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it might happen and, as if of a line, the senses might strike upon both ends, either it will run together again into one and the same thing, for instance the middle, or into another; but if another, each will have a sensation of the other, just as if I were to perceive one thing, and you 15.22.34 another. And if the sensation were one, for instance a face, it will be brought together into one, which is also what appears; for it is brought together even in the pupils themselves—or how could the largest things be seen by them?—so that going into the governing part, they become, as it were, indivisible thoughts. And this will be indivisible, or else it would be shared out with this thing which is a magnitude, so that one part would be of one part, another of another, and none of us would have the perception of the whole 15.22.35 sense-object. But in fact the whole is one; for how could it be divided? For indeed the equal will not be applied to the equal, because the governing part is not equal to every sense-object. According to what size, then, is the division? Or will it be divided 15.22.36 into as many parts as the incoming sensation has number with respect to its variety? And will each of those parts of the soul then also perceive with its own subdivisions, or will the parts of the subdivisions be without sensation? But that is impossible. But if any part whatsoever perceives the whole, since magnitude is by nature divisible into infinite parts, it will follow that for each person infinite sensations arise for each sense-object, 15.22.37 for example, infinite images of the same thing in our governing part. And indeed, if the perceiving principle is a body, perceiving could not happen in any other way than like seals from rings impressed on wax, whether the sensations are impressed on blood or on air. If it is as in moist bodies, which 15.22.38 is also reasonable, like in water, it will be confounded, and there will be no memory; but if the impressions remain, either it is not possible for others to be impressed while those occupy the space, so that there will be no other sensations, or if others are made, the former ones will be destroyed, so that there will be no remembering. But if it is possible to remember and to perceive other things on top of others, with the previous ones not being an impediment, it is impossible for the soul to be a body. 15.22.39 One might also see this same thing from the sensation of pain. When a man is said to have a pain in his finger, the distress is surely in the finger, but the sensation of pain, it is clear they will agree, occurs in the governing part. So while one part is in pain, the governing 15.22.40 part of the spirit perceives it, and the whole soul suffers the same thing. How then does this happen? By transmission, they will say, the psychic spirit in the finger being first affected, and transmitting it to the next part, and that to another, until it arrives at the governing 15.22.41 part. It is necessary, therefore, if the first part perceived pain, for the sensation of the second part to be different, and if the sensation is by transmission, for that of the third part to be different again, and for many and infinite sensations to arise concerning one pain, and for the governing part to perceive last of all, and its own sensation 15.22.42 besides these. But the truth is, that each of those parts does not perceive the pain 15.22.42 in the finger, but the one next to the finger, that the flat of the foot is in pain, and the third, that another part above it is, and for there to be many pains; and the governing part would not perceive the pain in the finger, but only the pain next to itself, and know this alone, letting the rest go, not knowing that the finger 15.22.43 is in pain. If, therefore, it is not possible for sensation of such a thing to happen by transmission, nor, since a body is a mass, for there to be knowledge in one part of what another part has suffered—for of any magnitude, one part is one thing, and another part is another—it is necessary to posit that the perceiving principle is such that it is everywhere the same as itself. And it is fitting to attribute this to something else among beings than to a body. 15.22.44 That it is not even possible to think, if the soul were any body whatsoever, must be shown from the following: for if perceiving is the soul's apprehending sense-objects by using a body, then thinking could not also be apprehending 15.22.45 through a body, or it will be the same as perceiving. If, then, thinking is to... without

