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with the world supposed incorruptible according to him, who of the Peripatetics confirms these things for us? 15.6.8 But it is necessary to encourage the fellow-combatant in these matters, that it is not in every case, if something has come into being, that this must perish, and again, neither if something will not perish, is it necessary for this to be uncreated. For one must neither concede to the incorruptible the single cause of being uncreated, nor must one leave the change to destruction for that which has come into being unaided.15.6.9 15.6.9 Whence then can we take help for these things from the works of Aristotle, a man who does not idly nor by himself conclude the argument about these things, but openly opposes Plato and places what has come into being under the necessity of perishing, and says that what will not perish has its incorruptibility established solely from not having come into being, and who certainly does not even leave power in God, using which he might do something good? For what 15.6.10 has not yet come into being before, this, he says, could not even come into being. And he is so far from helping Plato's argument through these things, that by frightening some of those zealous for Plato's teachings with what he said, he made them abandon the dogma, being unable to understand that according to the nature of things themselves, one might conceive without God's will and power neither that which has come into being as incorruptible 15.6.11 nor that which will not be corrupted as created. But when someone sets up the best cause, the one from God, one must take this as the guide of all things and show it to be a cause in no way inferior to the others. For it is ridiculous that because a thing has come into being, it perishes for this reason, unless God wills that it not perish, and that because something is uncreated, it has the strength not to perish, while the will from God is insufficient15.6.12 to preserve as incorruptible something that has come into being. And the builder is able to construct a house that did not exist, and someone is able to make a statue, which did not exist before, exist, and another, having built a ship from raw material, provided it to those who needed it, and each of the other craftsmen, as many as pursue the creative arts, have this power, to bring something that does not exist into being, but the all-sovereign king and master craftsman, will he not even share in as much power as a human craftsman, and will he be for us devoid of all generation? No, if indeed we are able even to a small degree 15.6.13 to grasp the consideration of the divine cause. But is he able to create and to will good things—"for he was good, and in the good there is no envy about anything"—but unable to preserve and keep safe the things that have come into being? And indeed the other craftsmen are capable of both. For example, the builder and the shipwright not only construct new ships and houses, but are also able to help those being corrupted by time,15.6.14 replacing for them the worn-out parts with others; so that at least this much must by all means be conceded to God also. For that which someone is able to make whole, how could he be unable to make it in part? Therefore something new must come into being, if indeed someone is to be a maker at all, and the good work must be preserved completely; 15.6.15 for to wish to undo what has been well made, is the mark of an evil one. And there is no other greater bond for the salvation of things that have come into being than the will of God. Or while many things that have partaken of human effort and will—both nations and cities and works—having come into being, remain for an impossibly long time when the one who willed them no longer exists, will the things that have partaken of the mind of God and came into being through him and by him, will these then perish and not 15.6.16 remain, even while their maker is present? What cause having overpowered the mind of God? Is it the necessity from the things themselves that have come into being? But it, at least, by accepting to be ordered, has already confessed its defeat by God. But is it from some external cause contending against God? But neither does such a thing exist, nor in those things where God has already prevailed and ordered them is it still right to subordinate him to anything in these matters, unless indeed we are completely unaware that we are speaking about the greatest and most divine power. 15.6.17 But indeed into the argument concerning the truth

