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“Upon those who step into the same rivers, different and different 15.20.3 waters flow. And souls are exhaled from moist things.” Zeno, therefore, in a similar manner to Heraclitus, declares the soul to be an exhalation, and says that it is sentient for this reason, that its ruling part is able to be impressed by existing and real things through the sense-organs and to receive the impressions. For these are properties of soul.” 15.20.4 And after other things: “They say there is a soul in the whole, which they call aether, and air around the earth and sea, and exhalations from these; and that the other souls are attached to this one, both those that are in animals and those that are in the surrounding medium; 15.20.5 for the souls of the dead still remain. Some say the soul of the whole is eternal, but the others are mixed into that one at their end. And every soul has a ruling principle in itself, which is in fact life and sensation and impulse.” 15.20.6 And again after a little: “They say the soul is both generated and perishable; but that it is not destroyed immediately upon being released from the body, but endures for some time by itself, that of the virtuous until the dissolution of all things into fire, but that of 15.20.7 the foolish for certain periods of time. They say that souls endure in this way, that we endure, having become souls separated from the body and having changed into the lesser substance of the soul. But the souls of the foolish and of irrational animals perish along with their bodies.” 15.20.8 Such are the doctrines of the Stoic philosophy, collected from the Epitomes of Areius Didymus. But against the absurd opinion of these men concerning the soul, the things briefly spoken against it by Longinus of our time, through these words, suffice:

15.21.1 21. OBJECTION OF LONGINUS TO THE STOIC OPINION CONCERNING THE SOUL

“To speak concisely, all in succession, as many as have declared the soul to be a body, seem to me to be far removed from reasoning as they ought. For where is it at all possible to posit its nature as similar to any of the elements, or where to refer it to blendings and mixtures? These, occurring in many ways, are naturally apt to generate the forms of countless other bodies, in which, even if not continuously, it is at least possible to see from afar the cause in the elements and the starting-point from the primary for the secondary and tertiary things. But of the things concerning the soul no trace nor proof is found in bodies, even if someone should strive ambitiously, like Epicurus and Chrysippus, to move every stone and to investigate every power 15.21.2 of body for the generation of the actions of the soul. For what use would the fineness of breath be to us for presentations and reasonings? And what of this? Does the shape of atoms have so great a power and tendency, beyond other things, as to generate intelligence, when it is mixed into the constitution of another body? I think, indeed, not even if one happened to be one of Hephaestus's tripods and handmaidens of which Homer says that the former proceed of themselves automatically into the assembly, and the latter work together with their master and lack none of the advantages which living beings have, let alone indeed any of the chance filings. and again, it is like the stones on the seashore in its ability to do anything extraordinary in respect to sensation. 15.21.3 For one might justly be indignant with Zeno and Cleanthes for having discoursed about it so exceedingly insolently and for both having said that the soul is an exhalation of the solid body. For what, in the name of the gods, is there in common at all between an exhalation and a soul? And where is it possible, believing that our substance and that of the other animals is like this, on the one hand to be able to preserve sufficient presentations and memories, and on the other hand

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«Ποταμοῖσι τοῖσιν αὐτοῖσιν ἐμβαίνουσιν ἕτερα καὶ ἕτερα 15.20.3 ὕδατα ἐπιρρεῖ· καὶ ψυχαὶ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑγρῶν ἀναθυμιῶνται.» ἀναθυμίασιν μὲν οὖν ὁμοίως τῷ Ἡρακλείτῳ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀποφαίνει Ζήνων, αἰσθητικὴν δὲ αὐτὴν εἶναι διὰ τοῦτο λέγει ὅτι τυποῦσθαί τε δύναται τὸ μέρος τὸ ἡγούμενον αὐτῆς ἀπὸ τῶν ὄντων καὶ ὑπαρχόντων διὰ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων καὶ παραδέχεσθαι τὰς τυπώσεις. ταῦτα γὰρ ἴδια ψυχῆς ἐστι.» 15.20.4 Καὶ μεθ' ἕτερα· «Εἶναι δὲ ψυχὴν ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ φασίν, ὃ καλοῦσιν αἰθέρα, καὶ ἀέρα κύκλῳ περὶ τὴν γῆν καὶ θάλασσαν, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἀναθυμιάσεις· τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς ψυχὰς προσπεφυκέναι ταύτῃ, ὅσαι τε ἐν ζῴοις εἰσὶ καὶ ὅσαι ἐν τῷ περιέχοντι· 15.20.5 διαμένειν γὰρ ἔτι τὰς τῶν ἀποθανόντων ψυχάς. ἔνιοι δὲ τὴν μὲν τοῦ ὅλου ἀΐδιον, τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς συμμίγνυσθαι ἐπὶ τελευτῇ εἰς ἐκείνην. ἔχειν δὲ πᾶσαν ψυχὴν ἡγεμονικόν τι ἐν αὑτῇ, ὃ δὴ ζωὴ καὶ αἴσθησίς ἐστι καὶ ὁρμή.» 15.20.6 Καὶ ἔτι μετ' ὀλίγα· «Τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν γενητήν τε καὶ φθαρτὴν λέγουσιν· οὐκ εὐθὺς δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγεῖσαν φθείρεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπιμένειν τινὰς χρόνους καθ' ἑαυτήν, τὴν μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων μέχρι τῆς εἰς πῦρ ἀναλύσεως τῶν πάντων, τὴν δὲ 15.20.7 τῶν ἀφρόνων πρὸς ποσούς τινας χρόνους. τὸ δὲ διαμένειν τὰς ψυχὰς οὕτως λέγουσιν, ὅτι διαμένομεν ἡμεῖς ψυχαὶ γενόμενοι τοῦ σώματος χωρισθέντες καὶ εἰς ἐλάττω μεταβαλόντες οὐσίαν τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς. τὰς δὲ τῶν ἀφρόνων καὶ ἀλόγων ζῴων ψυχὰς συναπόλλυσθαι τοῖς σώμασι.» 15.20.8 Τοιαῦτα καὶ τὰ τῆς Στωϊκῆς φιλοσοφίας δόγματα ἀπὸ τῶν Ἐπιτομῶν Ἀρείου ∆ιδύμου συνειλεγμένα. πρὸς δὲ τὴν περὶ ψυχῆς ἄτοπον τῶν ἀνδρῶν δόξαν ἀπαρκεῖ τὰ παρὰ Λογγίνῳ τῷ καθ' ἡμᾶς συντόμως ἀντειρημένα διὰ τούτων·

