν ζωὴν ὑποστήσει μόνῳ τῷ ἀνάρχῳ ὑφεστῶσαν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ἀτελεύτητον οὐκέτι διὰ τῆς φύσεως ἐπεκτείνουσαν, εἴπερ 2.1.532 φύσις ἡ ἀγεννησία νομίζοιτο· εἰ δὲ ἀμφότερά τις οὐσίαν εἶναι βιάζοιτο, ἀνάγκη πᾶσα κατὰ τὸν ἀποδοθέντα τοῦ Εὐνομίου λόγον ἑκάτερον τῶν ὀνομάτων κατὰ τὴν ἐγκει μένην ἔμφασιν καὶ ἐν τῷ τῆς οὐσίας λόγῳ τὸ εἶναι ἔχειν τοσοῦτον ὑπάρχον μόνον, ὅσον ἡ σημασία τῆς προσηγορίας ἐνδείκνυται· καὶ οὕτως ἰσχυρὸς ὁ τοῦ Εὐνομίου λόγος γενή σεται οὔτε τοῦ ἀνάρχου τὸ ἀτελεύτητον ἔχοντος οὔτε τοῦ ἀτελευτήτου τὸ ἄναρχον, ἐπειδὴ κατὰ τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐσία τῶν εἰρημένων ἐστὶν ἑκάτερον καὶ ἀμίκτως τὰ δύο ταῖς ἐννοίαις ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα, καὶ οὔτε ἡ ἀρχὴ πρὸς τὸ τέλος τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει λόγον οὔτε τὰ ἀναιρετικὰ τούτων ὀνό ματα πρὸς ἄλληλα ταῖς σημασίαις συμφέρεται. 2.1.533 Ὡς δ' ἂν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπιγνοίη τὸν ἴδιον λῆρον, ἐκ τῶν παρ' ἐκείνου ῥηθέντων ἔσται ὁ ἔλεγχος. λέγει γὰρ τοῖς ἡμετέροις μαχόμενος ὅτι ὁ θεὸς καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἀτελεύτητόν ἐστιν ἀγέννητος καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἀγέννητον ἀτελεύτητος, ὡς μιᾶς ἐν ἑκατέροις τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐμφάσεως οὔσης. εἰ τοίνυν καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἀτελεύτητόν ἐστιν ἀγέννητος καὶ ταὐτόν ἐστι κατὰ τὸ σημαινόμενον τὸ ἀτελεύτητόν τε καὶ ἀγέννητον, ἀτελεύτητον δὲ καὶ τὸν υἱὸν εἶναι συντίθεται, ἀγέννητον ἐκ τῆς ἀκολουθίας ταύτης καὶ τὸν υἱὸν κατ' ἀνάγκην συν θήσεται, εἴπερ ταὐτόν ἐστι, καθὼς εἴρηκε, τῷ ἀνάρχῳ τὸ 2.1.534 ἀτελεύτητον. ὡς γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἀγεννήτῳ βλέπει τὸ ἀτελεύ τητον, οὕτως ὁμολογεῖ νενοηκέναι καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀτελευτήτῳ τὸ ἄναρχον. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐν τῷ ἴσῳ τὴν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀνα στροφὴν ἐποιήσατο. ἀλλὰ 20φύσει καὶ οὐ παραθέσει τῶν αἰώνων20, φησίν, 20ὁ θεός ἐστιν ἀγέννητος20. τίς δὲ ὁ περὶ τούτου μαχόμενος, τὸ μὴ φύσει τὸν θεὸν πᾶν 2.1.535 εἶναι ὅ τι καὶ λέγεται; καὶ γὰρ καὶ δίκαιον καὶ δυνατὸν καὶ πατέρα καὶ ἄφθαρτον οὔτε τῇ πρὸς τοὺς αἰῶνας παρα θέσει λέγομεν τὸν θεὸν εἶναι οὔτε τῇ πρὸς ἕτερόν τι τῶν ὄντων ἀναφορᾷ, ἀλλὰ περὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ὅ τι ποτὲ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν, πᾶσαν εὐσεβῆ θεωροῦμεν ὑπόληψιν. ὡς εἴ γε καθ' ὑπόθεσιν μήτε αἰὼν μήτε τι ἄλλο τῶν κατὰ τὴν κτίσιν νοουμένων δεδημιούργητο, οὐδὲν ἧττον ἦν ἂν ὁ θεὸς ὅπερ νῦν εἶναι πεπίστευται, οὐδὲν τῶν αἰώνων εἰς τὸ 2.1.536 γενέσθαι ὅ ἐστι προσδεόμενος. ἀλλ' 20οὐκ ἐπείσακτον20, φησίν, 20οὐδὲ σύνθετον οὐδὲ διάφορον ἔχει ζωήν· αὐτὸς γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ἀΐδιος ζωὴ κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν ζωὴν ἀθάνατος, κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀθανασίαν ἄ φθαρτος20. ταῦτα καὶ περὶ τοῦ μονογενοῦς μεμαθήκαμεν, καὶ ὁ ἀντιλέγων οὐκ ἔστι, εἰ μή τις ἄρα ταῖς Ἰωάννου φωναῖς ἐκ τοῦ προφανοῦς διαμάχοιτο. οὔτε γὰρ ἐπεισήχθη τῷ υἱῷ ἡ ζωή (Ἐγὼ γάρ εἰμι, φησίν, ἡ ζωή) οὔτε σύνθετος αὐτοῦ ἡ ζωὴ οὔτε διάφορος, ἀλλὰ κατ' αὐτήν ἐστι τὴν ζωὴν ἀθάνατος (<ἐν> τίνι γὰρ ἄν τις ἄλλῳ τὸ ἀθάνατον πλὴν ἐν ζωῇ θεωρήσειε;) καὶ κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀθανασίαν ἄφθαρτος. τὸ