ARTICLE VI

Aristotle, De anima, III, 5 (430a 14).

E.g., St. Jerome, Epist. XXXVI (PL 22:459); Peter Lombard, Sentent., III, 13, 1 (QR II:607); St. Bonaventure, In Sent., III, d. 14, a. 3, q. 2 (QR III:322); Alexander of Hales, Summa Theol., III, n. 117 (QR IV:166); St. Albert the Great, In Sent., III, d. 13, a. 1 (BO 28:237).

In q. 20, aa. 1-3.

Aristotle, De anima, III, 5 (430a 14).

Volume 3

LIBRARY OF LIVING CATHOLIC THOUGHT

(Under the direction of the West Baden College faculty)

QUESTIONS XXI--XXIX

St. Thomas Aquinas

THE

DISPUTED QUESTIONS

ON TRUTH

Translated from the definitive Leonine text

by ROBERT W. SCHMIDT, S.J., PH.D.

West Baden College

QUESTIONS XXI-XXIX

Volume III

HENRY REGNERY COMPANY

Chicago

Imprimatur

Imprimi potest

Very Rev. Joseph M. Egan, S.J.

Praepositus Provincialis Provinciae Chicagiensis

12 June 1954

Nihil obstat

Rev. Robert J. Willmes, S.J.

Censor deputatus

16 June 1954

Imprimatur

Samuel Cardinal Stritch

Archiepiscopus Chicagiensis

17 June 1954

Copyright (c) 1954 by Henry Regnery Company, Chicago, Illinois

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 52-12511

Typography and jacket design by Joseph Trautwein

Manufactured in the United States of America

PREFACE TO VOLUME THREE

This third volume of Truth completes the translation of St. Thomas Aquinas' De veritate. The nine questions which it contains, 21-29, are concerned with the will, its object, and its operation. Since a power is understood from its operation, and an operation from its object, first the nature of good is studied. Then the will and its operations--willing, intending, and choosing--are investigated. It is the human will which is directly under discussion; but both because the human will can be better understood in contrast with the divine will, and because the divine will is a norm and guide for the human will, the third of these questions deals with the will of God. Since the characteristic operation of the human will is deliberate free choice, a special question is devoted to the will as the power from which this operation immediately proceeds. In choice there are various influences upon the will. Those of the object and of the intellect are examined in Questions 22 and 24. Within man there are also lower appetites which exert an attraction upon him and help to influence his will. These are treated in Questions 25 and 26. Then from above there is the supernatural influence of grace which enables man to perform operations above the natural capabilities of his will. In the last three questions grace, its initial reception, and Christ, its cause and source, are considered. Thus it is seen that, centered about the operation of the human will, there is a recognizable unity among these last nine questions.

The very principle of unity here, however, seems to destroy the coherence of this section with the rest of the work and the unity of the work as a whole. The whole series of twenty-nine questions is entitled Truth and supposedly deals with truth throughout. But the will, its object, its operation, and the influences upon it seem to lie well outside the scope of truth. Thus there is a real problem of the unity of Truth. Because the problem becomes particularly acute for the present volume, a few words may be in place here.

The nine questions of Volume I deal with the nature of truth and the way in which it is found in the divine and angelic intellects. The eleven questions of Volume II deal with the human intellect and its truth both in the speculative and in the practical orders. Now what thread might connect a discussion centered about the operation of the will with these discussions of truth?

Some principle of unity might be found in the procedure of a science. Concerning the subject of the science not only its principles and subjective parts are sought but also its properties. Now good may be considered a property of the true. Both are transcendental properties of being and interchangeable with being. Since good is a property of being, it is also a property of the true. It is, moreover, caused by the true; for the relation to appetite which is added to being to constitute good depends upon the apprehension of being and the consequent relation to intellect which is truth. This would provide some justification for prolonging a study of truth into an investigation of good and the will.

A still closer and more intrinsic connection can be found. It has to do with practical truth. Truth is in judgments, not only speculative but also practical. In the descent to practice the last judgment is, in most cases, a free judgment involved in a free choice. The very name by which free choice is usually designated in medieval Latin is liberum arbitrium--"free judgment" or "free decision." Though as choice or acceptance the act belongs to the will, as judgment it belongs to the intellect. In this act too truth must be found. But because the judgment is free and is made only in the free acceptance of the particular good by the will, its truth cannot be accounted for without taking the will into account. For this reason a study of practical truth is incomplete without a consideration of the will and free choice. On this score, then, the coherence and unity of the nine questions of Volume III with the twenty preceding questions is saved through the meeting point of free practical judgment, the will, and free choice.

