Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God is not found in the acts of the soul. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 26), that "man was made to God's image, inasmuch as we exist and know that we exist, and love this existence and knowledge." But to exist does not signify an act. Therefore the image of God is not to be found in the soul's acts.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine (De Trin. ix, 4) assigns God's image in the soul to these three things---mind, knowledge, and love. But mind does not signify an act, but rather the power or the essence of the intellectual soul. Therefore the image of God does not extend to the acts of the soul.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) assigns the image of the Trinity in the soul to "memory, understanding, and will." But these three are "natural powers of the soul," as the Master of the Sentences says (1 Sent. D iii). Therefore the image of God is in the powers, and does not extend to the acts of the soul.

Objection 4: Further, the image of the Trinity always remains in the soul. But an act does not always remain. Therefore the image of God does not extend to the acts.

On the contrary, Augustine (De Trin. xi, 2 seqq.) assigns the trinity in the lower part of the soul, in relation to the actual vision, whether sensible or imaginative. Therefore, also, the trinity in the mind, by reason of which man is like to God's image, must be referred to actual vision.

I answer that, As above explained (Article 2), a certain representation of the species belongs to the nature of an image. Hence, if the image of the Divine Trinity is to be found in the soul, we must look for it where the soul approaches the nearest to a representation of the species of the Divine Persons. Now the Divine Persons are distinct from each other by reason of the procession of the Word from the Speaker, and the procession of Love connecting Both. But in our soul word "cannot exist without actual thought," as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 7). Therefore, first and chiefly, the image of the Trinity is to be found in the acts of the soul, that is, inasmuch as from the knowledge which we possess, by actual thought we form an internal word; and thence break forth into love. But, since the principles of acts are the habits and powers, and everything exists virtually in its principle, therefore, secondarily and consequently, the image of the Trinity may be considered as existing in the powers, and still more in the habits, forasmuch as the acts virtually exist therein.

Reply to Objection 1: Our being bears the image of God so far as if is proper to us, and excels that of the other animals, that is to say, in so far as we are endowed with a mind. Therefore, this trinity is the same as that which Augustine mentions (De Trin. ix, 4), and which consists in mind, knowledge, and love.

Reply to Objection 2: Augustine observed this trinity, first, as existing in the mind. But because the mind, though it knows itself entirely in a certain degree, yet also in a way does not know itself---namely, as being distinct from others (and thus also it searches itself, as Augustine subsequently proves---De Trin. x, 3,4); therefore, as though knowledge were not in equal proportion to mind, he takes three things in the soul which are proper to the mind, namely, memory, understanding, and will; which everyone is conscious of possessing; and assigns the image of the Trinity pre-eminently to these three, as though the first assignation were in part deficient.

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine proves (De Trin. xiv, 7), we may be said to understand, will, and to love certain things, both when we actually consider them, and when we do not thing of them. When they are not under our actual consideration, they are objects of our memory only, which, in his opinion, is nothing else than habitual retention of knowledge and love . "But since," as he says, "a word cannot be there without actual thought (for we think everything that we say, even if we speak with that interior word belonging to no nation's tongue), this image chiefly consists in these three things, memory, understanding, and will. And by understanding I mean here that whereby we understand with actual thought; and by will, love, or dilection I mean that which unites this child with its parent." From which it is clear that he places the image of the Divine Trinity more in actual understanding and will, than in these as existing in the habitual retention of the memory; although even thus the image of the Trinity exists in the soul in a certain degree, as he says in the same place. Thus it is clear that memory, understanding, and will are not three powers as stated in the Sentences.

Reply to Objection 4: Someone might answer by referring to Augustine's statement (De Trin. xiv, 6), that "the mind ever remembers itself, ever understands itself, ever loves itself"; which some take to mean that the soul ever actually understands, and loves itself. But he excludes this interpretation by adding that "it does not always think of itself as actually distinct from other things." Thus it is clear that the soul always understands and loves itself, not actually but habitually; though we might say that by perceiving its own act, it understands itself whenever it understands anything. But since it is not always actually understanding, as in the case of sleep, we must say that these acts, although not always actually existing, yet ever exist in their principles, the habits and powers. Wherefore, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 4): "If the rational soul is made to the image of God in the sense that it can make use of reason and intellect to understand and consider God, then the image of God was in the soul from the beginning of its existence."

Articulus 7

Argumentum 1

Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod imago dei non inveniatur in anima secundum actus.

Dicit enim Augustinus, XI de CIV. Dei, quod homo factus est ad imaginem dei, secundum quod sumus, et nos esse novimus, et id esse ac nosse diligimus.

Sed esse non significat actum.

Ergo imago dei non attenditur in anima secundum actus.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, Augustinus, in IX de Trin., assignat imaginem dei in anima secundum haec tria, quae sunt mens, notitia et amor.