15.21.1 καʹ. ΛΟΓΓΙΝΟΥ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΗΝ ΤΩΝ ΣΤΩΙΚΩΝ ΠΕΡΙ ΨΥΧΗΣ ∆ΟΞΑΝ ΑΝΤΙΡΡΗΣΙΣ

«Συνελόντι δ' εἰπεῖν, πόρρω μοι δοκοῦσιν ἀφεστηκέναι τοῦ τὰ δέοντα λογίζεσθαι πάντες ἐφεξῆς ὁπόσοι τὴν ψυχὴν σῶμα ἀπεφήναντο. ποῦ γὰρ ὅλως ἐγχωρεῖ παραπλήσιον εἶναί τινι τῶν στοιχείων τὸ κατ' αὐτὴν θεῖναι, ποῦ δὲ ἐπὶ τὰς κράσεις καὶ μίξεις ἀνενεγκεῖν; αἳ κατὰ πολλοὺς γιγνόμεναι τρόπους ἄλλων μὲν ἀμυθήτων ἰδέας σωμάτων ἀπογεννᾶν πεφύκασιν, ἐν οἷς εἰ καὶ μὴ συνεχῶς, ἀλλ' οὖν πόρρωθεν ἰδεῖν ἔνι τὴν τῶν στοιχείων αἰτίαν καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὰ δεύτερα καὶ τρίτα τῶν πρώτων ἀφορμήν. τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν ἴχνος οὐδὲν οὐδὲ τεκμήριον ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν εὑρίσκεται, κἂν εἰ φιλοτιμοῖτό τις ὡς Ἐπίκουρος καὶ Χρύσιππος ἅπαντα λίθον κινεῖν καὶ πᾶσαν ἐρευνᾶν δύνα15.21.2 μιν σώματος εἰς γένεσιν τῶν περὶ ψυχῆς πράξεων. τί γὰρ ἡ τοῦ πνεύματος ἡμῖν λεπτότης πρὸ ἔργου γένοιτ' ἂν εἰς φαντασίας καὶ λογισμούς; τί δέ; τῶν ἀτόμων σχῆμα τοσαύτην παρὰ τἄλλα ἔχειν δύναμιν καὶ τροπήν, ὥστε φρόνησιν γεννᾶν, ὅταν εἰς ἑτέρου πλάσιν ἐγκαταμιχθῇ σώματος; οἶμαι μὲν ὡς οὐδ' εἰ τῶν Ἡφαίστου τις ὢν τύχοι τριπόδων καὶ θεραπαινῶν ὧν φησιν Ὅμηρος τοὺς μὲν αὐτομάτους εἰς τὸν ἀγῶνα δι' αὑτῶν χωρεῖν, τὰς δὲ συνεργάζεσθαι τῷ δεσπότῃ καὶ μηδενὸς οἵων οἱ ζῶντες ἔχουσι πλεονεκτημάτων ἀπολείπεσθαι, μή τί γε δὴ τῶν ἐκ ταὐτομάτου ψηγμάτων. καὶ αὖ τοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν αἰγιαλῶν προσέοικε λίθοις εἰς τὸ δύνασθαί τι περιττότερον ποιεῖν 15.21.3 πρὸς αἴσθησιν. Ζήνωνι μὲν γὰρ καὶ Κλεάνθει νεμεσήσειέ τις ἂν δικαίως οὕτως σφόδρα ὑβριστικῶς περὶ αὐτῆς διαλεχθεῖσι καὶ ταὐτὸν ἄμφω τοῦ στερεοῦ σώματος εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ἀναθυμίασιν φήσασι. τί γάρ, ὦ πρὸς θεῶν, κοινὸν ὅλως ἀναθυμιάσει καὶ ψυχῇ; ποῦ δὲ ἐγχωρεῖ νομίσαντας τούτῳ προσεοι κέναι τήν θ' ἡμετέραν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων οὐσίαν τοῦτο μὲν φαντασίας καὶ μνήμας οἵους τε εἶναι σῴζειν διαρκεῖς, τοῦτο δὲ