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should he say that atoms or indivisible parts, having come together, make a soul, he would be refuted by the union and the community of feeling and by the juxtaposition, since something that is one throughout or sympathetic cannot come into being from impassible bodies incapable of being united; but the soul is sympathetic with itself; and from indivisible parts, neither a body nor magnitude could come into being. And yet if the body is simple, they will not say that what is material has life from itself, for matter is without quality, but that what is ordered according to form brings life; if they say this form is a substance, not the composite, then the soul will be one of these; which will not be body, for it is not itself from matter, or again we will analyze it in the same way. But if they say it is an affection of matter and not a substance, they must say from whence the affection and the life has come into the matter. For indeed matter does not form itself nor put a soul into itself. Therefore there must be something that supplies life, whether the supply is for matter or for any of the bodies, being outside and beyond corporeal nature, since there would be no body at all if psychic power did not exist. For its nature flows and is in flux and would perish very quickly, if all things were bodies, even if one were to give the name 'soul' to one of them. For it would suffer the same things as the other bodies, since they have one matter. Rather, it would not even come into being, but all things would stand still in matter, if that which forms it did not exist. And perhaps matter would not exist at all; and this universe will be dissolved, if one should entrust it to the coherence of a body, giving it the rank of soul up to its name, to air and breath, most dispersible and not having its unity from itself. For how, since all bodies can be cut, would someone assigning this universe to any one of them not make it unintelligent and borne along at random? For what order is there in breath, which needs order from a soul, or reason or mind? But if soul exists, all these things are its servants for the constitution of the cosmos and of each living being, with one power contributing from one thing, and another from another, to the whole, but if it is not present in the wholes, these things would be nothing, let alone in order. And they themselves, led by the truth, testify that there must be some form of soul prior to bodies and superior to them, positing an intelligent breath and an intellectual fire, as if without fire or breath the superior part could not exist among beings, and seeking a place to be established, when one ought to seek where they will establish bodies, since they must in fact be established in the powers of the soul. But if they posit life and soul as nothing apart from breath, how does their much-talked-of 'disposed in a certain way' stand, to which they have recourse, when they are forced to posit another active nature apart