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to apprehend a body, much more must that which understands not be a body in turn, since sensation is of perceptible things, but intellection is of intelligible things. But if they are not willing, at any rate 15.22.46 there will be intellections of certain intelligible things and apprehensions of things without magnitude. How then, being a magnitude, will it understand that which has no magnitude, and by means of the divisible, understand the indivisible? Or by some part of itself that is without parts? But if this is so, that which understands will not be a body. For indeed the 15.22.47 whole is not needed for touching; for even one part is sufficient. If then they concede that the primary intellections, which is true, are of things entirely purest of body, of each thing-in-itself, it is necessary that that which understands also knows by being or becoming pure of body. But if they say the intellections are of the forms in matter, still they come to be by being separated 15.22.48 from the bodies, with the intellect doing the separating. For indeed the separation is not with flesh or matter at all of a circle and a triangle and a line and a point. Therefore it is necessary for the soul itself also to separate from body in such an act. Therefore it is necessary for it not to be a body itself. And I think that the beautiful and the just are without magnitude, and therefore the intellection of them, so that it will receive the approaching parts of itself and they will lie without parts in it. 15.22.49 And how, if the soul is a body, could moderation and justice and courage and the others be its virtues? For being moderate or justice or courage would be some kind of breath or blood, unless perhaps courage were the impassivity of the breath, and moderation a good mixture, and beauty a certain shapeliness in forms, according to which, 15.22.50 upon seeing, we call bodies comely and beautiful. So it might be fitting for a breath to be strong and beautiful in its forms, but what need is there for a breath to be moderate? But is it not the opposite, to feel pleasure in embraces and touches, where it will either be warmed or desire coolness in due measure or will approach certain soft and tender and smooth things? 15.22.51 And why would it care about distributing according to worth? Does the soul apprehend the theorems of virtue and the other intelligibles as being eternal, or does virtue come to be for someone and benefit them and then perish again? But who is the maker and from where? For so that thing would remain again. Therefore they must be eternal and abiding, like the things in geometry. And if they are eternal and abiding, they are not of bodies. Therefore that in which they will be must be of such a kind; therefore it must not be a body. For the whole nature of body does not remain, but flows. 15.22.52 But if, seeing the actions of bodies heating and cooling and pushing and weighing down, they assign the soul to this realm, as if establishing it in an active place, first, they are ignorant that even here bodies accomplish these things by incorporeal powers within them; then, that we do not consider these powers to be what constitutes a soul, but to understand, to perceive, to reason, to desire, to take care wisely and well, all of which things seek another 15.22.53 substance. Therefore, having transferred the powers of incorporeal things to bodies, they leave none for those other things. That bodies too are capable of what they are capable of by incorporeal powers, is clear from the following: for they will agree that quality and quantity are different, and that every body is a quantity, and further that not every body is qualified, such as matter. And agreeing to these things, they will agree that quality, 15.22.54 being different from quantity, is different from body. For how, not being a quantity, will it be a body, if indeed every body is a quantity? And indeed, as was said somewhere above, if every body and every mass, when divided, is deprived of what it was, but when the body is broken into small pieces, the same whole quality remains in each part, for instance the sweetness of honey is no less sweetness in each part, 15.22.55 sweetness would not be a body, and similarly for the others. Then if the powers were bodies, it would be necessary for the strong powers to be large masses, and for those able to do little to be small masses. But if the powers of large masses are small, and few and very small masses have the greatest powers, acting must be attributed to something other than magnitude; therefore, to that which is without magnitude. 15.22.56 And that the matter is the same, a body as

