Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man was not immortal. For the term "mortal" belongs to the definition of man. But if you take away the definition, you take away the thing defined. Therefore as long as man was man he could not be immortal.

Objection 2: Further, corruptible and incorruptible are generically distinct, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. x, Did. ix, 10). But there can be no passing from one genus to another. Therefore if the first man was incorruptible, man could not be corruptible in the present state.

Objection 3: Further, if man were immortal in the state of innocence, this would have been due either to nature or to grace. Not to nature, for since nature does not change within the same species, he would also have been immortal now. Likewise neither would this be owing to grace; for the first man recovered grace by repentance, according to Wis. 10:2: "He brought him out of his sins." Hence he would have regained his immortality; which is clearly not the case. Therefore man was not immortal in the state of innocence.

Objection 4: Further, immortality is promised to man as a reward, according to Apoc. 21:4: "Death shall be no more." But man was not created in the state of reward, but that he might deserve the reward. Therefore man was not immortal in the state of innocence.

On the contrary, It is written (Rm. 5:12): "By sin death came into the world." Therefore man was immortal before sin.

I answer that, A thing may be incorruptible in three ways. First, on the part of matter---that is to say, either because it possesses no matter, like an angel; or because it possesses matter that is in potentiality to one form only, like the heavenly bodies. Such things as these are incorruptible by their very nature. Secondly, a thing is incorruptible in its form, inasmuch as being by nature corruptible, yet it has an inherent disposition which preserves it wholly from corruption; and this is called incorruptibility of glory; because as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.): "God made man's soul of such a powerful nature, that from its fulness of beatitude, there redounds to the body a fulness of health, with the vigor of incorruption." Thirdly, a thing may be incorruptible on the part of its efficient cause; in this sense man was incorruptible and immortal in the state of innocence. For, as Augustine says (Questions. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19 ): "God made man immortal as long as he did not sin; so that he might achieve for himself life or death." For man's body was indissoluble not by reason of any intrinsic vigor of immortality, but by reason of a supernatural force given by God to the soul, whereby it was enabled to preserve the body from all corruption so long as it remained itself subject to God. This entirely agrees with reason; for since the rational soul surpasses the capacity of corporeal matter, as above explained (Question 76, Article 1), it was most properly endowed at the beginning with the power of preserving the body in a manner surpassing the capacity of corporeal matter.

Reply to Objection 1:and 2: These objections are founded on natural incorruptibility and immortality.

Reply to Objection 3: This power of preserving the body was not natural to the soul, but was the gift of grace. And though man recovered grace as regards remission of guilt and the merit of glory; yet he did not recover immortality, the loss of which was an effect of sin; for this was reserved for Christ to accomplish, by Whom the defect of nature was to be restored into something better, as we shall explain further on (3, Question 14, Article 4, ad 1).

Reply to Objection 4: The promised reward of the immortality of glory differs from the immortality which was bestowed on man in the state of innocence.

Articulus 1

Argumentum 1

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo in statu innocentiae non erat immortalis. Mortale enim ponitur in definitione hominis.

Sed remota definitione, aufertur definitum.

Ergo si homo erat, non poterat esse immortalis.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, corruptibile et incorruptibile genere differunt, ut dicitur in X metaphys..

Sed eorum quae differunt genere, non est transmutatio in invicem. Si ergo primus homo fuit incorruptibilis, non posset homo in statu isto esse corruptibilis.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, si homo in statu innocentiae fuit immortalis, aut hoc habuit per naturam, aut per gratiam. Sed non per naturam, quia, cum natura eadem maneat secundum speciem, nunc quoque esset immortalis. Similiter nec per gratiam, quia primus homo gratiam per poenitentiam recuperavit, secundum illud Sap. X, eduxit illum a delicto suo; ergo immortalitatem recuperasset; quod patet esse falsum.

Non ergo homo erat immortalis in statu innocentiae.

Argumentum 4

Praeterea, immortalitas promittitur homini in praemium; secundum illud Apoc. XXI, mors ultra non erit.

Sed homo non fuit conditus in statu praemii, sed ut praemium mereretur. Ergo homo in statu innocentiae non fuit immortalis.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod dicitur ad Rom. V, quod per peccatum intravit mors in mundum.

Ergo ante peccatum homo erat immortalis.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid potest dici incorruptibile tripliciter. Uno modo, ex parte materiae, eo scilicet quod vel non habet materiam, sicut Angelus; vel habet materiam quae non est in potentia nisi ad unam formam, sicut corpus caeleste.

Et hoc dicitur secundum naturam incorruptibile. Alio modo dicitur aliquid incorruptibile ex parte formae, quia scilicet rei corruptibili per naturam, inhaeret aliqua dispositio per quam totaliter a corruptione prohibetur. Et hoc dicitur incorruptibile secundum gloriam, quia, ut dicit Augustinus in epistola ad dioscorum, tam potenti natura deus fecit animam, ut ex eius beatitudine redundet in corpus plenitudo sanitatis, idest incorruptionis vigor.

Tertio modo dicitur aliquid incorruptibile ex parte causae efficientis. Et hoc modo homo in statu innocentiae fuisset incorruptibilis et immortalis.

Quia, ut Augustinus dicit in libro de quaest. Vet. Et nov. Test., deus hominem fecit, qui quandiu non peccaret, immortalitate vigeret, ut ipse sibi auctor esset aut ad vitam aut ad mortem.

Non enim corpus eius erat indissolubile per aliquem immortalitatis vigorem in eo existentem; sed inerat animae vis quaedam supernaturaliter divinitus data, per quam poterat corpus ab omni corruptione praeservare, quandiu ipsa deo subiecta mansisset. Quod rationabiliter factum est. Quia enim anima rationalis excedit proportionem corporalis materiae, ut supra dictum est.

Conveniens fuit ut in principio ei virtus daretur, per quam corpus conservare posset supra naturam corporalis materiae.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo et secundum dicendum quod rationes illae procedunt de incorruptibili et immortali per naturam.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod vis illa praeservandi corpus a corruptione, non erat animae humanae naturalis, sed per donum gratiae. Et quamvis gratiam recuperaverit ad remissionem culpae et meritum gloriae, non tamen ad amissae immortalitatis effectum.

Hoc enim reservabatur christo, per quem naturae defectus in melius reparandus erat, ut infra dicetur.

Ad 4

Ad quartum dicendum quod differt immortalitas gloriae, quae promittitur in praemium, ab immortalitate quae fuit homini collata in statu innocentiae.