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he becomes of God by taking on what he does not have and casting off what he has; but he who has never been in evil has neither what he might take on nor what he might leave behind. Again, a man can be called someone's son, in one sense truly, when one speaks with a view to nature, and in another sense by an extension of meaning, 3.1.125 when the choice of his life imposes the name. But God, being one good in a simple and uncompounded nature, always looks to the same thing and is never changed by the impulses of choice, but always both wills what he is and is altogether what he wills, so that through both he is named Son of God properly and truly, both because his nature has the good in itself and because his choice is not broken off from the better, so that this title would not be applied to him by an extension of meaning. Therefore, there is no place for those things which we have set against each other from the person of our adversaries to be brought forward by our adversaries for the annulment of the kinship according to nature. 3.1.126 But I know not how or why, hating and turning away from the truth, they call him Son, but lest the community of substance should be witnessed to by this title, they separate the word from the meaning inherent in the name and leave the name of Son empty and meaningless for the Only-begotten, bestowing on him only the sound of the word. And that I say these things truly and do not miss the mark of our opponents' aim, it is possible to learn clearly 3.1.127 from the very things they use to attack the truth. For such are the things brought forward by them for the construction of their blasphemy, 20that we have been taught many names of the Only-begotten from the divine Scripture: stone, axe, rock, foundation, bread, vine, door, way, shepherd, spring, wood, resurrection, teacher, light, and many other such things; but it is not pious to say any of these things concerning the Lord 3.1.128 while understanding them according to their literal meaning. For it would be among the most absurd things to think that what is incorporeal and immaterial, simple and without shape, is formed by the meanings appearing in some of the names, so that on hearing 'axe' we should think of such-and-such a shape of iron, or 'light' the one in the air, or 'vine' the one from the planting of branches, or any of the other things, just as custom suggests we understand them; but transferring the significations of these names to what is more befitting of God, we understand something else, even if we so name him, not as being any of these things according to the principle of nature, but as being called these things, but being understood as something other than these through 3.1.129 what is said. And if such names are both truly applied to the Only-begotten God and do not contain the indication of his nature, they say it is consistent20 20not to take the meaning of 'Son' according to the prevailing custom for the interpretation of his nature either, but to find some other meaning for this word besides the common and literal one20. These and such things they philosophize for the construction of the idea that the Son 3.1.130 is not what he both is and is called. But our discourse was hastening toward another end, to show the recent treatise of Eunomius to be false and inconsistent, and in agreement neither with the truth nor with itself. But since through our accusations against their dogma something like a defense of their blasphemy has been introduced into the discussion, it would be well to discuss this first in brief, and then to return to the sequence of what has been written. 3.1.131 What, then, can we say to such things without failing in what is fitting? That although there are many names, as they also say, which are applied to the Only-begotten from Scripture, we say that none of the others has its fitness in reference to the one who begot him. For we do not speak of a stone or a resurrection or a shepherd or a light or any of the other things by referring them to the God of all in the same way as we speak of the Son of the Father, but it is possible, by a kind of art and rule, to divide the meaning of the divine names in two. 3.1.132 For some have the indication of his high and ineffable glory, while others show the diversity of the providential economy; so that if, by hypothesis, that which is benefited did not exist, neither would the
