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has neither seen nor conceived anywhere in any way, whether coming into being, or being, or about to be? Correct. 14.22.5 But pleasures, indeed, and these the greatest, whenever we see anyone taking pleasure, seeing either the ridiculous in them or the most shameful of all things following them, we are ashamed ourselves and, making them disappear, we hide them as much as possible, consigning all such things to night, as if it is not fitting for the light to see them. 14.22.6 And you will say in every way, O Protarchus, both sending by messengers and declaring to those present, that pleasure is not the first possession, nor yet the second, but first, somehow, is that which is concerned with measure and the moderate and the opportune and all such things as one must think the eternal nature has chosen. At any rate, it appears so from what has now been said. 14.22.7 Second, surely, that which is concerned with the symmetrical and beautiful and the perfect and sufficient and all that belongs to this class. So it seems, at any rate. 14.22.8 The third, then, according to my divination, if you place mind and intelligence, you would not stray far from the truth. Perhaps. 14.22.9 Are not the fourth things, then, those which we established as belonging to the soul itself, knowledges and arts and right opinions, are these not the fourth in addition to the three, if indeed they are more akin to the good than to pleasure? They might be. 14.22.10 Fifth, then, the pleasures which we set down, defining them as painless, calling them pure, those of the soul itself following upon knowledge, and those following the senses. Perhaps. 14.22.11 “But in the sixth generation,” says Orpheus, “cease the order of the song,” and it seems our argument, too, in the sixth judgment is brought to a stop. Now, after this, nothing is left for us except, as it were, to give a head to what has been said. Then we must. 14.22.12 Know, then, for the third time to the savior, let us go through the same argument, having testified to it. Which one? Philebus posited for us that the good is all and complete pleasure. For a third time, O Socrates, as you seem to say, you were just saying that we must take up the argument from the beginning. 14.22.13 Yes. And let us hear what comes after this. For I, perceiving what I have now gone through and being displeased with the argument of Philebus not only, but often with that of countless others, said that mind is by far better and more excellent than pleasure for the life of men. That was so. 14.22.14 And suspecting that there were many other things, I said that if anything should appear better than both of these, I would fight together with mind against pleasure for second place, and pleasure would be deprived even of second place. You did indeed say that, and after this you spoke most sufficiently about these matters; neither of them appeared sufficient. Most truly. 14.22.15 Therefore, were not both mind and pleasure completely dismissed in the argument itself, on the ground that neither of them is the good itself, since they lack self-sufficiency and the power of the sufficient and the perfect? Most correctly. But when a third thing appeared, better than either of these, mind now has been shown to be more akin and more suitable than pleasure to the nature of the victor. How could it not? 14.22.16 Therefore, fifth according to the judgment, as the argument has now declared, would be the power of pleasure. It seems so. But not first, not even if all the oxen and horses and all the other beasts say so by their pursuit of enjoyment; believing them, as diviners believe birds, the many judge that pleasures are best for our living well, and they think that the loves of beasts are more valid witnesses than the arguments of those who have at any time divined in the philosophic Muse. Most truly, O Socrates, we all now say that you have spoken.” 14.22.17 Thus Plato. And I will set before you also a few things from the *On Nature* of Dionysius, a man who was a bishop of the Christian philosophy, spoken in reply to Epicurus. Take them and read his words, which are as follows: 14.23.1 23. AGAINST THOSE ACCORDING TO EPICURUS WHO DENY PROVIDENCE

