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Your example is small and timid, O poet; but the season of spring comes on; long is the time in between and for whom it does not happen. If you wish to accurately depict the fleeting and unsound nature of the human race, compare it to the happiness of Aristotle. This more easily than leaves both springs up and falls away, not waiting for the year to come around, not for the same year, nor the same month, but on the same day, 15.4.15 in the same hour, it both comes to be and perishes. And many are the things that destroy it, and all from chance. For the banes of the body, and these are countless, and poverty and dishonor and all such things; and for none of them are the things of dear virtue self-sufficient, not adequate for help; for it is weak to ward off unhappiness, and to preserve 15.4.16 happiness. Therefore, one who has been brought up in these things and is pleased by these arguments, in what way will he either agree with Plato's or ever encourage others toward them? For it is not possible that anyone starting from these things would accept those Heraclean and divine doctrines, that virtue is something strong and all-beautiful, and neither ever lacking for happiness nor ever deprived of it, but even if poverty, even if sickness, even if disgrace, even if tortures and pitch and the cross, even if all the things from tragedy flow upon him at once, still the just man is happy 15.4.17 and blessed. At any rate, with the loudest-voiced herald he proclaims, as if some victorious athlete, the most just man, that this is the happiest man, who reaps the fruit of happiness from justice itself. Therefore, divide, if you wish, and vary in three and four and many ways, distinguishing the goods; for these things are nothing to the matter at hand. You will certainly never 15.4.18 bring us to Plato through them. For what if of the goods, as you say, some are worthy of honor, like the gods, some are praiseworthy, like the virtues, some are powers, like wealth and strength, and some are useful, like cures? What if, distinguishing these with a smaller division, you were to say that of the goods some are ends, and some are not ends? Naming ends those things for whose sake are the others, and not ends those things taken for the sake of 15.4.19 others. And what if one were to learn that some things are simply good, and others are not for all? Or that some are goods of the soul, some of the body, and some external? Or again that of the goods some are powers, some dispositions and states, others activities, some ends, some materials, and some instruments? And even if someone were to learn from you to distribute the good in ten ways according to the ten categories, what are these teachings in relation to the opinion of 15.4.20 Plato? For as long as you, whether calling the things of virtue goods homonymously or however you wish, take other things as necessary for happiness, taking away the sufficiency of virtue, while Plato, having from abundance the full measure for happiness from virtue itself, inquires about the other things, we would have nothing in common in this respect; you need other arguments, and Plato's need others. 15.4.21 For just as there are no faithful oaths for lions and men, nor do wolves and lambs have a mind of one accord, so there is no friendship for Plato and Aristotle concerning the highest and most authoritative doctrine of happiness. For through and through, even if they do not wish each other ill, they appear to say at least opposite things concerning the matters that bear on this.”

15.5.1 5. BY THE SAME TO THE SAME, CONCERNING WHAT WAS DISPUTED BY MOSES AND PLATO IN THE DISCOURSE ON PROVIDENCE

Again, when Moses and the prophets among the Hebrews, and not only them but also Plato, had in these things harmoniously and clearly set forth the argument concerning the providence of the whole, Aristotle, having established the divine as far as the moon, circumscribes the remaining parts of the world from the administration of God; for which he is also refuted by the one who was mentioned, who goes through it somewhat as follows:

