ARTICLE I

The Question Is about the Tendency to Good and the Will, and in the First Article We Ask: DO ALL THINGS TEND TO GOOD?

Difficulties:

It seems that they do not, for

1. Being is related to the true and to good in the same way since it is interchanged with either one. Furthermore, tendency is related to good as cognition is to the true. But not every being knows the true. Neither, then, does every being tend to good.

2. When the prior is removed the posterior also is removed. But in an animal cognition precedes appetitive tendency. Cognition, however, in no sense extends to inanimate things so that we could say that they know naturally. Neither, then, does appetitive tendency extend to them so that we could say that they naturally tend to good.

3. According to Boethius a thing is said to tend to something else inasmuch as it is like it. If, then, something tends to good, it must be like good. But since things are alike which have the same quality or form, the form of good must be in whatever tends to good. Now it cannot be there according to the thing's real existence, because it would then no longer tend; for what someone has he does not seek. The form of good must therefore pre-exist intentionally in the being which tends to good. But anything which has something else in it in this manner is cognitive. Only in cognitive beings, therefore, can there be a tendency to good; and so the conclusion is the same as before.

4. If all things tend to good, this must be understood of a good which all can have, because nothing tends either naturally or rationally to what is impossible for it to have. But the only good extending to all beings is existence. It is therefore the same to say that all things tend to good as that they tend to existence. Now not all things tend to existence; in fact it seems that none do, because all have existence and nothing tends except to what it does not have, as is made clear by Augustine and the Philosopher. Not all things, therefore, tend to good.

5. The one, the true, and the good are all equally interchanged with being. But not all beings tend to the one and the true. Neither, then, do they tend to the good.

6. Some people who know the right thing to do act contrary to this knowledge, according to the Philosopher. Now they would not so act if they did not desire or will to do so. But what is against reason is evil. Some people therefore tend to evil, and so not all tend to good.

7. The good which all things are said to tend to, as the Commentator says, is to be. But some people do not seek to be but rather not to be--the damned in hell, for instance, who desire even the death of the soul so that they should not exist at all. Not everything, therefore, seeks good.

8. The appetitive powers stand to their objects in just the same relation as the apprehensive to theirs. But an apprehensive power has to be devoid of the species of its object in order to be able to know, as the pupil of the eye must be without color. Hence whatever tends to good must also be devoid of the species of good. But everything has the species of good. Therefore nothing tends to good.

9. To work for an end belongs to the Creator, to nature, and to an agent who acts with a purpose. But the Creator and a created agent with a purpose, such as man, in working for an end and desiring and loving good, have knowledge of the end or good. Then since nature is in a sense intermediate between the two, presupposing the work of creation and being presupposed in the work of art, if it takes pleasure in seeking the end for which it works, it too must know that end. But it does not have knowledge. Then the things of nature also do not tend to good.

10. Whatever is tended to is sought. But according to Plato nothing of which knowledge is not had can be sought. Thus if anyone were to seek a runaway slave without having any knowledge of his appearance, upon finding him he would not know that he had done so. Hence things which do not have knowledge of good do not tend to it.

11. To strive for an end belongs to what is directed to an end. But the last end, God, is not directed to an end. He does not, then, strive for an end or good; and so not everything tends to good.

12. A nature is determined to one thing. Then if things naturally tend to good, they should not naturally tend to anything else. But all things seek peace, as Augustine and Dionysius explain, and also the beautiful, as Dionysius also says. Consequently not all things naturally tend to good.

13. Just as a person strives for an end when he does not have it, he also takes pleasure in it when he has it. But we do not say that inanimate things take pleasure in good. Neither, then, should we say that they tend to good.

To the Contrary:

1'. Dionysius says: "Existents desire the beautiful and the good; and whatever they do, they do because it seems good. The intention of all existents has as its principle and term the good."

2'. The Philosopher says that some have defined good well by saying that it is "what all things tend to."

3'. Whatever acts, acts for an end, as is made clear by the Philosopher. But whatever acts for something tends to it. Therefore everything tends to an end and to good, which has the character of an end.

4'. Everything seeks its own perfection. But by the fact that a thing is perfect it is good. Everything therefore seeks good.

REPLY:

All things, not only those which have knowledge but also those which are without it, tend to good. To understand this it will help to bear in mind that some of the ancient philosophers taught that well-suited effects in nature come about from the necessity of their prior causes, though the natural causes themselves have not been disposed in that particular way with a view to the suitability of the effects. With this opinion the Philosopher finds fault, because according to it, unless such suitabilities and aptnesses were in some sense intended, they would come about by chance and so would not happen most of the time but only rarely, like other things which we say happen by chance. Hence we must say that all natural things are ordained and disposed to their well-adapted effects.

There are two ways in which a thing may be ordained or directed to something else as its end: (1) by itself, as a man directs himself to the place where he is going; and (2) by something else, as an arrow is aimed at a definite spot by the archer. Nothing can direct itself to an end unless it knows the end, for the one directing must have knowledge of that to which he directs. But even things which do not know the end can be directed to a definite end, as is evident from the arrow.

This can come about in two ways. (1) Sometimes what is directed to an end is merely driven or moved by the one directing it without acquiring from the director any form by which such a direction or inclination belongs to it. Such an inclination, like that by which the arrow is aimed by the archer at a definite target, is violent. (2) Sometimes what is directed or inclined to an end acquires from the director or mover some form by which such an inclination belongs to it. In that case the inclination will be natural, having a natural principle. Thus He who gave heaviness to the stone inclined it to be borne downward naturally. In this way the one who begets them is the mover in regard to heavy and light things, according to the Philosopher.

It is after this fashion that all natural things are inclined to what is suitable for them, having within themselves some principle of their inclination in virtue of which that inclination is natural, so that in a way they go themselves and are not merely led to their due ends. Things moved by violence are only led, because they contribute nothing to the mover. But natural things go to their ends inasmuch as they cooperate with the one inclining and directing them through a principle implanted in them.

What is directed or inclined to something by another is inclined to that which is intended by the one inclining or directing it. The arrow, for example, is directed to the same target at which the archer aims. Consequently, since all natural things have been inclined by a certain natural inclination toward their ends by the prime mover, God, that to which everything is naturally inclined must be what is willed or intended by God. But since God can have no end for His will other than Himself and He is the very essence of goodness, all other things must be naturally inclined to good. To desire or have appetency (appetere) is nothing else but to strive for something (ad aliquid petere), stretching, as it were, toward something which is destined for oneself.

Accordingly, since all things are destined and directed by God to good, and this is done in such a way that in each one is a principle by which it tends of itself to good as if seeking good itself, it is necessary to say that all things naturally tend to good. If all things were inclined to good without having within themselves any principle of inclination, they could be said to be led to good, but not to be tending toward it. But in virtue of an innate principle all things are said to tend to good as if reaching for it of their own accord. For this reason it is said in Wisdom (8:1) that divine wisdom "ordereth all things sweetly" because each one by its own motion tends to that for which it has been divinely destined.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The true and good are somewhat similarly related to being, and also somewhat dissimilarly. From the viewpoint of predicative interchangeability they are similarly related, for every being is good just as it is true. But as perfecting causes they are dissimilarly related; for the true, unlike good, does not stand as a perfecting cause to all beings, because the perfection of the true is considered from the point of view of the specific character only. Only immaterial beings, then, can be perfected by the true, because only they can receive the specific character without its material act of existing. But good, being perfective both in regard to the specific character and in regard to the act of existing, can perfect material beings as well as immaterial. All things can accordingly tend to good, but not all can know the true.

2. Some say that there is natural cognition in all things just as there is a natural appetitive tendency. But this cannot be true because, in view of the fact that cognition is by assimilation, likeness in real existence does not bring about cognition but rather hinders it. It is for this reason that the sense organs must be devoid of sensible species in order to be able to receive them by way of the spiritual existence which causes knowledge. Hence those things which in no way receive anything except according to material existence can in no way know. Yet they can tend inasmuch as they are directed to something having real existence. Appetitive tendency does not necessarily look to a spiritual existence as does cognition. Hence there can be a natural appetite but not a natural cognition. This still does not prevent appetite from following cognition in animals, because even in the things of nature it follows apprehension or cognition--not that of the things which have the appetite but that of Him who directs them to their end.

3. Whatever tends to anything tends to it in so far as that thing has some likeness to itself. And a likeness in spiritual existence does not suffice; otherwise an animal would have to tend to whatever it knows. The likeness must be one in real existence. Now this likeness may be taken in two ways: (1) in so far as the form of one thing is in another with perfect actuality; and in this case there does not follow from likeness to the end a tendency to the end, but repose in it; and (2) in so far as the form of one is in another incompletely, i.e., potentially; and so, by reason of the potential possession of the form of the end and of good, the thing tends to good or its end and desires it. It is in this sense, as having form within it potentially, that matter is said to desire form. The more, then, that potentiality is achieved and brought closer to actuality, the more vigorous is the inclination which it causes. This is why any natural motion is intensified near the end when the thing tending to the end is more like that end.

4. When we say that all things tend to good, good is not to be restricted to this or that but to be taken in its generality, because each being naturally tends to a good suitable to itself. If, notwithstanding, the term good is limited to some single good, that will be the act of being. Nor is this prevented by the fact that all things have the act of being, because whatever has being desires its continuance and what actually has being in one way has it only potentially in another. Thus air is actually air and potentially fire. And so what actually has being desires to be actually.

5. The one and the true do not have the character of an end as does good; and so they do not have the character of the appetible either.

6. Even those who act contrary to reason are seeking good directly. A man who fornicates, for instance, is interested in something good and pleasurable to sense. That the act is bad from the viewpoint of reason is beyond his intention. Good is accordingly desired directly; evil, indirectly.

7. A thing is appetible in the same way as it is good. It was said above that in its substantial act of being a thing is not called good simply and absolutely unless other due perfections are added. The substantial act of being is accordingly not appetible in an absolute sense if its due perfections are not joined to it. Hence the Philosopher says: "To be is delightful to all things." But we are not to understand an evil and corrupt life or a sorrowful one, for this is evil simply and is simply to be shunned, though it is appetible in a certain respect. In the matter of seeking and shunning, it is all of a piece for a thing to be good and to be destructive of evil, or again to be evil and to be destructive of good. Hence we call the very lack of evil a good, as the Philosopher points out. Non-existence therefore assumes the aspect of a good inasmuch as it takes away being in a state of sorrow or wickedness, which is simply evil, although it is good in some respect. In this sense non-existence can be desired under the aspect of good.

8. Concerning apprehensive powers it is not always true that the power is altogether devoid of the species of its object. It is false in regard to those powers which have a universal object, as in the case of the intellect, whose object is the what although it has whatness itself. Yet it must be devoid of the forms which it receives. It is false also in regard to touch, because, although it has special objects, they nevertheless necessarily belong to an animal. Thus its organ cannot be wholly without warmth and cold; and yet it is somehow independent of heat and cold, being of an intermediate make-up. But what is intermediate is neither of the extremes. Now appetitive tendency has a common object, good. Hence it is not altogether devoid of good, but just of that good to which it tends. It nevertheless has that good potentially and in this respect is like it, just as an apprehensive power is in potency to the species of its object.

9. As is clear from what has been said,* knowledge of the end is required in everyone directing anything to an end. Nature, however, does not direct to an end but is directed. But God and also any purposeful agent direct to an end, and so they must have knowledge of the end, but not a thing of nature.

10. That argument is correct in regard to a being that tends to an end by directing itself towards it, because it has to know when it has reached the end. But there is no such necessity in a thing which is merely being directed to its end.

11. By the same nature by which a thing tends to an end which it does not yet have, it delights in an end which it already has. Thus by the same nature the element earth moves downward and rests there. Now it is not consonant with the last end to tend to an end, but it is consonant with it to take pleasure in itself as an end. Though this cannot properly be called an appetite, still it is something belonging to the genus of appetite, and from it all appetite is derived. For from the fact that God takes pleasure in Himself, He directs other things to Himself.

12. If appetite terminates in good and peace and the beautiful, this does not mean that it terminates in different goals. By the very fact of tending to good a thing at the same time tends to the beautiful and to peace. It tends to the beautiful inasmuch as it is proportioned and specified in itself. These notes are included in the essential character of good, but good adds a relationship of what is perfective in regard to other things. Whoever tends to good, then, by that very fact tends to the beautiful. Peace, moreover, implies the removal of disturbances or obstacles to the obtaining of good. By the very fact that something is desired, the removal of obstacles to it is also desired. Consequently, at the same time and by the same appetitive tendency good, the beautiful, and peace are sought.

13. Pleasure includes in its notion knowledge of the good which gives pleasure. For this reason only things which know the end can take pleasure in an end. But appetitive tendency does not entail knowledge in the being which tends, as is evident from what has been said.* Nevertheless, using pleasure broadly and improperly, Dionysius says that what is beautiful and good is found by all to be pleasurable and lovable.