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impulses and wills of things advantageous for the understanding of matters? Or shall we then reduce the gods and the one who extends through all things alike, both earthly and heavenly, to an exhalation and smoke and such nonsense, and not even be ashamed before the poets, who, although not having an accurate understanding of the gods, nevertheless have spoken more august things about them, partly from the common conception of men, and partly from the inspiration of the Muses, which is wont to move them to these things, and not exhalations nor airs nor spirits and trifles?” These things Longinus also says to you; but hear also the following from Plotinus, directed against the same people:

15.22.1 22. AGAINST THE STOICS, THAT THE SOUL CANNOT BE CORPOREAL; FROM THE FIRST [TREATISE] OF PLOTINUS ON THE SOUL

“Whether each of us is immortal, or perishes entirely, or some parts of him go off into dispersion and corruption, while other parts, which constitute his very self, remain forever, thus 15.22.2 one might learn by investigating according to nature. Man, indeed, would not be anything simple, but there is a soul in him, and he also has a body, whether it is an instrument for us, or attached in another way. But let him be divided in this way, 15.22.3 and the nature and substance of each part must be examined. The body, then, being itself a composite, can neither remain according to reason, and sense perception sees it being dissolved and wasting away and receiving all sorts of destructions, with each of its components being carried to its own kind, one destroying another and changing into another and perishing, and especially when the soul that makes it a friend 15.22.4 is not present to its mass. And even if each part becomes isolated, it is not one, being subject to dissolution into both form and matter, from which even the simple bodies must have their compositions. And indeed, having magnitude, since they are bodies, they are cut and broken into small pieces, and in this way too they would be subject to corruption. 15.22.5 Therefore, if this is a part of us, we are not entirely immortal; but if it is an instrument, it had to be of such a nature, being given for a certain time. But that which is most sovereign, and man himself, is in either case the soul, whether considered in terms of form, with the body as matter, or in terms of the user, with the body as an instrument. 15.22.6 What nature, then, does this have? If it is a body, it must certainly be dissolved; for every body is a composite. But if it should not be a body, but of another nature, that too must be examined, either in the same way or in another. But first we must consider into what this body, 15.22.7 which they call soul, must be dissolved. For since life is necessarily present to the soul, it is necessary that this body, the soul, if it were composed of two or more bodies, either each of them should have life innate in it; or one should have it and the other not, or neither should have it. If, then, 15.22.8 life belonged to one of them, this itself would be soul. What body, then, could there be, having life from itself? For fire and air and water and earth are lifeless in themselves, and whatever of these has a soul present in it possesses life as something added. And there are no other bodies besides these; and even for those who think there are other elements than these, they have been said to be bodies, not souls, nor possessed of life. But if the coming together of things, 15.22.9 none of which has life, has produced life, that is absurd. But if each has life, even one is sufficient; or rather, it is impossible for a conglomeration of bodies to produce life, and for non-intelligent things to generate intelligence. And indeed, they will not say that these things came to be mixed in just any way. There must, therefore, be that which orders and that which is the cause of the mixture; so that this would have the rank of soul. 15.22.10 For not only is it composite, but not even a simple body could exist among beings without a soul existing in the universe, if indeed reason, approaching matter, makes a body, and reason could not approach from anywhere except from a soul. 15.22.11 But if someone not thus, but

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ὁρμὰς καὶ βουλήσεις τῶν λυσιτελούντων εἰς σύνεσιν πραγμάτων; ἦ τἄρα καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τὸν διὰ πάντων παρήκοντα ὁμοίως ἐπιγείων τε καὶ οὐρανίων εἰς ἀναθυμίασιν καὶ καπνὸν καὶ τοιαύτην φλυαρίαν καταθήσομεν καὶ οὐδὲ τοὺς ποιητὰς αἰσχυνούμεθα, οἳ καίπερ ἀκριβῆ σύνεσιν τῶν θεῶν οὐκ ἔχοντες ὅμως τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῆς κοινῆς ἐπινοίας τῶν ἀνθρώπων, τὰ δ' ἐξ ἐπιπνοίας τῶν Μουσῶν, ἣ κινεῖν αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ ταῦτα πέφυκε, σεμνότερα εἰρήκασι περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀναθυμιάσεις οὐδ' ἀέρας οὐδὲ πνεύματα καὶ λήρους;» Ταῦτά σοι καὶ ὁ Λογγῖνος, ἐπάκουσον δὲ καὶ Πλωτίνου τὰ τοιάδε πρὸς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀποτεινομένου·

15.22.1 κβʹ. ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΥΣ ΣΤΩΙΚΟΥΣ ΟΤΙ ΟΥ ∆ΥΝΑΤΑΙ ΣΩΜΑΤΙΚΗ ΕΙΝΑΙ Η ΨΥΧΗ· ΑΠΟ ΤΟΥ Α περι ψυχης πλωτινου

