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and that having left a similar force at Gynaikokastron for the same reason, they themselves with the rest of the army had crossed the Axios and come to Berroia and Edessa, which were our captured cities. Once we have taken these, the Thessalians will immediately join us, as will Acarnania and the rest of the Epirote lands, which have long been awaiting my arrival. And once we have gained such a force, no one will presume to resist us any longer, but either all will willingly cede their authority to us, or they will be compelled by arms.” When the emperor said such things, both the protostrator with his companions and especially the exiles from Byzantium took his words badly and were full of fear and anxiety, considering the wandering to be endless if they had to traverse Acarnania and Epirus, suffering from the evils of the campaign, especially with their homes in a bad state and in need of swift relief. Therefore, they were afraid to speak openly against him and to reveal their own opinion on what had been said, not wanting to impute to themselves both disloyalty towards the emperor and the base quality of being utterly defeated in times of danger; 2.240 but by stringing together certain unnecessary pretexts, they tried to prevent the action. But as the emperor insisted, saying that this was the only most advantageous opinion in the present circumstances; “But if this has escaped your notice, O emperor,” said the protostrator, “that an army of Triballians has been besieging Edessa for a long time now, through which we must march and fight our way into the city, that would be another matter. But if you are not ignorant of it, I am most amazed that, being such a man and having much experience in generalship, in addition to the present war against our countrymen, you are ordering us to risk battle against the Triballians as well, when even if they were alone, it would be among the most difficult tasks to oppose them.” The emperor, however, said that he knew nothing at all about the siege. For the ruler of the Triballians had sent an embassy to him while he was still in Thrace, and had made a truce and an alliance; on account of which he thought he was not at war with any Roman city. But if that man, having broken the truce, has become an enemy instead of an ally and has sent men to besiege our city, to what should we pay attention more than to this, so that we, being most able to deliver the city from its perils, may both secure their salvation and for ourselves the goodwill from them and from others? For my part, even if no gain were to follow for us from the war, I consider this very thing alone, the rescuing of a Roman city in danger, to be among the greatest of gains. For which reasons I no longer advise turning to 2.241 anything else, but now openly cast my vote for it. But if it seems ignoble to you and your companions to fight the Triballians on behalf of besieged Romans, then I myself with my household followers will march against them, while you, remaining at Gynaikokastron, await our return.” And he immediately ordered the trumpet to signal the march to the army. But the protostrator and the exiles from Byzantium with the emperor then considered it shameful and ignoble to be left behind, and they suspected that to follow along would result in an endless wandering. Therefore they both tried to restrain the emperor's impulse as best they could and secretly conversed with the others and urged them, suggesting a lack of necessities and battles and wars and that no city would receive the emperor willingly; and whatever was in their power to prevent them from eagerly following the emperor, they left nothing untried. From which they cast no small alarm into the army and persuaded them to proceed to desertion. For a certain Koteanitzes of the Thessalonians, having persuaded about a hundred others, was the first to desert the emperor and departed for Thessalonica. And they did these things, not because they had chosen to make war on the emperor, but because they were not able to bear the mistreatment of their households and the threats from Byzantium. For those who were managing affairs there and making war on the emperor not only did not send an embassy 2.242 to him or
