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«But one might examine in this way how 'entelechy' is spoken of concerning the soul. They say that in the composite the soul holds the rank of form in relation to the ensouled body as matter, and that it is the form not of every body, nor insofar as it is body, but of a psychic, organic body, having life in potentiality. If, then, it is likened to that with which it is compared, as the form of a statue to the bronze; then when the body is divided, the soul is divided with it, and when some part is cut off, a particle of the soul is with the part that was cut off, and the withdrawal in sleep does not happen, if indeed the entelechy must be naturally attached to that of which it is the entelechy, and in truth, not even sleep occurs. And yet, if it is an entelechy, there would be no opposition of reason to desires; but the whole would have one and the same affection throughout, not being in discord with itself. And perhaps only sensations could possibly occur, but thoughts would be impossible. For this reason they themselves also introduce another soul or intellect, which they posit as immortal. The reasoning soul, therefore, must be an entelechy in a different way than this, if we must use this name. Nor the sensitive soul, if this too has the impressions of sensible things when they are absent; for then it will not have them with the body. But if not, they will be present in this way as forms and images; but it is impossible to receive others, if they are present in this way. Therefore it is not an inseparable entelechy. And indeed, that which desires not foods nor drinks, but other things apart from those of the body, this itself is not an inseparable entelechy either. What remains would be the vegetative part, which might seem to be disputed, whether it might be an inseparable entelechy in this way. But not even this appears to be so. For if the principle of every plant is about the root, and when the rest of the body withers, the soul in many plants is about the root and the lower parts, it is clear that, having left the other parts, it has contracted into one part; it was not, therefore, in the whole as an inseparable entelechy. And again, before the plant has grown, it is in the small mass. If, therefore, it both comes into a small part from a larger plant and from a small part goes to the whole, what prevents it from being separated altogether? And how, being without parts, could it become the entelechy of a divisible body? And the same soul from one animal becomes another; how then could the soul of the former become that of the next, if it was the entelechy of one? This is apparent from animals that change into other animals. Its being, therefore, it does not have by being the form of something, but it is a substance, not receiving its being from being established in a body, but being, before this particular animal also came to be, the body will not generate the soul. What then is its substance? If it is neither body nor an affection of a body, but action and production, and many things both in it and from it, being a substance apart from bodies, of what kind is it? Or is it clear that it is what we say is truly substance? For all that is corporeal might be said to be becoming, but not substance, coming to be and perishing, but never truly being, but preserved by participation in that which is, insofar as it partakes of it.» Since we have gone through the works of Plotinus, it is not out of place to consider also what was said by Porphyry about the soul in his *Against Boethus*:

15.11.1 11. PORPHYRY ON THE SAME «To him who has said the soul is an entelechy and, being entirely motionless, has supposed that it moves, it must be said: whence the enthusiasms of the animal, when it understands nothing of what it sees and says, but the soul sees both the future and what is not present and is moved in the same way? And whence, at the constitution of the animal, the counsels and considerations and wishes of the soul as of an animal, which are inclinations of the soul and not of the body?» 15.11.2 Then he adds the following: «But to compare the soul to heaviness or to uniform and motionless qualities