from bodies? If, then, not every breath is soul, since myriad breaths are soulless, and they will say that the breath 'disposed in a certain way' is, they will say that this 'disposed in a certain way' and this disposition is something among beings, or nothing. But if it is nothing, there would only be breath, and 'disposed in a certain way' would be a name; and thus it will result for them that they are saying nothing else exists except matter, and soul and God, and all things are a name, and that alone exists. But if the disposition is among the things that are, and something other than the substrate and matter, in matter, yet itself immaterial because it is not in turn composed of matter, it would be a certain principle and not a body and another nature. Furthermore, from the following it appears no less impossible for the soul to be any kind of body. For it is either hot or cold, or hard or soft, and moist or solid, and black or white, and all the other qualities of bodies, some in some, others in others. And if it is hot, it will only heat, and if cold, it will only cool, and that which is light, being added and present, will make things light, and the heavy will make them heavy, and the black will make them black, and the white will make them white. For it is not the nature of fire to cool nor of the cold to make things hot. But the soul, in different living beings, does different things, and in the same one, opposite things, solidifying some things, melting others, and making some dense and others rare, black, white, light, heavy; and yet it would have to do one thing according to its

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ἀτόμους ἢ ἀμερῆ συνελθόντα ψυχὴν ποιεῖν λέγοι, τῇ ἑνώσει καὶ ὁμοιοπαθείᾳ ἐλέγχοιτ' ἂν καὶ τῇ παραθέσει, μὴ δι' ὅλου οὐ γινομένου ἑνὸς οὐδὲ συμπαθοῦς ἐξ ἀπαθῶν καὶ μὴ ἑνοῦσθαι δυναμένων σωμάτων· ψυχὴ δ' ἑαυτῇ συμπαθής· ἐκ δὲ ἀμερῶν σῶμα οὐδὲ μέγεθος ἂν 15.22.12 γένοιτο. καὶ μὴν εἰ ἁπλοῦ ὄντος τοῦ σώματος τὸ μὲν ὅσον ὑλικὸν παρ' αὑτοῦ ζωὴν ἔχειν οὐ φήσουσιν ὕλη γὰρ ἄποιον, τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος τεταγμένον ἐπιφέρειν τὴν ζωήν· εἰ μὲν οὐσίαν φήσουσι τὸ εἶδος τοῦτο εἶναι, οὐ τὸ συναμφότερον, θάτερον δὲ τούτων ἔσται ἡ ψυχή· ὃ οὐκ ἔσται σῶμα, οὐ γὰρ ἐξ 15.22.13 ὕλης καὶ αὐτό, ἢ πάλιν τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἀναλύσομεν. εἰ δὲ πάθημα τῆς ὕλης, ἀλλ' οὐκ οὐσίαν φήσουσιν εἶναι, ἀφ' οὗ τὸ πάθημα καὶ ἡ ζωὴ εἰς τὴν ὕλην ἐλήλυθε λεκτέον αὐτοῖς. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἡ ὕλη ἑαυτὴν μορφοῖ οὐδ' ἑαυτῇ ψυχὴν ἐντίθησι. δεῖ ἄρα τι εἶναι τὸ χορηγὸν ζωῆς, εἴτε τῇ ὕλῃ ἡ χορηγία εἴθ' ὁτῳοῦν τῶν σωμάτων, ἔξω ὂν καὶ ἐπέκεινα σωματικῆς φύσεως, ἐπεὶ 15.22.14 οὐδ' ἂν εἴη σῶμα οὐδὲν ψυχικῆς δυνάμεως οὐκ οὔσης. ῥεῖ γὰρ καὶ ἐν φορᾷ αὐτοῦ ἡ φύσις καὶ ἀπόλοιτο ἂν ὡς τάχιστα, εἰ πάντα σώματα εἴη, κἂν εἰ ὄνομα ἑνὶ αὐτῶν ψυχήν τις θεῖτο. τὰ αὐτὰ γὰρ ἂν πάθοι τοῖς ἄλλοις σώμασιν, ὕλης μιᾶς οὔσης αὐτοῖς. μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδ' ἂν γένοιτο, ἀλλὰ στήσεται 15.22.15 ἐν ὕλῃ τὰ πάντα, μὴ ὄντος τοῦ μορφοῦντος αὐτήν. τάχα δ' ἂν οὐδ' ἂν ἡ ὕλη τὸ παράπαν εἴη· λυθήσεται δὲ καὶ τόδε τὸ ξύμπαν, εἴ τις αὐτὸ πιστεύσειε σώματος συνέρξει, διδοὺς αὐτῷ ψυχῆς τάξιν μέχρι τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἀέρι καὶ πνεύματι σκεδαστοτάτῳ καὶ τὸ ἑνὶ εἶναι ἔχοντι οὐ παρ' αὑτοῦ. πῶς γὰρ τεμνομένων τῶν πάντων σωμάτων ᾡτινιοῦν τις ἀνατιθεὶς τόδε τὸ πᾶν οὐκ ἀνόητόν 15.22.16 τε καὶ φερόμενον εἰκῇ ποιήσει; τίς γὰρ τάξις ἐν πνεύματι δεομένῳ παρὰ ψυχῆς τάξεως ἢ λόγος ἢ νοῦς; ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς μὲν οὔσης, ὑπουργὰ ταῦτα πάντα αὐτῇ εἰς σύστασιν κόσμου καὶ ζῴου ἑκάστου, ἄλλης παρ' ἄλλου δυνάμεως εἰς τὸ ὅλον συντελούσης, ταύτης δὲ μὴ παρούσης ἐν τοῖς ὅλοις οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη ταῦτα, οὐχ ὅτι ἐν τάξει. 15.22.17 Μαρτυροῦσι δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας ἀγόμενοι ὡς δεῖ τι πρὸ τῶν σωμάτων εἶναι κρεῖττον αὐτῶν ψυχῆς εἶδος, ἔννουν πνεῦμα καὶ πῦρ νοερὸν τιθέμενοι, ὥσπερ ἄνευ πυρὸς ἢ πνεύματος οὐ δυναμένης τῆς κρείττονος μοίρας ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν εἶναι, τόπον δὲ ζητούσης εἰς τὸ ἱδρυθῆναι, δέον ζητεῖν ὅπου τὰ σώματα ἱδρύσουσιν, ὡς ἄρα δεῖ ταῦτα ἐν ψυχῆς δυνάμεσιν ἱδρῦσθαι. 15.22.18 εἰ δὲ μηδὲν παρὰ τὸ πνεῦμα τὴν ζωὴν καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τίθενται, τὸ δὴ πολυθρύλητον αὐτοῖς «πως ἔχον» πῶς ἔχει, εἰς ὃ καταφεύγουσιν, ἀναγκαζόμενοι τίθεσθαι ἄλλην παρὰ τὰ σώματα φύσιν δραστήριον; εἰ οὖν οὐ πᾶν μὲν πνεῦμα ψυχή, ὅτι μυρία πνεύματα ἄψυχα, τὸ δὲ «πως ἔχον» πνεῦμα φήσουσι, τὸ «πως ἔχον» τοῦτο καὶ ταύτην τὴν σχέσιν τῶν ὄντων τι φήσουσιν ἢ 15.22.19 μηδέν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν μηδέν, πνεῦμα ἂν εἴη μόνον, τὸ δὲ «πως ἔχον» ὄνομα· καὶ οὕτω συμβήσεται αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν εἶναι λέγειν ἢ τὴν ὕλην, καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ θεόν, καὶ ὄνομα τὰ πάντα, ἐκεῖνο δὲ μόνον. εἰ δὲ τῶν ὄντων ἡ σχέσις καὶ ἄλλο παρὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον καὶ τὴν ὕλην, ἐν ὕλῃ μέν, ἄϋλον δὲ αὐτὸ τῷ μὴ πάλιν αὖ συγκεῖσθαι ἐξ ὕλης, λόγος ἂν εἴη τις καὶ οὐ σῶμα καὶ φύσις 15.22.20 ἑτέρα. ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶνδε οὐχ ἧττον φαίνεται ἀδύνατον ὂν τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι σῶμα ὁτιοῦν. ἢ γὰρ θερμόν ἐστιν ἢ ψυχρόν, ἢ σκληρὸν ἢ μαλακόν, ὑγρόν τε ἢ πεπηγός, μέλαν τε ἢ λευκόν, καὶ πάντα ὅσα ποιότητες σωμάτων ἄλλαι ἐν ἄλλοις. καὶ εἰ μὲν θερμόν, μόνον θερμανεῖ, ψυχρὸν δὲ μόνον ψύξει, καὶ κοῦφα ποιήσει τὸ κοῦφον προσγενόμενον καὶ παρόν, καὶ βαρυνεῖ τὸ βαρύ, καὶ μελανεῖ τὸ μέ 15.22.21 λαν, καὶ τὸ λευκὸν λευκὸν ποιήσει. οὐ γὰρ πυρὸς τὸ ψύχειν οὐδὲ τοῦ ψυχροῦ θερμὰ ποιεῖν. ἀλλ' ἥ γε ψυχὴ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις μὲν ζῴοις ἄλλα, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ποιεῖ, καὶ ἐν τῷ δὲ αὐτῷ τὰ ἐναντία, τὰ μὲν πηγνῦσα, τὰ δὲ χέουσα, καὶ τὰ μὲν πυκνὰ τὰ δὲ ἀραιά, μέλανα λευκά, κοῦφα βαρέα· καίτοι ἓν ἔδει ποιεῖν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