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the cause of the inscription, being unable to produce accusers, or a judgment, or a court. And now as if correcting another's folly, 20into necessity20 he says 2.1.568 20he has come to speak thus20. This is the refutation 20of our incurable20 20absurdity and of our feigned and reprehensible piety20. But he says that we, 20being at a loss20, 20do not know what to do with the present situation and, concealing our perplexity, slander him from his words for the wisdom of the world, while appropriating for ourselves the teaching of the holy 2.1.569 spirit20. This is another dream, to think that he possesses so much of external wisdom as to seem formidable to Basil on this account. Thus some have often imagined themselves to be sharing thrones with kings and to be of the highest rank, the deceitful vision of their dreams instilling this 2.1.570 opinion from their waking desire. He says that Basil, not knowing what to do with what 2.1.570 has been said, slanders him for the wisdom of the world. However, he would have greatly valued such a slander, to be thought formidable for the abundance of his words even to any ordinary person, let alone to Basil and someone like 2.1.571 him, if anyone at all is or was like him. But I will pass over all the intervening argument—if his slavish abuse and his uncultured jests, with which he thinks he assails ours, are an argument—considering it disgusting and unpleasant for our discourse to be stuffed with so much filth, just as those who are disgusted by the foul and malodorous parts of ulcers and are annoyed by the sight of those whose appearance is altered by warts and calluses from some plethoric ill-humor. But having set out his thought in a few words, I will pass over the great stench of what has been said. For now my argument will proceed with freedom, paying no attention to tearing apart spitefully any of what is said. 2.1.572 Every argument, at least a true argument, is a certain vocal sound that signifies the movements of thought. And every activity and movement of a sound mind looks toward the knowledge and contemplation of existing things, as far as is possible. But the nature of existing things has been divided in two, being separated into the intelligible and the sensible; but of things that appear to the senses, because of the readiness of their comprehension, a common knowledge is available to all, with the judgment of the senses 2.1.573 producing no ambiguity about the subject. For the differences of colors and of the other qualities, whatever we judge by hearing or smell or the sense of touch or taste, all we who share the same nature, with one voice both know and name them, and whatever other matters of life with which we are occupied that seem to have a more superficial comprehension, which are concerned with both the political 2.1.574 and the moral end of life. But in the contemplation of the intelligible nature, because it is beyond sensory comprehension, with the mind reaching conjecturally for things that escape the senses, we are moved in different ways concerning the object of our inquiry, and according to the thought that arises in each person about the subject, as best we can, we declare what has been understood, approaching as closely as possible the force of what was understood through the significance of words. 2.1.575 And in these matters, it is often possible for what is sought to be achieved through both, with the thought not missing the object of inquiry and the voice accurately declaring what has been understood through fitting interpretation; but it is also possible perhaps to fail in both or at least one of these, with either the comprehending thought or the interpretive faculty being diverted from what is 2.1.576 fitting. Since there are two things, then, by which every argument is judged, both the soundness in the thought and the utterance in words, it would be better to be approved in both, but it is no less good not to fail of the fitting conception, even if the expression happens to be inferior to the thought. Whenever, therefore, concerning the high and unseen things the...