BUT ASCRIBE THE UNIVERSE TO ATOMIC BODIES

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οὔτε εἶδεν οὔτ' ἐπενόησεν οὐδαμοῦ οὐδαμῶς οὔτε γιγνόμενον οὔτε ὄντα οὔτε ἐσόμενον; Ὀρθῶς. 14.22.5 Ἡδονὰς δέ γε δήπου, καὶ ταύτας σχεδὸν τὰς μεγίστας, ὅταν ἴδωμεν ἡδόμενον ὁντινοῦν, ἢ τὸ γελοῖον ἐπ' αὐταῖς ἢ τὸ πάντων αἴσχιστον ἑπόμενον ὁρῶντες αὐτοί τε αἰσχυνόμεθα καὶ ἀφανίζοντες κρύπτομεν ὅτι μάλιστα, νυκτὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα διδόντες, ὡς φῶς οὐ δέον ὁρᾶν αὐτά. 14.22.6 Πάντη δὲ φήσεις, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ὑπό τ' ἀγγέλων πέμπων καὶ παροῦσι φράζων, ὡς ἡδονὴ κτῆμα οὐκ ἔστι πρῶτον οὐδ' αὖ δεύτερον, ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μέν πη περὶ μέτρον καὶ τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ καίριον καὶ πάντα ὁπόσα χρὴ τοιαῦτα νομίζειν τὴν ἀΐδιον ᾑρῆσθαι φύσιν. Φαίνεται γοῦν ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων. 14.22.7 ∆εύτερον μὴν περὶ τὸ σύμμετρον καὶ καλὸν καὶ τὸ τέλεον καὶ ἱκανὸν καὶ πάνθ' ὁπόσα τῆς γενέσεως αὐτῆς ἐστι. Ἔοικε γοῦν. 14.22.8 Τὸ τοίνυν τρίτον, ὡς ἡ ἐμὴ μαντεία, νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν τιθεὶς οὐκ ἂν μέγα τι τῆς ἀληθείας παρεξέλθοις. Ἴσως. 14.22.9 Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ τέταρτα, ἃ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς ἔθεμεν, ἐπιστήμας τε καὶ τέχνας καὶ δόξας ὀρθὰς λεχθείσας, ταῦτ' εἶναι τὰ πρὸς τοῖς τρισὶ τέτταρτα, εἴπερ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐστι μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς ἡδονῆς ξυγγενῆ; Τάχ' ἄν. 14.22.10 Πέμπτας τοίνυν ἃς ἡδονὰς ἔθεμεν ἀλύπους ὁρισάμενοι, καθαρὰς ἐπονομάσαντες τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς, ἐπιστήμας, τὰς δὲ αἰσθήσεις ἑπομένας. Ἴσως. 14.22.11 «Ἕκτῃ δ' ἐν γενεᾷ,» φησὶν Ὀρφεύς, «κατεπαύσατε κόσμον ἀοιδῆς,» ἀτὰρ κινδυνεύει καὶ ὁ ἡμέτερος λόγος ἐν ἕκτῃ καταπεπαυμένος εἶναι κρίσει. τὸ δὴ μετὰ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν οὐδὲν λοιπὸν πλὴν ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἀποδοῦναι τοῖς εἰρημένοις. Οὐκοῦν χρή. 14.22.12 Ἴσθι δή, τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι τὸν αὐτὸν διαμαρτυράμενοι λόγον ἐπέλθωμεν. Ποῖον δή; Φίληβος τἀγαθὸν ἔθετο ἡμῖν ἡδονὴν εἶναι πᾶσαν καὶ παντελῆ. Τρίτον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἔοικας, ἔλεγες ἀρτίως τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπαναλαβεῖν δεῖν λόγον. 14.22.13 Ναί. τὸ δέ γε μετὰ τοῦτο ἀκούωμεν. ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ κατιδὼν ἅπερ νῦν διελήλυθα καὶ δυσχεράνας τὸν Φιλήβου λόγον οὐ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλων πολλάκις μυρίων, εἶπον ὡς ἡδονῆς γε νοῦς εἴη μακρῷ βέλτιόν τε καὶ ἄμεινον τῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίῳ. Ἦν ταῦτα. 14.22.14 Ὑποπτεύων δέ σε καὶ ἄλλα καὶ πολλά, εἶπον ὡς, εἰ φανείη τι τούτων ἀμφοῖν βέλτιον, ὑπὲρ τῶν δευτερείων νῷ πρὸς ἡδονὴν ξυνδιαμαχοίμην, ἡδονὴ δὲ καὶ δευτερείων στερήσοιτο. Εἶπες γὰρ οὖν καὶ μετὰ ταῦτά γε περί γ' ὧν ἱκανώτατα· τούτων οὐδέτερον ἱκανὸν ἀνεφάνη. Ἀληθέστατα. 14.22.15 Οὐκοῦν παντάπασιν ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ νοῦς ἀπήλλακτο καὶ ἡδονή, μηδὲ τἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ μηδέτερον αὐτοῖν εἶναι στερομένων αὐταρκείας καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἱκανοῦ καὶ τελέου δυνάμεως; Ὀρθότατα. Φανέντος δέ γε ἄλλου τινὸς κρείττονος τούτοιν ἑκατέρου τρίτου αὖ, νοῦς ἡδονῆς οἰκειότερον καὶ προσφυέστερον πέφανται νῦν τῇ τοῦ νικῶντος ἰδέᾳ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; 14.22.16 Οὐκοῦν πέμπτον κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν, ὡς νῦν ὁ λόγος ἀπεφήνατο, γίγνοιτ' ἂν ἡ τῆς ἡδονῆς δύναμις. Ἔοικεν. Πρῶτον δέ γε οὐδ' ἂν οἱ πάντες βόες τε καὶ ἵπποι καὶ τἄλλα ξύμπαντα θηρία φῶσι, τῷ τὸ χαίρειν διώκειν· οἷς πιστεύοντες, ὥσπερ μάντεις ὄρνισιν, οἱ πολλοὶ κρίνουσι τὰς ἡδονὰς εἰς τὸ ζῆν ἡμῖν εὖ κρατίστας εἶναι καὶ τοὺς θηρίων ἔρωτας οἴονται κυρίους εἶναι μάρτυρας μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς τῶν ἐν μούσῃ φιλοσόφῳ μεμαντευμένων ἑκάστοτε λόγων. Ἀληθέστατα, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰρῆσθαί σοι νῦν ἤδη φαμὲν ἅπαντες.» 14.22.17 Ταῦτα ὁ Πλάτων. ἐγὼ δέ σοι καὶ ∆ιονυσίου, τῆς κατὰ Χριστὸν φιλοσοφίας ἐπισκόπου ἀνδρός, ἀπὸ τῶν Περὶ φύσεως βραχέα τῶν πρὸς Ἐπίκουρον ἀντειρημένων παραθήσομαι. σὺ δὲ λαβὼν ἀνάγνωθι τὰς τοῦτον ἐχούσας αὐτοῦ τὸν τρόπον φωνάς· 14.23.1 κγʹ. ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΥΣ ΚΑΤ' ΕΠΙΚΟΥΡΟΝ ΠΡΟΝΟΙΑΝ ΜΕΝ ΑΡΝΟΥΜΕΝΟΥΣ

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