As in the first two volumes, the Latin text which forms the basis of this translation is the critical text of the Leonine Commission as was very kindly furnished to the translators in a carbon-copy manuscript in May, 1951. Only the text, without critical apparatus or notes, was provided. Since that time in correspondence the translators have raised a few questions about the text, and the successive presidents of the Commission, first the late Very Reverend Clement Suermondt, O.P., and more recently the Very Reverend Antoine Dondaine, O.P., with great kindness and generosity have indicated some emendations of the text. No mention of these departures from the original manuscript is made in the notes, since it is assumed that the emended readings will be incorporated in the published edition when it appears. In the rare instances in which for any reason a reading other than that of the Leonine text has been adopted, the departure is noted.

The aim of this translation, as in the preceding volumes, has been to express accurately in correct English the meaning of the original, and as far as possible in idiomatic English. Two extremes have by intention been avoided: a slavishly literal word-for-word or phrase-for-phrase rendition or a mere transliteration on the one hand, and on the other a rewriting of St. Thomas as we think he should have written his text to make it sound like a modern treatise. The intention has not been to produce a free and literary translation, but one that is close to the original, keeping where possible not only the same general sense but the same point of view and the same shade of thought. If a choice had to be made between Thomas' meaning and smooth idiomatic English, the meaning has been preferred. It has not been deemed possible or practical to avoid all medieval or Scholastic technical terminology, such as potency, patient, and intelligible species. No attempt has been made, on the other hand, to adhere at all times to a single rendition of each term, particularly such difficult and many-shaded words as ratio, inquantum, or even appetere. The main title word of Question 25, passio, caused particular difficulty. Its basic meaning is "undergoing" or "being acted upon." But this ranges through so many different connotations and turns and shades of meaning that no single English expression is adequate to translate it. Besides the expressions already mentioned, "suffering," "receiving," "experiencing," "emotion," "passion," and others have been used to convey its varied meanings. In the title, however, the word "passion" has been adopted as the most apt both to express the notion with which Thomas is principally concerned and to keep the connotation of the other related senses.

The details of physical form in this volume follow the pattern set in the preceding two. This applies to the headings, the names adopted for the various parts of an article, the manner of numbering difficulties and answers, and other minor details of style. The same policy on references has been followed.

Into the finding of references much time and effort has gone. No pretense can be made that in every case the exact passage which St. Thomas had in mind has been found. Only a close examination of his manner of citing will reveal how imprecise he often is--led in most cases by the practice then common of using traditionally reported and attributed dicta without first-hand verification. And already published editions, though filling out some of the references, especially the easier ones, remain distressingly incomplete, unsatisfactory, and inaccurate. The careful work of the Ottawa edition of the Summa theologiae has been a model and inspiration and has proved wonderfully helpful when the context in Truth ran sufficiently parallel. That, unfortunately, has been far too rare for the comfort and convenience of the translators.

Much help on this volume has been received in various ways from a number of people who deserve my sincere and everlasting gratitude. Rev. Robert F. Harvanek, S.J., director of the Library of Living Catholic Thought has been of great assistance at almost all stages of the work--in going over parts of the manuscript and suggesting valuable emendations in meaning and expression, in finding some troublesome references, in supervising the proofreading, and in many other ways. The translators of the first two volumes, Rev. Robert W. Mulligan, S.J., and Rev. James V. McGlynn, S.J., have found some of the references for me: the former by sending from Louvain and Paris some references to Augustine, Avicenna, and others; and the latter by providing almost all the Gloss references. Fathers John R. Connery, Stephen E. Donlon, James J. Doyle, Richard M. Green, John A. Hardon, John A. McEvoy, and John L. McKenzie, all fellow members of the Society of Jesus and colleagues at West Baden, have read one or more of the questions and given many excellent criticisms, without which there would be many more flaws in the translation than now appear. Any mistakes or defects which remain, however, cannot in any way be attributed to them, but are entirely of my own doing. Many others besides, both professors and students at West Baden College, have contributed much by reading and criticizing portions of the manuscript, searching out references, or reading proofs. To all of these I express my very inadequate but sincere thanks.

ROBERT W. SCHMIDT, S.J.

West Baden College

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface

Question Twenty-One: Good

ARTICLE

I Does good add anything to being?

II Are being and good interchangeable as to their real subjects?

III Is good in its essential character prior to the true?

IV Is everything good by the first goodness?

V Is a created good good by its essence?