«Εἰ δέ ἐστιν ἀθάνατος ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἢ φθείρεται πᾶς ἢ τὰ μὲν αὐτοῦ ἄπεισιν εἰς σκέδασιν καὶ φθοράν, τὰ δὲ μένει εἰσαεὶ ἅπερ ἐστὶν αὐτός, ὧδ' 15.22.2 ἄν τις μάθοι κατὰ φύσιν ἐπισκοπούμενος. ἁπλοῦν μὲν δή τι οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῷ ψυχή, ἔχει δὲ καὶ σῶμα, εἴτ' οὖν ὄργανον ὂν ἡμῖν, εἴτε ἕτερον τρόπον προσηρτημένον. ἀλλ' οὖν διῃρήσθω τε ταύτη 15.22.3 καὶ ἑκατέρου τὴν φύσιν τε καὶ οὐσίαν καταθεατέον. τὸ μὲν δὴ σῶμα, καὶ αὐτὸ συγκείμενον, οὔτε παρὰ τοῦ λόγου δύναται μένειν ἥ τε αἴσθησις ὁρᾷ λυόμενόν τε καὶ τηκόμενον καὶ παντοίους ὀλέθρους δεχόμενον, ἑκάστου τε τῶν ἐνόντων πρὸς τὸ αὑτοῦ φερομένου φθείροντός τε ἄλλου ἕτερον καὶ μεταβάλλοντος εἰς ἄλλο καὶ ἀπολλύντος, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν ψυχὴ ἡ φίλα 15.22.4 ποιοῦσα μὴ παρῇ τοῖς ὄγκοις. κἂν μονωθῇ δὲ ἕκαστον γενόμενον, ἓν οὐκ ἔστι, λύσιν δεχόμενον εἴς τε μορφὴν καὶ ὕλην, ἐξ ὧν ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ ἁπλᾶ τῶν σωμάτων τὰς συστάσεις ἔχειν. καὶ μὴν καὶ μέγεθος ἔχοντα, ἅτε σώματα ὄντα, τεμνόμενά τε καὶ εἰς μικρὰ θραυόμενα, καὶ ταύτη φθορὰν ἂν ὑπομένοι. 15.22.5 ὥστε εἰ μὲν μέρος ἡμῶν τοῦτο, οὐ τὸ πᾶν ἀθάνατοι, εἰ δ' ὄργανον, ἔδει γε αὐτὸ εἰς χρόνον τινὰ δοθὲν τοιοῦτον τὴν φύσιν εἶναι. τὸ δὲ κυριώτατον καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἄνθρωπος, εἴπερ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος, ὡς πρὸς ὕλην τὸ σῶμα ἢ κατὰ τὸ χρώμενον ὡς πρὸς ὄργανον, ἑκατέρως δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ αὐτός. 15.22.6 Τοῦτο οὖν τίνα φύσιν ἔχει; ἢ σῶμα μὲν ὂν πάντως ἀναλυτέον· σύνθετον γὰρ πᾶν γε σῶμα. εἰ δὲ μὴ σῶμα εἴη, ἀλλὰ φύσεως ἄλλης, κἀκείνην ἢ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἢ κατὰ ἄλλον σκεπτέον. πρῶτον δὲ σκεπτέον εἰς ὅ τι δεῖ 15.22.7 τοῦτο τὸ σῶμα, ὃ λέγουσι ψυχήν, ἀναλύειν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ζωὴ ψυχῇ πάρεστιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἀνάγκη τοῦτο τὸ σῶμα, τὴν ψυχήν, εἰ μὲν ἐκ δύο σωμάτων ἢ πλειόνων εἴη, ἤτοι ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν ἢ ἕκαστον ζωὴν σύμφυτον ἔχειν· ἢ τὸ μὲν ἔχειν, τὸ δὲ μή, ἢ μηδὲ ἕτερον ἢ μηδὲν ἔχειν. εἰ μὲν δὴ ἑνὶ αὐτῶν 15.22.8 προσείη τὸ ζῆν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἂν εἴη ψυχή. τί ἂν οὖν εἴη σῶμα, ζωὴν παρ' αὑτοῦ ἔχον; πῦρ γὰρ καὶ ἀὴρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆ ἄψυχα παρ' αὑτῶν, καὶ ὅτῳ πάρεστι τούτων ψυχή, τοῦτο ἐπακτῷ κέχρηται τῇ ζωῇ. ἄλλα δὲ παρὰ ταῦτα σώματα οὐκ ἔστι· καὶ οἷς δὲ δοκεῖ εἶναι στοιχεῖα τούτων ἕτερα, σώματα οὐ ψυχαὶ ἐλέχθησαν εἶναι οὐδὲ ζωὴν ἔχοντα. εἰ δὲ μηδενὸς αὐτῶν ζωὴν ἔχοντος 15.22.9 ἡ σύνοδος πεποίηκε ζωήν, ἄτοπον. εἰ δὲ ἕκαστον ζωὴν ἔχει, καὶ ἓν ἀρκεῖ· μᾶλλον δὲ ἀδύνατον συμφόρησιν σωμάτων ζωὴν ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ νοῦν γεννᾶν τὰ ἀνόητα. καὶ δὴ καὶ οὐχ ὁπωσοῦν κραθέντα ταῦτα φήσουσι γενέσθαι. δεῖ ἄρα εἶναι τὸ τάξον καὶ τὸ τῆς κράσεως αἴτιον· ὥστε τοῦτο τάξιν ἂν ἔχοι ψυ15.22.10 χῆς. οὐ γὰρ ὅτι σύνθετον, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἁπλοῦν ἂν εἴη σῶμα ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἄνευ ψυχῆς οὔσης ἐν τῷ παντί, εἴπερ λόγος προσελθὼν ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ σῶμα ποιεῖ, οὐδαμόθεν δ' ἂν προσέλθοι λόγος ἢ παρὰ ψυχῆς. 15.22.11 Εἰ δέ τις μὴ οὕτως, ἀλλὰ