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γένοιτο καὶ οἷον γραμμῆς ἐπ' ἄμφω τὰ πέρατα αἱ αἰσθήσεις προσβάλοιεν, ἢ συνδραμεῖται εἰς ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πάλιν, οἷον τὸ μέσον, ἢ ἄλλο· τὸ δὲ ἄλλο ἑκάτερον ἑκατέρου αἴσθησιν ἕξει, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐγὼ μὲν ἄλλου, σὺ δὲ 15.22.34 ἄλλου αἴσθοιο. καὶ εἰ ἓν εἴη τὸ αἴσθημα, οἷον πρόσωπον, εἰς ἓν συναιρεθήσεται, ὅπερ καὶ φαίνεται· συναιρεῖται γὰρ καὶ ἐν αὐταῖς ταῖς κόραις ἢ πῶς ἂν τὰ μέγιστα δὴ ταύταις ὁρῷτο;, ὥστε ἔτι μᾶλλον εἰς τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν ἰόντα οἷον ἀμερῆ νοήματα γίνεσθαι. καὶ ἔσται ἀμερὲς τοῦτο, ἢ μεγέθει ὄντι τούτῳ συμμερίζοιτο ἄν, ὥστε ἄλλο ἄλλου μέρους μέρος καὶ μηδέν' ἂν ἡμῶν ὅλου 15.22.35 τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ τὴν ἀντίληψιν ἴσχειν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἕν ἐστι τὸ πᾶν· πῶς γὰρ ἂν καὶ διαιροῖτο; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὸ ἴσον τῷ ἴσῳ ἐφαρμόσει, ὅτι οὐκ ἴσον τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν παντὶ αἰσθητῷ. κατὰ πηλίκα οὖν ἡ διαίρεσις; ἢ εἰς τοσαῦτα διαιρε15.22.36 θήσεται, καθ' ὅσον ἂν ἀριθμοῦ ἔχῃ εἰς ποικιλίαν τὸ εἰσιὸν αἴσθημα; καὶ ἕκαστον δὴ ἐκείνων τῶν μερῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἄρα καὶ τοῖς μορίοις αὐτοῦ αἰσθήσεται, ἢ ἀναίσθητα τὰ μέρη τῶν μορίων ἔσται; ἀλλὰ ἀδύνατον. εἰ δὲ ὁτιοῦν παντὸς αἰσθήσεται, εἰς ἄπειρα διαιρεῖσθαι τοῦ μεγέθους πεφυκότος, ἀπείρους καὶ αἰσθήσεις καθ' ἕκαστον αἰσθητὸν συμβήσεται γίγνεσθαι ἑκάστῳ, 15.22.37 οἷον τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀπείρους ἐν τῷ ἡγεμονοῦντι ἡμῶν εἰκόνας. καὶ μὴν σώματος ὄντος τοῦ αἰσθανομένου, οὐκ ἂν ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ γένοιτο τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ οἷον ἐν κηρῷ ἐνσημανθεῖσαι ἀπὸ δακτυλίων σφραγῖδες, εἴτ' οὖν εἰς αἷμα εἴτ' οὖν εἰς ἀέρα τῶν αἰσθημάτων ἐνσημαινομένων. εἰ μὲν ὡς ἐν σώμασιν ὑγροῖς, ὅπερ 15.22.38 καὶ εὔλογον, ὥσπερ εἰς ὕδωρ, συγχυθήσεται, καὶ οὐκ ἔσται μνήμη· εἰ δ' ἐμμενοῦσιν οἱ τύποι, ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλους ἐνσημαίνεσθαι ἐκείνων κατεχόντων, ὥστε ἄλλαι αἰσθήσεις οὐκ ἔσονται, ἢ γιγνομένων ἄλλων ἐκεῖνοι οἱ πρότεροι ἀπολοῦνται, ὥστε οὐδὲν ἔσται τὸ μνημονεύειν. εἰ δὲ ἔστι τὸ μνημονεύειν καὶ ἄλλων αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐπ' ἄλλοις, οὐκ ἐμποδιζόντων τῶν πρόσθεν, ἀδύνατον τὴν ψυχὴν σῶμα εἶναι. 15.22.39 Ἴδοι δ' ἄν τις καὶ ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ἀλγεῖν αἰσθήσεως τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο. ὅταν δάκτυλον λέγηται ἀλγεῖν ἄνθρωπος, ἡ μὲν ὀδύνη περὶ τὸν δάκτυλον δήπουθεν, ἡ δ' αἴσθησις τοῦ ἀλγεῖν δῆλον ὅτι ὁμολογήσουσι περὶ τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν γίγνεσθαι. ἄλλου δὴ ὄντος τοῦ πονοῦντος μέρους, τοῦ πνεύματος τὸ ἡγε15.22.40 μονοῦν αἰσθάνεται, καὶ ὅλη ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ αὐτὸ πάσχει. πῶς οὖν τοῦτο συμβαίνει; διαδόσει, φήσουσι, παθόντος μὲν πρώτως τοῦ περὶ τὸν δάκτυλον ψυχικοῦ πνεύματος, μεταδόντος δὲ τῷ ἐφεξῆς καὶ τούτου ἄλλῳ, ἕως πρὸς τὸ ἡγε15.22.41 μονοῦν ἀφίκοιτο. ἀνάγκη τοίνυν εἰ τὸ πρῶτον πόνου ᾔσθετο, ἄλλην τὴν αἴσθησιν τοῦ δευτέρου εἶναι καὶ εἰ κατὰ διάδοσιν ἡ αἴσθησις, καὶ τοῦ τρίτου γε ἄλλην καὶ πολλὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ ἀπείρους τὴν περὶ ἑνὸς ἀλγήματος γίγνεσθαι, καὶ τούτων ἁπασῶν ὕστερον τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν αἰσθέσθαι καὶ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ 15.22.42 παρὰ ταύτας. τὸ δὲ ἀληθές, ἑκάστην ἐκείνων μὴ τοῦ ἐν τῷ δακτύλῳ ἀλγή15.22.42 ματος, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν ἐφεξῆς τῷ δακτύλῳ, ὅτι ὁ ταρσὸς ἀλγεῖ, τὴν δὲ τρίτην, ὅτι ἄλλο τὸ πρὸς τὸ ἄνωθεν, καὶ πολλὰς εἶναι ἀλγηδόνας· τό τε ἡγεμονοῦν μὴ τοῦ πρὸς τῷ δακτύλῳ ἀλγήματος αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τοῦ πρὸς αὑτῷ καὶ τοῦτο γινώσκειν μόνον, τὰ δ' ἄλλα χαίρειν ἐᾶν, μὴ ἐπιστάμενον ὅτι ἀλγεῖ 15.22.43 ὁ δάκτυλος. εἰ τοίνυν κατὰ διάδοσιν τὴν αἴσθησιν οὐχ οἷόν τε τοῦ τοιούτου γίνεσθαι μηδὲ σώματος, ὄγκου ὄντος, ἄλλου παθόντος ἄλλου γνῶσιν εἶναι παντὸς γὰρ μεγέθους τὸ μὲν ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο ἐστί, δεῖ τοιοῦτον τίθεσθαι τὸ αἰσθανόμενον, οἷον πανταχοῦ αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι. τοῦτο δὲ ἄλλῳ τινὶ τῶν ὄντων ἢ σώματι ποιεῖν προσήκει. 15.22.44 Ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲ νοεῖν οἷόν τε, εἰ σῶμα ἡ ψυχὴ ὁτιοῦν εἴη, δεικτέον ἐκ τῶνδε· εἰ γὰρ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαί ἐστι τὸ σώματι προσχρωμένην τὴν ψυχὴν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τῶν αἰσθητῶν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη καὶ τὸ νοεῖν τὸ διὰ σώματος καταλαμβά15.22.45 νειν, ἢ ταὐτὸν ἔσται τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι. εἰ οὖν τὸ νοεῖν ἐστι τὸ ἄνευ