VI Does the good of a creature consist in measure, species, and order as Augustine says?

Question Twenty-Two: The Tendency to Good and the Will

I Do all things tend to good?

II Do all things tend to God Himself?

III Is appetite a special power of the soul?

IV In rational beings is will a power distinct from sense appetite?

V Does the will will anything necessarily?

VI Does the will necessarily will whatever it wills?

VII Does a person merit by willing what he wills necessarily?

VIII Can God force the will?

IX Can any creature change the will or influence it?

X Are will and intellect the same power?

XI Is the will a higher power than the intellect, or is the opposite true?

XII Does the will move the intellect and the other powers of the soul?

XIII Is intention an act of the will?

XIV Does the will in the same motion will the end and intend the means?

XV Is choice an act of the will?

Question Twenty-Three: God's Will

I Does it belong to God to have a will?

II Can the divine will be distinguished into antecedent and consequent?

III Is God's will suitably divided into His embracing will and His indicative will?

IV Does God of necessity will whatever He wills?

V Does the divine will impose necessity upon the things willed?

VI Does justice as found among created things depend simply upon the divine will?

VII Are we obliged to conform our will to the divine will?

VIII Are we obliged to conform our will to the divine will as regards its object so as to be bound to will what we know God wills?

Question Twenty-Four: Free Choice

I Is man endowed with free choice?

II Is there free choice in brutes?

III Is there free choice in God?

IV Is free choice a power or not?

V Is free choice one power or several?

VI Is free choice the will or a power other than the will?

VII Can there be any creature which has its free choice naturally confirmed in good?

VIII Can the free choice of a creature be confirmed in good by a gift of grace?

IX Can the free choice of man in this present life be confirmed in good?

X Can the free choice of any creature be obstinate or unalterably hardened in evil?

XI Can the free choice of man in this present life be obstinate in evil?

XII Can free choice in the state of mortal sin avoid mortal sin without grace?

XIII Can a person in the state of grace avoid mortal sin?

XIV Is free choice capable of good without grace?

XV Can man without grace prepare himself to have grace?

Question Twenty-Five: Sensuality

I Is sensuality a cognitive or only an appetitive power?

II Is sensuality one simple power or is it divided into several: the irascible and the concupiscible powers?

III Are the irascible and the concupiscible powers only in the lower appetite or also in the higher?

IV Does sensuality obey reason?

V Can there be sin in sensuality?

VI Is the concupiscible power more corrupt and infected than the irascible?

VII Can sensuality be cured in this life of the aforesaid corruption?

Question Twenty-Six: The Passions of the Soul

I How does the soul suffer when separated from the body?

II How does the soul suffer while joined to the body?

III Is passion only in the sense appetitive power?

IV On what grounds are the contrariety and diversity among the passions of the soul based?

V Are hope, fear, joy, and sadness the four principal passions of the soul?

VI Do we merit by our passions?

VII Does a passion accompanying a meritorious act detract from its merit?

VIII Were there any such passions in Christ?

IX Was the passion of pain in the soul of Christ as regards higher reason?

X Did the pain of the passion which was in Christ's higher reason prevent the joy of fruition, and conversely?

Question Twenty-Seven: Grace

I Is grace something created which is in the soul positively?

II Is ingratiatory grace the same as charity?

III Can any creature be the cause of grace?

IV Are the sacraments of the New Law the cause of grace?

V In one man is there only one ingratiatory grace?

VI Is grace in the essence of the soul?

VII Is grace in the sacraments?

Question Twenty-Eight: The Justification of Sinners

I Is the justification of sinners the forgiveness of sins?

II Can there be forgiveness of sins without grace?

III Does the justification of sinners require free choice?

IV What motion of free choice is needed for justification: Is a motion toward God required?

V In the justification of sinners is a motion of free choice toward sin required?

VI Are the infusion of grace and the forgiveness of guilt the same?

VII Does the forgiveness of guilt naturally precede the infusion of grace?

VIII In the justification of sinners does the motion of free choice naturally precede the infusion of grace?

IX Is the justification of sinners instantaneous?

Question Twenty-Nine: The Grace of Christ

I Is there created grace in Christ?

II For Christ's human nature to be united personally to the Word is habitual grace required?

III Is the grace of Christ infinite?

IV Does the grace of headship belong to Christ in His human nature?

V Is any habitual grace required in Christ for Him to be the head?

VI Could Christ merit?

VII Could Christ merit for others?

VIII Could Christ merit in the first instant of His conception?

Aids to References

References

Glossary

Truth