ARTICLE V

In the Fifth Article We Ask: IS A CREATED GOOD GOOD BY ITS ESSENCE?

Difficulties:

It seems that it is, for

1. That without which a thing cannot be seems to be essential to it. But a creature cannot be without goodness, because nothing can be created by God which is not good. A creature is therefore good by its essence.

2. To be and to be good are had by the creature from the same source, because from the mere fact of having being it is good, as has previously been shown. But a creature has being by its essence. By its essence, therefore, it is also good.

3. Whatever belongs to something under the qualification "as such" is essential to it. But good belongs to a creature as existing, because, as Augustine says, "inasmuch as we are, we are good." Hence a creature is good by its own essence.

4. Since goodness is a created form inhering in the creature, as has been shown, it will be either the substantial form or an accidental form. If accidental, the creature will be able sometimes to be without it. But this cannot be said of a creature. It remains, then, that it is the substantial form. But every such form is either the essence of the thing or a part of the essence. A creature is therefore good by its essence.

5. According to Boethius, creatures are good inasmuch as they have emanated from the first good. But they have emanated from the first good essentially. Therefore creatures are essentially good.

6. That which gives its name is always simpler than that which receives the name, or equally simple. But no form added to the essence is simpler than the essence or equally simple. Therefore no other form added to the essence gives its name to the essence; for we cannot say that the essence is white. But the very essence of a thing is named from goodness, for every essence is good. Goodness is therefore not a form added to the essence, and accordingly any creature is essentially good.

7. Just as the one is interchangeable with being, so too is good. But oneness, from which the one which is interchanged with being is designated, does not express a form added to the essence of a thing, as the Commentator says; but everything is one by its essence. So too, then, is everything good by its essence.

8. If a creature is good by a goodness added to its essence, since everything which is, is good, that goodness too, being something real, will be good. But it will not be good by some other goodness--for that would involve an infinite regress--but by its own essence. By the same reasoning, then, it can be asserted that the creature itself is good by its own essence.

To the Contrary:

1'. Nothing which is said of a thing by participation belongs to that thing by its essence. But a creature is called good by participation, as is clear from Augustine. A creature is therefore not good essentially.

2'. Everything that is good by its own essence is a substantial good. But creatures are not substantial goods, as is clear from Boethius. Creatures, therefore, are not good by their essence.

3'. Whatever has something predicated of it essentially, cannot have its opposite predicated of it. But evil, the opposite of good, is predicated of some creatures. A creature is therefore not good essentially.

REPLY:

With three authorities we must say that creatures are not good by their essence but by participation. These are Augustine, Boethius,

and the author of The Causes, who says that only God is pure goodness. They were, however, brought to the same position by different considerations.

For the clarification of this point it should be noted that, as appears from what has been said, goodness is divided into substantial and accidental, just as is the act of being. There is, however, this difference: a thing is called a being in an absolute sense because of its substantial act of existing; but because of its accidental act of existing it is not said to be absolutely. Since generation is a motion toward existence, when someone receives substantial existence, he is said to be generated without qualification; but when he receives accidental existence, he is said to be generated in a certain sense. The same also holds for corruption, which is the loss of existence. But just the opposite is true of good. From the point of view of its substantial goodness a thing is said to be good in a certain sense, but from that of its accidental goodness it is said to be good without qualification. Thus we do not call an unjust man good simply, but only in a certain sense--inasmuch as he is a man. But a just man we call good without further restriction.

The reason for this difference is this. A thing is called a being inasmuch as it is considered absolutely, but good, as has already been made clear, in relation to other things. Now it is by its essential principles that a thing is fully constituted in itself so that it subsists; but it is not so perfectly constituted as to stand as it should in relation to everything outside itself except by means of accidents added to the essence, because the operations by which one thing is in some sense joined to another proceed from the essence through powers distinct from it. Consequently nothing achieves goodness absolutely unless it is complete in both its essential and its accidental principles.

