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they say it exists, but makes things different by adding qualities, how does it not make it clear that the things added are themselves principles and incorporeal? Let them not say that it is because animals die when breath or blood departs. For it is not possible to exist without these, nor without many other things, none of which would be the soul. And indeed, neither breath is through all parts nor blood, but soul is. 15.22.57 Further, if the soul, being a body, passed through everything, it would be mixed in the same way as mixture occurs with other bodies. But if the mixture of bodies allows none of the things mixed to exist in actuality, then the soul would no longer be in the bodies in actuality, but only in potentiality, having lost its being as soul, just as, if sweet and 15.22.58 bitter were mixed, the sweet does not exist; therefore we do not have a soul. But for a body to be mixed with a body, whole through whole, so that wherever one is, the other is also, both occupying an equal volume and the whole, and for no increase to have occurred when the other was introduced, will leave nothing that it does not divide. For the mixture is not according to large parts alternately—for thus, they say, it would be juxtaposition—but has passed through everything, the thing introduced being divided into something smaller, which is impossible, for the lesser to become equal to the greater; but at any rate, having passed through all, it would cut it throughout. 15.22.59 It is necessary, therefore, if at any point whatever and not in between there will be a body that has not been cut, that the division of the body has been into points, which is impossible. But if the division is infinite—for whatever body you take is divisible—it will be so not only in potentiality, but the infinite will exist in actuality. Therefore it is not possible for a body to pass whole through whole, but the soul is through all parts; therefore it is incorporeal. 15.22.60 And to say that the same breath is first a nature, but when it is in a cold place and is tempered it becomes soul, becoming finer in the cold—which in itself is absurd; for many animals are born in a hot place and have a soul that has not been cooled; but at any rate they say that there is a nature prior to soul, coming into being by external 15.22.61 chances. It follows, then, for them that they make the worse first, and before this another, lesser thing, which they call a state. But mind is last, clearly having come from the soul; or if mind were before all things, it would be necessary to make soul next, then 15.22.62 nature; and always what is later is worse, if indeed it is its nature. If, then, God for them is also 15.22.62 according to mind, later and generated and having his thinking as something brought in from outside, it might be that neither soul nor mind nor God exists; if that which is in potentiality should come to be, without that which is in actuality and mind existing before it, it will not come to actuality. For what will be the agent, if there is