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corporeal, according to which the subject is either moved or has a certain quality, was of one who had fallen completely, either voluntarily or involuntarily, from the dignity of the soul and had in no way observed that by the presence of the soul the body of the animal became alive, just as by the presence of fire the adjacent water becomes hot, being cold by itself, and by the rising of the sun the air is illuminated, being dark without its brilliance. 15.11.3 But neither was the heat of the water the heat of the fire, nor the fire itself, nor was the light in the air the light innate to the sun; and in the same way, neither is the animation of the body, which is like gravity and a quality of the body, the soul that has been assigned to the body, on account of which the body also partook of some vital breath.” 15.11.4 Then, next, after other things, he adds: “Now, the other things that others have said about it bring us shame. For how is the argument that posits the soul as the entelechy of a natural, organic body not shameful? And how is it not full of shame to represent it as a kind of spirit or intellectual fire, ignited or tempered by the cooling and as it were the dipping of the air, or he who posits it as a collection of atoms, or who declares that it is generated from a body at all? Which argument indeed in the Laws he declared to be impious of the impious. All these arguments, therefore, are full of shame. But concerning the one who says it is a self-moving substance, one would not, he says, be ashamed.”

15.12.1 12. TO THE SAME, WHO DISAGREED WITH PLATO ALSO IN THE DISCOURSE ON THE UNIVERSAL SOUL

“While Plato says that the soul, passing through all things, sets all things in order, and that this is the one by which the rest would agree that all things are governed, and that nature is nothing else than soul, and clearly a soul that is not irrational, and from these things he concludes that all things happen according to providence, if indeed 15.12.2 also according to nature; to none of these things does Aristotle agree with us. For he says that nature is not soul, and that things on earth are governed by nature, but not governed by soul. For there are other causes for each of the things. For of the celestial things, which are always in the same state and in the same manner, he posits fate as the cause, of things below the moon, nature; and of human affairs, prudence and providence and soul, offering what is polished in such divisions, 15.12.3 but not discerning what is necessary. For if there were not some one animate power, passing through the universe and binding and holding all things together, the universe could be governed neither reasonably nor well. It was of the same blindness, then, both to hope that a city could ever subsist well without unity, and to suppose that this all-beautiful universe would preserve its order, just as it appears 15.12.4 to be, without binding and fitting it together by the fellowship of some one similar thing. And he says that the thing which governs all things is something of this kind, for instance, a principle of motion, but he is not willing that this should be soul, although Plato, in turn, shows that for all things that are moved, the principle and source of motion is the soul. And what would be the work of a rational and prudent soul, to do nothing in vain, this he attributes to nature, but he does not impart to it the name of soul, as if things were taken from names, and not from their powers.”

15.13.1 13. TO THE SAME, WHO ALSO MOCKED THE IDEAS IN PLATO, WHICH THE HEBREWS ALSO, NOT BEING IGNORANT OF THEM, HAD ALREADY ESTABLISHED BEFORE

DISCOURSES

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σωματικαῖς, καθ' ἃς ἢ κινεῖται ἢ ποιόν ἐστι τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ἐκπεπτωκότος ἦν τέλεον ἢ ἑκόντος ἢ ἄκοντος τῆς ψυχικῆς ἀξίας καὶ οὐδαμῶς καθεωρακότος ὡς παρουσίᾳ μὲν τῆς ψυχῆς ζωτικὸν γέγονε τὸ τοῦ ζῴου σῶμα, ὡς πυρὸς παρουσίᾳ θερμὸν τὸ παρακείμενον ὕδωρ, ψυχρὸν ὂν καθ' ἑαυτό, καὶ ἡλίου ἀνατολῇ πεφώτισταί γε ὁ ἀήρ, σκοτεινὸς ὢν ἄνευ τῆς τούτου ἐκλάμψεως. 15.11.3 ἀλλ' οὔτε ἡ θέρμη τοῦ ὕδατος ἡ θερμότης ἦν τοῦ πυρὸς οὔτε τὸ πῦρ, οὔτε τὸ ἐναέριον φῶς τὸ σύμφυτον τῷ ἡλίῳ φῶς· ὡσαύτως δὲ οὐδὲ ἡ τοῦ σώματος ἐμψυχία, ἥτις ἔοικε τῇ βαρύτητι καὶ τῇ περὶ σῶμα ποιότητι, ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ ἐν τῷ σώματι καταταχθεῖσα, δι' ἣν καὶ πνοῆς τινος ζωτικῆς μετέσχε τὸ σῶμα.» 15.11.4 Εἶθ' ἑξῆς μεθ' ἕτερα ἐπιλέγει· «Τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα ὅσα περὶ αὐτῆς εἰρήκασιν ἄλλοι, αἰσχύνην ἡμῖν φέρει. πῶς γὰρ οὐκ αἰσχρὸς ὁ ἐντελέχειαν τιθεὶς τὴν ψυχὴν λόγος σώματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ; πῶς δὲ οὐκ αἰσχύνης γέμων ὁ πνεῦμά πως ἔχον αὐτὴν ἀποδιδοὺς ἢ πῦρ νοερόν, τῇ περιψύξει καὶ οἷον βαφῇ τοῦ ἀέρος ἀναφθὲν ἢ στομωθέν, ὅ τε ἀτόμων ἄθροισμα θεὶς ἢ ὅλως ἀπὸ σώματος αὐτὴν γεννᾶσθαι ἀποφαινόμενος; ὃν δὴ λόγον ἐν Νόμοις ἀσεβῶν ἀσεβῆ εἶναι ἀπεφήνατο. αἰσχύνης οὖν πάντες οὗτοι πλήρεις λόγοι. ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ λέγοντι αὐτοκίνητον οὐσίαν οὐκ ἄν τις, φησίν, αἰσχυνθείη.»