Any perfection which a creature has from its essential and accidental principles combined, God has in its entirety by His one simple act of being. His essence is His wisdom, His justice, His power, and so forth--all of which in us are distinct from our essence. In God, accordingly, absolute goodness is itself also the same as His essence; but in us it is taken with reference to things that are added to our essence. Consequently, complete or absolute goodness increases and diminishes and disappears entirely in us, but not in God. Our substantial goodness, however, always remains. It is in this sense, it seems, that Augustine says that God is good essentially, but we, by participation.

Still another difference is found between God's goodness and ours. Goodness is not taken as essential when a nature is considered absolutely but when it is taken in its act of existence. Humanity, for instance, does not have the note of good or goodness except by its having existence. The divine nature or essence, however, is itself its act of being, whereas the nature or essence of any created thing is not its act of being but participates in being from another. In God, accordingly, the act of being is pure, because God is His own subsistent act of being; but in the creature the act of being is received or participated. Even granted, therefore, that absolute goodness were attributed to a creature because of its substantial existence, nevertheless the fact would still remain that it has goodness by participation, just as it has a participated existence. But God is goodness essentially inasmuch as His essence is His existence. This seems to be the meaning of the philosopher in The Causes when he says that only the divine goodness is pure goodness.

A still further difference is discovered between the divine goodness and that of creatures. Goodness has the character of a final cause. But God has this, since He is the ultimate end of all beings just as He is their first principle. From this it follows that any other end has the status or character of an end only in relation to the first cause, because a secondary cause does not influence the effect unless the influence of the first cause is presupposed, as is made clear in The Causes. Hence too, good, having the character of an end, cannot be said of a creature unless we presuppose the relation of Creator to creature.

Granted, therefore, that a creature were its own act of being, as God is, the act of being of the creature would still not have the character of good except on the supposition of its relation to its Creator; and it would, by that fact, still be called good by participation and not absolutely in its essential constitution. But the divine act of being, which has the character of good even if nothing else is presupposed, has this character of itself. This is what Boethius seems to have meant.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. A creature cannot fail to be good with essential goodness, which is goodness in a qualified sense; yet it can fail to be good with accidental goodness, which is absolute and unqualified goodness. That goodness, moreover, which is referred to from the viewpoint of the substantial act of being is not the very essence of the thing but is a participated act of being. This is true even if the relation to the first act of being subsisting by itself is presupposed.

2. A thing has from the same source being and goodness in a qualified sense, i.e., in its substantial existence; but it does not formally have from the same source being without qualification and goodness without qualification, as is clear from what has been said.* For this reason the conclusion does not follow.

3-4. The same answer applies.

5. A creature is from God not only in its essence but also in its act of existing, which constitutes the chief characteristic of substantial goodness; and also in its additional perfections, which constitute its absolute goodness. These are not the essence of the thing. And furthermore, even the relation by which the essence of the thing is referred to God as its source is distinct from the essence.

6. An essence is denominated good in the same way as it is denominated a being. It is good by participation, then, just as it has existence by participation. Existence and good taken in general are simpler than essence because more general, since these are said not only of essence but also of what subsists by reason of the essence and even, too, of accidents.

7. The predication of the one which is interchanged with being is based upon the note of negation which it adds to being. But good does not add to being a negation but essentially consists in something positive. There is consequently no parallel.

8. The existence of a thing is called a being, not because it has some existence other than itself, but because by that existence the thing is said to be. In just the same way goodness is called good because by it a thing is said to be good. From the fact that the existence of a thing is not called a being because of an existence distinct from itself it does not follow that the substance of the thing is not said to be by an existence which is distinct from it. In just the same way that conclusion does not follow in regard to goodness. It does, however, apply to oneness (in regard to which the Commentator adduces the argument because it makes no difference to the one whether it be referred to essence or to existence. Hence the essence of a thing is one of itself, not because of its act of existing; and so it is not one by any participation, though it is a being and good in this way.