not another before it? And if it will lead itself to actuality, which is absurd, yet 15.22.63 it will lead itself looking to something, which will not be in potentiality, but in actuality. And yet if that which is in potentiality will possess that which always remains the same, it will come to actuality of itself, and this will be better than the potential, as being an object of desire for it. Therefore, the better is prior, and has a different nature from body, and is always in actuality; therefore, mind and soul are also prior to nature. Therefore soul is not as breath nor as body. But that it is not a body, one might say, and other things have been said by others, but these are also sufficient. 15.22.64 Since, then, it is of another nature, we must inquire what this is. Is it then something different from body, but something of a body, such as a harmony? For when the followers of Pythagoras spoke of harmony in another sense, they thought it to be something like the harmony 15.22.65 of strings. For just as here, when the strings are tuned, something like an affection supervenes on them, which is called harmony, in the same way, in our body, which comes into being in a mixture of dissimilar things, the particular mixture produces both life and soul, which is the affection upon the mixture. But that it is impossible, many 15.22.66 things have already been said against this opinion. For indeed, that soul is prior, but harmony is posterior; and that the one rules and directs the body and fights against it in many ways, but a harmony would not do these things; and that the one is a substance, but harmony is not a substance; and that the mixture of the bodies, of which we are composed, being in a due proportion, would be health;

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φασιν οὖσαν, διάφορα δὲ ποιεῖν ποιότητας προσβαλοῦσαν, πῶς οὐ δῆλον ποιεῖ τὰ προσγενόμενα λόγους αὐτοὺς καὶ ἀσωμάτους εἶναι; μὴ διότι πνεύματος ἢ αἵματος ἀποστάντων ἀποθνήσκει τὰ ζῷα, λεγόντων. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄνευ τούτων εἶναι οὐδ' ἄνευ πολλῶν ἄλλων, ὧν οὐδὲν ἂν ἡ ψυχὴ εἴη. καὶ μὴν οὔτε πνεῦμα διὰ πάντων οὔτε αἷμα, ψυχὴ δέ. 15.22.57 Ἔτι εἰ σῶμα οὖσα ἡ ψυχὴ διῆλθε διὰ παντός, κἂν κραθεῖσα εἴη ὃν τρόπον τοῖς ἄλλοις σώμασιν ἡ κρᾶσις. εἰ δὲ ἡ τῶν σωμάτων κρᾶσις οὐδὲν ἐνεργείᾳ ἐᾷ εἶναι τῶν κραθέντων, οὐδ' ἂν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔτι ἐνεργείᾳ ἐνείη τοῖς σώμασιν, ἀλλὰ δυνάμει μόνον, ἀπολέσασα τὸ εἶναι ψυχή, ὥσπερ, εἰ γλυκὺ καὶ 15.22.58 πικρὸν κραθείη, τὸ γλυκὺ οὐκ ἔστιν· οὐκ ἄρα ἔχομεν ψυχήν. τὸ δὲ δὴ σῶμα ὂν σώματι κεκρᾶσθαι ὅλον δι' ὅλων, ὡς ὅπου ἂν ᾖ θάτερον, καὶ θάτερον εἶναι, ἴσον ὄγκον ἀμφοτέρων καὶ τὸ πᾶν κατεχόντων, καὶ μηδεμίαν αὔξην γεγονέναι ἐπεμβληθέντος τοῦ ἑτέρου οὐδὲν ἀπολείψει ὃ μὴ τέμῃ. οὐ γὰρ κατὰ μεγάλα μέρη παραλλὰξ ἡ κρᾶσις οὕτω γάρ φασι παράθεσιν ἔσεσθαι, διεληλυθὸς δὲ διὰ παντός, τὸ ἐπεμβληθὲν ἐπὶ σμικρότερον ὅπερ ἀδύνατον, τὸ ἔλαττον ἴσον γενέσθαι τῷ μείζονι, ἀλλ' οὖν διεληλυθὸς πᾶν τέμοι κατὰ πᾶν. 15.22.59 ἀνάγκη τοίνυν, εἰ καθ' ὁτιοῦν σημεῖον καὶ μὴ μεταξὺ σῶμα ἔσται ὃ μὴ τέτμηται, εἰς σημεῖα τὴν