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it is manifest that, since the goal and happiness are not equal nor the same according to Plato and according to Aristotle, but with the one always shouting and proclaiming that the most just man is the most happy, and the other not allowing happiness to follow upon virtue, unless one is also fortunate in birth and beauty, and even in gold, “who went to war wearing gold, like a girl,” it is necessary that according to the difference of the end, the philosophy that leads to it should also be 15.4.4 different. For by walking on one road, which is designed to lead to something small and lowly, it is not possible to arrive at things greater and set on high. Do you see where that high hill is, rugged and spiteful, on which he sits making light of your battle? 15.4.5 Upon this high hill it is impossible for that sharp and crafty beast to ascend; and in order for a fox to come to the same place as the offspring of an eagle, either they must by some evil chance fall to the earth, their own wings having been destroyed, or she, having grown what she is not by nature meant to grow, must put on swift wings and so be lifted from the earth and fly up to the high hill. But as long as each remains in its own station, there is no fellowship for the creatures of earth with the nurslings of heaven.” 15.4.6 And after other things he adds: “Since these things are so, and since Plato tries to draw the souls of the young somewhere upward toward the divine and in this way to appropriate them to virtue and to the good, while persuading them to look down upon all other things, tell us, O Peripatetic, how will you teach these things? How will you guide 15.4.7 the lovers of Plato to them? Where in your school of thought is there such a height of doctrines as to acquire the mindset of the Aloadae and to seek the road to heaven, which they thought could be made by piling up mountains, but which in fact is made by the removal of human strivings, as Plato says? 15.4.8 What help, then, do you offer to the young in these matters? And whence comes any doctrine that champions virtue? From what treatises of Aristotle? From which of his successors? From what unwritten traditions? For I permit you even to lie if you wish, only say something bold. But in fact you have nothing to say, nor would any of the leaders of your 15.4.9 school permit you to. At any rate, Aristotle’s treatises on these subjects, entitled the Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics and the Magna Moralia, have a small and lowly and common view of virtue, just as much as any private person and uneducated man and boy and woman might have. For the diadem, so to speak, and the royal scepter, which virtue has received from Zeus as an inalienable possession—since “that is not to be taken back, whatsoever” he “shall have bowed his head to confirm”—this they dare to 15.4.10 take away from her. For they do not allow her to make men happy, but they make her similar to wealth and reputation and birth and health and beauty and all the other things that are common to vice as well. For just as any one of these things, being present without virtue, is not sufficient to declare the one who possesses it happy, so too virtue, in the same way, 15.4.11 without these things is not capable of making the one who has it happy. How then has the dignity of virtue not been taken down and cast down? Yes, but they say that virtue far surpasses the other goods. What of that? For so does health surpass wealth; but the fact that without each other they are not sufficient for happiness 15.4.12 is common to all. Whenever, then, someone from these doctrines and this school of thought would teach the one who seeks the whole of human good within the soul itself, happiness, he says, does not mount the wheel, nor could one who is afflicted by the 15.4.13 fortunes of Priam be happy and blessed. But it is not unlikely for one who has virtue to fall into such circumstances. And from these things it follows that happiness neither follows in every case upon those who have virtue, nor, if it should come to be, does it always remain. As of leaves, some the wind scatters on the ground, but others the burgeoning wood puts forth; so of the generation of men, one grows and another ceases. 15.4.14 Further

