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This overturns the entire philosophy of Plato. Who then is the first who attempted to oppose with proofs and to take away from the soul its immortality and all its other power? Who else before Aristotle? For of the others, some conceded that it survives, while others, if not this, at least assigned to the soul a power in the body and some motion and works and actions; but he, by as much as Plato dignified the matter of the soul, declaring it a principle of generation and a creation of God and ruler of all things, by so much he strove to pull it down and dishonor it and all but declare the soul to be nothing; for neither breath nor fire nor a body at all, nor yet incorporeal such as to exist and be moved by itself, but not even so much as to be unmoved upon the body and, so to speak, soulless. For such a thing he dared or was even compelled to do, as to take away from the soul the primary motions, to deliberate, to think, to expect, to remember, to reason. For he says these movements are not of the soul, the secretary, as they say, of nature. Indeed, this man is trustworthy to conjecture something about external things, he who has erred so much concerning his own soul as not even to apprehend that he thinks. For it is not the soul, he says, but the man who performs each of these things, and the soul is thus unmoved. Therefore, following him, Dicaearchus, and being capable of seeing the consequence, has done away with the whole substance of the soul. For that the soul is something invisible and unseen is clear, so that we would not grant that the soul exists on account of the evidence from the senses; but its movements, since it is unseen, seem to compel us to confess that the soul is something. For everyone seems to understand that these things belong to the soul, to deliberate and to consider and to think in whatever way. For when we see the body and its powers and consider that such activities are not of the body, we grant that there is something else in us that deliberates, and that this is the soul. For from what other source have we come to believe in the soul? If someone then takes these things away by which the soul is most revealed and attaches them to some other thing, he has neither left a source from which its existence is made manifest nor how it might seem to be useful. What help then is there for one who wishes the soul to be immortal from one who kills the soul? And what teaching of the manner of its motion, according to which we say it is self-moved, from those who assign no motion at all to it? Yes; but with respect to the immortality of the intellect, one might say he agrees with Plato; for even if he does not wish the whole soul to be immortal, he at least confesses the intellect to be divine and incorruptible. What then the intellect is in substance and nature, whence it is and from where it enters into men and where it departs again, he himself would know, if indeed he understands anything of what he says about the intellect and is not evading refutation by cloaking the difficulty of the matter in obscurity of language, just as cuttlefish provide for their elusiveness from darkness. And certainly in these things also he differs from Plato. For the one says it is impossible for intellect to exist without soul, but the other separates the intellect from the soul. And as for immortality, the one grants it to it together with the soul, as being impossible otherwise, but the other says that this belongs to it alone when separated from the soul. And he did not think it right for the soul to depart from the body, because this pleased Plato, but he compelled the intellect to be torn away from the soul, because Plato recognized such a thing to be impossible.” Thus Atticus. And I will connect to these also the words of Plotinus, in the following manner:

15.10.1 10. FROM THE SECOND BOOK OF PLOTINUS ON THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL, AGAINST ARISTOTLE WHO SAID THE SOUL IS AN ENTELECHY