διαίρεσιν τοῦ σώματος γεγονέναι, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον. εἰ δὲ ἀπείρου τῆς τομῆς οὔσης ὃ γὰρ ἂν λάβῃς σῶμα διαίρετόν ἐστιν, οὐ δυνάμει μόνον, ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ τὰ ἄπειρα ἔσται. οὐ τοίνυν ὅλον δι' ὅλου χωρεῖν δυνατὸν τὸ σῶμα, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ δι' ὅλων· ἀσώματος ἄρα. 15.22.60 Τὸ δὲ καὶ φύσιν μὲν προτέραν τὸ αὐτὸ πνεῦμα λέγειν, ἐν δὲ ψυχρῷ γενομένην καὶ στομωθεῖσαν ψυχὴν γίγνεσθαι, λεπτοτέραν ἐν ψυχρῷ γιγνομένην ὃ δὴ καὶ αὐτὸ ἄτοπον· πολλὰ γὰρ ζῷα ἐν θερμῷ γίγνεται καὶ ψυχὴν ἔχει οὐ ψυχθεῖσαν· ἀλλ' οὖν φασί γε προτέραν φύσιν ψυχῆς εἶναι κατὰ συντυχίας 15.22.61 τὰς ἔξω γιγνομένην. συμβαίνει οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸ χεῖρον πρῶτον ποιεῖν καὶ πρὸ τούτου ἄλλο ἔλαττον, ἣν λέγουσιν ἕξιν. ὁ δὲ νοῦς ὕστατος, ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς δηλονότι γενόμενος, ἢ εἰ πρὸ πάντων νοῦς, ἐφεξῆς ἔδει ψυχὴν ποιεῖν, εἶτα 15.22.62 φύσιν· καὶ αἰεὶ τὸ ὕστερον χεῖρον, εἴπερ πέφυκεν. εἰ οὖν καὶ ὁ θεὸς αὐτοῖς 15.22.62 κατὰ τὸν νοῦν ὕστερος καὶ γενητὸς καὶ ἐπακτὸν τὸ νοεῖν ἔχων, ἐνδέχοιτο ἂν μηδὲ ψυχὴν μηδὲ νοῦν μηδὲ θεὸν εἶναι· εἰ τὸ δυνάμει, μὴ ὄντος πρότερον τοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ καὶ νοῦ, γένοιτο, οὐδὲ ἥξει εἰς ἐνέργειαν. τί γὰρ ἔσται τὸ ἄγον, μὴ ὄντος ἑτέρου παρ' αὐτὸ προτέρου; εἰ δ' αὑτὸ ἄξει εἰς ἐνέργειαν, ὅπερ ἄτοπον, ἀλλὰ 15.22.63 βλέπον γε πρός τι ἄξει, ὃ οὐ δυνάμει, ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ ἔσται. καίτοι τὸ ἀεὶ μένειν τὸ αὐτὸ εἴπερ τὸ δυνάμει ἕξει, καθ' ἑαυτὸ εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἥξει, καὶ τοῦτο κρεῖττον ἔσται τοῦ δυναμένου, οἷον ὀρεκτὸν ὂν ἐκείνου. πρότερον ἄρα τὸ κρεῖττον καὶ ἑτέραν φύσιν ἔχον σώματος καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ὂν ἀεί· πρότερον ἄρα καὶ νοῦς καὶ ψυχὴ φύσεως. οὐκ ἄρα οὕτως ψυχὴ ὡς πνεῦμα οὐδ' ὡς σῶμα. ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν μὴ σῶμα, λέγοιτ' ἄν, καὶ εἴρηται καὶ ἄλλοις ἕτερα, ἱκανὰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα. 15.22.64 Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἄλλης φύσεως, δεῖ ζητεῖν τίς αὕτη. ἆρ' οὖν ἕτερον μὲν σώματος, σώματος δέ τι, οἷον ἁρμονία; τοῦτο γὰρ ἁρμονίαν τῶν ἀμφὶ Πυθαγόραν λεγόντων ἕτερον τρόπον, ᾠήθησαν αὐτὸ τοιοῦτόν τι εἶναι οἷον καὶ ἡ περὶ χορδὰς 15.22.65 ἁρμονία. ὡς γὰρ ἐνταῦθα ἐντεταμένων τῶν χορδῶν ἐπιγίνεταί τι οἷον πάθημα ἐπ' αὐταῖς, ὃ λέγεται ἁρμονία, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ τοῦ ἡμετέρου σώματος, ἐν κράσει ἀνομοίων γινομένου, τὴν ποιὰν κρᾶσιν ζωήν τε ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ψυχήν, οὖσαν τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ κράσει πάθημα. ὅτι δὲ ἀδύνατον, πολλὰ 15.22.66 ἤδη πρὸς ταύτην τὴν δόξαν εἴρηται. καὶ γὰρ ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρότερον, ἡ ψυχή, ἡ δ' ἁρμονία ὕστερον, καὶ ὡς τὸ μὲν ἄρχει καὶ ἐπιστατεῖ τῷ σώματι καὶ μάχεται πολλαχῇ, ἁρμονία δὲ οὐκ ἂν οὖσα ταῦτα ποιοῖ· καὶ ὡς τὸ μὲν οὐσία, ἡ δὲ ἁρμονία οὐκ οὐσία· καὶ ὅτι ἡ κρᾶσις τῶν σωμάτων, ἐξ ὧν συνέσταμεν, ἐν λόγῳ οὖσα, ὑγεία ἂν εἴη·