15.12.1 ιβʹ. ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΝ ΑΥΤΟΝ ∆ΙΕΝΕΧΘΕΝΤΑ ΤΩΙ ΠΛΑΤΩΝΙ ΚΑΙ ΕΝ ΤΩΙ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΚΑΘΟΛΟΥ ΨΥΧΗΣ ΛΟΓΩΙ

«Ἔτι τοῦ Πλάτωνος λέγοντος τὴν ψυχὴν διακοσμεῖν τὰ πάντα διήκουσαν διὰ πάντων, καὶ ταύτην ὑφ' ἧς καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ διοικεῖσθαι συγχωροῖεν ἂν ἕκαστα, καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο εἶναι τὴν φύσιν ἢ ψυχὴν καὶ δηλονότι ψυχὴν οὐκ ἄλογον καὶ ἐκ τούτων συνάγοντος, ὅτι πάντα κατὰ πρόνοιαν γίνεται, εἴ γε καὶ 15.12.2 κατὰ φύσιν· πρὸς οὐδὲν τούτων ἡμῖν Ἀριστοτέλης ὁμολογεῖ. οὐ γὰρ εἶναι τὴν φύσιν ψυχήν, καὶ τὰ περὶ γῆν ὑπὸ μὲν φύσεως διοικεῖσθαι, ὑπὸ δὲ ψυχῆς μὴ διοικεῖσθαι. εἶναι γὰρ ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ τῶν πραγμάτων ἄλλας καὶ τὰς αἰτίας. τῶν μὲν γὰρ οὐρανίων ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἐχόντων αἰτίαν τὴν εἱμαρμένην ὑποτίθησι, τῶν δὲ ὑπὸ σελήνην τὴν φύσιν, τῶν δὲ ἀνθρωπίνων φρόνησιν καὶ πρόνοιαν καὶ ψυχήν, τὸ μὲν γλαφυρὸν ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις διαιρέ15.12.3 σεσι παρεχόμενος, τὸ δὲ ἀναγκαῖον οὐ συνορῶν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ μία τις εἴη δύναμις ἔμψυχος διήκουσα διὰ τοῦ παντὸς καὶ πάντα συνδοῦσα καὶ συνέχουσα, οὔτ' ἂν εὐλόγως τὸ πᾶν οὔτε καλῶς διοικούμενον εἶναι δύναιτο. τῆς δ' αὐτῆς ἦν ἄρ' ἀβλεψίας καὶ πόλιν ἐλπίσαι ποτὲ καλῶς χωρὶς ἑνώσεως διαγενέσθαι καὶ τὸ πᾶν τόδε ἡγήσασθαι πάγκαλον τῷ λόγῳ διαφυλάξειν, οἷόν περ φαί 15.12.4 νεται, μὴ συνδήσαντα καὶ συναρμόσαντα ἑνός τινος ὁμοίου κοινωνίᾳ. καὶ τοιοῦτον μέν τι πρᾶγμα τὸ διοικοῦν ἕκαστα εἶναί φησιν, οἷον ἀρχὴν εἶναι κινήσεως, τοῦτο δὲ εἶναι ψυχὴν οὐ βούλεται, καίτοι τοῦ Πλάτωνος αὖ δεικνύντος ὅτι τοῖς κινουμένοις ἅπασιν ἀρχὴ καὶ πηγὴ τῆς κινήσεως ἡ ψυχή. καὶ ὃ μὲν ἂν ἔργον εἴη ψυχῆς λογικῆς καὶ φρονίμου τὸ μηδὲν μάτην ποιεῖν, τοῦτο ἀνατίθησι τῇ φύσει, τοῦ δὲ ὀνόματος αὐτῇ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ μεταδίδωσιν, ὥσπερ ἐκ τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκ τῶν δυνάμεων τῶν πραγμάτων λαμβανομένων.»

15.13.1 ιγʹ. ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΝ ΑΥΤΟΝ ∆ΙΑΠΑΙΞΑΝΤΑ ΚΑΙ ΤΑΣ ΠΑΡΑ ΠΛΑΤΩΝΙ Ι∆ΕΑΣ ΑΣ ΟΥΚ ΑΓΝΟΕΙΝ ΚΑΙ ΟΙ ΕΒΡΑΙΩΝ Η∆Η ΠΡΟΤΕΡΟΝ ΣΥΝΕΣΤΗΣΑΝ

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