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πρόδηλον, ὅτι τοῦ σκοποῦ καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας οὐκ ἴσων ὄντων οὐδὲ τῶν αὐτῶν κατὰ Πλάτωνα καὶ κατὰ Ἀριστοτέλην, ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν βοῶντος ἑκάστοτε καὶ κηρύττοντος ὅτι εὐδαιμονέστατος ὁ δικαιότατος, τοῦ δὲ μὴ ἐπιτρέποντος ἕπεσθαι τῇ ἀρετῇ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἂν μὴ καὶ γένος εὐτυχήσῃ καὶ κάλλος, ἀλλὰ καὶ χρυσόν «ὃς καὶ χρυσὸν ἔχων πόλεμόνδ' ἴεν ἠΰτε κούρη», ἀνάγκη κατὰ τὴν διαφορὰν τοῦ τέλους καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἄγουσαν φιλοσοφίαν διά15.4.4 φορον εἶναι. μιᾷ γὰρ ὁδῷ βαδίζοντα, ἥτις ἄγειν πέφυκεν ἐπί τι τῶν μικρῶν καὶ ταπεινῶν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ τὰ μείζω καὶ ἐν ὕψει κείμενα. Ὁρᾷς ἵν' ἔστ' ἐκεῖνος ὑψηλὸς πάγος, τρηχύς τε καὶ παλίγκοτος ἐν τῷ κάθηται σὴν ἐλαφρίζων μάχην; 15.4.5 ἐπὶ τοῦτον τὸν ὑψηλὸν πάγον τὸ δριμὺ καὶ πανοῦργον ἐκεῖνο θηρίον ἀνελθεῖν ἀδύνατον· ἵνα δὲ εἰς ταὐτὸν ἔλθῃ τοῖς ἀετοῦ γεννήμασιν ἀλώπηξ, ἢ τύχῃ τινὶ δεῖ χρησαμένους ἐκείνους πονηρᾷ καταπεσεῖν εἰς γῆν τῶν οἰκείων αὐτοῖς φθαρέντων ἢ φύσασαν αὐτήν, ἃ μὴ πέφυκε φύειν, λαιψηρὰ κυκλῶσαι πτερὰ καὶ οὕτως ἀρθεῖσαν ἐκ γῆς ἀναπτέσθαι πρὸς τὸν ὑψηλὸν πάγον. ἕως δ' ἑκάτερον ἐπὶ τῆς οἰκείας μένει τάξεως, οὐκ ἔνι κοινωνία τοῖς γῆς πρὸς τὰ οὐρανοῦ θρέμματα.» 15.4.6 Καὶ μεθ' ἕτερα ἐπιλέγει· «Τούτων τοίνυν οὕτως ἐχόντων καὶ πειρωμένου τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἕλκειν τὰς τῶν νέων ψυχὰς ἄνω που πρὸς τὸ θεῖον καὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον προσοικειοῦντος μὲν τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῷ καλῷ, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἁπάντων ἀναπείθοντος ὑπερφρονεῖν, φράσον ἡμῖν, ὦ Περιπατητικέ, πῶς ἐκδιδάξεις ταῦτα; πῶς ὁδηγήσεις 15.4.7 ἐπ' αὐτὰ τοὺς φιλοπλάτωνας; ποῦ σοι τῆς αἱρέσεως τοσοῦτον ὕψος λό γων ὥστε τὸ τῶν Ἀλωαδῶν φρόνημα κτήσασθαι καὶ τὴν εἰς οὐρανὸν ὁδὸν ζητεῖν, ἣν ἐκεῖνοι μὲν ᾤοντο ὀρῶν ἀναθέσει δύνασθαι γίνεσθαι, τὸ δ' ἄρ' ἦν ἀφαιρέσει τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων σπουδασμάτων γινόμενον, ὥς φησι Πλάτων; 15.4.8 τίς οὖν ἡ παρὰ σοῦ πρὸς ταῦτα τοῖς νέοις βοήθεια; καὶ πόθεν τίς ὁ τῆς ἀρετῆς συναγωνιστὴς λόγος; ἐκ ποίων πραγματειῶν Ἀριστοτέλους; τίνος τῶν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ; ἐκ ποίων ἀγράφων; δίδωμι γάρ σοι κἂν ψεύδεσθαι θέλῃς, μόνον τι νεανικόν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὔτ' ἔχεις εἰπεῖν οὔτ' ἂν ἐπιτρέψαι σοι τῶν ἡγεμόνων τῆς 15.4.9 αἱρέσεως οὐδείς. αἱ γοῦν Ἀριστοτέλους περὶ ταῦτα πραγματεῖαι, Εὐδήμειοί τε καὶ Νικομάχειοι καὶ Μεγάλων Ἠθικῶν ἐπιγραφόμεναι, μικρόν τι καὶ ταπεινὸν καὶ δημῶδες περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς φρονοῦσι καὶ τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἄν τις καὶ ἰδιώτης καὶ ἀπαίδευτος καὶ μειράκιον καὶ γυνή. τὸ μὲν γὰρ διάδημα, ὡς εἰπεῖν, καὶ τὸ σκῆπτρον τὸ βασιλικόν, ὃ παρὰ τοῦ ∆ιὸς ἔχει λαβοῦσα ἀναφαίρετον ἡ ἀρετή ἐπεὶ «οὐ παλινάγρετον, ὅττι κεν» οὗτος «τῇ κεφαλῇ ἐπινεύσει», τοῦτο αὐτὴν 15.4.10 ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τολμῶσιν. οὐ γὰρ ἐπιτρέπουσιν αὐτὴν ποιεῖν εὐδαίμονας, ὁμοίαν δὲ αὐτὴν καθιστᾶσι πλούτῳ καὶ δόξῃ καὶ γένει καὶ ὑγείᾳ καὶ κάλλει καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα κοινὰ τῆς κακίας. ὡς γὰρ τούτων ὁτιοῦν παρὸν χωρὶς ἀρετῆς οὐκ αὔταρκες εὐδαίμονα τὸν κεκτημένον ἀποφῆναι, καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ κατὰ ταὐτὰ 15.4.11 χωρὶς τούτων οὐχ ἱκανὴ ποιῆσαι τὸν ἔχοντ' αὐτὴν εὐδαίμονα. πῶς οὖν οὐ καθῄρηται καὶ καταβέβληται τὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀξίωμα; Ναί· ἀλλὰ πολὺ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν ὑπερέχειν τὴν ἀρετὴν λέγουσι. τί δὴ τοῦτο; καὶ γὰρ τὴν ὑγείαν τοῦ πλούτου· ἀλλὰ τό γε χωρὶς ἀλλήλων μὴ ἀρκεῖν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν 15.4.12 πᾶσι κοινόν. ὁπόταν οὖν τις ἐκ τούτων τῶν δογμάτων καὶ ταύτης τῆς αἱρέσεως διδάξειε τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ πᾶν ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ζητοῦντα, εὐδαιμονία, φησίν, ἐπὶ τροχὸν οὐκ ἀναβαίνει οὐδὲ ὁ ταῖς Πριαμικαῖς 15.4.13 τύχαις συνεχόμενος δύναιτ' ἂν εὐδαίμων καὶ μακάριος εἶναι. τὸν δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχοντα τοιούτοις τισὶ περιπεσεῖν οὐκ ἀπεικός. τούτοις δὲ ἕπεται τὸ μήτε ἀκολουθεῖν ἐκ παντὸς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τοῖς τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχουσι μήτ', εἰ γένοιτο, παραμένειν ἀεί. Φύλλα τὰ μέν τ' ἄνεμος χαμάδις χέει, ἄλλα δέ θ' ὕλη τηλεθόωσα φύει· ὣς ἀνδρῶν γενεὴ ἡ μὲν φύει, ἡ δ' ἀπολήγει. 15.4.14 ἔτι