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and of a thing made being mentioned in the same way, moving from the words to the things signified, we do not observe the same meaning for each of the names; for a creature signifies one thing and an offspring signifies another, so that even if he mixes the unmixable, the intelligent hearer will hear with discernment and will show that it is among the impossible things for any single nature to admit to itself the appellation of offspring and of creature. For if one of these were true, the other would by necessity be false, so that if He were a creature, He would not be an offspring, and conversely, if He were called an offspring, He would be foreign to the title of creature. 3.2.103 But Eunomius says that 20the substance of the Son admits to itself the appellations of offspring and of thing made and of creature20. Has he secured this headless and rootless argument by means of what follows (since no force was established by the first points for what was being constructed), or does the rest also partake of the same futility, not acquiring strength from any alliance of reasonings, but having the exposition of the blasphemy in a narrative and unconstructed manner, as in the telling of dreams? 3.2.104 For adding this to what has been said, he says that it has 20a generation without intermediary, while indivisibly preserving the relation to the one who begot and made and created20. For if we leave aside ‘without intermediary’ and ‘indivisibly’ and examine the meaning of the words by itself, we will find that everywhere the nonsense of his teaching, strengthened by no argument, is hurled at the ears of the deceived. 20The one who begot,20 he says, 20and created and made.20 3.2.105 Although these seem to be three, they contain the meaning of two concepts, because the two words are equivalent to one another in sense. For to make is the same as to create, but generation is different from these things mentioned. Since, therefore, the common understanding of men is divided into different senses based on the meaning of the words, what argument has shown us that a thing made is the same as a generation, so that we might adapt the one 3.2.106 substance to the difference in the words? For as long as the customary meaning of the terms prevails and no argument is found that alters the significations of the words to their opposite, it is not possible for any one nature to be split between the concept of a thing made and of an offspring. For since each of these, when said by itself, has its own interpretation, it is absolutely necessary that the related pairing, both proper and cognate to the names, be conceived along with them. 3.2.107 For the rest of the things that are spoken of in relation to something do not have their propriety in relation to what is foreign and unsuitable, but even if that to which it is related is left unsaid, the paired term is automatically heard along with the original; for example, craftsman, slave, friend, son, and such things. For all things that are considered with reference to another present, through their appellation, the proper and connected kinship of what is signified, having their fellowship with what is of a different kind unmixed. 3.2.108 For neither is the name of craftsman paired with son, nor is the term slave referred to craftsman, nor does friend signify slave, nor son master, but we recognize a clear and distinct pairing of each of these to its suitable counterpart, understanding through friend another friend, through slave the lord, the work through the craftsman, and through the son the father. So therefore both offspring and thing made have their primary signification in relation to something. Therefore, the one who begot is paired with the offspring, and the one who created with the creature, and it is entirely necessary, if we are not to produce some confusion of things through the interchange of names, to preserve for each of the things spoken of in relation to something that which is properly signified along with it. 3.2.109 Since, therefore, the meaning of these words is clear as to what it regards, how did he who advances his doctrines through the art of logic not understand the proper meaning of these names in relation to something, but