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σοι τὸ παράδειγμα μικρὸν καὶ ἄτολμον, ὦ ποιητά· ἔαρος δ' ἐπιγίνεται ὥρη· πολὺς ὁ μεταξὺ χρόνος καὶ ᾧ μὴ γίνεται. εἰ θέλεις ἀκριβῶς τὸ ἐπίκηρον καὶ σαθρὸν τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης γενεᾶς ἀπεικάσαι, παράβαλλε τὴν Ἀριστοτέλους εὐδαιμονίαν. ῥᾷον τῶν φύλλων αὕτη καὶ φύεται καὶ ἀπολείπει, οὐκ ἀναμένουσα περιτελλόμενον τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν οὐδ' αὐτοετεὶ οὐδ' αὐτομηνί, ἀλλ' αὐτῆς ἡμέρας, 15.4.15 αὐτῆς ὥρας καὶ γίνεται καὶ ἀπόλλυται. πολλὰ δὲ τὰ ἀπολλύντα, καὶ πάντα ἐκ τῆς τύχης. καὶ γὰρ αἱ τοῦ σώματος κῆρες, μυρίαι δὲ αὗται, καὶ πενία καὶ ἀτιμία καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· καὶ πρὸς οὐδὲν αὐταρκεῖ τὰ τῆς φίλης ἀρετῆς, πρὸς βοήθειαν οὐχ ἱκανά· τὴν μὲν γὰρ κακοδαιμονίαν εἴργειν, τὴν δὲ εὐδαι 15.4.16 μονίαν διασῴζειν ἀσθενής. τούτοις οὖν τις ἐντραφεὶς καὶ τούτοις ἀρεσκόμενος τοῖς λόγοις τίνα τρόπον ἢ αὐτὸς συνᾴσεται τοῖς Πλάτωνος ἢ ἄλλους πρὸς αὐτὰ ἐπιρρώσει ποτέ; οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅπως ἄν τις ἐκ τούτων ὁρμώμενος παραδέξαιτο τὰ Ἡράκλεια καὶ θεῖα ἐκεῖνα δόγματα, ὡς ἰσχυρόν τι καὶ πάγκαλον χρῆμα ἀρετὴ καὶ οὔ τε ποτὲ ἐνδέουσα πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν οὔτε ποτὲ αὐτῆς ἀφαιρουμένη, ἀλλὰ κἂν πενία, κἂν νόσος, κἂν ἀδοξία, κἂν βάσανοι καὶ πίττα καὶ σταυρός, κἂν τὰ ἐκ τῆς τραγῳδίας ἅμα πάντα ἐπιρρυῇ, ἔτι ὁ δίκαιος εὐδαί15.4.17 μων καὶ μακάριος. ὑπὸ κήρυκι γοῦν αὐτῷ τῷ μεγαλοφωνοτάτῳ κηρύττει, καθάπερ ἀθλητήν τινα νικηφόρον, τὸν δικαιότατον, ὅτι οὗτός ἐστιν εὐδαιμονέστατος ὁ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς δικαιοσύνης τὸν καρπὸν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας δρεπόμενος. διαίρει τοίνυν, εἰ βούλει, καὶ ποίκιλλε τριχῇ καὶ τετραχῇ καὶ πολλαχῇ τὰ ἀγαθὰ διαστελλόμενος· οὐδὲν γὰρ ταῦτα πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον. οὐ δή ποθ' 15.4.18 ἡμᾶς δι' αὐτῶν προσάξεις τῷ Πλάτωνι. τί γὰρ εἰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὡς φῄς, τὰ μὲν τίμια, καθάπερ οἱ θεοί, τὰ δὲ ἐπαινετά, ὡς αἱ ἀρεταί, τὰ δὲ δυνάμεις, ὡς πλοῦτος καὶ ἰσχύς, τὰ δὲ ὠφέλιμα, ὡς αἱ θεραπεῖαι; τί δ', εἰ ταῦτα ἐλάττονι διαιρέσει διαστελλόμενος λέγοις τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι τέλη, τὰ δὲ οὐ τέλη; τέλη μὲν ὀνομάζων ὧν χάριν τὰ ἄλλα, οὐ τέλη δὲ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἕνεκεν λαμβα15.4.19 νόμενα. τί δ', εἰ μάθοι τις ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἁπλῶς ἀγαθά, τὰ δὲ οὐ πᾶσιν; ἢ ὅτι τὰ μὲν ψυχῆς ἀγαθά, τὰ δὲ σώματος, τὰ δ' ἐκτός; ἢ πάλιν ὅτι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν δυνάμεις, τὰ δὲ διαθέσεις καὶ ἕξεις, ἄλλα δὲ ἐνέργειαι, τὰ δὲ τέλη, τὰ δὲ ὗλαι, τὰ δὲ ὄργανα; κἂν κατὰ τὰς δέκα δὲ κατηγορίας παρὰ σοῦ μάθῃ τις δεκαχῇ διανέμειν τἀγαθόν, τί ταῦτα πρὸς τὴν Πλάτωνος γνώμην τὰ διδάγ15.4.20 ματα; ἕως οὗ γὰρ σὺ μὲν εἴτε ὁμωνύμως εἴτε ὅπως βούλει καλῶν ἀγαθὰ τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἄλλα πρὸς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὡς ἀναγκαῖα παραλαμβάνεις, τὸ ἱκανὸν τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀφαιρούμενος, Πλάτων δ' ἐκ περιουσίας περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζητεῖ τὸ δὴ ἔκπλεων εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν ἀπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ἀρετῆς ἔχων, οὐδὲν ἂν ἡμῖν εἴη κατὰ τοῦτο κοινόν· ἄλλων σοὶ δεῖ λόγων, ἄλλων τοῖς Πλάτωνος. 15.4.21 ὡς γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι λέουσι καὶ ἀνδράσιν ὅρκια πιστὰ οὐδὲ λύκοι τε καὶ ἄρνες ὁμόφρονα θυμὸν ἔχουσιν, οὕτως οὐκ ἔστι Πλάτωνι καὶ Ἀριστοτέλει φιλία περὶ τοῦ κορυφαιοτάτου καὶ κυριωτάτου τῆς εὐδαιμονίας δόγματος. διαμπερὲς γάρ, εἰ μὴ καὶ κακὰ φρονέουσιν ἀλλήλοις, τά γε ὑπεναντία περὶ τῶν εἰς τοῦτο διαφερόντων φαίνονται λέγοντες.»

15.5.1 εʹ. ΤΟΥ ΑΥΤΟΥ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΝ ΑΥΤΟΝ ∆ΙΕΝΕΧΘΕΝΤΑ ΜΩΣΕΙ ΚΑΙ ΠΛΑΤΩΝΙ ΕΝ ΤΩΙ ΠΕΡΙ ΠΡΟΝΟΙΑΣ ΛΟΓΩΙ

Πάλιν Μωσέως καὶ τῶν παρ' Ἑβραίοις προφητῶν, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ Πλάτωνος ἐν τούτοις συμφώνως τὸν περὶ τῆς τῶν ὅλων προνοίας λόγον εὐκρινῶς διατεθειμένων, ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης μέχρι σελήνης στήσας τὸ θεῖον τὰ λοιπὰ τοῦ κόσμου μέρη περιγράφει τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ διοικήσεως· ἐφ' οἷς καὶ ἀπελέγχεται πρὸς τοῦ δηλωθέντος, ὧδέ πη διεξιόντος·