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«Τὸ δὲ τῆς ἐντελεχείας ὧδ' ἄν τις ἐπισκέψαιτο πῶς περὶ ψυχῆς λέγεται. τὴν ψυχήν φασιν ἐν τῷ συνθέτῳ εἴδους τάξιν ὡς πρὸς ὕλην τὸ σῶμα ἔμψυχον ἔχειν, σώματος δὲ οὐ παντὸς εἶδος οὐδὲ ᾗ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ ψυχικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ, δυ15.10.2 νάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος. εἰ μὲν οὖν ᾗ παραβέβληται ὡμοίωται, ὡς μορφὴ ἀνδριάντος πρὸς χαλκόν· καὶ διαιρουμένου τοῦ σώματος συμμερίζεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἀποκοπτομένου τινὸς μέρους μετὰ τοῦ ἀποκοπέντος ψυχῆς μόριον εἶναι τήν τε ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις ἀναχώρησιν μὴ γίνεσθαι, εἴπερ δεῖ προσφυᾶ τὴν 15.10.3 ἐντελέχειαν οὗ ἐστιν εἶναι, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς μηδὲ ὕπνον γίνεσθαι. καὶ μὴν ἐντελεχείας οὔσης, οὐδὲ ἐναντίωσιν λόγου πρὸς ἐπιθυμίας· ἓν δὲ καὶ ταὐτὸν δι' ὅλου πεπονθέναι τὸ πᾶν, οὐ διαφωνοῦν ἑαυτῷ. αἰσθήσεις δὲ μόνον δυνατὸν ἴσως γίνεσθαι, τὰς δὲ νοήσεις ἀδύνατον. διὸ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἄλλην ψυχὴν ἢ νοῦν εἰσ15.10.4 άγουσιν, ὃν ἀθάνατον τίθενται. τὴν οὖν λογιζομένην ψυχὴν ἄλλως ἐντελέχειαν ἢ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἀνάγκη εἶναι, εἰ δεῖ τῷ ὀνόματι τούτῳ χρῆσθαι. οὐδ' ἡ αἰσθητική, εἴπερ καὶ αὕτη τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀπόντων τοὺς τύπους ἔχει, αὐτοὺς οὐ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἄρα ἕξει· εἰ δὲ μή, οὕτως ἐνέσονται ὡς μορφαὶ καὶ εἰκόνες· ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον ἄλλους δέχεσθαι, εἰ οὕτως ἐνεῖεν. οὐκ ἄρα ὡς ἀχώ15.10.5 ριστος ἐντελέχεια. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν μὴ σιτίων μηδὲ ποτῶν, ἀλλ' ἄλλων παρὰ τὰ τοῦ σώματος, οὐδ' αὐτὸ ἀχώριστος ἐντελέχεια. λοιπὸν δὲ τὸ φυτικὸν ἂν εἴη, ὃ ἀμφισβήτησιν ἂν δόξειεν ἔχειν, μή τι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον 15.10.6 ἐντελέχεια ἀχώριστος ᾖ. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῦτο φαίνεται οὕτως ἔχον. εἰ γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ παντὸς φυτοῦ περὶ τὴν ῥίζαν καὶ αὐαινομένου τοῦ ἄλλου σώματος περὶ τὴν ῥίζαν καὶ τὰ κάτω ἐν πολλοῖς τῶν φυτῶν ἡ ψυχή, δῆλον ὅτι ἀπολιποῦσα τὰ ἄλλα μέρη εἰς ἕν τι συνεστάλη· οὐκ ἄρα ἦν ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ ὡς ἀχώριστος ἐντελέχεια. καὶ γὰρ αὖ ἔστι, πρὶν αὐξηθῆναι τὸ φυτόν, ἐν τῷ ὀλίγῳ ὄγκῳ. 15.10.7 εἰ οὖν καὶ εἰς ὀλίγον ἔρχεται ἐκ μείζονος φυτοῦ καὶ ἐξ ὀλίγου ἐπὶ πᾶν, τί κωλύει καὶ ὅλως χωρίζεσθαι; πῶς δ' ἂν καὶ ἀμερὴς οὖσα μεριστοῦ τοῦ σώματος ἐντελέχεια γένοιτο; ἥ τε αὐτὴ ψυχὴ ἐξ ἄλλου ζῴου ἄλλο γίνεται· πῶς οὖν 15.10.8 ἡ τοῦ προτέρου τοῦ ἐφεξῆς ἂν γένοιτο, εἰ ἦν ἐντελέχεια ἑνός; φαίνεται δὲ τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν μεταβαλλόντων ζῴων εἰς ἄλλα ζῷα. οὐκ ἄρα τῷ εἶδος εἶναί τινος τὸ εἶναι ἔχει, ἀλλ' ἔστιν οὐσία, οὐ παρὰ τὸ ἐν σώματι ἱδρῦσθαι τὸ εἶναι λαμβάνουσα, ἀλλ' οὖσα, πρὶν καὶ τοῦδε γενέσθαι, οἷον ζῴου οὐ τὸ σῶμα τὴν 15.10.9 ψυχὴν γεννήσει. τίς οὖν οὐσία αὐτῆς; εἰ δὲ μήτε σῶμα μήτε πάθος σώματος, πρᾶξις δὲ καὶ ποίησις, καὶ πολλὰ καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς, οὐσία παρὰ τὰ σώματα οὖσα, ποία τίς ἐστιν; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι ἥν φαμεν ὄντως οὐσίαν εἶναι; τὸ μὲν γὰρ γένεσις, ἀλλ' οὐκ οὐσία πᾶν τὸ σωματικὸν εἶναι λέγοιτ' ἄν, γινόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, ὄντως δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄν, μεταλήψει δὲ τοῦ ὄντος σῳζόμενον, καθ' ὅσον ἂν αὐτοῦ μεταλαμβάνῃ.» Ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ τὰ Πλωτίνου διήλθομεν, συνιδεῖν οὐκ ἄτοπον καὶ τὰ Πορφυρίῳ ἐν τοῖς Πρὸς Βόηθον περὶ ψυχῆς εἰρημένα·

15.11.1 ιαʹ. ΠΟΡΦΥΡΙΟΥ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΑΥΤΟΥ «Πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἐντελέχειαν τὴν ψυχὴν εἰπόντα καὶ ἀκίνητον παντελῶς οὖσαν κινεῖν ὑπειληφότα ῥητέον, πόθεν οἱ ἐνθουσιασμοὶ τοῦ ζῴου μηδὲν μὲν ξυνιέντος ὧν ὁρᾷ τε καὶ λέγει, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς καὶ τὸ μέλλον καὶ μὴ ἐνεστὼς βλεπούσης καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὸ κινουμένης, πόθεν δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ ζῴου συστάσεως αἱ τῆς ὡς ζῴου ψυχῆς βουλαί τε καὶ σκέψεις καὶ θελήσεις, ῥοπαὶ οὖσαι τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ οὐ τοῦ σώματος;» 15.11.2 Εἶθ' ἑξῆς ἐπιλέγει· «Τὸ δὲ βαρύτητι ἀπεικάζειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ ποιότησι μονοειδέσι καὶ ἀκινήτοις