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ἐπιγραφῆς τὴν αἰτίαν, οὐ κατηγόρους, οὐ κρίσιν, οὐ δικαστήριον ἐπιδεῖξαι δυνάμενος. καὶ νῦν ὡς ἀλλοτρίαν μωρίαν ἐπανορθούμενος 20εἰς ἀνάγκην20 φησὶ 2.1.568 20τοῦ οὕτως εἰπεῖν ἐληλυθέναι20. οὗτος ὁ ἔλεγ χος 20τῆς ἀνηκέστου20 ἡμῶν 20ἀτοπίας καὶ τῆς προσ ποιήτου καὶ ἐπιλήπτου εὐλαβείας20. ἀλλ' 20ἀπο ροῦντας20 ἡμᾶς φησιν 20οὐκ ἔχειν ὅ τι χρησόμεθα τοῖς παροῦσι καὶ τὴν ἀπορίαν ἐπικρυπτομένους ἐκεῖνον μὲν ἐκ τῶν ῥημάτων εἰς τὴν τοῦ κόσμου διαβάλλειν σοφίαν, αὐτοὺς δὲ τὴν τοῦ ἁγίου 2.1.569 πνεύματος οἰκειοῦσθαι διδασκαλίαν20. ἄλλος ὄνει ρος οὗτος, τοσοῦτον ἑαυτῷ προσεῖναι τῆς ἔξω σοφίας οἴεσθαι, ὡς φοβερὸν Βασιλείῳ διὰ τοῦτο δοκεῖν. οὕτω τινὲς καὶ βασιλεῦσιν ὁμόθρονοι καὶ τῆς ὑψηλοτέρας ἀξίας εἶναι πολλάκις ἑαυτοὺς ἐφαντάσθησαν, τῆς ἠπατημένης τῶν ἐνυ πνίων ὄψεως ἐκ τῆς καθ' ὕπαρ ἐπιθυμίας τὴν περὶ τούτου 2.1.570 δόκησιν ἐντιθείσης. οὐκ ἔχοντά φησιν Βασίλειον, ὅ τι τοῖς 2.1.570 εἰρημένοις χρήσεται, διαβάλλειν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ κόσμου σοφίᾳ. πολλοῦ μέντοι τὴν τοιαύτην ἂν διαβολὴν ἐτιμήσατο, τὸ φοβερὸς νομισθῆναι τῇ περιουσίᾳ τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν ἐπιτυχόντων τινί, μή τί γε Βασιλείῳ καί τινι τῶν κατ' 2.1.571 αὐτόν, εἴπερ τις ὅλως ἐστὶ κατ' αὐτὸν ἢ ἐγένετο. ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν διὰ μέσου λόγον, εἴπερ λόγος ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνδραποδώδης αὐτοῦ λοιδορία καὶ τὰ ἄμουσα σκώμματα δι' ὧν κατα τρέχειν τῶν ἡμετέρων οἴεται, πάντα παρήσω, βδελυκτόν τε καὶ ἀηδὲς ποιούμενος τοσούτοις μολύσμασι τὸν ἡμέτερον ἐμφορύνεσθαι λόγον, ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ ὀχθώδη τε καὶ ὀδωδότα τῶν ἑλκῶν μυσαττόμενοι καὶ δυσανασχετοῦντες τὴν θέαν τῶν ἀπὸ πληθωρικῆς τινος βαρυχυμίας δι' ἀκροχορδόνων καὶ ἥλων ἀλλοιωθέντων τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν. τὸν δὲ νοῦν αὐτοῦ δι' ὀλίγων ἐκθέμενος τὴν πολλὴν τῶν εἰρημένων παραδραμοῦμαι δυσω δίαν. ἔσται δέ μοι τέως κατ' ἐλευθερίαν ὁ λόγος διεξα γόμενος, οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸ ἐπηρεαστικῶς σπαράσσειν τι τῶν λεγομένων ἐπιστρεφόμενος. 2.1.572 Πᾶς λόγος ὅ γε ἀληθῶς λόγος σημαντική τίς ἐστι τῶν κατ' ἔννοιαν κινημάτων φωνή. πᾶσα δὲ τῆς ὑγιοῦς διανοίας ἐνέργειά τε καὶ κίνησις πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὄντων γνῶσίν τε καὶ θεωρίαν, ὡς ἂν οἷόν τε ᾖ, βλέπει. διχῆ δὲ μεμέ ρισται τῶν ὄντων ἡ φύσις εἴς τε τὸ νοητὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν διαιρουμένη· ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν κατ' αἴσθησιν φαινομένων διὰ τὸ πρόχειρον τῆς κατανοήσεως κοινὴ πρόκειται πᾶσιν ἡ γνῶσις, οὐδεμίαν περὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἀμφιβολίαν ἐμποιούσης 2.1.573 τῆς αἰσθητικῆς ἐπικρίσεως. τάς τε γὰρ τῶν χρωμάτων καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ποιοτήτων διαφοράς, ὅσα δι' ἀκοῆς ἢ ὀσφρήσεως ἢ τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἁφὴν ἢ τὴν γεῦσιν αἰσθήσεως ἐπικρίνομεν, ὁμοφώνως πάντες οἱ τῆς αὐτῆς κοινωνοῦντες φύσεως γινώσκομέν τε καὶ ὀνομάζομεν, καὶ ὅσα τῶν λοιπῶν τὴν κατάληψιν ἐπιπολαιοτέραν ἔχειν δοκεῖ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον ἀναστρεφομένων πραγμάτων, ἃ πρός τε τὸν πολιτικὸν 2.1.574 καὶ τὸν ἠθικὸν τοῦ βίου σκοπὸν καταγίνεται. ἐν δὲ τῇ θεωρίᾳ τῆς νοερᾶς φύσεως διὰ τὸ ὑπερκεῖσθαι αὐτὴν τῆς αἰσθητικῆς καταλήψεως στοχαστικῶς τῆς διανοίας ἐπορε γομένης τῶν ἐκφευγόντων τὴν αἴσθησιν ἄλλοι ἄλλως κινού μεθά τε περὶ τὸ ζητούμενον καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐγγινομένην ἑκάστῳ περὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον διάνοιαν, ὅπως ἂν οἷόν τε ᾖ, τὸ νοηθὲν ἐξαγγέλλομεν, ἐγγίζοντες ὡς ἔνι μάλιστα τῇ δυνάμει τῶν νοηθέντων διὰ τῆς τῶν ῥημάτων ἐμφάσεως. 2.1.575 ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἔστι μὲν πολλάκις καὶ δι' ἀμφοτέρων κατορ θωθῆναι τὸ σπουδαζόμενον, τῆς τε διανοίας οὐχ ἁμαρτούσης τοῦ ζητουμένου καὶ τῆς φωνῆς εὐθυβόλως τὸ νοηθὲν διὰ τῆς προσφυοῦς ἑρμηνείας ἐξαγγελλούσης· ἔστι δὲ τυχὸν καὶ ἀμφοτέρων ἢ τοῦ ἑτέρου γε τούτων ἀποτυχεῖν, ἢ τῆς καταληπτικῆς διανοίας ἢ τῆς ἑρμηνευτικῆς δυνάμεως τοῦ 2.1.576 προσήκοντος παρενεχθείσης. δύο τοίνυν ὄντων δι' ὧν ἅπας εὐθύνεται λόγος, τῆς τε κατὰ τὸν νοῦν ἀσφαλείας καὶ τῆς ἐν ῥήμασι προφορᾶς, κρεῖττον μὲν ἂν εἴη τὸ δι' ἀμφοτέρων εὐδόκιμον, οὐχ ἧττον δὲ ἀγαθὸν τῆς προσηκούσης μὴ διαμαρτεῖν ὑπολήψεως, κἂν ὁ λόγος ἐλάττων τῆς διανοίας τύχῃ. ὅταν τοίνυν περὶ τῶν ὑψηλῶν καὶ ἀθεάτων ἡ διά