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and also the circular, as if it were a certain bodily motion, he assigned to the fifth 15.8.8 body, deceiving himself most easily. For to those moving in a straight line, heaviness and lightness provided the principle of motion, but the fifth body, partaking of neither heaviness nor lightness, has a cause for motionlessness 15.8.9 rather, but not for circular motion. For if for things moving in a straight line, it is not the shape that has the cause of motion, but the tendency, a body not only when placed in the middle of something similar will not have a direction in which to incline, but when placed around in a circle of any kind will not have a cause for inclination toward anything, whether they go to the right towards the dawn and the sun, or to the left, 15.8.10 or forward, or backward. Further, for the other bodies, when they have been pushed out of their proper places, the reference to these places provides the motion to return again of themselves; but for that fifth body, which never departs from its own places, it would be fitting to remain. 15.8.11 And concerning the other bodies, too, with the fifth being excepted, Aristotle appears to be contending not to say the same things as Plato. For when Plato had investigated whether there is a body heavy by nature or light by nature, and since these things seemed to be spoken of according to the relation to 'up' and 'down,' and had considered whether there is anything 'down' by nature and 'up' or not, and had demonstrated precisely that according to the affinities of bodies for their places 'down' would be said for each to be that to which it was borne, and 'up' for each to be the alien place from which it would depart, and had distributed both 'heavy' and 'light' according to the same relation, and beyond these things had demonstrated that it is not reasonable for either the middle or the periphery 15.8.12 to be called 'up' or 'down'; this man opposes, thinking it necessary to overthrow that one's views from all sides, and forces the name 'heavy' on what is borne to the middle, and 'light' on what is borne to the periphery, and says the place in the middle is 'down,' and the one on the periphery is 'up'." 15.8.13 But concerning the cosmos and the things from which it is made and the things in the heavens, they are so far apart from each other. Thus these men. But Moses and the Hebrew oracles are not concerned with any of these things; and reasonably so, because it was not considered profitable for the right conduct of life for those occupied with such matters.

15.9.1 9. BY THE SAME TO THE SAME, AND HOW HE DISAGREED WITH PLATO AND THE HEBREW ORACLES IN THE MATTERS CONCERNING THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL

"But concerning the soul, what could we say? For these things are clear not only to philosophers, but now almost to all private citizens, that Plato leaves the soul immortal and has made many arguments on this behalf, 15.9.2 proving in various and diverse ways that the soul is immortal. And great has been the ambition of those who are zealous for Plato's doctrines, contending together for the doctrine and for Plato. For this is almost the thing that holds together the man's entire 15.9.3 school of thought. For the hypothesis of the ethical doctrines followed upon the immortality of the soul, since the great and brilliant and vigorous quality of virtue was able to be saved through the divinity of the soul, and all the affairs of nature were able to be well-ordered according to the administration of the soul. 15.9.4 "For 'every soul,' he says, 'cares for all that is soulless, and ranges over the whole heaven, now in one form, now in another.'" But indeed, for Plato, the things of science and of wisdom are also connected to the immortality of the soul. For all learning is recollection, and he thinks that in no other way can inquiry and learning, from which knowledge comes, be preserved. 15.9.5 If the soul is not immortal, neither is there recollection. And if not this, neither is there learning. Therefore, since all of Plato's doctrines are simply dependent upon and hanging from the divinity and immortality of the soul, he who does not concede

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δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐν κύκλῳ, καθάπερ σωματικήν τινα, τῷ πέμπτῳ προσ15.8.8 ένειμε σώματι, παντευκόλως αὑτὸν ἐξαπατήσας. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἐπ' εὐθείας κινουμένοις αἱ βαρύτητες καὶ κουφότητες τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς κινήσεως παρείχοντο, τὸ δὲ πέμπτον σῶμα, μήτε βάρους μετέχον μήτε κουφότητος, ἀκινη15.8.9 σίας μᾶλλον, ἀλλ' οὐ τῆς ἐν κύκλῳ κινήσεως αἰτίαν ἔχει. εἰ γὰρ τοῖς ἐπ' εὐθείας κινουμένοις οὐ τὸ σχῆμα τὴν αἰτίαν ἔχει τῆς κινήσεως, ἀλλ' ἡ ῥοπή, σῶμα οὐ μόνον ἐν μέσῳ τεθὲν ὁμοίου τινὸς οὐχ ἕξει πῇ κλιθῇ, ἀλλ' ἐν κύκλῳ περιτεθὲν ὁποίῳ τινὶ οὐχ ἕξει τῆς ἐπί τι κλίσεως αἰτίαν, εἴτ' ἐπὶ δεξί' ἴωσι πρὸς ἠῶ τ' ἠέλιόν τε εἴτ' ἐπ' ἀριστερὰ 15.8.10 εἴτε πρόσω εἴτ' ὀπίσω. ἔτι τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις σώμασιν ἐξωσθεῖσι τῶν οἰκείων τόπων παρέχει τὸ κινεῖσθαι πάλιν ἀφ' αὑτῶν ἡ πρὸς τούτους ἀναφορά· τῷ πέμπτῳ δὲ ἐκείνῳ, μηδέποτε ἐκβαίνοντι τῶν αὑτοῦ τόπων, μένειν ἂν προσ15.8.11 ήκοι. καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὲ σωμάτων, ὑπεξαιρουμένου τοῦ πέμπτου, φαίνεται φιλονεικῶν Ἀριστοτέλης μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ λέγειν Πλάτωνι. ζητήσαντος γὰρ τοῦ Πλάτωνος, εἰ ἔστι φύσει βαρὺ σῶμα ἢ φύσει κοῦφον, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ταῦτα κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ ἄνω καὶ κάτω σχέσιν ἐφαίνετο λέγεσθαι, σκεψαμένου, εἴτε ἔστι τι κάτω φύσει καὶ ἄνω εἴτε μή, καὶ ἀποδείξαντος ἀκριβῶς, ὅτι κατὰ μὲν τὰς τῶν σωμάτων πρὸς τοὺς τόπους οἰκειότητας τὸ κάτω λέγοιτο ἑκάστοις ἐφ' ὃ φέροιντο, ἄνω δὲ ἑκάστοις τὸ ἀλλότριον ἀφ' οὗ ἀναχωροῖεν, καὶ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν σχέσιν καὶ τὸ βαρὺ καὶ τὸ κοῦφον διανείμαντος καὶ πρόσω τούτων ἀποδείξαντος ὅτι μήτε τὸ μέσον μήτε τὸ πέριξ 15.8.12 εὔλογον ἄνω τι αὐτῶν ἢ κάτω λέγεσθαι· ὅδε ἀντιτίθησι πανταχόθεν καταβάλλειν δεῖν ἡγούμενος τὰ ἐκείνου, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον φερόμενον βαρὺ λέγειν βιάζεται, τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ πέριξ κοῦφον, καὶ τὸν μὲν τόπον τὸν ἐν μέσῳ κάτω φησί, τὸν δὲ πέριξ ἄνω.» 15.8.13 Ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν κόσμου καὶ ἐξ ὧν οὗτος καὶ τῶν κατ' οὐρανόν, τοσοῦτον ἀλλήλων ἀφεστήκατον. ταῦτα μὲν οἵδε. Μωσῆς δὲ καὶ τὰ Ἑβραίων λόγια τούτων οὐδὲν πολυπραγμονεῖ· καὶ εἰκότως, ὅτι μηδὲ πρὸς βίου κατόρθωσιν τοῖς περὶ ταῦτα ἀσχολουμένοις λυσιτελεῖν ἐνομίσθη.

15.9.1 θʹ. ΤΟΥ ΑΥΤΟΥ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΝ ΑΥΤΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΕΡΙ ΑΘΑΝΑΣΙΑΣ ΨΥΧΗΣ ∆ΙΕΝΕΧΘΕΝΤΑ ΤΩΙ ΠΛΑΤΩΝΙ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΕΒΡΑΙΩΝ ΛΟΓΟΙΣ

«Ὑπὲρ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τί καὶ λέγοιμεν ἄν; δῆλα γὰρ ταῦτα οὐ μόνον τοῖς φιλοσοφοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἤδη σχεδὸν καὶ τοῖς ἰδιώταις ἅπασιν, ὅτι Πλάτων μὲν ἀθάνατον τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπολείπει καὶ πολλοὺς ὑπὲρ τούτου λόγους πεποίη15.9.2 ται, ποικίλως καὶ παντοίως ἀποδεικνὺς ὅτι ἐστὶν ἀθάνατος ἡ ψυχή. πολλὴ δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐσπουδακόσι περὶ τὰ Πλάτωνος ἡ φιλοτιμία γέγονε, συναγωνιζομένοις τῷ τε δόγματι καὶ τῷ Πλάτωνι. σχεδὸν γὰρ τὸ συνέχον τὴν πᾶσαν 15.9.3 αἵρεσιν τἀνδρὸς τοῦτ' ἔστιν. ἥ τε γὰρ τῶν ἠθικῶν δογμάτων ὑπόθεσις ἐπηκολούθησε τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀθανασίᾳ, τὸ μέγα καὶ λαμπρὸν καὶ νεανικὸν τῆς ἀρετῆς διὰ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς θεῖον σῶσαι δυνηθείσης, τά τε τῆς φύσεως πράγματα πάντα κατὰ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς διοίκησιν ἔσχε τὸ καλῶς διοικεῖσθαι δύνασθαι. 15.9.4 «Ψυχὴ γὰρ πᾶσα,» φησί, «παντὸς ἐπιμελεῖται τοῦ ἀψύχου, πάντα δὲ οὐρανὸν περιπολεῖ ἄλλοτ' ἐν ἄλλοις εἴδεσι γινομένη.» ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὰ τῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ τῆς σοφίας εἰς τὴν ἀθανασίαν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνῆπται τῷ Πλάτωνι. πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ μαθήσεις ἀναμνήσεις, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως οἴεται δύνασθαι σῴζεσθαι 15.9.5 καὶ ζήτησιν καὶ μάθησιν, ἐξ ὧν ἐπιστήμη γίνεται. εἰ δὲ μή ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος, οὐδὲ ἀνάμνησις. εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο, οὐδὲ μάθησις. πάντων οὖν τῶν Πλάτωνος δογμάτων ἀτεχνῶς ἐξηρτημένων καὶ ἐκκρεμαμένων τῆς κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν θειότητός τε καὶ ἀθανασίας, ὁ μὴ συγχωρῶν