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καὶ ποιήματος20 κατὰ ταὐτὸν μνημονευθέντων, ἐκ τῶν φωνῶν ἐπὶ τὰ σημαινόμενα μεταβάντες οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐνθεωροῦμεν διάνοιαν· ἄλλο γάρ τι τὸ κτίσμα καὶ ἕτερον σημαίνει τὸ γέννημα, ὥστε κἂν ἐκεῖνος μιγνύῃ τὰ ἄμικτα, ὁ συνετὸς ἀκροατὴς διακεκριμένως ἀκού σεται καὶ δείξει τῶν ἀδυνάτων εἶναι τὴν τοῦ γεννήματος καὶ τὴν τοῦ κτίσματος προσηγορίαν μίαν τινὰ φύσιν εἰς ἑαυτὴν δέχεσθαι. εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἕτερον ἀληθεύοιτο τούτων, ψεῦδος ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔσται τὸ ἕτερον, ὥστε εἰ κτίσμα εἴη, μὴ εἶναι γέννημα, καὶ τὸ ἔμπαλιν, εἰ γέννημα λέγοιτο, ἀλ λοτριοῦσθαι τῆς ἐπωνυμίας τοῦ κτίσματος. 3.2.103 Ἀλλά φησιν ὁ Εὐνόμιος 20εἰς ἑαυτὴν δέχεσθαι τοῦ υἱοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν τὰς τοῦ γεννήματος καὶ ποιήματος καὶ κτίσματος προσηγορίας20. μή τι διὰ τῶν ὑπολοίπων κατησφαλίσατο τὸν ἀκέφαλον τοῦτον καὶ ἄρριζον λόγον (ὡς οὐδεμία διὰ τῶν πρώτων κατε βλήθη πρὸς τὸ κατασκευαζόμενον δύναμις) ἢ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῆς αὐτῆς ἔχεται ματαιότητος, οὐκ ἀπό τινος τῆς ἐκ τῶν λογισμῶν συμμαχίας τὴν ἰσχὺν προσλαβόντα, ἀλλὰ διεξο δικήν τε καὶ ἀκατάσκευον ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν ὀνείρων διη 3.2.104 γήσεως τὴν τῆς βλασφημίας ἔκθεσιν ἔχοντα; λέγει γὰρ τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἐπισυνάψας ταῦτα ὅτι 20ἀμεσίτευτον μὲν ἔχουσαν τὴν γέννησιν, ἀμερίστως δὲ σῴ ζουσαν τὴν πρὸς τὸν γεγεννηκότα καὶ πεποιη κότα καὶ κτίσαντα σχέσιν20. εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἀμεσίτευτόν τε καὶ ἀμέριστον καταλιπόντες αὐτὴν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς θεωρή σαιμεν τὴν τῶν ῥημάτων διάνοιαν, εὑρήσομεν ὅτι πανταχοῦ τὸ ληρῶδες τῆς διδασκαλίας δι' οὐδενὸς ἰσχυροποιούμενον λόγου ταῖς ἀκοαῖς τῶν ἀπατωμένων προσρίπτεται. 20τὸν γεγεννηκότα20, φησί, 20καὶ κτίσαντα καὶ ποιή 3.2.105 σαντα20. ταῦτα κἂν τρία δοκῇ, δύο νοημάτων περιέχει τὴν σημασίαν, τῷ τὰς δύο φωνὰς ἰσοδυναμεῖν ἀλλήλαις κατὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν. τὸ γὰρ ποιῆσαι τῷ κτίσαι ταὐτόν ἐστιν, ἕτερον δὲ παρὰ τὰ εἰρημένα ἡ γέννησις. τῆς οὖν κοινῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπολήψεως πρὸς διαφόρους ἐννοίας ἐκ τῆς τῶν ῥημάτων σημασίας μεριζομένης, τίς ἡμῖν ἐπέδειξε λόγος ταὐτὸν εἶναι τῇ γεννήσει τὸ ποίημα, ἵνα τὴν μίαν 3.2.106 οὐσίαν τῇ τῶν ῥημάτων διαφορᾷ προσαρμόσωμεν; ἕως γὰρ ἂν ἡ συνήθης κρατῇ σημασία τῶν λέξεων καὶ μηδεὶς εὑρίσκηται λόγος ὁ μετασκευάζων εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τὰς τῶν ῥημάτων ἐμφάσεις, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μίαν τινὰ φύσιν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ποιήματος καὶ γεννήματος ἔννοιαν διασχισθῆναι. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ λεγόμενον τούτων ἑκάτερον ἰδιά ζουσαν ἔχει τὴν ἑρμηνείαν, ἀνάγκη πᾶσα οἰκείαν τε καὶ συγγενῆ τοῖς ὀνόμασι συνεπινοεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν σχετικὴν 3.2.107 συζυγίαν. καὶ γὰρ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν πρός τι λεγομένων οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἀλλότριόν τε καὶ ἀκατάλληλον ἔχει τὴν οἰκειότητα, ἀλλὰ κἂν σιωπηθῇ πρὸς ὃ λέγεται, αὐτομάτως μετὰ τοῦ πρωτοτύπου καὶ τὸ συνεζευγμένον ἀκούεται· οἷον δημιουργὸς δοῦλος φίλος υἱὸς καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. πάντα γὰρ ὅσα τῇ πρὸς ἕτερον ἀναφορᾷ θεωρεῖται, τὴν οἰκείαν ἕκαστον καὶ συνημμένην τοῦ δηλουμένου συγγένειαν διὰ τῆς προσηγορίας παρίστησιν, ἄμικτον ἔχοντα τὴν πρὸς τὸ ἑτερογενὲς κοινω 3.2.108 νίαν. οὔτε γὰρ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ τὸ ὄνομα τῷ υἱῷ συνέ ζευκται οὔτε ἡ τοῦ δούλου φωνὴ πρὸς τὸν δημιουργὸν ἀναφέρεται οὔτε ὁ φίλος τὸν δοῦλον ἐδήλωσεν οὔτε ὁ υἱὸς τὸν δεσπότην, ἀλλὰ φανερὰν καὶ διακεκριμένην τούτων ἑκάστου τὴν πρὸς τὸ κατάλληλον συζυγίαν ἐπιγινώσκομεν, νοοῦντες διὰ μὲν τοῦ φίλου ἕτερον φίλον, διὰ δὲ τοῦ δούλου τὸν κύριον, τὸ δὲ ἔργον διὰ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ καὶ διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ τὸν πατέρα. οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ τὸ γέννημα καὶ τὸ ποίημα πρός τι τὴν κυρίαν ἔμφασιν ἔχει. οὐκοῦν συνέ ζευκται τῷ μὲν γεννήματι ὁ γεννήσας, ὁ δὲ κτίσας τῷ κτίσματι, καὶ δεῖ πάντως, εἴγε μὴ μέλλομεν σύγχυσίν τινα τῶν πραγμάτων διὰ τῆς τῶν ὀνομάτων ὑπαλλαγῆς ἐμποιεῖν, σῴζειν ἑκάστῳ τῶν πρός τι λεγομένων τὸ οἰκείως συσση μαινόμενον. 3.2.109 Φανερᾶς οὖν οὔσης τῆς τῶν λέξεων τούτων ἐννοίας πρὸς ὅ τι βλέπει, πῶς ὁ διὰ τῆς λογικῆς τεχνολογίας προ άγων τὰ δόγματα τὴν οἰκείαν τῶν πρός τι διάνοιαν ἐπὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων οὐ κατενόησεν, ἀλλ'