Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul was not made, but was God's substance. For it is written (Gn. 2:7): "God formed man of the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man was made a living soul." But he who breathes sends forth something of himself. Therefore the soul, whereby man lives, is of the Divine substance.

Objection 2: Further, as above explained (Question 75, Article 5), the soul is a simple form. But a form is an act. Therefore the soul is a pure act; which applies to God alone. Therefore the soul is of God's substance.

Objection 3: Further, things that exist and do differ are the same. But God and the mind exist, and in no way differ, for they could only be differentiated by certain differences, and thus would be composite. Therefore God and the human mind are the same.

On the contrary, Augustine (De Orig. Animae iii, 15) mentions certain opinions which he calls "exceedingly and evidently perverse, and contrary to the Catholic Faith," among which the first is the opinion that "God made the soul not out of nothing, but from Himself."

I answer that, To say that the soul is of the Divine substance involves a manifest improbability. For, as is clear from what has been said (Question 77, Article 2; Question 79, Article 2; Question 84, Article 6), the human soul is sometimes in a state of potentiality to the act of intelligence ---acquires its knowledge somehow from things---and thus has various powers; all of which are incompatible with the Divine Nature, Which is a pure act---receives nothing from any other---and admits of no variety in itself, as we have proved (Question 3, Articles 1,7; Question 9, Article 1).

This error seems to have originated from two statements of the ancients. For those who first began to observe the nature of things, being unable to rise above their imagination, supposed that nothing but bodies existed. Therefore they said that God was a body, which they considered to be the principle of other bodies. And since they held that the soul was of the same nature as that body which they regarded as the first principle, as is stated De Anima i, 2, it followed that the soul was of the nature of God Himself. According to this supposition, also, the Manichaeans, thinking that God was corporeal light, held that the soul was part of that light bound up with the body.

Then a further step in advance was made, and some surmised the existence of something incorporeal, not apart from the body, but the form of a body; so that Varro said, "God is a soul governing the world by movement and reason," as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei vii, 6 ) So some supposed man's soul to be part of that one soul, as man is a part of the whole world; for they were unable to go so far as to understand the different degrees of spiritual substance, except according to the distinction of bodies.

But, all these theories are impossible, as proved above (Question 3, Articles 1,8; and Question 75, Article 1), wherefore it is evidently false that the soul is of the substance of God.

Reply to Objection 1: The term "breathe" is not to be taken in the material sense; but as regards the act of God, to breathe , is the same as to "make a spirit." Moreover, in the material sense, man by breathing does not send forth anything of his own substance, but an extraneous thing.

Reply to Objection 2: Although the soul is a simple form in its essence, yet it is not its own existence, but is a being by participation, as above explained (Question 75, Article 5, ad 4). Therefore it is not a pure act like God.

Reply to Objection 3: That which differs, properly speaking, differs in something; wherefore we seek for difference where we find also resemblance. For this reason things which differ must in some way be compound; since they differ in something, and in something resemble each other. In this sense, although all that differ are diverse, yet all things that are diverse do not differ. For simple things are diverse; yet do not differ from one another by differences which enter into their composition. For instance, a man and a horse differ by the difference of rational and irrational; but we cannot say that these again differ by some further difference.

Articulus 1

Argumentum 1

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima non sit facta, sed sit de substantia dei.

Dicitur enim Gen. II, formavit deus hominem de limo terrae, et inspiravit in faciem eius spiraculum vitae, et factus est homo in animam viventem.

Sed ille qui spirat, aliquid a se emittit.

Ergo anima qua homo vivit, est aliquid de substantia dei.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, sicut supra habitum est, anima est forma simplex.

Sed forma est actus. Ergo anima est actus purus, quod est solius dei. Ergo anima est de substantia dei.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, quaecumque sunt, et nullo modo differunt, sunt idem.

Sed deus et mens sunt, et nullo modo differunt, quia oporteret quod aliquibus differentiis differrent, et sic essent composita.

Ergo deus et mens humana idem sunt.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod Augustinus, in libro de origine animae, enumerat quaedam quae dicit esse multum aperteque perversa, et fidei catholicae adversa; inter quae primum est, quod quidam dixerunt deum animam non de nihilo, sed de seipso fecisse.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod dicere animam esse de substantia dei, manifestam improbabilitatem continet.

Ut enim ex dictis patet, anima humana est quandoque intelligens in potentia, et scientiam quodammodo a rebus acquirit, et habet diversas potentias, quae omnia aliena sunt a dei natura, qui est actus purus, et nihil ab alio accipiens, et nullam in se diversitatem habens, ut supra probatum est.

Sed hic error principium habuisse videtur ex duabus positionibus antiquorum.

Primi enim qui naturas rerum considerare incoeperunt, imaginationem transcendere non valentes, nihil praeter corpora esse posuerunt. Et ideo deum dicebant esse quoddam corpus, quod aliorum corporum iudicabant esse principium. Et quia animam ponebant esse de natura illius corporis quod dicebant esse principium, ut dicitur in I de anima, per consequens sequebatur quod anima esset de natura dei.

Iuxta quam positionem etiam Manichaei, deum esse quandam lucem corpoream existimantes, quandam partem illius lucis animam esse posuerunt corpori alligatam.

Secundo vero processum fuit ad hoc, quod aliqui aliquid incorporeum esse apprehenderunt, non tamen a corpore separatum, sed corporis formam.

Unde et varro dixit quod deus est anima mundum motu et ratione gubernans; ut Augustinus narrat, VII de CIV. Dei. Sic igitur illius totalis animae partem aliqui posuerunt animam hominis, sicut homo est pars totius mundi; non valentes intellectu pertingere ad distinguendos spiritualium substantiarum gradus, nisi secundum distinctiones corporum.

Haec autem omnia sunt impossibilia, ut supra probatum est.

Unde manifeste falsum est animam esse de substantia dei.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod inspirare non est accipiendum corporaliter, sed idem est deum inspirare, quod spiritum facere.

Quamvis et homo corporaliter spirans non emittat aliquid de sua substantia, sed de natura extranea.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod anima, etsi sit forma simplex secundum suam essentiam, non tamen est suum esse, sed est ens per participationem; ut ex supra dictis patet.

Et ideo non est actus purus, sicut deus.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod differens, proprie acceptum, aliquo differt, unde ibi quaeritur differentia, ubi est convenientia.

Et propter hoc oportet differentia esse composita quodammodo, cum in aliquo differant, et in aliquo conveniant. Sed secundum hoc, licet omne differens sit diversum, non tamen omne diversum est differens; ut dicitur in X metaphys..

Nam simplicia diversa sunt seipsis, non autem differunt aliquibus differentiis, ex quibus componantur. Sicut homo et asinus differunt rationali et irrationali differentia, de quibus non est dicere quod ulterius aliis differentiis differant.