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τοῦτο τὴν πᾶσαν ἀνα15.9.6 τρέπει φιλοσοφίαν Πλάτωνος. τίς οὖν ἐστιν ὁ πρῶτος ἐγχειρήσας ἀντι τάξασθαι ἀποδείξεσι καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀφελέσθαι τῆς ἀθανασίας καὶ τῆς ἄλλης πάσης δυνάμεως; τίς δ' ἕτερος πρὸ Ἀριστοτέλους; τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων οἱ μὲν ἐπιδιαμένειν συνεχώρησαν, οἱ δ', εἰ μὴ καὶ τοῦτο, δύναμίν γε ἐν τῷ σώματι 15.9.7 καὶ κίνησίν τινα καὶ ἔργα καὶ πράξεις ἀπένειμαν τῇ ψυχῇ· ὁ δέ, ὅσῳπερ Πλάτων ἀπεσέμνυνε τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς πρᾶγμα, ἀρχὴν γενέσεως καὶ θεοῦ παίδευμα καὶ τῶν ἁπάντων προστάτιν ἀποφηνάμενος, τοσῷδε ἐφιλονείκησε καθελεῖν 15.9.8 καὶ ἀτιμάσαι καὶ μικροῦ δεῖν μηδὲν ἀποφῆναι τὴν ψυχήν· οὔτε γὰρ πνεῦμα οὔτε πῦρ οὔτε ὅλως σῶμα, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἀσώματον οἷον εἶναί τε ἐφ' αὑτοῦ καὶ κινεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀκίνητον εἶναι καὶ ὡς εἰπεῖν ἄψυχον. οἷον γὰρ τόδε ἐτόλμησεν ἢ καὶ ἀπηναγκάσθη, ὡς καὶ τὰς πρωτουργοὺς κινήσεις ἀφελέσθαι τῆς ψυχῆς, τὸ βουλεύσασθαι, τὸ διανοηθῆναι, τὸ προσδο15.9.9 κῆσαι, τὸ μνημονεῦσαι, τὸ λογίσασθαι. οὐ γὰρ ψυχῆς ταῦτά φησι τὰ κινήματα ὁ τῆς φύσεως, ὥς φασι, γραμματεύς. πάνυ γοῦν οὗτός ἐστι πιστὸς συνεικέναι τι περὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ὁ τῆς αὑτοῦ ψυχῆς τοσοῦτον διημαρτηκὼς ὡς μηδ' ὅτι διανοεῖται παρακολουθεῖν. οὐ γὰρ ἡ ψυχή, φησίν, ἀλλ' ὁ ἄνθρωπός 15.9.10 ἐστιν ὁ τούτων ἕκαστον ἐνεργῶν, ἡ ψυχὴ δὲ ἀκίνητος οὕτως. τούτῳ τοιγαροῦν ἑπόμενος ∆ικαίαρχος καὶ τἀκόλουθον ἱκανὸς ὢν θεωρεῖν ἀνῄρηκε τὴν ὅλην ὑπόστασιν τῆς ψυχῆς. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἀόρατόν τι καὶ ἀφανές ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ δῆλον, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν διά γε τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐνάργειαν δῴημεν εἶναι ψυχήν· αἱ δὲ κινήσεις αὐτῆς ἀφανοῦς οὔσης ἀναγκάζειν ἡμᾶς δοκοῦσιν 15.9.11 εἶναί τι τὴν ψυχὴν ὁμολογεῖν. ταῦτα γὰρ ἅπας τις συνιέναι δοκεῖ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄντα, τὸ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ σκοπεῖσθαι καὶ καθ' ὃν δήποτε τρόπον διανοεῖσθαι. ὅταν γὰρ ἴδωμεν τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὰς τούτου δυνάμεις καὶ ἐνθυμηθῶμεν δὲ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐνεργείας ὡς οὐ σώματος, δίδομεν εἶναί τι ἐν ἡμῖν ἕτερον τὸ βουλευόμενον, τοῦτο δὲ εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν. ἐπεὶ πόθεν ἀλλαχόθεν ἐπιστεύσα15.9.12 μεν ὑπὲρ ψυχῆς; ἂν οὖν τις ἐξ ὧν μάλιστα ψυχὴ φαίνεται ταῦτα ἀφελόμενος ἑτέρῳ τινὶ προσάψῃ πράγματι, οὔτε ὅθεν οὖσα ἐμφαίνεται καταλέλοιπεν οὔτε ὅ τι χρήσιμος ἂν εἶναι δοκοίη. τίς οὖν ἡ βοήθεια τῷ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀθάνατον εἶναι θέλοντι παρὰ τοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀποκτιννύντος; τίς δὲ ἡ διδασκαλία τοῦ τρόπου τῆς κινήσεως, καθ' ὃν αὐτοκίνητον αὐτήν φαμεν, παρὰ τῶν μηδὲ 15.9.13 τὸ παράπαν αὐτῇ κίνησιν νεμόντων; Ναί· ἀλλὰ κατά γε τὴν ἀθανασίαν τοῦ νοῦ φήσαι τις ἂν αὐτὸν κοινωνεῖν Πλάτωνι· καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὴ πᾶσαν βούλεται τὴν ψυχὴν ἀθάνατον εἶναι, τόν γε νοῦν ὁμολογεῖ θεῖόν τε καὶ ἄφθαρτον εἶναι. Τίς μὲν οὖν τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὴν φύσιν ὁ νοῦς, ὅθεν ὢν καὶ πόθεν ἐπεισκρινόμενος τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ ποῦ πάλιν ἀπαλλαττόμενος, αὐτὸς ἂν εἰδείη, εἴ γέ τι συνίησιν ὧν λέγει περὶ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ μὴ τὸ ἄπορον τοῦ πράγματος τῷ ἀσαφεῖ τοῦ λόγου περιστέλλων ἐξίσταται τὸν ἔλεγχον, ὥσπερ αἱ σηπίαι τὸ δυσθήρευτον ἐκ τοῦ 15.9.14 σκοτεινοῦ ποριζόμενος. πάντως δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαφέρεται Πλάτωνι. ὁ μὲν γάρ φησι νοῦν ἄνευ ψυχῆς ἀδύνατον εἶναι συνίστασθαι, ὁ δὲ χωρίζει τῆς ψυχῆς τὸν νοῦν. καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀθανασίας ὁ μὲν μετὰ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῷ δίδωσιν, ὡς ἄλλως οὐκ ἐνδεχόμενον, ὁ δέ φησιν αὐτῷ μόνῳ χωριζομένῳ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦτο περιγίνεσθαι. καὶ τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν τοῦ σώματος οὐκ ἠξίωσεν ἐκβαίνειν, ὅτι Πλάτωνι τοῦτο ἤρεσε, τὸν δὲ νοῦν ἀπορρήγνυσθαι τῆς ψυχῆς ἠνάγκασεν, ὅτι ἀδύνατον ἔγνω Πλάτων τὸ τοιοῦτο.» Ταῦτα μὲν ὁ Ἀττικός. συνάψω δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ τὰ Πλωτίνου τόνδ' ἔχοντα τὸν τρόπον·

15.10.1 ιʹ. ΠΛΩΤΙΝΟΥ ΕΚ ΤΟΥ ΠΕΡΙ ΑΘΑΝΑΣΙΑΣ ΨΥΧΗΣ ∆ΕΥΤΕΡΟΥ ΠΡΟΣ ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΗΝ ΕΝΤΕΛΕΧΕΙΑΝ ΤΗΝ ΨΥΧΗΝ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΦΗΣΑΝΤΑ