Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that the first man was not created in grace. For the Apostle, distinguishing between Adam and Christ, says (1 Cor. 15:45): "The first Adam was made into a living soul; the last Adam into a quickening spirit." But the spirit is quickened by grace. Therefore Christ alone was made in grace.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Questions. Vet. et Nov. Test., qu. 123) that "Adam did not possess the Holy Ghost." But whoever possesses grace has the Holy Ghost. Therefore Adam was not created in grace.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. x) that "God so ordered the life of the angels and men, as to show first what they could do by free-will, then what they could do by His grace, and by the discernment of righteousness." God thus first created men and angels in the state of natural free-will only; and afterwards bestowed grace on them.

Objection 4: Further, the Master says (Sent. ii, D, xxiv): "When man was created he was given sufficient help to stand, but not sufficient to advance." But whoever has grace can advance by merit. Therefore the first man was not created in grace.

Objection 5: Further, the reception of grace requires the consent of the recipient, since thereby a kind of spiritual marriage takes place between God and the soul. But consent presupposes existence. Therefore man did not receive grace in the first moment of his creation.

Objection 6: Further, nature is more distant from grace than grace is from glory, which is but grace consummated. But in man grace precedes glory. Therefore much more did nature precede grace.

On the contrary, Man and angel are both ordained to grace. But the angels were created in grace, for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9): "God at the same time fashioned their nature and endowed them with grace." Therefore man also was created in grace.

I answer that, Some say that man was not created in grace; but that it was bestowed on him subsequently before sin: and many authorities of the Saints declare that man possessed grace in the state of innocence.

But the very rectitude of the primitive state, wherewith man was endowed by God, seems to require that, as others say, he was created in grace, according to Eccles. 7:30, "God made man right." For this rectitude consisted in his reason being subject to God, the lower powers to reason, and the body to the soul: and the first subjection was the cause of both the second and the third; since while reason was subject to God, the lower powers remained subject to reason, as Augustine says . Now it is clear that such a subjection of the body to the soul and of the lower powers to reason, was not from nature; otherwise it would have remained after sin; since even in the demons the natural gifts remained after sin, as Dionysius declared (Div. Nom. iv). Hence it is clear that also the primitive subjection by virtue of which reason was subject to God, was not a merely natural gift, but a supernatural endowment of grace; for it is not possible that the effect should be of greater efficiency than the cause. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13) that, "as soon as they disobeyed the Divine command, and forfeited Divine grace, they were ashamed of their nakedness, for they felt the impulse of disobedience in the flesh, as though it were a punishment corresponding to their own disobedience." Hence if the loss of grace dissolved the obedience of the flesh to the soul, we may gather that the inferior powers were subjected to the soul through grace existing therein.

Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle in these words means to show that there is a spiritual body, if there is an animal body, inasmuch as the spiritual life of the body began in Christ, who is "the firstborn of the dead," as the body's animal life began in Adam. From the Apostle's words, therefore, we cannot gather that Adam had no spiritual life in his soul; but that he had not spiritual life as regards the body.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says in the same passage, it is not disputed that Adam, like other just souls, was in some degree gifted with the Holy Ghost; but "he did not possess the Holy Ghost, as the faithful possess Him now," who are admitted to eternal happiness directly after death.

Reply to Objection 3: This passage from Augustine does not assert that angels or men were created with natural free-will before they possessed grace; but that God shows first what their free-will could do before being confirmed in grace, and what they acquired afterwards by being so confirmed.

Reply to Objection 4: The Master here speaks according to the opinion of those who held that man was not created in grace, but only in a state of nature. We may also say that, though man was created in grace, yet it was not by virtue of the nature wherein he was created that he could advance by merit, but by virtue of the grace which was added.

Reply to Objection 5: As the motion of the will is not continuous there is nothing against the first man having consented to grace even in the first moment of his existence.

Reply to Objection 6: We merit glory by an act of grace; but we do not merit grace by an act of nature; hence the comparison fails.

Articulus 1

Argumentum 1

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod primus homo non fuerit creatus in gratia.

Apostolus enim, I Cor. XV, distinguens Adam a christo, dicit, factus est primus Adam in animam viventem; novissimus autem in spiritum vivificantem.

Sed vivificatio spiritus est per gratiam.

Ergo hoc est proprium christi, quod fuerit factus in gratia.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de quaestionibus veteris et novi testamenti, quod Adam non habuit spiritum sanctum.

Sed quicumque habet gratiam, habet spiritum sanctum.

Ergo Adam non fuit creatus in gratia.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de correptione et gratia, quod deus sic ordinavit Angelorum et hominum vitam, ut prius in eis ostenderet quid posset eorum liberum arbitrium, deinde quid posset suae gratiae beneficium, iustitiaeque iudicium.

Primo ergo condidit hominem et Angelum in sola naturali arbitrii libertate, et postmodum eis gratiam contulit.

Argumentum 4

Praeterea, magister dicit, in XXIV distinctione libri II Sent., quod homini in creatione datum est auxilium per quod stare poterat, sed non poterat proficere.

Quicumque autem habet gratiam, potest proficere per meritum.

Ergo primus homo non fuit creatus in gratia.

Argumentum 5

Praeterea, ad hoc quod aliquis accipiat gratiam, requiritur consensus ex parte recipientis, cum per hoc perficiatur matrimonium quoddam spirituale inter deum et animam. Sed consensus in gratiam esse non potest nisi prius existentis. Ergo homo non accepit gratiam in primo instanti suae creationis.

Argumentum 6

Praeterea, natura plus distat a gratia quam gratia a gloria, quae nihil est aliud quam gratia consummata. Sed in homine gratia praecessit gloriam.

Ergo multo magis natura praecessit gratiam.

Sed Contra

Sed contra, homo et Angelus aequaliter ordinantur ad gratiam.

Sed Angelus est creatus in gratia, dicit enim Augustinus, XII de CIV. Dei, quod deus simul erat in eis condens naturam et largiens gratiam.

Ergo et homo creatus fuit in gratia.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod quidam dicunt quod primus homo non fuit quidem creatus in gratia, sed tamen postmodum gratia fuit sibi collata antequam peccasset, plurimae enim sanctorum auctoritates attestantur hominem in statu innocentiae gratiam habuisse.

Sed quod etiam fuerit conditus in gratia, ut alii dicunt, videtur requirere ipsa rectitudo primi status, in qua deus hominem fecit, secundum illud Eccle. VII, deus fecit hominem rectum.

Erat enim haec rectitudo secundum hoc, quod ratio subdebatur deo, rationi vero inferiores vires, et animae corpus. Prima autem subiectio erat causa et secundae et tertiae, quandiu enim ratio manebat deo subiecta, inferiora ei subdebantur, ut Augustinus dicit.

Manifestum est autem quod illa subiectio corporis ad animam, et inferiorum virium ad rationem, non erat naturalis, alioquin post peccatum mansisset, cum etiam in Daemonibus data naturalia post peccatum permanserint, ut dionysius dicit cap. IV de div. Nom..

Unde manifestum est quod et illa prima subiectio, qua ratio deo subdebatur, non erat solum secundum naturam, sed secundum supernaturale donum gratiae, non enim potest esse quod effectus sit potior quam causa.

Unde Augustinus dicit, XIII de CIV. Dei, quod posteaquam praecepti facta transgressio est, confestim, gratia deserente divina, de corporum suorum nuditate confusi sunt, senserunt enim motum inobedientis carnis suae, tanquam reciprocam poenam inobedientiae suae.

Ex quo datur intelligi, si deserente gratia soluta est obedientia carnis ad animam, quod per gratiam in anima existentem inferiora ei subdebantur.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod apostolus illa verba inducit ad ostendendum esse corpus spirituale, si est corpus animale, quia vita spiritualis corporis incoepit in christo, qui est primogenitus ex mortuis, sicut vita corporis animalis incoepit in Adam. Non ergo ex verbis apostoli habetur quod Adam non fuit spiritualis secundum animam; sed quod non fuit spiritualis secundum corpus.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in eodem loco, non negatur quin aliquo modo fuerit in Adam spiritus sanctus, sicut et in aliis iustis, sed quod non sic fuerit in eo, sicut nunc est in fidelibus, qui admittuntur ad perceptionem haereditatis aeternae statim post mortem.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod ex illa auctoritate Augustini non habetur quod Angelus vel homo prius fuerit creatus in naturali libertate arbitrii, quam habuisset gratiam, sed quod prius ostendit quid in eis posset liberum arbitrium ante confirmationem, et quid postmodum consecuti sunt per auxilium gratiae confirmantis.

Ad 4

Ad quartum dicendum quod magister loquitur secundum opinionem illorum qui posuerunt hominem non esse creatum in gratia, sed in naturalibus tantum.

Vel potest dici quod, etsi homo fuerit creatus in gratia, non tamen habuit ex creatione naturae quod posset proficere per meritum, sed ex superadditione gratiae.

Ad 5

Ad quintum dicendum quod, cum motus voluntatis non sit continuus, nihil prohibet etiam in primo instanti suae creationis primum hominem gratiae consensisse.

Ad 6

Ad sextum dicendum quod gloriam meremur per actum gratiae, non autem gratiam per actum naturae.

Unde non est similis ratio.