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σώματος ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, πολὺ πρότερον δεῖ μὴ σῶμα αὖ τὸ νοῆσον εἶναι, ἐπεὶ αἰσθητῶν μὲν ἡ αἴσθησις, νοητῶν δὲ ἡ νόησις. εἰ δὲ μὴ βούλονται, ἀλλ' οὖν 15.22.46 ἔσονταί γε καὶ νοητῶν τινων νοήσεις καὶ ἀμεγέθων ἀντιλήψεις. πῶς οὖν μέγεθος ὂν τὸ μὴ μέγεθος νοήσει καὶ τῷ μεριστῷ τὸ μὴ μεριστὸν νοήσει; ἢ μέρει τινὶ ἀμερεῖ αὐτοῦ; εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐ σῶμα ἔσται τὸ νοῆσον. οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῦ 15.22.47 ὅλου χρεία πρὸς τὸ θιγεῖν· ἀρκεῖ γὰρ καὶ ἕν τι. εἰ μὲν οὖν συγχωρήσονται τὰς πρώτας νοήσεις, ὅπερ ἀληθές ἐστιν, εἶναι τῶν πάντη σώματος καθαρωτάτων, αὐτοεκάστου, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ νοοῦν σώματος καθαρὸν ὂν ἢ γιγνόμενον γινώσκειν. εἰ δὲ τῶν ἐν ὕλῃ εἰδῶν τὰς νοήσεις φήσουσιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ χωριζο15.22.48 μένων γε τῶν σωμάτων γίγνονται, τοῦ νοῦ χωρίζοντος. οὐ γὰρ δὴ μετὰ σαρκῶν ἢ ὅλως ὕλης ὁ χωρισμὸς κύκλου καὶ τριγώνου καὶ γραμμῆς καὶ σημείου. δεῖ ἄρα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν σώματος αὐτὴν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ χωρίσαι. δεῖ ἄρα μηδὲ αὐτὴν σῶμα εἶναι. ἀμέγεθες δὲ οἶμαι καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἡ τούτων ἄρα νόησις, ὥστε καὶ προσιόντα τὰ μέρη αὐτῆς ὑποδέξεται καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ ἀμερῆ κείσεται. 15.22.49 Πῶς δ' ἂν καὶ σώματος ὄντος τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρεταὶ αὐτῆς σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη ἀνδρεία τε καὶ ἄλλαι; πνεῦμά τι γὰρ ἢ αἷμά τι ἂν τὸ σωφρονεῖν εἴη ἢ δικαιότης ἢ ἀνδρεία, εἰ μὴ ἄρα ἡ ἀνδρεία τὸ δυσπαθὲς τοῦ πνεύματος εἴη, καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη ἡ εὐκρασία, τὸ δὲ κάλλος εὐμορφία τις ἐν τύποις, καθ' ἣν 15.22.50 λέγομεν ἰδόντες ὡραίους καὶ καλοὺς τὰ σώματα. ἰσχυρῷ μὲν οὖν καὶ καλῷ ἐν τύποις πνεύματι εἶναι προσήκοι ἄν, σωφρονεῖν δὲ τί δεῖ πνεύματι; ἀλλ' οὐ τοὐναντίον ἐν περιπτύξεσι καὶ ἁφαῖς εὖ παθεῖν, ὅπου ἢ θερμανθήσεται ἢ συμμέτρως ψύχεος ἱμερεῖ ἢ μαλακοῖς τισι καὶ ἁπαλοῖς καὶ λείοις 15.22.51 πελάσει; τὸ δὲ κατ' ἀξίαν νεῖμαι τί ἂν αὐτῷ μέλοι; πότερον δὲ ἀϊδίων ὄντων τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς θεωρημάτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν νοητῶν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐφάπτεται, ἢ γίνεταί τῳ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὠφελεῖ καὶ πάλιν φθείρεται; ἀλλὰ τίς ὁ ποιῶν καὶ πόθεν; οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἐκεῖνο πάλιν μένοι. δεῖ ἄρα ἀϊδίων εἶναι καὶ μενόντων, οἷα καὶ τὰ ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ. εἰ δὲ ἀϊδίων καὶ μενόντων, οὐ σωμάτων. δεῖ ἄρα καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἔσται, τοιοῦτον εἶναι· δεῖ ἄρα μὴ σῶμα εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ μένει, ἀλλὰ ῥεῖ ἡ σώματος φύσις πᾶσα. 15.22.52 Εἰ δὲ τὰς τῶν σωμάτων ποιήσεις ὁρῶντες θερμαινούσας καὶ ψυχούσας καὶ ὠθούσας καὶ βαρυνούσας ἐνταῦθα τάττουσι τὴν ψυχήν, οἷον ἐν δραστηρίῳ τόπῳ ἱδρύοντες αὐτήν, πρῶτον μὲν ἀγνοοῦσιν ὡς καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὰ σώματα δυνάμεσι ταῖς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀσωμάτοις ταῦτα ἐργάζεται· ἔπειτα ὅτι οὐ ταύτας τὰς δυνάμεις περὶ ψυχὴν εἶναι ἀξιοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ νοεῖν, τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, λογίζεσθαι, ἐπιθυμεῖν, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἐμφρόνως καὶ καλῶς, ἃ πάντα ἄλλην 15.22.53 οὐσίαν ζητεῖ. τὰς οὖν δυνάμεις τῶν ἀσωμάτων μεταβιβάσαντες εἰς τὰ σώματα οὐδεμίαν ἐκείνοις καταλείπουσιν. ὅτι δὲ καὶ τὰ σώματα ἀσωμάτοις δυνάμεσι δύναται ἃ δύναται, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον· ὁμολογήσουσι γὰρ ἕτερον ποιότητα καὶ ποσότητα εἶναι καὶ πᾶν σῶμα ποσὸν εἶναι καὶ ἔτι οὐ πᾶν σῶμα ποιὸν εἶναι, ὥσπερ τὴν ὕλην. ταῦτα δὲ ὁμολογοῦντες, τὴν ποιότητα ὁμο15.22.54 λογήσουσιν ἕτερον οὖσαν ποσοῦ ἕτερον σώματος εἶναι. πῶς γὰρ μὴ ποσὸν οὖσα σῶμα ἔσται, εἴπερ πᾶν σῶμα ποσόν; καὶ μήν, ὅπερ καὶ ἄνω που ἐλέγετο, εἰ πᾶν σῶμα μεριζόμενον καὶ ὄγκος πᾶς ἀφαιρεῖται ὅπερ ἦν, κερματιζομένου δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ μέρει ἡ αὐτὴ ὅλη ποιότης μένει, οἷον ἡ γλυκύτης ἡ τοῦ μέλιτος οὐδὲν ἔλαττον γλυκύτης ἐστὶν ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ, 15.22.55 οὐκ ἂν εἴη σῶμα ἡ γλυκύτης, ὁμοίως καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι. ἔπειτα εἰ σώματα ἦσαν αἱ δυνάμεις, ἀναγκαῖον ἦν τὰς μὲν ἰσχυρὰς τῶν δυνάμεων μεγάλους ὄγκους, τὰς δὲ ὀλίγον δρᾶν δυναμένας ὄγκους μικροὺς εἶναι. εἰ δὲ μεγάλων μὲν τῶν ὄγκων μικραί, ὀλίγοι δὲ καὶ μικρότατοι τῶν ὄγκων μεγίστας ἔχουσι τὰς δυνάμεις, ἄλλῳ τινὶ ἢ μεγέθει τὸ ποιεῖν ἀναθετέον· ἀμεγέθει ἄρα. 15.22.56 τὸ δὲ ὕλην μὲν τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι, σῶμα ὥς