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ἀφθάρτου κατ' αὐτὸν ὑποκειμένου τοῦ κόσμου, τίς ἡμῖν τῶν Περιπατητικῶν ταῦτα βεβαιοῖ; 15.6.8 ∆εῖ δὲ παραμυθήσασθαι τὸν συναγωνιστὴν τούτων, ὅτι οὐ πάντως, εἴ τι γέγονε, τοῦτο ἀνάγκη φθαρῆναι, πάλιν δ' οὐδ' εἴ τι μὴ φθαρήσεται, τοῦτο ἀναγκαῖον ἀγένητον εἶναι. οὔτε γὰρ μίαν αἰτίαν τῷ ἀφθάρτῳ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἀγενήτου συγχωρητέον οὔτε τῷ γενομένῳ τὴν εἰς ὄλεθρον μεταβολὴν ἀβοή15.6.9 θητον καταλειπτέον. πόθεν οὖν ἐκ τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους λάβωμεν βοήθειαν εἰς ταῦτα, ἀνδρὸς οὐ τηνάλλως οὐδὲ καθ' αὑτὸν περαίνοντος τὸν περὶ τούτων λόγον, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὀρθοῦ πρὸς Πλάτωνα ἐναντιουμένου καὶ τό τε γενόμενον εἰς ἀνάγκην τοῦ ἀπολέσθαι περιιστάντος τό τε μὴ ἀπολούμενον ἐκ μόνου τοῦ μὴ γενέσθαι λέγοντος κρατύνεσθαι τὸ ἄφθαρτον, οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ δύναμιν ἀπολείποντος αὐτοῦ περὶ τὸν θεόν, ᾗ χρώμενος ἀγαθὸν ἄν τι ποιήσαι; ὃ γὰρ 15.6.10 οὔπω πρότερον γέγονε, τοῦτο, φησίν, οὐδ' ἂν γένοιτο. τοσοῦτον δὲ ἀποδεῖ τοῦ διὰ τούτων βοηθεῖν τῷ Πλάτωνος λόγῳ, ὥστε ἤδη τινὰς καὶ τῶν περὶ τὰ Πλάτωνος ἐσπουδακότων φοβήσας οἷς εἶπεν ἀπέστησε τοῦ δόγματος, οὐ δυνηθέντας συνιδεῖν ὅτι κατὰ μὲν τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων ἦν ἄν τις ἄνευ θεοῦ βουλήσεως καὶ δυνάμεως ἐπινοήσαι οὔτε τὸ γενόμενον ἄφθαρτον 15.6.11 οὔτε τὸ μὴ φθαρησόμενον γενητόν. ὅταν δὲ τὴν ἀρίστην τις αἰτίαν ἐπιστήσῃ τὴν ἐκ θεοῦ, δεῖ ταύτην ἡγεμόνα τῶν πάντων λαβόντα μηδὲν αὐτὴν τῶν ἄλλων αἰτίαν ἀποφαίνειν χείρονα. γελοῖον γὰρ διότι μὲν γέγονέ τι, διὰ τοῦτο φθαρῆναι, εἰ δὲ ὁ θεὸς βούλεται, μὴ φθαρῆναι, καὶ διότι μέν τι ἀγένη τόν ἐστιν, ἔχειν ἰσχὺν τοῦ μὴ φθαρῆναι, τὴν δὲ παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ βούλησιν ἐν15.6.12 δεῖν πρὸς τὸ ἄφθαρτον τηρῆσαί τι τῶν γενομένων. καὶ ὁ μὲν οἰκοδόμος ἱκανὸς οὐκ οὖσαν οἰκίαν κατασκευάσασθαι, ἱκανὸς δέ τις καὶ ἀνδριάντα, μὴ ὄντα πρότερον, ὄντα ποιῆσαι καὶ ναῦν ἄλλος ἐξ ὕλης ἀργοῦ τεκτηνάμενος παρέσχε τοῖς δεομένοις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνιτῶν ἕκαστος, ὅσοι γε τὰς ποιητικὰς μετίασι τέχνας, δύναμιν ταύτην ἔχουσιν, ὥς τι τῶν οὐκ ὄντων ἄγειν εἰς οὐσίαν, ὁ δὲ παμβασιλεὺς καὶ ἀριστοτέχνης οὐδ' ὅσον ἀνθρωπίνου τεχνίτου δυνάμεως μεθέξει, ἄμοιρος δ' ἡμῖν πάσης ἔσται γενέσεως; οὔκ, ἐάν γε καὶ κατὰ βραχὺ 15.6.13 θείας αἰτίας ἐπιλογισμὸν οἷοί τε ὦμεν λαβεῖν. ἀλλὰ ποιῆσαι μὲν ἱκανὸς καὶ βουληθῆναι τὰ καλά «ἀγαθὸς γάρ, ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς φθόνος περὶ οὐδενός», τηρῆσαι δὲ καὶ διαφυλάξαι τὰ γενόμενα οὐ δυνατός; καὶ μὴν καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ τεχνῖται πρὸς ἄμφω ἱκανοί. ὁ γοῦν οἰκοδόμος καὶ ὁ ναυπηγὸς οὐ μόνον καινὰς κατασκευάζονται ναῦς καὶ οἰκίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῖς ὑπὸ χρόνου διαφθειρομέναις 15.6.14 ἱκανοὶ βοηθεῖν, ἕτερα τῶν πεπονημένων ἀντικαθιστάντες αὐταῖς· ὥστε καὶ τῷ θεῷ πάντως τό γε τοσοῦτον συγχωρητέον. ὃ γάρ τις ὅλον ποιῆσαι δυνατός, τοῦτο πῶς ἂν ἐκ μέρους ἀδύνατος εἴη ποιεῖν; καὶ γενέσθαι τοίνυν τι δεῖ καινόν, εἴ γε μέλλοι τις ὅλως ποιητής, καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἔργον πρὸς ἅπαν 15.6.15 διασῴζεσθαι· τὸ γὰρ εὖ γενόμενον ἐθέλειν λύειν, κακοῦ. μείζων δὲ ἄλλος εἰς σωτηρίαν τῶν γενομένων δεσμὸς οὐκ ἔστι τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ βουλήσεως. ἢ ἀνθρωπίνης μὲν σπουδῆς καὶ βουλήσεως μεταλαβόντα πολλά, καὶ ἔθνη καὶ πόλεις καὶ ἔργα, μένει χρόνον ἀμήχανον ὅσον γενόμενα μηκέτ' ὄντος τοῦ θελήσαντος, τὰ δὲ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ μετασχόντα γνώμης καὶ δι' αὐτὸν καὶ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γενόμενα, ταῦτα δὲ ἄρα παρόντος τοῦ ποιήσαντος οἰχήσεται καὶ οὐ 15.6.16 παραμενεῖ; τίνος αἰτίας βιασαμένης τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ γνώμην; πότερον τῆς ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν γενομένων ἀνάγκης; ἀλλ' αὐτή γε τῷ προσέσθαι τὸ κοσμηθῆναι τὴν ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ προσωμολόγησεν ἧτταν. ἀλλ' ἔξωθέν τινος αἰτίας ἀνταγωνιζομένης τῷ θεῷ; ἀλλ' οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε ἐν οἷς ἔφθη κρατήσας καὶ κοσμήσας ὁ θεὸς ἔτι ἄξιον ἐν τούτοις αὐτὸν ἐλαττοῦν τινος, εἴ γε μὴ παντάπασι λανθάνομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς περὶ τῆς μεγίστης καὶ θειοτάτης δυνάμεως διαλεγόμενοι. 15.6.17 ἀλλὰ γὰρ εἰς τὸν περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας λόγον