Mens autem non significat actum; sed magis potentiam, vel etiam essentiam intellectivae animae.

Ergo imago dei non attenditur secundum actus.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, Augustinus, X de Trin., assignat imaginem trinitatis in anima secundum memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem.

Sed haec tria sunt vires naturales animae, ut magister dicit, III distinctione I libri Sent..

Ergo imago attenditur secundum potentias, et non secundum actus.

Argumentum 4

Praeterea, imago trinitatis semper manet in anima. Sed actus non semper manet. Ergo imago dei non attenditur in anima secundum actus.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod Augustinus, XI de Trin., assignat trinitatem in inferioribus animae partibus secundum actualem visionem sensibilem et imaginariam.

Ergo et trinitas quae est in mente, secundum quam homo est ad imaginem dei, debet attendi secundum actualem visionem.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ad rationem imaginis pertinet aliqualis repraesentatio speciei.

Si ergo imago trinitatis divinae debet accipi in anima, oportet quod secundum illud principaliter attendatur, quod maxime accedit, prout possibile est, ad repraesentandum speciem divinarum personarum. Divinae autem personae distinguuntur secundum processionem verbi a dicente, et amoris connectentis utrumque. Verbum autem in anima nostra sine actuali cogitatione esse non potest, ut Augustinus dicit XIV de Trin..

Et ideo primo et principaliter attenditur imago trinitatis in mente secundum actus, prout scilicet ex notitia quam habemus, cogitando interius verbum formamus, et ex hoc in amorem prorumpimus. Sed quia principia actuum sunt habitus et potentiae; unumquodque autem virtualiter est in suo principio, secundario, et quasi ex consequenti, imago trinitatis potest attendi in anima secundum potentias, et praecipue secundum habitus, prout in eis scilicet actus virtualiter existunt.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod esse nostrum ad imaginem dei pertinet, quod est nobis proprium supra alia animalia; quod quidem esse competit nobis inquantum mentem habemus. Et ideo eadem est haec trinitas cum illa quam Augustinus ponit in IX de Trin., quae consistit in mente, notitia et amore.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod Augustinus hanc trinitatem primo adinvenit in mente. Sed quia mens, etsi se totam quodammodo cognoscat, etiam quodammodo se ignorat, prout scilicet est ab aliis distincta; et sic etiam se quaerit, ut Augustinus consequenter probat in X de Trin., ideo, quasi notitia non totaliter menti coaequetur, accipit in anima tria quaedam propria mentis, scilicet memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem, quae nullus ignorat se habere, et in istis tribus potius imaginem trinitatis assignat, quasi prima assignatio sit quodammodo deficiens.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus probat XIV de Trin., intelligere dicimur et velle seu amare aliqua, et quando de his cogitamus, et quando de his non cogitamus. Sed quando sine cogitatione sunt, ad solam memoriam pertinent; quae nihil est aliud, secundum ipsum, quam habitualis retentio notitiae et amoris.

Sed quia, ut ipse dicit, verbum ibi esse sine cogitatione non potest (cogitamus enim omne quod dicimus etiam illo interiori verbo quod ad nullius gentis pertinet linguam), in tribus potius illis imago ista cognoscitur, memoria scilicet, intelligentia et voluntate. Hanc autem nunc dico intelligentiam, qua intelligimus cogitantes; et eam voluntatem sive amorem vel dilectionem, quae istam prolem parentemque coniungit.

Ex quo patet quod imaginem divinae trinitatis potius ponit in intelligentia et voluntate actuali, quam secundum quod sunt in habituali retentione memoriae, licet etiam quantum ad hoc, aliquo modo sit imago trinitatis in anima, ut ibidem dicitur.

Et sic patet quod memoria, intelligentia et voluntas non sunt tres vires, ut in sententiis dicitur.

Ad 4

Ad quartum dicendum quod aliquis respondere posset per hoc quod Augustinus dicit XIV de Trin., quod mens semper sui meminit, semper se intelligit et amat.

Quod quidam sic intelligunt, quasi animae adsit actualis intelligentia et amor sui ipsius. Sed hunc intellectum excludit per hoc quod subdit, quod non semper se cogitat discretam ab his quae non sunt quod ipsa.

Et sic patet quod anima semper intelligit et amat se, non actualiter, sed habitualiter. Quamvis etiam dici possit quod, percipiendo actum suum, seipsam intelligit quandocumque aliquid intelligit. Sed quia non semper est actu intelligens, ut patet in dormiente, ideo oportet dicere quod actus, etsi non semper maneant in seipsis, manent tamen semper in suis principiis, scilicet potentiis et habitibus.

Unde Augustinus dicit, XIV de Trin., si secundum hoc facta est ad imaginem dei anima rationalis, quod uti ratione atque intellectu ad intelligendum et conspiciendum deum potest, ab initio quo esse coepit, fuit in ea dei imago.