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καὶ ἐν Γυναικοκάστρῳ δύναμιν ὁμοίαν καταλιπόντας τῆς αὐτῆς αἰτίας ἕνεκα, τῇ ἄλλῃ στρατιᾷ διαβάντας αὐτοὺς τὸν Ἀξιὸν, εἰς Βέῤῥοιαν γενέσθαι καὶ Ἔδεσσαν τὰ ἡμέτερα ᾑρημένας πόλεις. ἐκείνων δὲ κρατήσασιν οἵ τε Θεσσαλοὶ προσχωρήσουσιν αὐτίκα καὶ Ἀκαρνανία καὶ τὸ ἄλλο ἠπειρωτικὸν, πάλαι τὴν ἐμὴν ἄφιξιν προσδεχόμενον. τοιαύτην δὲ προσλαβοῦσι δύναμιν οὐδεὶς ἀνθίστασθαι ἔτι ἀξιώσει, ἀλλ' ἢ ἑκόντες τῆς ἀρχῆς πάντες παραχωρήσουσιν ἡμῖν, ἢ τοῖς ὅπλοις βιασθέντες.» τοιαῦτα εἰπόντος βασιλέως, πρωτοστράτωρ τε ἅμα τοῖς συνοῦσι καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ Βυζαντίου μάλιστα φυγάδες ἐν δεινῷ τοὺς λόγους ἐποιοῦντο καὶ φόβου ἦσαν μεστοὶ καὶ ἀγωνίας, τὸν πλάνον ὡς ἀπέραντον λογιζόμενοι, εἰ δέοι Ἀκαρνανίαν καὶ Ἤπειρον περιιέναι, τοῖς ἐκ τῆς στρατείας κακοῖς ταλαιπωροῦντας, τῶν οἴκοι μάλιστα κακῶς διακειμένων καὶ ταχείας τῆς ἐπικουρίας δεομένων. φανερῶς μὲν οὖν ἀντειπεῖν καὶ τὴν οἰκείαν, ὡς ἔχουσι περὶ τὰ εἰρημένα, γνώμην ἐκκαλύψαι ἐδεδίεσαν, τό,τε περὶ βασιλέα δυσνοεῖν καὶ τὸ ἡσσῆσθαι κατάκρας ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς ὡς φαῦλον ἑαυτοῖς προστρίβειν οὐκ ἐθέλοντες· 2.240 προφάσεις δέ τινας συνείροντες οὐκ ἀναγκαίας, διεκώλυον τὴν πρᾶξιν. ὡς δὲ ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐπέκειτο, ταύτην εἶναι μόνον φάσκων ὡς ἐν τοῖς παροῦσι λυσιτελεστάτην γνώμην· «ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν τοῦτό σε λέληθεν» εἶπεν «ὦ βασιλεῦ» ὁ πρωτοστράτωρ «ὡς στρατιὰ Τριβαλῶν πολὺν ἤδη χρόνον Ἔδεσσαν περικάθηται πολιορκοῦσα, ᾗ δεῖ χωρήσαντας διὰ μάχης παρέρχεσθαι εἰς τὴν πόλιν, ἄλλος ἂν εἴη λόγος. εἰ δ' οὐκ ἀγνοεῖς, μάλιστα θαυμάζειν ἔχω, ὅτι δὴ τοιοῦτος ὢν καὶ πολλὴν πρὸς στρατηγίαν πεῖραν ἐσχηκὼς, πρὸς τῷ παρόντι νυνὶ πολέμῳ τῷ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοφύλων, καὶ πρὸς Τριβαλοὺς παραβάλλεσθαι ἡμᾶς κελεύεις, ὅτε εἰ καὶ μόνοι ἦσαν, τῶν ἐργωδεστάτων ἦν ἀντιτάττεσθαί τινα.» ὁ βασιλεὺς δὲ μάλιστα μὲν οὐδὲν εἰδέναι περὶ τῆς πολιορκίας ἔφασκε. τὸν γὰρ τῶν Τριβαλῶν δεσπότην πρεσβείαν ποιησάμενον πρὸς αὐτὸν, ἔτι περὶ Θρᾴκην διατρίβοντα, σπονδὰς καὶ συμμαχίαν θέσθαι· δι' ἃ καὶ οἴεσθαι αὐτὸν μηδεμιᾷ Ῥωμαίων πόλει πολεμεῖν. εἰ δ' ἐκεῖνος λύσας τὰς σπονδὰς, πολέμιος ἀντὶ συμμάχου γέγονε καὶ πόλιν ἡμετέραν πέμψας πολιορκεῖ, τίνι μᾶλλον, ἢ τούτῳ προσέχειν χρὴ, ὥστε τὴν πόλιν ἀπαλλάττειν τῶν δεινῶν μάλιστα δυναμένους, καὶ ἐκείνοις τε τὴν σωτηρίαν ἐκπορίζειν καὶ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς τήν τε ἐξ ἐκείνων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων εὔνοιαν; ἐγὼ δ' εἰ καὶ μηδὲν ἡμῖν ἕψεσθαι κέρδος ἔμελλεν ἐκ τοῦ πολέμου, τοῦτ' αὐτὸ μόνον, τὸ Ῥωμαίων πόλιν κινδυνεύουσαν ἐξαιρεῖσθαι, τῶν μεγίστων τίθεμαι κερδῶν. δι' ἃ οὐδὲ πρὸς 2.241 ἄλλο τι τρέπεσθαι οὐκέτι συμβουλεύω, ἀλλ' ἤδη φανερῶς ἐπιψηφίζομαι. εἰ δὲ σοί τε καὶ τοῖς συνοῦσι τὸ Τριβαλοῖς ὑπὲρ Ῥωμαίων πολιορκουμένων μάχεσθαι ἀγεννὲς δοκεῖ, ἀλλ' ἅμα τοῖς οἴκοθεν ἑπομένοις αὐτὸς ἐπ' ἐκείνους βαδιοῦμαι, ὑμεῖς δ' ἐν Γυναικοκάστρῳ μένοντες, τὴν ἐπάνοδον περιμένετε ἡμῶν.» ἐκέλευέ τε αὐτίκα τῇ σάλπιγγι τὴν ὁδοιπορίαν τῇ στρατιᾷ σημαίνειν. πρωτοστράτωρ δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐκ Βυζαντίου συνόντες βασιλεῖ φυγάδες τότε ἀπολείπεσθαι ἐνόμιζον αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἀγεννὲς, καὶ τὸ συνέπεσθαι ὑπώπτευον ὡς ἀπεράντου τῆς πλάνης ἐσομένης. διὸ αὐτοί τε ὡς εἶχον τὴν ὁρμὴν ἐπειρῶντο κωλύειν βασιλεῖ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους κρύφα διαλεγόμενοι παρεκάλουν, ἔνδειάν τε τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὑποβάλλοντες καὶ μάχας καὶ πολέμους καὶ ὡς οὐδεμία τῶν πόλεων εἰσδέξοιτο βασιλέα ἑκοντί· καὶ ὅσα ἐνῆν πρὸς τὸ μάλιστα αὐτοὺς μὴ βασιλεῖ προθύμους ἕπεσθαι κωλύειν, εἴων ἀνεπιχείρητον οὐδέν. ἐξ ὧν οὐ μικράν τινα πτοίαν εἰς τὸ στράτευμα ἐνέβαλον καὶ πρὸς ἀποστασίαν ἔπειθον χωρεῖν. Κοτεανίτζης γάρ τις τῶν Θεσσαλονικέων ἑτέρους πείσας περὶ ἑκατὸν πρῶτος βασιλέως ἀποστὰς, εἰς Θεσσαλονίκην ἀπεχώρει. ταῦτα δὲ ἔπραττον, οὐ βασιλεῖ προῃρημένοι πολεμεῖν, ἀλλὰ τῶν οἰκείων τὴν κάκωσιν καὶ τὰς ἐκ Βυζαντίου ἀπειλὰς οὐ φέρειν ὄντες δυνατοί. οἱ γὰρ ἐκεῖσε ἄγοντες τὰ πράγματα καὶ πολεμοῦντες βασιλεῖ πρὸς μὲν ἐκεῖνον οὐχ ὅτι γε πρεσβείαν 2.242 ἐποιήσαντο ἢ