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θεοῦ γίνεται προσλαβὼν ἃ οὐκ ἔχει καὶ ἀποβαλὼν ἃ ἔχει· ὁ δὲ μηδέποτε γεγονὼς ἐν κακίᾳ οὔτε ὃ λάβῃ οὔτε ὃ καταλίπῃ ἔχει. πάλιν ὁ ἄν θρωπος δύναται πῆ μὲν ἀληθῶς υἱός τινος λέγεσθαι, ὅταν πρὸς τὴν φύσιν βλέπων τις λέγῃ, πῆ δὲ ἐκ καταχρήσεως, 3.1.125 ὅταν ἡ τοῦ βίου προαίρεσις ἐπιβάλῃ τὸ ὄνομα. ὁ δὲ θεὸς ἓν ὢν ἀγαθὸν ἐν ἁπλῇ τε καὶ ἀσυνθέτῳ τῇ φύσει πάντοτε πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ βλέπει καὶ οὐδέποτε ταῖς τῆς προαιρέσεως ὁρμαῖς μεταβάλλεται, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ καὶ βούλεται ὅπερ ἐστὶν καὶ ἐστὶ πάντως ὃ καὶ βούλεται, ὥστε δι' ἀμφοτέρων υἱὸς θεοῦ κυρίως καὶ ἀληθῶς ὀνομάζεσθαι, τῆς τε φύσεως ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐχούσης τῆς τε προαιρέσεως οὐκ ἀπερ ρωγυίας τοῦ κρείττονος, ὡς μὴ ἂν ἐκ καταχρήσεως αὐτῷ τὴν φωνὴν ταύτην ἐπικληθῆναι. οὐκοῦν οὐδεμίαν ἔχει χώραν, ἅπερ ἐκ προσώπου τῶν ἐναντίων ἑαυτοῖς ἀντεθή καμεν, ταῦτα ἐπὶ παραγραφῇ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν οἰκειότητος παρὰ τῶν ἐναντίων προφέρεσθαι. 3.1.126 Ἀλλ' οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως ἢ διότι μισοῦντες τε καὶ ἀπο στρεφόμενοι τὴν ἀλήθειαν υἱὸν μὲν αὐτὸν ὀνομάζουσιν, ὡς δ' ἂν μὴ τὸ κατ' οὐσίαν κοινὸν διὰ τῆς φωνῆς ταύτης μαρτυρηθείη, τῆς ἐγκειμένης τῷ ὀνόματι σημασίας τὴν φωνὴν χωρίσαντες κενὸν τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ ἀσήμαντον τῷ μονογενεῖ καταλείπουσι, μόνον αὐτῷ τὸν ψόφον τῆς φωνῆς χαριζόμενοι. καὶ ὅτι ταῦτα ἀληθῆ λέγω καὶ οὐ παραστοχάζομαι τοῦ σκοποῦ τῶν ὑπεναντίων, φανερῶς ἔστιν 3.1.127 ἐξ αὐτῶν ὧν κατεπιχειροῦσι τῆς ἀληθείας μαθεῖν. τοιαῦτα γάρ ἐστιν ἃ παρ' αὐτῶν ἐπὶ κατασκευῇ τῆς βλασφημίας προφέρεται, 20ὅτι πολλὰ τοῦ μονογενοῦς ὀνόματα παρὰ τῆς θείας γραφῆς ἐδιδάχθημεν, λίθον ἀξίνην πέτραν θεμέλιον ἄρτον ἄμπελον θύραν ὁδὸν ποι μένα πηγὴν ξύλον ἀνάστασιν διδάσκαλον φῶς καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλά, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν τούτων κατὰ τὴν πρόχειρον σημασίαν εὐσεβές ἐστιν ἐπὶ τοῦ κυρίου 3.1.128 νοοῦντας λέγειν. ἦ γὰρ ἂν εἴη τῶν ἀτοπωτάτων τὸ ἀσώματόν τε καὶ ἄϋλον ἁπλοῦν τε καὶ ἀσχημάτι στον ταῖς ἐμφαινομέναις τισὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων σημα σίαις διαμορφοῦσθαι νομίζειν, ὥστε ἀξίνην ἀκού σαντας τὸ τοιόνδε σχῆμα τοῦ σιδήρου νοεῖν ἢ φῶς τὸ ἐναέριον ἢ ἄμπελον τὴν ἐκ φυτείας κλημάτων ἤ τι τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον, καθὼς ἡ συνήθεια νοεῖν ὑποτίθεται· ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὸ θεοπρεπέστερον τὰς τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων μετενεγκόντες ἐμφάσεις ἄλλο τι νοοῦμεν, κἂν οὕτω κατονομάζωμεν, οὐχ ὡς ὄντα τι τούτων κατὰ τὸν λόγον τῆς φύσεως, ἀλλ' ὡς ταῦτα μὲν λεγόμενον, ἄλλο δέ τι παρὰ ταῦτα διὰ 3.1.129 τῶν λεγομένων νοούμενον. εἰ δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ ἀληθῶς ἐπιλέγεται τῷ μονογενεῖ θεῷ καὶ τῆς φύσεως οὐ περιέχει τὴν ἔνδειξιν, ἀκόλουθον εἶναι20 λέγουσι 20μηδὲ τοῦ υἱοῦ τὸ σημαινό μενον κατὰ τὴν ἐπικρατοῦσαν συνήθειαν εἰς τὴν τῆς φύσεως ἐρμηνείαν παραλαμβάνειν, ἀλλ' ἐξευρίσκειν τινὰ σημασίαν καὶ ταύτης τῆς φωνῆς ἑτέραν παρὰ τὴν κοινήν τε καὶ πρόχειρον20. ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα φιλοσοφοῦσι πρὸς κατασκευὴν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι 3.1.130 τὸν υἱὸν ὅπερ ἐστί τε καὶ λέγεται. ἡμῖν δὲ πρὸς ἕτερον μὲν ἦν σπεύδων ὁ λόγος, τὴν πρόσφατον τοῦ Εὐνομίου λογο γραφίαν δεῖξαι ψευδῆ καὶ ἀσύστατον καὶ οὔτε πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν οὔτε πρὸς ἑαυτὴν συμφωνοῦσαν. ἐπεὶ δὲ δι' ὧν κατηγοροῦμεν τοῦ δόγματος αὐτῶν οἷόν τις συνηγορία τῆς βλασφημίας ἐπεισήχθη τῷ λόγῳ, καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι περὶ τού του πρότερον ἐν ὀλίγῳ διαλαβεῖν, εἶθ' οὕτως ἐπὶ τὴν ἀκο λουθίαν τῶν γεγραμμένων ἐπανελθεῖν. 3.1.131 Τί τοίνυν ἔστιν εἰπόντας πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα μὴ διαμαρ τεῖν τοῦ προσήκοντος; ὅτι πολλῶν ὄντων, καθὼς κἀκεῖνοί φασι, τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἃ τῷ μονογενεῖ παρὰ τῆς γραφῆς ἐπι λέγεται, οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων τῇ πρὸς τὸν γεγεννηκότα φαμὲν ἀναφορᾷ τὸ προσφυὲς ἔχειν. οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ υἱὸν τοῦ πατρός, οὕτως ἢ λίθον ἢ ἀνάστασιν ἢ ποιμένα ἢ φῶς ἤ τι τῶν ἄλλων ἐπὶ τὸν θεὸν τῶν ὅλων ἐπαναφέροντες λέγομεν, ἀλλ' ἔστιν οἷον τέχνῃ τινὶ καὶ κανόνι διχῇ διελέσθαι τῶν θείων ὀνομάτων 3.1.132 τὴν σημασίαν. τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῆς ὑψηλῆς τε καὶ ἀφράστου δόξης τὴν ἔνδειξιν ἔχει, τὰ δὲ τὸ ποικίλον τῆς προνοητικῆς οἰκονομίας ἐνδείκνυται· ὥστε καθ' ὑπόθεσιν εἰ μὴ τὸ εὐερ γετούμενον εἴη, μηδὲ τὰς